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To listen to, value, and try to understand the plight and experience of ordinary people in 
everyday settings, and the victims of disaster, presupposes a concern with who they are 
and where their experiences take place. To focus on their words is to recognise that these 
are the only way to recover experience in other places and times. To pay close attention 
to what they say, their story and concerns, gives them direct entry into the concepts and 
discussions of social and disaster research. 
 
Hewitt (1998, 42) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an analysis of human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district of East 
Gippsland, Victoria, in south-eastern Australia. On January 30, 2003, bushfires devastated the small 
population of this isolated farming district. The fires destroyed homes, livelihood assets and public 
infrastructure. They also adversely affected the health, livelihoods and social lives of many local 
people. Australian bushfire research has traditionally focused on the geophysical dimensions of fire 
hazards and disasters, with little consideration of how cultural, economic, political and social factors 
shape people’s exposure to hazards and their capacities to cope and adapt to bushfire impacts. To date, 
there have been no systematic, social science analyses of human vulnerability to bushfires. 
 
The vulnerability analysis presented in this thesis concentrates on two key research questions: (1) How 
and why were people exposed to hazards during the bushfires? and (2) How and why were people 
differentially capable of coping and adapting to the fires’ impacts? Qualitative methods were primarily 
used to investigate these questions, including semi-structured interviews with residents and 
landholders of the Wulgulmerang district, representatives of government departments and authorities, 
and others who participated in responses to the fires. 
 
The thesis develops a multifaceted understanding of how and why people were vulnerable to the 
January 30 fires. Vulnerability is shown to arise from the circumstances of people’s day to day lives, 
which are shaped by factors both within and beyond their control. Local pressures and challenges – 
such as drought, declining farm incomes, depopulation, limited access to essential services, and 
political marginality – are shown to increase people’s exposure to bushfire hazards and reduce their 
capacities to cope and adapt. The thesis demonstrates the fundamental importance of sustainable 
livelihoods and regional economic and social vitality to the long-term goal of vulnerability reduction. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE WULGULMERANG BUSHFIRE 
DISASTER 
 
1.1  Introduction 
On the afternoon of January 30, 2003, bushfires triggered a major disaster in East Gippsland’s 
Wulgulmerang district. Initially, it was reported that the fires had destroyed six homes, the local 
service station and a sports pavilion (Hodgson and Papadakis 2003). It soon became apparent, 
however, that the fires had wrought far greater damage and destruction, and that the long-term impacts 
on the district’s small population would be profound. Three weeks after the fires, an article in 
Melbourne’s The Age newspaper described the unfolding disaster (Miller 2003). Thousands of sheep 
and cattle had been killed and more than twenty hay, wool and machinery sheds were either damaged 
or destroyed. With large sections of internal and boundary fencing missing, and little or no pasture or 
hay to feed surviving animals, many graziers were forced to further reduce stock numbers or take on 
the extra costs of buying feed or agistment. Wild dogs posed a further threat to stock, particularly 
sheep, as they ventured out from the surrounding national parks in search of prey. Importantly, the 
fires occurred in a context of longstanding drought, from which many graziers had only just rebuilt 
their herds. Residents complained that they had not received firefighting support and that they had 
been forgotten by government. ‘Red tape’ was said to be hampering recovery. For example, a 
roadblock at Buchan, sixty kilometres away, was holding up deliveries of desperately needed hay and 
was blocking insurance assessors, donated goods and outside support. This was a community, ‘… 
feeling forgotten… [but] hanging in there – just – thanks to the kindness of strangers’, which would 
now have to ‘… wait and see what happens next’ (Miller 2003, 4). 
 
This thesis tells the story of the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster. It asks why the people of Gelantipy, 
Seldom Seen, Wulgulmerang, Black Mountain and Suggan Buggan (‘the Wulgulmerang district’) 
were so profoundly affected by the bushfires of January 30, 2003. The causes and impacts of the 
disaster are understood through the frame of human vulnerability, which requires analysis of how 
people are exposed to hazards in everyday life and their capacities for coping and adapting to potential 
impacts. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the Wulgulmerang district and its people. It 
offers a rationale for studying disaster and introduces the aims of the research. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the key themes and findings and an outline of the thesis structure. Throughout the 
thesis, an attempt is made to let the people of the Wulgulmerang district speak for themselves, to 
articulate their meanings and understandings in their own words. Nevertheless, in the process of 
analysing people’s vulnerability and the causes of the disaster, it is necessary to make critical 
judgements which may be at odds with those of research participants. For these and any errors of fact, 
I accept full responsibility. 
 
 2 
1.2  The Wulgulmerang district, East Gippsland 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Wulgulmerang district 
Source: Department of Sustainability and Environment 
 
The Wulgulmerang district is a remote farming settlement nestled between the Alpine and Snowy 
River National Parks in East Gippsland, Victoria. A thin ribbon of agricultural land stretches along the 
Wulgulmerang Plateau as it rises gently through Gelantipy and Seldom Seen to Wulgulmerang and 
Black Mountain. At Black Mountain, the plateau drops away and a steep and winding road descends 
into Suggan Buggan, a tiny ‘town’ encircled by mountains that is home to just a few permanent 
residents. The heavily forested headwaters of the Buchan River lie to the west, the iconic Snowy River 
to the east. The area encompasses a diverse array of environments, from the closed forests, or 
‘jungles’, found in gullies on the plateau’s lower reaches, to the snow gum woodland and open forests 
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that dominate the elevated north. In 1977, Victoria’s Land Conservation Council (1977, 306 & 329) 
recognised the ‘very high’ conservation values of the Wulgulmerang Plateau and Suggan Buggan, due 
to their unique geology and physical geography and the wide range of flora and fauna species that are 
endemic to the area or otherwise highly significant. Of particular note are the geological formations at 
Mount Wombargo, referred to as ‘rivers of rock’ (Wakefield 1967, 12), and threatened species such as 
the Yellow Hyacinth Orchid (Dipodium hamiltonianum) (Jessup and Johnson 1997) and the Brush-
tailed Rock-wallaby (Petrogale penicillata) (Hill and Baker-Gabb 1991). 
 
The study area is described by George Seddon (1994, 169) in his environmental history, Searching for 
the Snowy: 
 
Once the Snowy turns south at Biddi, its course is fairly direct to Bass Strait, although it 
twists and turns on the way through its narrow valley cut deep below its surroundings. 
These are for the most part a dissected tableland, a southerly extension of the Monaro 
Tableland. It rarely looks like a tableland because only a few areas have escaped 
dissection by stream action. One such area is the Wulgulmerang Plateau on the west bank 
north of Buchan, mostly now cleared and under pasture. It is good cattle country: high, 
wide and handsome, with clear air and long views, a little like the range lands of 
Wyoming in North America.1 
 
Before introducing the basic human geography of the Wulgulmerang district, it will be useful to 
situate the area in its broader regional context. East Gippsland comprises approximately 21,000 square 
kilometres of eastern Victoria, from the Mitchell River catchment in the west to the Genoa River and 
Mallacoota in the east (EGCMA 2005).2 This amounts to roughly 10% of the land area of Victoria; 
however, East Gippsland is home to less than 1% of the State’s population. On Census night – August 
8, 2006 – there were 40,034 people living in the East Gippsland Shire (LGA), with the majority (63 
%) living in the regional centre of Bairnsdale and its outskirts (ABS 2006a). The region is unique in 
that it has a small and sparsely distributed population, low levels of development and a high ratio of 
public to private land (Lugg et al. 1993). About 80% of East Gippsland is reserved as public land, 
mostly as State Forests and National Parks. The region’s economy is sustained by natural resource use, 
with agriculture, native and plantation forestry, fisheries, and tourism constituting the major 
commercial land uses. Around one-quarter of Victoria’s sawn hardwood and one-fifth of its pulpwood 
is sourced from public land in East Gippsland (EGCMA 2005). The rugged terrain and high proportion 
of public and forested land in East Gippsland means that agriculture has played a limited, but 
                                               
1
 See Appendix 1.1, Photograph 1. 
2
 East Gippsland is sometimes considered to extend further west to incorporate the town of Sale – as in the ‘East 
Gippsland Statistical Division’ used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics – but this is properly Central 
Gippsland. 
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significant, role in the region’s economy. In 2002, the Victorian Government reduced the volume of 
sawlogs that could be cut from native forests in East Gippsland by 43%, after it was revealed that 
sustainable yield estimates across the State had been miscalculated (Miller 2002). An $80 million 
assistance package was announced to buy back licences and assist workers who elected to stay in the 
industry (State Government of Victoria 2002). Similarly, a 2005 decision put an end to cattle grazing 
in Victoria’s Alpine National Park after a long public debate about its ecological impacts and cultural 
significance (State Government of Victoria 2005). It is significant that, by 2004, ‘conservation’ had 
become the single largest public land use in East Gippsland. Conflict over the use and conservation of 
the region’s natural resources has intensified since the mid-1970s (Hutton and Connors 1999), 
particularly over the logging of old-growth and other native forests (Woodgate et al. 1994) and the 
diversion of water from the Snowy River to generate electricity and supply irrigators in the Murray 
and Murrumbidgee River systems (Miller 2005).3  
 
Economy and community in the Wulgulmerang district remain firmly tied to agriculture. The district’s 
population is small, with less than 100 people living between Gelantipy and Suggan Buggan, and the 
local economy is sustained by cattle and sheep farming, which are the major private land uses. It is 
important to note that the small settlements that make up the district are not ‘towns’ in any sense of the 
word. There is very little communal space – save for a public hall at Gelantipy, a sports pavilion at 
Wulgulmerang and thousands of hectares of public land – and although there are two fuel stops, there 
are no other shops, post offices or banks, let alone hotels or pubs. From the main road, one mostly sees 
farmland and a few scattered houses and sheds surrounded by dense, native bush (Appendix 1.1). The 
area is one of the few parts of Victoria, a relatively densely settled State, that is classified as ‘remote’ 
under the Accessibility / Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA) due to the very restricted accessibility 
of goods, services and opportunities for social interaction (GISCA 2004). 
 
The term ‘community’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the people of the Wulgulmerang 
district in a collective sense. It is recognised that communities ‘… are characterized as much by their 
heterogeneity as by their (uneasy) alliance around certain issues’ (Zimmerer and Basset 2003, 6) and 
may not be socially inclusive or cohesive. Communities may contain subgroups and social divisions, 
and some people may find themselves ‘on the outer’. In the Wulgulmerang district, people’s shared 
isolation and the inaccessibility of basic goods and services, particularly education, means they face 
localised issues and challenges that require local action. People generally identify as belonging to ‘the’ 
local community, but acknowledge that people don’t always agree or get along. Indeed, a persistent 
                                               
3
 This latter campaign has formed alliances between conservationists and resource users, particularly farmers, 
who are fighting to increase the Snowy River’s water allocation to the minimum 28 percent of annual natural 
discharge required to maintain the morphology and habitat of the river (Pendlebury et al. 1996). 
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theme in the interviews was an element of social division between people in Gelantipy and 
Wulgulmerang (discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
At the time of writing (September 2008), the Wulgulmerang district faces many social and economic 
challenges. The accelerated rate of change in many small, rural communities since the 1970s has been 
attributed to Australian governments’ shift away from policies based on economic protectionism to 
those that promote minimal government intervention in markets and economies (Lawrence 1987). In 
the name of ‘economic efficiency’, this has resulted in the progressive deregulation of the agricultural 
sector and a decline in government policies that aim for socio-spatial equity. Declining farm incomes, 
farm amalgamations and enlargements, and the out-migration of agricultural workers have undermined 
the social and economic viability of many small towns, which have tended to experience a contraction 
of local economic activity, rising unemployment, the withdrawal of essential services, depopulation 
and a breakdown of social institutions and networks (Tonts 2000). As will be seen in Chapter 4, 
residents of the Wulgulmerang district experience many of these problems. Overwhelmingly, their 
greatest concern is the aged and diminished state of the local population, which is at once a symptom 
and a cause of the area’s continuing social and economic decline. As will become clear, these 
processes and the everyday pressures to which they give rise are integral to understanding the causes 
of human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district and thus the disaster that followed 
the fires of January 30, 2003. 
 
1.3  Bushfires as an environmental hazard in the district 
Environmental hazards arise from the interaction of natural and social systems (Burton et al. 1993). 
Although bushfires and other geophysical processes and events are sometimes referred to as hazards, 
they are only hazardous insofar as they threaten human life, assets and other values we want to protect 
(Hewitt 1997, see Chapter 2). Bushfires have been an ever-present threat to human life and property in 
the Wulgulmerang district since European settlement. Early European settlers recognised that much of 
the region’s vegetation had evolved with fire of both natural and anthropogenic origins. Whether 
ignited by lightning or Aboriginal burning, fires were a real threat to settlers’ newly-acquired property. 
These were hazards of place and land use – a potential cost of occupying the Wulgulmerang Plateau to 
capitalise on its grazing resources. Moreover, European land management practices increased the 
flammability of the environment by using fire to improve those resources. Regular burning of grasses 
and scrub to improve pasture has promoted the succession of fire tolerant (and flammable) species in 
some of the local ecosystems (Wakefield 1970). Landholders continue to use fire to improve pastures 
and reduce fuel loads on private land, while government land managers prescribe fire on public land to 
meet ecological and fuel management objectives. 
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The biophysical features of the Plateau render it especially prone to bushfires. The district is 
surrounded by large tracts of native bush, most of which is national park and other public land where 
fuel loads have accumulated due to land management practices, namely a lack of fuel reduction 
burning [Fire Management Officer (FMO), Informant 52]. During summer, when the risk of 
destructive bushfires is highest, the country to the north-west poses the greatest threat to residents and 
landholders. On days of high fire danger, the Wulgulmerang Plateau is typically exposed to hot, dry 
north-westerly winds that can drive fires and blow embers (or firebrands) toward the settlement. A fire 
research scientist involved in the operational response to the 2003 fires explained that the high 
elevation (mostly between 800 and 1000 metres above sea-level) exposed it to particularly strong 
winds. Furthermore, the limited variation in topography on the Plateau and the relatively open forests 
allow strong winds to penetrate fuels [Research scientist, Informant 51]. 
 
Bushfires were a feature of the Wulgulmerang Plateau long before European settlement. However, it is 
the relatively recent advent of European land uses in the landscape that has transformed bushfires into 
hazards that threaten human life, property and other values.4 It has already been noted that around 80% 
of East Gippsland is reserved as public land and that ‘conservation’ is now the dominant public land 
use. With the Alpine National Park to the west and north, and the Snowy River National Park to the 
east, the district contains many hundreds of kilometres of public/private land interface, where land and 
fire management objectives frequently conflict [FMO, Informant 52]. Whereas the prime objective of 
private land management is typically asset protection, public land management also requires 
ecological objectives to be met. Moreover, public land managers are increasingly working to tight 
prescriptions, particularly when their use of fire has potential to threaten private assets. The role of 
public land management – particularly prescribed burning for fuel reduction – in people’s exposure to 
bushfire hazards is addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
As noted, private land in the district is used primarily for agriculture, with most landholders grazing 
cattle and/or sheep for beef, fat lamb and wool production. Agricultural properties range in size from 
around 100 hectares (ha) to approximately 4,500 ha (11,000 acres). The latter property is unique in 
that it is owned by an absentee landholder and, by the reckoning of one resident grazier, is an 
amalgamation of more than 10 pre-existing family farms [Informant 7]. When this large property is 
excluded, the agricultural holdings of research participants average 646 ha. These typically comprise 
people’s homes and belongings, as well as a range of capital assets that may be threatened by 
bushfires, such as livestock, pasture, fences, sheds, stored produce, machinery and other equipment. 
Preparing and defending these assets from bushfires is made difficult by the fact that they are typically 
                                               
4
 ‘Environmental hazard’ is defined in Chapter 2. Aboriginal people would have been threatened by bushfires at 
times. However, their superior knowledge and experience of fires meant that they were better adapted to their 
environments that their European successors.  
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spread over large areas. A smaller proportion of the population occupy residential or holiday 
properties, often in high amenity locations that adjoin or are surrounded by dense bush (see Appendix 
1.1, Photograph 5). Many of these properties, particularly those at Suggan Buggan and along 
McKillop’s Road, are accessible only by steep, narrow and poorly surfaced roads. Road travel is a 
leading cause of death during bushfires, most commonly after late evacuation, with flames, smoke, 
fallen trees and traffic increasing the likelihood that drivers will become disorientated, trapped or 
involved in an accident (Tibbits et al. 2008). Road travel during bushfires is a significant issue for the 
entire district, as the Gelantipy Road between Buchan and Wulgulmerang is the only bitumen road 
leading in and out of the district. The possibility that it could become blocked by fallen trees during a 
major fire was raised by a number of local people, who have campaigned for many years to have 
overhanging trees removed from roadsides.5  
 
The Forests Act 1958 (Vic.) is the key legislation governing fire management on public land in 
Victoria. It confers responsibility for fire management in national parks, state forests and other public 
lands on the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). The DSE is required to prevent 
and suppress fires on public land, and may use fire to meet silvicultural, pest control and ecological 
objectives. The Act regulates citizens’ lighting of fires on public land and prohibits the use of fire 
during periods of acute fire danger. It also bestows a number of powers on the DSE, including the 
power to compel the owner, occupier or manager of land within 1.5 kilometres of any protected public 
land to remove fire hazards from the property. The CFA, established by the Country Fire Authority 
Act 1958 (Vic.), is responsible for protecting people and property from fires on private land in rural 
and regional Victoria, and on Melbourne’s outer fringe. The CFA responds to incidents such as 
bushfires, structure and transport fires, hazardous material spills and industrial accidents, but also 
develops and implements a range of community awareness, education and safety programs. Strategies 
for community bushfire safety now centre on the ‘Stay and defend or leave early’ policy, which 
encourages residents to decide whether they will prepare to stay and defend their properties from 
bushfires, or leave well before a fire arrives. The policy is underpinned by evidence that late 
evacuation is a very dangerous response to bushfires and that, provided they are adequately prepared, 
ordinary people can safely and successfully protect their homes by staying to defend them (see 
Chapter 2). There are more than 1200 volunteer CFA brigades throughout Victoria. The 
Wulgulmerang district is served by the Gelantipy CFA brigade. The number of volunteers with the 
Gelantipy CFA has declined significantly in recent years (see Chapter 4). Under the Country Fire 
Authority Act 1958 and the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic.), the CFA and local governments – in 
this case the East Gippsland Shire Council – are able to issue the owner or occupier of private land 
with a fire prevention notice requiring the removal of fire hazards from the property. In the event of 
                                               
5
 Informants 14, 20, 34, and Public meeting at Gelantipy, January 15, 2007. 
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non-compliance, local governments have the power to undertake necessary works at cost to the owner 
or occupier. 
 
1.4  Why study the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster? 
Victoria has a history of far more destructive and costly bushfires than those that swept the 
Wulgulmerang district on January 30, 2003. In 1851, for example, the ‘Black Thursday’ fires burned 
an estimated five million hectares of what is now Victoria, claiming 12 lives, one million sheep and 
thousands of cattle. Bushfires in February and March of 1926 took 60 lives and damaged homes, farms 
and forests throughout Gippsland. It was in January 1939, however, that bushfires wrought destruction 
on a scale unparalleled in Australian history. The ‘Black Friday’ fires burned 1.5 million hectares of 
Victoria. 71 people lost their lives and 650 houses were destroyed. Timber mills were razed and 
thousands of head of stock were killed. The ‘Ash Wednesday’ bushfires wreaked havoc in the State in 
1983, with 47 lives, more than 2000 houses and 27,000 head of stock lost. Of course, there have been 
many more, smaller and less damaging bushfires, at least in quantitative terms, throughout the State 
(see DSE 2007). The Wulgulmerang disaster seems inconsequential when compared to events such as 
Black Friday and Ash Wednesday. Moreover, given that only six homes, a public building and a 
relatively small amount of agricultural and other assets were destroyed, one may question whether it 
was a disaster at all.  
 
‘Disaster’ is, of course, a subjective and notoriously difficult term to define (Quarantelli 1998; Perry 
and Quarantelli 2005). Governments, for example, often use thresholds of damage and loss to declare 
disasters in order to access special funds for relief and recovery. The media, in contrast, often proclaim 
disasters to sensationalise news stories or to push editorial lines. For those who are impacted by 
environmental hazards, claims of disaster may pressure decision-makers into action. Despite their 
bureaucratic purposes, quantitative measures of disaster are of limited value because they are 
insensitive to the local contexts in which hazards occur and do not take into account intangible and 
non-marketed impacts, such as social division and increases in incidences of depression or domestic 
violence. This thesis adopts the definition of disaster offered by Wisner et al. (2004, 50), but also takes 
into account these intangible and non-marketed impacts: 
 
A disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard 
and suffer severe damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that 
recovery is unlikely without aid. 
 
The January 30, 2003, bushfires may be classed as a disaster for at least three reasons. First, a 
significant proportion of the Wulgulmerang district’s population was directly affected by the fires and 
sustained heavy losses of property and livelihood assets. Indeed, rates of damage and loss were 
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exceptionally high given the small size of the population. Moreover, losses of agricultural assets, in 
particular, have severely affected many people’s livelihoods over the longer term (see Chapter 6). 
Second, the less tangible impacts of the fires have also been significant. In particular, there was a 
sharp rise in incidences of mental health issues such as depression and post-traumatic stress after the 
fires. Widespread discontent with official and unofficial responses to the fires also created and 
intensified rifts within the community. For example, fire authorities’ decision to hold firefighters back 
on January 30, due to concerns for their safety (Chapter 5), provoked anger that filtered through to the 
local CFA brigade and culminated in the resignation of a small number of volunteers from its already 
depleted ranks (Chapter 6). Finally, at the household and community level, people were heavily reliant 
on ‘outside’ support for recovery in the short to medium term. The heavy reliance on government and 
other organisations, particularly charitable and volunteer groups, can be attributed partly to the low 
levels of insurance among those who were affected. Also important is the limited local capacity for 
recovery and adaptation, which is a symptom of a range of social and economic pressures, including 
population decline, poor infrastructure and low levels of service provision (Chapter 4). 
 
To date, there have been no in-depth analyses of human vulnerability or resilience to bushfires. 
Australia has a strong tradition of bushfire research; however, it has largely focused on the 
geophysical aspects of bushfires, such as the influence of fuel and weather on fire behaviour (Luke 
and McArthur 1978; Cheney and Sullivan 1997) and the role of strategies such as fuel reduction in 
reducing the potential for disastrous fires (Gill et al. 1987; Cheney 1996; McCarthy and Tolhurst 
2001). Social science research on bushfires, in contrast, is still in its infancy. Although social scientists 
have investigated elements of vulnerability to bushfires, such as hazard perceptions (Edgell and Brown 
1975; Fleeton 1980; Beringer 2000) and gender relations (Cox 1998; Goodman and Proudley 2008), 
they are yet to produce the rich, detailed case studies of people’s vulnerability to bushfire hazards in 
specific places and times. 
 
This thesis aims to identify the causes of human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang 
district, as manifested during and after the bushfires of January 30, 2003. To do this, the nature of 
everyday life in the district, past and present, is examined (Chapter 4) before an analysis of people’s 
experiences of the January 30 fires (Chapter 5) and their aftermath (Chapter 6). Ultimately, the 
research aims to inform the development of policies and programs that reduce vulnerability and build 
resilience to bushfires and other hazards in the Wulgulmerang district. It is also hoped that this 
research will have relevance for small and remote communities in other parts of Australia. Given the 
social and economic challenges facing many rural communities and the potential impacts of climate 
change, it is increasingly important that governments and other organisations have the knowledge and 
capacity to support and protect those who may be unable to protect themselves. 
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1.5  Research aims 
The research aims to develop an understanding of how and why residents and landholders of the 
Wulgulmerang district were vulnerable to the bushfires of January 30, 2003. Specifically, it aims to 
develop an understanding of: 
 
 How and why people were differentially exposed to hazards during the fires; and 
 How and why people were differentially capable of coping and adapting to the impacts of the 
fires. 
 
Furthermore, the research aims to build on critical hazards theory by developing and applying the 
concept of vulnerability in a Western context.  
 
1.6  Outline of the thesis 
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 2 reviews English-language, social science literature on 
human vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards and disasters. It charts the progression of 
this field from early geographical studies of hazard perception and adjustment to more recent analyses 
of human vulnerability and resilience. A concept of human vulnerability is advanced that enables 
analysis of (a) how and why people are exposed to hazards and (b) their capacities for coping and 
adapting to hazard impacts. The core research questions of the research are developed from this 
concept and a simple vulnerability framework is developed to guide the analysis.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the methodological approach of the research. It discusses the underlying realist 
philosophy and intensive research strategy that was developed to investigate the core research 
questions. A rationale for the case study approach and qualitative research methods is provided, 
followed by a discussion of the particular techniques that were used to collect and analyse data. The 
Chapter also considers the ethical and political considerations of the research and the adequacy of the 
research methods. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the nature of everyday life in the Wulgulmerang district. It provides the basis for 
an historical perspective on the progression of vulnerability to bushfires. In addition to local histories, 
interviews with residents and landholders are used to identify contemporary issues and challenges. 
Pressures and challenges that may influence people’s vulnerability are identified, including livelihood 
pressures, such as drought and declining farm incomes, as well as district-scale challenges, such as 
depopulation and service inaccessibility. The Chapter concludes with a statement on the conditions of 
life in the district preceding the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster. 
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In Chapters 5 and 6, events surrounding the bushfires of January 30, 2003, are examined. Chapter 5 
draws heavily on interviews with local people to develop a narrative of the key events immediately 
preceding and during the January 30 fires. It then goes on to examine factors that contributed to the 
scale of damage and destruction of the fires, including: the management of public land prior to the 
2003 fire season; levels of household preparedness; and household, firefighting and emergency 
responses. Chapter 6 then examines the impacts of the January 30 fires on residents and landholders 
and the strategies they adopted to cope and adapt. The impacts of the fires are grouped into three main 
categories, including impacts on: human health; finances and livelihoods; and social and community 
life. Those affected are shown to have employed a range of strategies to cope and adapt, with varying 
degrees of success. For example, those who were well-insured were generally able to recover losses 
with relative ease. As would be expected, those with little or no insurance were far more reliant on 
government assistance and donations of goods and labour.  
 
In Chapter 7, the research findings are discussed in relation to the conceptual framework and 
vulnerability literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the causes of 
human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district and the prospects for reducing 
vulnerability into the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO: VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ are common to many scientific traditions and disciplines in 
the natural and social sciences, from conservation biology and engineering to anthropology and human 
geography. However, the meaning of these terms and their applications in research are highly varied, 
even within disciplines. This Chapter concentrates on concepts of vulnerability and resilience (and 
other related ideas) that are used in the social sciences to understand the causes and human impacts of 
environmental hazards and disasters. Despite the diversity of conceptual and theoretical approaches to 
vulnerability and resilience, all share a common concern: the susceptibility of human beings to harm 
from events, processes and changes in physical and social environments. Inevitably, researchers 
attribute vulnerability and resilience to different causes. At one end of the spectrum, the human 
impacts of environmental hazards are explained primarily in terms of geophysical phenomena. This is 
the realm of the ‘violent earth’, ‘perfect storms’ and ‘natural disasters’. In this view, as Hewitt (1983a, 
5) has forcefully argued, ‘The initiative in calamity is seen to be with nature, which decides where and 
what social responses will become significant’. At the other end of the spectrum, human vulnerability 
is a product of deep-rooted inequalities in social, political and economic systems. This view is typified 
by Wisner et al.’s (2004, 7) assertion that ‘Vulnerability is generated by social, economic and political 
processes that influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and with differing intensities’.  
 
This Chapter reviews English-language, social science literature on human vulnerability and resilience 
to environmental hazards and disasters. It begins with a statement on the basic problem of hazards and 
disasters, before introducing some of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are used to 
understand these phenomena. Natural hazards research is shown to emphasise processes of individual 
perception and choice of adjustment in explanations of how people respond to extreme geophysical 
events. Research on Human vulnerability and resilience, which emerged from critiques of the hazards 
paradigm, variously investigates how people are exposed to hazards as well as their capacities to cope 
with or adapt to potential impacts. A range of factors that may contribute to vulnerability and 
resilience are identified. Next, insights into human vulnerability and resilience are gleaned from social 
science research on bushfires. While this literature has not engaged with the ideas explored in this 
Chapter in any great depth, many of its research findings have direct relevance to this thesis. Finally, 
approaches to vulnerability and resilience analysis are examined. It is argued that, to be effective, 
analyses must draw on the knowledge and experiences of those who experience hazards and disasters. 
Having drawn insights from this literature, the Chapter concludes by outlining the conceptual 
framework of this study. 
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2.2  Environmental hazards and disasters 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) estimates that 255 million people 
were affected by ‘natural disasters’ each year in the decade 1994 – 2003. Over the same period, these 
disasters claimed an average 58,000 lives and cost an estimated USD 60 billion per annum (Guhar-
Sapir et al. 2004). More recently, disasters have exacted an even heavier toll. On December 26, 2004, 
an earthquake off the west coast of Sumatra triggered a tsunami that killed at least 225,000 people. In 
October of the following year an earthquake in Pakistan-administered Kashmir claimed more than 
73,000 lives. This disaster was largely overshadowed by the political fallout over Hurricane Katrina, 
which killed more than 1,300 people, drew attention to profound social inequalities, particularly 
between black and white populations in New Orleans, and exposed the US government’s limited 
capacity to manage large-scale emergencies and disasters. In May, 2006, an earthquake again shook 
Indonesia, this time in southern Java, killing more than 5,700 people, injuring another 36,000 and 
leaving an estimated 1.5 million homeless (ISDR 2006). As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the number of 
recorded disasters has risen dramatically since the 1960s, reflecting both improved reporting and 
increased concentrations of people and assets in locations subject to environmental hazards. It is 
important to note that disasters occur with greater frequency and effect in developing countries. The 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Walter 2004) reports that over the 
decade 1994 – 2003 disasters in countries of high human development (HHD) killed an average of 44 
people per event, while disasters in countries of low human development (LHD) killed an average of 
300 people each. Economic damage from disasters in HHD countries was more than 11 times greater 
than in LHD countries (USD 318 million per disaster, compared to 28 million). However, as Handmer 
and Dovers (2007) point out, while disasters often inflict greater gross economic costs in highly 
developed countries, the proportional impact on developing countries’ economies is typically far 
greater. 
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Figure 2.1: Number of disasters registered in EMDAT, 1900 – 20051  
Source: ISDR (2006) 
 
In 1987 the United Nations General Assembly recognised the problem of increasing losses from 
‘natural disasters’ and passed a resolution to declare 1990 – 1999 the International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The objective of the IDNDR was ‘… to reduce, through concerted 
international action, especially in developing countries, the loss of life, property damage and social 
and economic damage caused by natural disasters’ (United Nations General Assembly 1989, web 
page). Dissatisfaction with the top-down, technocratic approach that characterised the first years of the 
IDNDR was expressed at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in Yokohama, Japan, 
in 1994. The ensuing Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World recognised the need to 
develop ‘… a clear understanding of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as 
well as its behaviour and interactions with the physical and natural environment’ and to engage NGOs 
and affected communities in natural disaster reduction (United Nations 1994, web page). The UN 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR 2008, web page), succeeded the IDNDR in 2000: 
 
The ISDR aims at building disaster resilient communities by promoting increased 
awareness of the importance of disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable 
development, with the goal of reducing human, social, economic and environmental 
losses due to natural hazards and related technological and environmental disasters. 
 
The latest development in the global framework for disaster reduction is the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (2005 – 2015), adopted at the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan. 
                                               
1
 Note that USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in 1964. CRED was established 
in 1973, the year in which the OFDA began compiling data on disaster occurrence. The Emergency Events 
Database (EMDAT) was created in 1988. 
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The Hyogo Framework sets out five priorities for action to achieve a ‘... substantial reduction of 
disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and 
countries’ by 2015 (ISDR 2005, 3): 
 
i. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for implementation. 
ii. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. 
iii. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all 
levels. 
iv. Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
v. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
 
The shift to participative and less technocratic approaches to disaster reduction can be partly attributed 
to developments in academic research on hazards and disasters. These are now discussed. 
 
2.3  Natural hazards research 
2.3.1  Natural hazards 
Natural hazards research effectively began with the late Gilbert F. White’s 1942 doctoral dissertation, 
later published as Human adjustment to floods (White 1945). In evaluating the United States’ national 
flood policies, White showed that flood losses continued to rise despite massive investments in 
structural flood control. He argued that the prevailing approach to flood management was ‘… one of 
protecting the occupants of flood plains against floods, of aiding them when they suffer flood losses, 
and of encouraging more intensive use of flood plains’ (White 1945, 32-3, emphasis added). He 
exposed the lack of coordination between the various players in flood plain management, which had 
resulted in the failure to integrate catchment management, flood avoidance, flood accommodation and 
flood protection (Platt et al. 1997). Instead, he argued for an approach based on ‘… adjusting human 
occupance to the flood plain environment so as to utilize most effectively the natural resources of the 
plain, and, at the same time, of applying feasible and practicable measures for minimizing the 
detrimental impacts of floods’ (White 1945, 2). To remedy the reliance on structural flood controls, he 
advocated ‘multiple adjustments’ based on local and regional contexts. Importantly, these adjustments 
needed to be economically viable, socially acceptable and environmentally sensitive, while local 
measures had to be acceptable and intelligible to local people (Platt et al. 1997). White effectively 
broadened the field of natural hazards research from a narrow focus on technological or engineering 
fixes to include investigations of how people adjust to natural hazards (Burton and Kates 1964; Kates 
1971; White 1974; Burton et al. 1978). 
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Natural hazards research is grounded in the human ecology tradition of geography, in which human-
environment relationships are viewed in terms of human adjustment (Emel and Peet 1989). This 
tradition was pioneered by Harlan Barrows – White’s doctoral advisor – who believed that the 
objective of geographic inquiry is to illuminate the relationships between natural environments and the 
distribution and activities of humankind. Barrows (1923, 3) argued against the prevailing 
environmental determinism of contemporary geographers such as Ellen C. Semple and Ellsworth 
Huntington, insisting that geographic inquiry be approached ‘… from the standpoint of man’s 
adjustment to environment’: 
 
Thus defined, geography is the science of human ecology… Geography will aim to make 
clear the relationships existing between natural environments and the distribution and 
activities of man. Geographers will, I think, be wise to view this problem in general from 
the standpoint of man’s adjustment to environment, rather than that of environmental 
influence. The former approach is more likely to result in the recognition and proper 
valuation of all the factors involved, and especially to minimize the danger of assigning to 
the environmental factors a determinative influence which they do not exert (Barrows 
1923, 3). 
 
Thus in hazards research, natural systems are held to be neutral. This is evident in Burton et al.’s 
(1978; 1993, 32) assertion that: 
 
Natural hazards are neither benevolent nor maliciously motivated toward their members: 
they are neutral, in the sense that they neither prescribe nor set powerful constraints on 
what can be done with them. It is people who transform the environment into resources 
and hazards, by using natural features for economic, social, and aesthetic purposes. 
 
In this view, natural (or environmental) hazards arise from the interaction of natural and social 
systems. Hazards are distinguished from ‘extreme’ events or processes in nature, which are not 
necessarily hazardous to people (Mitchell et al. 1989; Burton et al. 1993). Consequently, a bushfire 
that is confined to an unpopulated and undeveloped area would not be considered a hazard, whereas 
one that burned in the vicinity of residential settlements, commercial interests or public infrastructure 
would. This perspective entails recognition of the potential benefits that environmental processes and 
events such as bushfires often provide. Indeed, hazards are often created when people occupy 
locations and engage in land uses and activities in order to exploit those benefits and resources (Burton 
et al. 1993). For instance, in many parts of Australia there has been a growth in populations at the 
urban-rural interface and other potentially fire-prone environments as people move away from 
metropolitan areas to enjoy the amenity and lifestyle of coastal and rural settings (Burnley and 
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Murphy 2004; Costello 2007). Conversely, hazard exposure may arise in situations where people are 
compelled by social, economic and political circumstances to occupy hazardous locations, or engage 
in hazardous land uses and activities (Mustafa 1998). For example, the un-affordability of housing in 
metropolitan Melbourne and Sydney has forced many low-income families into less expensive 
locations in small cities, towns and rural areas (Berry 2003) where they may experience heightened 
exposure to bushfire hazards. 
 
2.3.2  Human responses to natural hazards 
Geographers focus on the ‘range of response’ to natural hazards, which encompasses long-term 
biological and cultural adaptations and shorter-term adjustments (Burton et al. 1993). The typically 
tall and slender body shape of Masai people is a biological adaptation to the hot climate of East Africa, 
enabling heat to be more efficiently released from their bodies. The ‘Queenslander’ style of 
architecture, prevalent in many parts of Queensland and northern New South Wales, is an example of 
a cultural adaptation where houses are raised on stilts to enable ventilation and to protect homes from 
floodwater. Adjustments, on the other hand, entail measures to reduce the potential impacts of hazards, 
such as basic preparedness, early warning systems, or insurance to recoup losses. Burton et al. (1993) 
distinguish between purposeful adjustments, which are actions taken with the intention of reducing the 
damage potential of a particular hazard, and incidental adjustments, which are actions that provide 
unintended protective benefits. The more immediate and tangible benefits of hazard adjustments have 
meant that research and policy focus largely on opportunities for adjustment, with only marginal 
consideration of possible avenues for more widespread and lasting adaptation. This situation is 
changing, with adaptation now a major theme in research and policy for global environmental change.  
 
In The environment as hazard, Burton et al. (1993, 31) proposed that human responses to hazards 
could be explained by examining three elements of a given situation: ‘… the ways in which people (1) 
recognize and describe a hazard, (2) consider how they might deal with it, and (3) choose among the 
actions that seem to them available’. In this view, hazard adjustment is first and foremost a matter of 
perception, both of hazards and of opportunities to adjust. Geographical hazards research has thus 
been strongly influenced by psychological theories of human perception and decision-making 
(Kasperson and Dow 1993). Perception research flourished in human geography during the 1960s and 
1970s (e.g. Burton and Kates 1964; Saarinen 1966; Kates 1971; White 1974), variously investigating: 
individuals’ subjective risk assessments; attitudes to the environment; media reporting of hazards; 
awareness of physical processes contributing to hazards; comprehension of the character of hazardous 
environments; and identification of possible adjustments (Mitchell 1984).  
 
Many early hazard perception studies employed the concept of bounded rationality, originally 
developed by Simon (1956). Previously, decision-making had been modelled on the classical theory of 
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expected utility maximization which holds that rational actors make decisions based on an assessment 
of fixed and known alternatives, for which probable outcomes are known in order to gain optimal 
economic benefit (Simon 1959). If this were true, all people who occupy potentially hazardous 
locations would be aware of the hazards to which they are exposed and, based on an assessment of 
possible damages and the costs and benefits of available precautions, would select an optimal mix of 
adjustments. However, as Burton et al. (1993, 65) note, 
 
… it is rare indeed that individuals have access to full information in appraising either 
natural events or alternative courses of action. Even if they were to have such 
information, they would have goals quite different from maximizing expected utility. The 
bounds on rational choice in dealing with natural hazards, as with all human decisions, 
are numerous. 
 
Importantly, it should not be assumed that all people have the economic means to make adjustments. 
The failures of natural hazards research to properly account for the economic contexts of hazard 
adjustment are addressed below (see 2.3.3). 
 
Models of bounded rationality assert that, due to the limits of human cognition and the inherent 
uncertainty of future events, people simplify highly complex problems and then attempt to act within 
this simplified model of reality (Walmsley and Lewis 1984). This ‘… leads people to underestimate 
risk… [which] in turn, leads to underadjustment’ (Lindell and Perry 2004, 33). For example, Jackson’s 
(1981) study of residents’ responses to earthquake hazard on the West Coast of the U.S. found that 
people perceived a range of social, economic and environmental problems as greater threats than 
earthquakes. For others, the risk of earthquakes was overshadowed by the perceived benefits of the 
places where they lived. Jackson maintains that earthquakes are the most destructive ‘natural disasters’ 
in the region and that a rational model of behaviour ‘…would suggest that all people living in 
recognized zones of high seismic risk would be aware of the hazard, accept the possible damages, and 
take all possible precautions to minimize the impact of future events’ (Jackson 1981, 408). That 
people hadn’t taken ‘all possible precautions’ is taken as evidence of people’s misperception of 
earthquake hazards and their bounded rationality. 
 
Geographical studies of hazard perception are strongly related to risk perception research in 
psychology (see Slovic 2000b). Pidgeon et al. (1992, 89) define risk perception as ‘… people’s 
beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings as well as the wider social or cultural values and 
dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and their benefits’. The prevalent psychometric 
approach to risk perception is based on the idea that risk is subjectively defined by individuals, who 
are influenced by a range of psychological, social, cultural and institutional factors (Slovic 2000b; 
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Siegrist et al. 2005). A basic premise of psychometric risk research is that these factors and their 
interrelationships can be quantified and modelled to gain insights into how people perceive and 
therefore respond to hazards. Psychometric scaling methods are used to produce quantitative measures 
of the perceived risks and benefits of specified activities, which are elicited as ‘expressed preferences’. 
Since risk reduction typically entails some reduction of benefit, decision-makers require a means for 
weighing benefits against risks of particular actions (including inaction). Consequently, risk 
perception research aims to inform risk analysis and societal decision-making by: 
 
• Improving methods for eliciting opinions about risk; 
• Providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards; and 
• Improving the communication of risk information among laypeople, technical experts and 
policy-makers (Slovic et al. 1982). 
 
Psychometric risk research confirms that ‘laypeople’ and ‘experts’ perceive risks differently. Whereas 
expert risk perceptions tend to correlate with technical estimates of fatalities, lay perceptions are 
influenced by a wider range of factors, including people’s own experience and knowledge of the 
hazard, its catastrophic potential and controllability (Slovic 2000a). Research has also identified a 
range of heuristics (intuitive rules of thumb) and cognitive biases that guide decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982). For example, the 
‘availability’ heuristic is employed in situations where people assess the probability of an event based 
on the ease with which past occurrences can be recalled. This is said to explain why people’s risk 
perceptions are biased towards more recent or sensational events, even where the likelihood of 
reoccurrence is low. 
 
The lay/expert dualism is a basic problem in natural hazards and psychometric risk research. Bradbury 
(1989) argues that the very term ‘perceived’ implies the existence of ‘real’ risks that can be known by 
science and its experts but only perceived by non-experts. Nevertheless, from a psychometric 
perspective, Fischhoff (1989, 270) maintains that the distinction between actual and perceived risk is 
misconceived, since both expert and lay perceptions entail human interpretation, and are therefore 
subjective: 
 
In this light, what is commonly called the conflict between actual and perceived risk is 
better thought of as the conflict between two sets of risk perceptions: those of ranking 
scientists working within their field of expertise and those of anybody else. 
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Despite this, most psychometric studies are either implicitly or explicitly premised on the idea that 
expert risk calculations are the yardstick against which lay perceptions should be measured. For Irwin 
et al. (1999) the lay/expert dualism gives the false impression of coherence and homogeneity within 
both lay and scientific understandings of risk. Furthermore, the portrayal of expert risk perceptions as 
neutral and unbiased conceals the role of cultural, social and institutional factors in their construction 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lupton 1999). Wilkinson (2001, 9) argues that psychometric studies of 
risk perception ‘… record snapshots of risk judgements outside of the specific social contexts in which 
people live out their day to day lives’ and thus fail to capture the dynamism of risk perceptions in 
different social settings and in relation to new knowledge and experiences. Most basically, Sjöberg 
(1998) suggests that the act of filling out a risk perception questionnaire may momentarily increase 
worry, which raises doubts as to whether risk perceptions can be accurately measured at all. 
 
2.3.3  Critiques of natural hazards research 
A theoretical turn in human geography during the 1970s and 1980s, marked most notably by the 
emergence of political economic streams of geographic inquiry (Peet and Thrift 1989), sparked 
sustained critique of natural hazards research. Hazards research was roundly criticised for its 
theoretical ‘poverty’ (Torry 1979; Walker 1979; Watts 1983a), its fixation on cognitive aspects of 
perception and decision-making (Hewitt 1980; Walker 1979; Watts 1983a), its failure to address issues 
of power in analyses of how adjustments are chosen (Hewitt 1980, 1983a), its cultural insensitivity 
(Waddell 1977) and its environmentally determinist and technocratic nature (Waddell 1977; Hewitt 
1983a).  
 
Natural hazards research frequently succumbs to psychological reductionism. The basic approach is 
premised on the idea that, ‘If it were known precisely why people select some information and ignore 
other information, much social behaviour could be explained’ (Burton et al. 1993, 95). Information 
provision is the most prevalent and enduring approach to hazard and disaster reduction. This approach 
assumes two causal links: (1) that information provision will lead to awareness; and (2) that awareness 
will lead to behaviour (Sims and Baumann 1983). Sims and Baumann’s (1983) early review of natural 
hazards research found little evidence to support the link between awareness and protective behaviour. 
It did, however, find considerable evidence of the failure of hazard awareness and education programs 
to achieve their objectives. 
 
It doesn’t necessarily follow that because information is given it is received or because 
education is provided there is learning; nor does it follow that even if a public is informed 
about a risk and does know what to do, it therefore will do what it knows it could or 
should do (Sims and Baumann 1983, 167, emphasis in original). 
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Handmer’s (1985) study of the uses and limitations of flood maps as public information identified four 
impediments to the effectiveness of risk communication: (1) information may not reach the target 
audience; (2) it may not be understood; (3) it may not change attitudes; and (4) it may not change 
behaviour. More recently, Kirschenbaum (2005) investigated the relationship between risk perceptions 
and disaster preparedness in Israeli households. He concluded that ‘… risk perceptions have, at best, 
only a partial explanatory effect on actual preparedness behaviors’, and only for those behaviours that 
are immediate, tangible and draw on existing skill sets (e.g. stockpiling provisions) (Kirschenbaum 
2005, 118). The study found little evidence to support a link between risk perceptions and more 
complex, coordinated preparedness behaviours, such as emergency planning and creating protective 
refuge: 
 
The implication of these behaviors for policy makers is that when resources are put into 
increasing the long-term awareness of certain environmental or disaster risks, they are 
likely to be dissipated and have little impact on preparedness behaviors (Kirschenbaum 
2005, 119) 
 
Despite the prevalence of awareness and education programs in hazard and disaster reduction 
strategies worldwide, there have been few studies of their effectiveness in promoting the adoption of 
protective behaviour (Mileti 1999).  
 
Bunting and Guelke (1979) advance a powerful critique of behavioural research in geography more 
generally. They note the heavy reliance of such research on normative models of rational behaviour. 
They suggest that research began with the objective of understanding human behaviour in terms of 
people’s subjective environmental images, but soon became preoccupied with the measurement of 
images rather than their behavioural implications. Their critique is directed at two fundamental 
assumptions that underpin the approach. First, it is assumed that subjective environmental images can 
be accurately measured. The authors doubt whether these ‘images’ can be evaluated in isolation from 
the social, political and economic thoughts in which they are embedded and whether, more basically, 
people are capable of accurately conveying their ‘real’ thoughts about abstract images and preferences. 
Even if these conditions could be met, ‘… the most basic problem in perception research’ remains: ‘… 
the lack of any acceptable standards or criteria against which such elusive phenomena as 
environmental images can be evaluated and checked’ (Bunting and Guelke 1979, 454). Second, they 
too insist that there are no grounds, either theoretical or empirical, to confirm a simple or 
straightforward link between cognitive and overt (or actual) behaviour: 
 
Specific human behaviors do not generally occur in isolation but as reasonably conscious 
choices among a set of alternatives designed to satisfy an overall set of needs. An 
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examination of one type of activity outside the behaviour system or context in which it 
occurs represents a serious problem of reductionism which can only give rise to highly 
simplistic if not inaccurate conclusions (Bunting and Guelke 1979, 456, emphasis added). 
 
Bunting and Guelke argue that behavioural research in geography must be reorientated to focus on 
overt behaviour.  
 
Most notably, the preoccupation with information provision and rational decision-making has meant 
that issues of power, of constraints on choice, receive only cursory attention in natural hazards 
research. Hewitt (1980; 1983a) argues that human responses to hazards cannot be understood without 
analysis of how the distribution and exercise of power within society enables and constrains action. In 
reducing hazard response to a matter of choice, hazards research gives little consideration to how 
social, political and economic structures and processes shape choices. Hewitt (1980, 311) argues that, 
in hazards research, ‘The relations of society and environment seem to be predicated on the notion of 
people and institutions as more or less resourceful and varied actors’. Choice is important, however it 
is ‘… highly circumscribed and unevenly distributed’ and ‘… largely regulated by the distribution of 
power in society’ (Hewitt 1980, 310).  
 
Waddell (1977) criticises the basic assumptions and methods of natural hazards research, which he 
argues are only appropriate for the Western, urban-industrial societies for which they were originally 
conceived. He argued that the survey and questionnaire approach adopted in cross-cultural studies led 
by White (1974) suited only literate people who are accustomed to thinking abstractly about their 
preferences and choices. The approach has thus been labelled ‘parochial’, ‘extraordinarily naïve’ and 
‘… characteristic of the crude scientism, the ethnocentrism and the atheoretical basis of the hazard 
project as originally conceived’ (Watts 1983a, 239-40). Waddell (1977) suggests that natural hazards 
research embodies a developmental view of the ‘Third World’, in which traditional societies are 
deemed incapable of coping with hazards and are therefore dependent upon Western technology and 
modernisation (i.e. ‘Progress’) for protection. This technocratic approach is seen as supporting and 
reinforcing the power of specialised professionals and bureaucratically organised institutions, 
rendering it ‘… a creature of the most powerful, wealthy and centralised institutions’ (Hewitt 1983a, 
9). 
 
Many of the weaknesses of natural hazards research stem from its failure to articulate a theory of 
social process, organisation and change (Walker 1979) and its profound neglect of political economic 
structure (Watts 1983a). As has already been discussed, the approach is premised on the idea that 
people will assess the probability and likely consequences of a particular hazard, consider the options 
that are available to them, and then take action to avoid or minimise harm. According to Walker 
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(1979, 113) this model of individual, purposeful rationality is ‘… manifestly inadequate to explain 
most human behaviour’ because it attributes ‘inappropriate’ hazard responses to individuals’ 
psychological propensities and faulty hazard perceptions, while ignoring the wider social, cultural, 
political and economic factors that shape people’s behaviour. He argues that, paradoxically, studies of 
hazard perception and adjustment frequently provide evidence of social (i.e. collective) rather than 
individual causality, yet have no workable theories of social process (Walker 1979). Indeed, Kates 
(1971, 440) maintains that there is no real difference between individual and collective behaviour:  
 
While differing in detail and setting, our reading of the community, organization, and 
administration literature does not suggest a fundamental discrepancy between individual 
and collective behavior. Thus, while the appropriate managerial unit may differ, the ways 
in which the choice of adjustment is made does not fundamentally differ.  
 
Society is thus depicted as ‘… irreducibly individuated and structureless’, comprising atomised 
individuals (Watts 1983a, 241). 
 
As has already been noted, the human ecological concept of natural hazard maintains that 
environmental events and processes are not intrinsically hazardous – they become hazards when they 
intersect with social systems to put people and the things they value at risk (e.g. through particular 
land uses). However, despite the overt rejection of environmental determinism in human ecology, 
hazards have typically been regarded as ‘… those elements of the physical environment harmful to 
man and caused by forces extraneous to him’. Hewitt (1983a) has noted that the term has invariably 
been used to refer to objective physical processes – for example, a bushfire or flood – as ‘the hazard’. 
In this view, extreme physical events or processes are the starting point for analyses of 
human/environment relationships. Waddell (1977, 69) has described the approach as ‘… a resolutely 
deterministic one where the active forces are vested in nature and the passive in man’. Similarly, 
Hewitt (1983a, 5) contends that while most researchers acknowledge the importance of social and 
economic factors in creating risk, these are treated as secondary to the physical event: ‘The initiative 
in calamity is seen to be with nature, which decides where and what social conditions or responses will 
become significant’. This view is evident in Burton et al.’s (1993, 34) seven ‘environmental 
parameters for human response’.2 That environmental factors influence how people respond to hazards 
is not in question. It is the priority accorded to them, the fact that they are the starting point for 
analyses of human responses, that renders the approach a more subtle, environmentally determinist 
one (Hewitt 1983a). 
 
                                               
2
 These include the magnitude, frequency, duration, areal extent, speed of onset, spatial dispersing, and temporal 
spacing of physical processes and events. 
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As critiques of environmental determinism in hazards research began to emerge, the naturalness of 
‘natural disasters’ was increasingly drawn into question. Ball (1975, 368) proposed that ‘An 
examination of ‘natural’ disasters suggests that their causes are very often not uniquely natural 
phenomena and that human activity plays a significant role in their creation’. She suggested that while 
disasters are often triggered by the impact of some natural phenomenon, the causes of disaster are 
found in the social, political and economic and environmental factors that undermine the ability of a 
system to cope with new stresses. Similarly, in an influential paper in Nature, O’Keefe et al. (1976, 
567) argued that: 
 
The time is ripe for some form of precautionary planning which considers vulnerability of 
the population as the real cause of disaster – a vulnerability that is induced by socio-
economic conditions that can be modified by man [sic], and is not just an act of God. 
Precautionary planning must commence with the removal of concepts of naturalness from 
natural disaster. 
 
It is here that the foundations for a radically different approach to hazards and disaster research were 
laid. Social researchers began to question the role of social, political and economic systems in creating 
hazards and in undermining people’s capacities to protect themselves. This is the realm of human 
vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards, discussed next. Early examples included 
Amartya Sen’s (1981) Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation, Ken Hewitt’s 
(1983b) edited collection Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology and 
Michael Watts’ (1983b) Silent violence: food, famine and peasantry in northern Nigeria. Despite the 
emergence of this new paradigm, natural hazards research is still going strong. Unfortunately, social 
research on bushfires (or wildfires) in Australia and the United States is still largely devoted to 
understanding how individuals perceive bushfire hazards and choose adjustments (see 2.5.1). 
Consequently, many of the critiques discussed above are as relevant today as they were three decades 
ago. 
 
Appendix 2.1 provides a brief overview of the sociological literature on disasters.  
 
2.4  Human vulnerability and resilience 
In contemporary social sciences, the causes and impacts of environmental hazards and disasters are 
understood primarily through concepts of human vulnerability and resilience. As was noted above, the 
meaning and usage of these terms are highly varied in different research and practical settings. For 
example, in the context of global environmental change, vulnerability has been used to refer to 
characteristics of individuals, societies, ecosystems, and technological systems, as well as a range of 
other social and ecological units (Dow 1992). The term has also been used to describe characteristics 
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of buildings, infrastructure, livelihoods, settlement locations, regions, and economies (Wisner et al. 
2004). Wisner et al. (2004) instead use ‘vulnerability’ only to refer to people, arguing that buildings 
are better described as ‘unsafe’, settlement locations ‘hazardous’, economies ‘fragile’ and so on. 
However, others have expressed concern that such language may be disempowering and are careful to 
define vulnerability as a process or social space rather than a status (Watts and Bohle 1993; Pelling 
2003) or instead emphasise people’s capacities and resiliencies (Hewitt 1997; Handmer 2003; 
Fordham 2004). Consequently, concepts of resilience are increasingly finding favour in social science 
research on environmental hazards and disasters. Most often, resilience is treated as an opposite of 
vulnerability; a more positive way of talking about the same problem. It is argued here that while these 
concepts are related, important differences exist between the two.  
 
2.4.1  Vulnerability 
Definitions of vulnerability typically emphasise (a) people’s hazard exposure, (b) people’s capacities 
for coping with or adapting to potential impacts, or (c) both hazard exposure and capacities (Table 
2.1).
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Table 2.1: Selected definitions of vulnerability, emphasising exposure and/or capacity 
Emphasis Author(s) Definition 
Alexander (1993) ‘Human vulnerability is a function of the costs and benefits of inhabiting areas at risk from natural disaster’ (8). 
Gardner (2002) ‘Vulnerability is defined by the degree of exposure of people, property, and infrastructure to dangerous processes 
and events through a juxtaposition in time and location’ (298). 
Exposure 
Turner et al. (2003) ‘Vulnerability is the degree to which a system, subsystem, or system component is likely to experience harm due to 
exposure to a hazard’ (8074). 
Hewitt (1997) ‘Vulnerability involves, perhaps above all, the general and active capacities of people – what enables them to avoid, 
resist or recover from harm. Whereas a hazards perspective tends to explain risk and disaster in terms of external 
agents and their impacts, vulnerability looks to the internal state of a society and what governs that’ (28). 
Leichenko and 
O’Brien (2002) 
‘Dynamic’ vulnerability is ‘… the extent to which environmental and economic changes influence the capacity of 
regions, sectors, ecosystems, and social groups to respond to various types of natural and socio-economic shocks’ 
(3).  
Capacity 
Wisner et al. (2004) ‘By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It 
involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and other 
assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event or series or ‘cascade’ of such events) in nature and in 
society’ (11). 
Chambers (1989) ‘Vulnerability here refers to exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulty coping with them. Vulnerability 
thus has two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual or household is subject; and 
an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss’ (1). 
Bohle et al. (1994) ‘Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure of human welfare that integrates environmental, social, 
economic and political exposure to a range of potential harmful perturbations’ (37-38). It is ‘… a multilayered and 
multidimensional social space defined by the determinate political, economic and institutional capabilities of people 
in specific places at specific times’ (39). 
Exposure 
and capacity 
IPCC (2007) ‘Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate 
of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity’ (883). 
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Vulnerability as hazard exposure 
Concepts of vulnerability that emphasise hazard exposure are ultimately concerned with people’s 
locations and activities relative to harmful geophysical processes or events (Table 2.1). Hazard 
exposure is fundamental to vulnerability, since people can only be vulnerable in relation to a specific 
impact or set of impacts (Kelly and Adger 2000). Social scientists often regard hazard exposure as a 
matter for natural scientists, involving technical assessments of frequencies, probabilities, magnitudes 
and other hazard characteristics. This view is typified in Dow’s (1992, 421, emphasis added) assertion 
that, 
 
Taking exposure as an initial measure of vulnerability is a useful first step because it is 
relatively easy to measure and captures a number of indicative patterns in distribution.  
 
As a measure of vulnerability, however, 
 
… exposure is limited by its focus to a particular time. Choices and constraints that lead 
to exposure patterns are obscured and this inevitably limits the range of management 
options. As a measure of vulnerability it does not offer insights into the future, into the 
abilities of people or groups to recover that might distinguish these groupings. Starting 
with exposure to look at vulnerability is further limiting in its inability to look at the past 
and consider the explanations for the circumstances that led to a specific set of exposure 
conditions. The explanations for vulnerability are more deeply ingrained over time into 
social and ecological circumstances such that measures at a particular time offer limited 
insights (Dow 1992, 421). 
 
In Dow’s view, exposure appears to be a purely geophysical measure of hazard. It does not look to the 
reasons why people are exposed to hazards; it merely seeks to measure their exposure. Thus Hewitt 
(1997) argues that vulnerability becomes part of a hazards perspective (the ‘natural hazards’ research 
discussed above) when exposure is taken as its chief measure. However, this concept of exposure 
conflicts with basic hazards theory. It was noted earlier that environmental hazards arise from 
interactions of natural and social systems; features of the natural environment such as bushfire are not 
in themselves hazardous – they become hazards when they threaten human life, assets and other values 
of the ‘human use system’ of locations, livelihoods and social organisation (Burton et al. 1993, 32). 
Consequently, any investigation of hazard exposure requires an analysis of how natural and social 
systems interact to put people at risk. This point is well made by Mustafa (1998, 290, emphasis 
added), who notes that:  
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Exposure is a function of the socially determined physical location of the communities at 
risk, as well as the human decisions and societal structures that imperil the community. 
 
Social research on environmental hazards and disasters confirms that powerless and marginalised 
people often inhabit the most hazardous locations, are compelled to engage in hazardous livelihood 
strategies and receive the least protection from the state (Cannon 2000; Wisner et al. 2004). Hazard 
exposure, then, is more properly viewed as a social process through which people come to be exposed 
(and reduce their exposure) to potentially harmful geophysical processes or events. However, analyses 
of hazard exposure alone cannot fully explain vulnerability. People’s capacities to respond to hazards 
must also be considered. 
 
Vulnerability as coping / adaptive capacity 
A second group of vulnerability concepts emphasises the capacity of people and systems to cope with 
and adapt to hazards and their impacts (Table 2.1). In Timmerman’s (1981) early formulation, 
vulnerability was defined in terms of a system’s potential to react adversely to the occurrence of a 
hazardous event. The type and extent of adverse reaction is said to be conditioned by the system’s 
resilience, which is a measure of its capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous 
event (Table 2.2). Despite the emphasis on capacity, the focus on systems may conceal the role of 
human agency. More recent capacity-focused concepts of vulnerability highlight the active capacities 
of people. Here, Wisner et al.’s (2004, 11) definition is paramount: 
 
By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a 
natural hazard. 
 
Similarly, Hewitt (1997; 1998) argues that vulnerability exists where people’s capacities to avoid, 
resist or recover from harm are undermined by forces of social organisation. In this view it is 
acknowledged that, all things being equal, all human beings are capable of coping with and adapting to 
environmental hazards. Rarely, of course, are all things equal. 
 
Nested within capacity-focused concepts of vulnerability are concepts of coping or adaptive capacity. 
‘Adaptive capacity’ is commonly used in climate change research to refer to ‘… the ability or capacity 
of a system to modify or change its characteristics or behaviour so as to cope better with existing or 
anticipated external stresses’ (Adger et al. 2004, 34). As this research is ultimately concerned with 
people, adaptive capacity is used to refer to people’s capacities to adapt to new circumstances 
triggered by their experience of a hazard or disaster. 
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Concepts of vulnerability that emphasise human capacities typically take hazard exposure as a given 
(Cutter 1996). Vulnerability implies exposure, since people must always be vulnerable to something; 
however, exposure is formally outside the concept (Kelly and Adger 2000). Consequently, analyses 
aim to identify factors that enable or constrain people’s capacities to protect themselves from harm, 
but may not investigate how inequalities and injustices may lead to greater hazard exposure for 
particular groups and individuals. 
 
Vulnerability as hazard exposure and coping / adaptive capacity 
A third group of vulnerability concepts is concerned with people’s hazard exposure and their 
capacities to cope with and adapt to potential impacts (Table 2.1). Chambers (1989, 1), for example, 
defines vulnerability as ‘… exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficultly coping with them’. 
For Chambers, a household’s exposure to contingencies and stress represents the external dimension 
of vulnerability, while the lack of means to cope without damaging loss is the internal dimension. In 
reality, hazard exposure and coping or adaptive capacities are shaped by factors both within and 
outside an individual or household’s control (both internal and external). This is captured in Bohle et 
al.’s (1994, 37-38 & 39, emphasis added) definition of vulnerability presented in Table 2.1, which is 
worth quoting again in full:  
 
Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure of human welfare that integrates 
environmental, social, economic and political exposure to a range of potential harmful 
perturbations… [It is] a multilayered and multidimensional social space defined by the 
determinate political, economic and institutional capabilities of people in specific places 
at specific times.   
 
By defining vulnerability in terms of human welfare, it is acknowledged that hazard exposure and 
adaptive capacity are latent features of everyday life, taking their exact form at specific places and 
times with the impacts of particular hazardous processes or events. Furthermore, vulnerability is here 
defined as a social space, rather than an ongoing condition or state, which people may move in and out 
of in space and time. 
 
Implicit in most definitions of vulnerability are notions of difference. To be useful in disaster policy 
and management, analyses of vulnerability must differentiate between the types and degrees of 
vulnerability experienced by particular groups and individuals. Thus Winchester’s (1992, ix-x) study 
of cyclone disaster management in southern India centres on the concept of differential vulnerability, 
‘… whereby the differences between households are such that some people are more at risk than 
others to exactly the same threat in the same place’. Winchester showed that small farmers and 
fishermen were more vulnerable to the 1977 cyclone in Andhra Pradesh than larger farmers and petty 
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officials, largely because of their limited capacity to evacuate by road, the inferior materials and 
construction of their homes, and the more hazardous locations they inhabited. Their vulnerability was 
reflected in a mortality rate of 23-27 percent, compared to just 3-4 percent for larger farmers and petty 
officials. Furthermore, the latter were able to recover more quickly than smaller farmers and 
fishermen, many of whom were living on the poverty threshold. These findings informed Winchester’s 
(1992, 44) perspective that disasters are not ‘… out there in nature… but exist in society in our social 
organisation of knowledge and production’. Similarly, Mustafa (1998) analysed the differential 
vulnerability of communities and social groups to flood hazards in central Pakistan, concluding that 
the degree of vulnerability people experienced was directly related to the degree of political and 
economic power they wielded. 
 
Following Bohle et al. (1994) and Winchester (1992), human vulnerability is defined in this thesis as a 
spatially and temporally contingent social space wherein people differentially experience heightened 
exposure to hazards and a diminished capacity to cope with and adapt to potential impacts.  
 
2.4.2  Resilience 
The concept of resilience is gaining favour in hazards and disaster management. In addition to its 
positive connotations of capacity and strength, resilience implies a more flexible, proactive and 
strategic approach to hazard and disaster reduction. Consequently, there has been a push to translate 
the theoretical and practical work on vulnerability into the language of resilience (Handmer 2003). As 
is the case with vulnerability, the term is invoked to describe people, as individuals and groups, as well 
as a range of social, political, ecological and technological systems and units. Resilience is most often 
used as a loose antonym for vulnerability in hazards and disaster research (Adger 2000); however, its 
ecological origins reveal a somewhat different meaning. 
 
Resilience is defined in two very different ways in ecology. The standard definition, often termed 
engineering resilience, emphasises efficiency, control, constancy and predictability, which are all 
attributes of efficient and reliable systems (Holling and Gunderson 2002). This type of resilience is a 
measure of the speed at which a system returns to its original state after disturbance (Pimm 1984). 
Definitions such as this are based on an assumption that ecosystems are largely stable entities that tend 
toward equilibrium. An alternative perspective emphasises the persistence, adaptability, variability and 
unpredictability of ecological systems (Holling 1973). Here, resilience is a measure of the magnitude 
of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing the variables 
that control behaviour (Holling and Gunderson 2002).3 According to Holling (1973, 21),  
 
                                               
3
 See Folke (2006) for a concise overview of the literatures on the resilience of ecological and social-ecological 
systems. 
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A management approach based on resilience… would emphasize the need to keep options 
open, the need to view events in a regional rather than a local context, and the need to 
emphasize heterogeneity. Flowing from this would be not the presumption of sufficient 
knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the assumptions that future events 
are expected, but that they will be unexpected. The resilience framework can 
accommodate this shift of perspective, for it does not require a precise capacity to predict 
the future, but only a qualitative capacity to devise systems that can absorb and 
accommodate future events in whatever unexpected form they may take. 
 
Given the broad applicability of such an approach to global environmental change and other highly 
uncertain future events, it is not surprising that the concept of resilience has been used to understand 
changes in social and ecological systems (Berkes and Folke 1998b; Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Berkes et al. 2003). Research on the resilience of social-ecological systems is concerned primarily 
with sustainable resource and environmental management, rather than environmental hazards and 
disasters. It emphasises the relationships between social and ecological systems, the linkages between 
social and ecological problems, and thus the need for integrative and holistic management approaches 
(Berkes and Folke 1998a). Folke (2006) maintains that most research on the social dimensions of 
resource and environmental management overlooks the ecological dimensions and assumes that 
adaptive social systems will manage environmental resources in a sustainable fashion. However, 
adaptive forms of social organisation aren’t necessarily ecologically sustainable: 
 
A human society may show great ability to cope with change and adapt if analyzed only 
through the social dimension lens. But such an adaptation may be at the expense of 
changes in the capacity of ecosystems to sustain the adaptation, and may generate traps 
and breakpoints in the resilience of a social-ecological system (Folke 2006, 260). 
 
The vast majority of research into the resilience of social-ecological systems has been undertaken by 
researchers working as part of the Resilience Alliance, a ‘… a multidisciplinary research group that 
explores the dynamics of complex adaptive systems’ for sustainability (Resilience Alliance 2007a, 
web page). The Resilience Alliance defines resilience as: 
 
• The amount of change a system can undergo and still retain the same controls on function and 
structure; 
• The degree to which a system is capable of self-organisation; and 
• The ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation (Resilience Alliance 
2007b). 
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Elements of these ecological and social-ecological concepts are evident in definitions of resilience in 
the environmental hazards and disasters literature (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: Selected definitions of resilience 
Author(s) Definition 
Timmerman (1981) ‘Vulnerability is the degree to which a system, or part of a system may react adversely to 
the occurrence of a hazardous event. The degree and quality of that adverse reaction are 
partly conditioned by the system’s resilience, [which is] the measure of a system’s, or 
part of a system’s capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous 
event’ (1981, 21).  
Wildavsky (1988) ‘… the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, 
learning to bounce back’ (77). 
Mileti (1999) ‘Local resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able to withstand an 
extreme natural event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished 
productivity, or quality of life and without a large amount of assistance from outside the 
community’ (32-33). 
Adger (2000) ‘… social resilience is defined as the ability of communities to withstand external shocks 
to their social infrastructure’ (361). 
Smith (2001) ‘Resilience is a measure of the rate of recovery from a stressful experience, reflecting the 
social capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event’ (25). 
Pelling (2003) ‘Resilience to natural hazard is the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard 
stress. It is a product of the degree of planned preparation undertaken in the light of 
potential hazard, and of spontaneous or premeditated adjustments made in response to 
felt hazard, including relief and rescue. The most important policy options available to 
enhance resilience are those that shape formal or informal insurance mechanisms’ (48-9). 
ISDR (2004) ‘The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, 
by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning 
and structure. This is determined by the degree to which a social system is capable or 
organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future 
protection and to improve risk reduction measures’ (Annex 1, 6). 
Adger et al. (2005) ‘By resilience, we mean the capacity of linked social-ecological systems to absorb 
recurrent disturbances such as hurricanes or floods so as to retain essential structures, 
processes, and feedbacks. Resilience reflects the degree to which a complex adaptive 
system is capable of self-organization (versus lack of organization or organization forced 
by external factors) and the degree to which the system can build capacity for learning 
and adaptation’ (1036). 
IPCC (2007) ‘The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the 
same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the 
capacity to adapt to stress and change’ (880). 
Twigg (2007) ‘… system or community resilience can be understood as: capacity to absorb stress or 
destructive forces through resistance or adaptation capacity to manage, or maintain 
certain basic functions and structures, during disastrous events capacity to recover or 
‘bounce back’ after an event’ (6). 
 
Resilience is typically defined in terms of a social or ecological system’s capacity to resist and recover 
from disturbance. Timmerman’s (1981) early definition linked resilience with vulnerability. He argued 
that a system’s vulnerability to harm from a hazardous event is shaped by its capacity to absorb and 
recover from potential impacts (i.e. its resilience). Adger’s (2000) definition of social resilience 
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emphasises similar capacities, but is cast in terms of communities and their capacity to withstand 
shocks to their ‘social infrastructure’ (or institutions). Pelling (2003) is less abstract, referring to 
resilience as the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress, which may entail planned 
preparation as well as spontaneous or premeditated adjustments. Capacities for learning and adaptation 
are also important features of resilience. Adger et al. (2005), for instance, define a resilient social-
ecological system as one that can build capacity for learning and adaptation.  
 
The capacity for ‘social learning’ is increasingly identified as a component of adaptive and resilient 
systems. While definitions of social learning vary throughout the social sciences, the term is generally 
used to refer to processes of collaborative learning that form the basis for collective social action. The 
concept has been particularly influential in the fields of natural resource and environmental 
management (Keen et al. 2005; Muro and Jeffrey 2008), where deliberative and participative 
approaches are increasingly common. In this context, social learning refers to ‘... the process of 
collective action and reflection among different actors directed toward improving the management of 
human and environmental interrelations’ (Ison 2005, 37). Social learning has been particularly 
influential in the transition toward adaptive water management (Pahl-Wostl 2002; Ison et al. 2007; 
Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008). Just as concepts of vulnerability and resilience have challenged technocratic 
approaches to hazards and disaster management, social learning has been advanced as a means for 
shifting away from traditional engineering approaches to water management toward those that are 
more adaptive to the inherent uncertainty of complex social-ecological systems (Pahl-Wostl et al. 
2008). There is relatively little research on the role of social learning in building adaptive capacity and 
resilience for disasters. A notable exception is Pelling et al.’s (2008) study of the relational spaces 
within organisations that promote social learning for climate change adaptation. The authors argue that 
these informal spaces, which cut across formal organisational structures for learning and adaptation, 
‘… allow individuals or sub-groups within organisations to experiment, imitate, communicate, learn 
and reflect on their actions in ways that can surpass formal processes within policy and organisational 
settings’ (Pelling et al. 2008, 868). Given that informal institutions are often regarded as too complex 
to work with, or as legitimising behaviours that conflict with organisational aims, organisations face 
significant challenges to embrace relational spaces for social learning and thus maximise adaptive 
their capacity.4  
 
The capacity for self-organisation is arguably the defining feature of resilient systems (ISDR 2004; 
Adger et al. 2005; IPCC 2007, Table 2.2). For Mileti (1999) resilience reflects the local capacity to 
withstand an extreme natural event, while not suffering major losses and without a large amount of 
assistance from outside the community (Table 2.2). Similarly, as Twigg (2007, 6) points out: 
                                               
4
 The authors distinguish organisations from institutions, the latter being defined as ‘the rules of the game’. 
Institutions may be formal, as in the case of legislation, or informal, such as cultural norms and values. 
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A focus on resilience means putting greater emphasis on what communities can do for 
themselves and how to strengthen their capacities, rather than concentrating on their 
vulnerability to disaster or their needs in an emergency. 
 
It is difficult to argue against the goal of community self-sufficiency for coping with hazards and 
disasters. However, the emphasis on ‘what communities can do for themselves’ should not justify a 
‘laissez-faire’ approach to disaster management whereby states’ responsibilities and capacities to 
protect their citizens are diminished. States have a moral and legal responsibility to protect all of their 
citizens, communities do not. The informal and socially exclusive nature of communities means that 
they cannot ensure the safety of its members, let alone those who are excluded or isolated. Those who 
are already marginalised and powerless would be particularly vulnerable with such an approach. More 
basically, it is unclear whether all communities have the capacity to sustain a state of resilience or self-
sufficiency, even with the support and investment of government. 
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Table 2.3: A typology of resilience 
Source: Handmer and Dovers (2003) 
Resilience Key 
characteristics 
Sustainability 
Implications 
Typical 
generic 
arguments 
Elements 
Positive 
Approach to 
hazard 
Impact on 
power 
Emphasis 
Negative 
Type 1 1. Not 
sustainable. 
2. Possible that 
system will 
become so 
strained that it 
may collapse 
& change 
completely. 
 
 
Resistance or 
inability to 
change. 
1. Apparent 
stability & 
certainty. 
2. Will not make a 
maladaptive 
change. 
3. Maintenance of 
status quo and 
of optimising 
capacity. 
 
 
1. Lack of 
flexibility. 
2. Inability to 
adjust to new 
circumstances. 
3. Situation likely 
to get worse. 
4. Options will 
narrow. 
5. Irreversible 
damage 
 
 
1. Denial. 
2. If problem 
admitted, 
then appeals 
to ignorance 
(especially 
scientific) to 
defer action. 
3. Costs of 
tampering 
with status 
quo. 
Approach 
Denial of need 
for change. 
1. Identify and 
plan for 
obvious 
threats. 
2. Substantial 
resources 
may be 
committed to 
maintain the 
status quo in 
the face of a 
threat. 
 
Maintains or 
enhances 
existing power 
structure. 
1. Individual 
sovereignty. 
2. Hazard 
management 
by small 
professional 
group. 
3. Control of 
public agenda 
and 
information. 
Type 2 Change at the 
margins. 
1. Acknowledge 
that present 
system is not 
sustainable. 
2. Minor change 
may delay 
essential major 
changes. 
 
 
Treat symptoms. 1. Admission of 
problem. 
2. Some essential 
change may 
occur. 
3. Change is 
incremental 
rather than 
sudden. 
 
1. Gives 
impression of 
significant 
change & may 
lull people into 
a false sense 
of security. 
2. Unlikely to 
force sufficient 
change. 
 
 
1. Recognition 
that problem 
may exist. 
2. Inquiries, 
delaying 
tactics. 
3. Recognition 
that change 
is necessary 
& make 
minor 
adjustments. 
 
1. Less 
emphasis on 
anticipatory 
planning. 
2. Tinkering 
with hazard 
adjustments. 
 
Maintains 
existing 
structure, but 
may lead to 
slight shifts 
(e.g. to 
environmental 
interests) that 
are usually 
subsumed into 
existing power 
structure. 
1. ‘Right’ rhetoric 
2. Attempts to 
have people 
take some 
responsibility 
for hazards. 
3. Control of 
public agenda 
& information, 
with some 
participative 
mechanisms. 
 
Type 3 Treat causes. 1. Major change 
toward a 
sustainable 
society. 
2. Ability to 
manage 
uncertainty & 
unanticipated 
outcomes. 
3. Chance of 
maladaptive 
change. 
Treat causes. 1. Tackles 
underlying 
causes. 
2. Flexible/ 
adaptive 
systems. 
 
1. May go down 
wrong track. 
2. Loss of 
optimising 
capacity in 
present & near 
term. 
 
1. Change is 
essential. 
2. Appeals to 
ignorance: 
‘We don’t 
know, so we 
must 
change’. 
3. Longer-term 
view. 
1. Maximum 
flexibility to 
cope with 
unexpected 
threats. 
 
More likely to 
lead to major 
changes in 
power 
distribution. 
1. Humanity & 
the biosphere. 
2. Hazard 
management 
by all – indiv. 
freedom 
balanced by 
responsibility. 
3. Info. systems 
participatory 
but highly 
variable. 
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Dovers and Handmer (1992; Handmer and Dovers 1996) offer useful discussions of resilience within 
the contexts of global environmental change and sustainable development. They note that modern 
science-based hazard management has attempted to eliminate uncertainty and maximise control over 
the natural environment. However, because uncertainty will always exist, no matter how much 
knowledge is attained, they argue that, 
 
Like natural systems, human systems need to be flexible enough to cope with uncertainty 
and unanticipated shocks. They must be capable of responding positively to problems 
widely perceived as constituting a threat to human existence, such as ozone depletion, 
toxic wastes, the enhanced greenhouse effect, AIDS, land degradation, loss of 
biodiversity, and so on (Dovers and Handmer 1992, 270). 
 
Importantly, the authors distinguish between proactive and reactive resilience. Reactive resilience, 
which is the norm, resists all but the most marginal of changes, and therefore provides little scope for 
adaptation. In a later paper, Handmer and Dovers (1996) developed a typology of resilience, which is 
based on three different attitudes to change. Importantly, resilience is here linked to the longer-term 
goal of social and ecological sustainability. Type 1 resilience, Resistance and maintenance, is 
characterised by resistance or inability to change. Risks are denied or socially attenuated and the status 
quo is defended at great cost to maintain existing power structures. Where risks are acknowledged, 
inaction is justified on the grounds of inadequate scientific knowledge and the costs of taking action 
which, it is argued, may turn out to be ineffective or even unnecessary. Debate over climate change is 
a prominent example. There is now general consensus among scientists and politicians that human-
induced climate change is happening; however, many governments and corporations cite scientific 
uncertainty about the capacity of human interventions to address the problem, as well as the costs of 
taking action, to justify inaction. This type of resilience lacks flexibility and is therefore incapable of 
adapting to new circumstances. Its advantages, however, include: ensuring a stable, if inequitable, 
social system by maintaining the status quo and existing power relations; maintaining optimal, short-
term patterns of resource use; and, because it is resistant to change, will not lead to maladaptation. 
However, in social and ecological terms, resistance to change may lead to the eventual collapse and 
complete transformation of the system (Handmer and Dovers 1996). 
 
Type 2 resilience, Change at the margins, represents the most common approach to managing risks. 
While problems are recognised, they are only addressed to the extent that taking action does not 
challenge the status quo. This type of resilience may lead to essential changes; however, ‘There is a 
danger that the minor changes now in train may delay essential or major changes, giving the 
impression that the necessary changes are being, or will be, made by the current social institutions’ 
(Handmer and Dovers 1996, 500). While this approach may be practical, realistic and pragmatic, it 
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tends to treat the symptoms rather than the causes of problems. Moreover, responses are designed to be 
politically and economically palatable, rather than appropriate to the nature and scale of the threat. The 
danger, then, is that while Change at the margins may bring about important incremental change, it is 
unlikely to promote sustainability in the long-term (Handmer and Dovers 1996).  
 
Openness and adaptability is the third type of resilience. It is characterised by flexibility and a 
preparedness to adopt new operating assumptions and procedures. This type entails a willingness to 
address the underlying causes of problems, but is resisted by those in positions of power who stand to 
lose from radical changes to the status quo. Despite its longer-term view and high degree of 
adaptability, this approach may invite instability and economic inefficiency. Moreover, an open and 
adaptable system may be prone to maladaptive changes that threaten human welfare and the 
environment. 
 
As Handmer and Dovers (1996, 504) point out, ‘The sustainability debate centres on the question of 
whether marginal adjustments to the present system will suffice or whether more profound changes are 
demanded’. They argue that Change at the margins is potentially the least sustainable type of 
resilience, because it gives the impression that problems are being addressed when, in actual fact, they 
aren’t. At least the first and third types of resilience have longer-term visions. However, Resistance 
and maintenance is surely the least sustainable because, by failing to acknowledge and address 
problems, it shifts responsibility onto future generation and therefore clashes with the core principle of 
inter-generational equity that lies at the heart of sustainability discourse (WCED 1987). It also 
conflicts with the principle of intra-generational equity, since risks and their consequences are 
inequitably distributed. 
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Table 2.4: Principles of resilient systems 
The homeostasis principle: systems are maintained by feedbacks between component parts, which 
signal changes and can enable learning. Resilience is enhanced when feedbacks are transmitted 
effectively. 
 
The omnivory principle: external shocks are mitigated by diversifying resource requirements and their 
means of delivery. Failures to source or distribute a resource can then be compensated for by 
alternatives. 
 
The high flux principle: the faster the movement of resources through a system, the more resources will 
be available at any given time to help cope with perturbation. 
 
The flatness principle: overly hierarchical systems are less flexible and hence less able to cope with 
surprise and adjust behaviour. Top-heavy systems will be less resilient. 
 
The buffering principle: a system which has a capacity in excess of its needs can draw on this capacity 
in times of need, and so is more resilient. 
 
The redundancy principle: a degree of overlapping function in a system permits the system to change 
by allowing vital functions to continue while formerly redundant elements take on new functions. 
 Source: Wildavsky (cited in Pelling 2003) 
 
The principles of resilient systems outlined in Table 2.4 provide a useful framework for the proactive 
management of environmental hazards and disasters. Here, resilient systems have a high capacity for 
learning and adaptation and rely on a diverse range of resources that can be quickly mobilised to 
enable coping in times of stress. They are characterised by non-hierarchical modes of organisation and 
are therefore highly flexible and adaptive. Importantly, resilient systems have capacities that exceed 
their needs at any given time, as well as a degree of overlapping function that enables the system to 
change without disruption to essential functions. 
 
2.4.3  Factors influencing vulnerability and resilience 
Cannon (2000) has identified five components of vulnerability: (i) initial wellbeing, strength and 
resilience; (ii) livelihood resilience; (iii) self-protection; (iv) societal protection; and (v) social capital. 
Different levels of vulnerability are generated for each component when they intersect with particular 
social and political factors, including: class or income group; gender, ethnicity and age; type of state 
system; the state’s capacity and willingness to act; the strength of civil society permitted by the state; 
and other factors such as religious and political allegiances that create cohesion or division. Initial 
strength, wellbeing and resilience is a measure of the nutrition and health of people in everyday life, 
which influences their capacity to cope with illness or injury resulting from a hazard. Livelihood 
resilience refers to the capacity of individuals and households to cope in the aftermath of a hazard and 
to re-establish their earning or livelihood pattern. Cannon (2000) notes that hazards and disasters can 
create new income opportunities, for example in the construction industry, but can also reduce the 
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demand for labour. People on low incomes typically have less job security and find it more difficult to 
re-establish their livelihoods after disaster. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, black workers from 
New Orleans were found to be four times more likely to lose their jobs than their white counterparts. 
When income differences were factored into the equation, the ‘average’ black worker was closer to 
seven times more likely to have lost his or her job than the ‘average’ white worker (Elliott and Pais 
2006).  
 
Self-protection refers to the capacity and willingness of individuals and households to protect 
themselves from hazards. People with high incomes often choose to live in hazardous locations to take 
advantage of aesthetic values and lifestyle opportunities; however, they are more likely to have, or 
have access to, the necessary resources to protect themselves than are people on low incomes. 
Materially, they have more to lose from hazards, but their wealth generally enables them to absorb 
losses through insurance and other social safety nets, and to recover more rapidly (Cutter et al. 2000). 
Cannon (2000) also notes that the reduced income-earning capacity and general discrimination against 
particular ethnic groups means that some people are forced to occupy more hazardous locations and 
are unable to adequately protect themselves. There is, of course, a strong relationship between poverty 
and vulnerability to environmental hazards (Fothergill and Peek 2004); however, it cannot be assumed 
that the poor are always at greatest risk. Evidence suggests that wealthy people are often less well 
integrated into informal social networks, which may be pivotal in providing warnings and support, 
both material and immaterial, before, during and after disaster. Regardless, well-intentioned 
statements such as ‘The poor are living in crisis before a disaster strikes’ (Fothergill and Peek 2004, 
106) are unhelpful generalisations and certainly do not reflect how ‘poor’ people view themselves or 
their lives (Chambers 1995). The role of poverty in vulnerability must be assessed on a contextual, 
case-by-case basis (Cardona 2004).  
 
Societal protection refers to the capacity and willingness of social and political structures or 
institutions to provide protection from hazards. Cannon (2000) argues that the prejudice of dominant 
groups may lead to lower levels of protection for lower classes, while language or cultural barriers 
may leave ethnic groups unprotected when they don’t receive warnings or are unable to access social 
services. The degree of protection provided by the state depends on its willingness and capacity to act 
by taking precautionary measures, such as hazard mitigation and disaster planning, and providing 
assistance for emergency response and recovery. 
 
Cannon’s (2000) fifth component of vulnerability is social capital. While there is a voluminous 
literature on social capital, the basic concept remains contested (see Portes 1998; Schuller et al. 2000; 
Halpern 2005, for reviews). The term basically refers to relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange 
that enable people to act in their own and the collective interest. The term capital suggests that these 
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types of social relationships are a means for creating human and financial capital (Bebbington and 
Perreault 1999). Putnam (1995, 664-665) defines social capital as ‘… features of social life – 
networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives’. He distinguishes between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital. The former refers to 
associations between people based on shared identity and intimate personal relationships, such as that 
found in ethnic and religious groups. The latter describes relationships between people who are 
socially heterogeneous but share particular interests, as in a football club or environmental group. In 
practice, it may be difficult to distinguish between bonding and bridging capital; however, it has been 
suggested that rural areas tend to have high levels of bonding and low levels of bridging capital, while 
the reverse is often true in urban areas (Woolcock 2002; Pelling and High 2005). Bebbington and 
Perreault (1999, 398-399) argue that, 
 
Perhaps more than anything else, the capital analogy underscores the notion that there are 
stocks of social capital, which can be built up or depleted and whose availability (like 
other forms of capital) is unequally distributed, geographically and socially. To the extent 
that this social capital enhances the effectiveness (and efficiency) of actors’ ability to 
pursue their objectives and create other forms of capital, then a policy challenge becomes 
how to enhance the access of certain actors to these stocks, and how to foster mechanisms 
that foster the self-reproduction of appropriate forms of social capital. 
 
Concepts of social capital are increasingly applied in hazards and disaster research to understand 
people’s capacities for adaptation and resilience (Pelling 1998; Adger 2003; Pelling and High 2005; 
Ritchie and Gill 2007). According to Pelling and High (2005, 310), ‘Strong bonding ties are associated 
more with survival than development and are often observed in recovery from natural disaster and 
conflict’. They discuss social capital as a means for understanding adaptation to climate change, 
asking how the internal workings of communities and organisations influence choices of adaptive 
strategy. While this is partly a function of formal structure and resource distribution, the authors 
maintain that informal social relations and values (i.e. social capital) play an important role. Similarly, 
Adger (2003, 400) argues that social capital is vital to strategies for climate change adaptation, which 
requires intervention and planning by the state ‘… yet are equally dependent on the ability of 
individuals and communities to act collectively in the face of risks’. Government structures and 
institutions play an important role in the creation and maintenance of social capital; however, the state 
can also hinder its development by inhibiting people’s capacity to organise (e.g. by prohibiting trade 
unions), or by fostering inter-group rivalries and competition for assistance and scarce resources. 
Pelling (1998) has shown that the closed and non-participative nature of the Guyanese political system 
promoted individual rather than collective responses to urban flood hazard. This has resulted in ‘… 
sub-optimal collective adaptation… [by] preventing more efficient, co-ordinated environmental 
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improvements and social development that community-based action could provide’ (Pelling 1998, 
482). Informal social networks have been shown to be especially important in the dissemination of 
unofficial warnings, which are often given more credence than official or formal systems (Parker and 
Handmer 1998).  
 
Clearly, social relations shape people’s exposure and responses to environmental hazards, as well as 
their capacities to adapt to potential impacts. Research on gender relations suggests that women often 
experience greater vulnerability to hazards than men (Wiest et al. 1994; Fothergill 1996; Fordham 
1999; Enarson and Meyreles 2004). Women are more likely to be subjected to discrimination, 
domestic violence and poverty (Fothergill 1996) and their domestic roles and responsibilities means 
that they often neglect their own safety and needs during times of crisis (Fordham 2004). Indeed, 
Wiest et al. (1994) report that women and girls often experience greater stress and trauma in 
emergencies and disasters than men, particularly because of their greater responsibility for childcare 
and higher incidences of domestic and sexual violence after disasters. In the developing world, the 
prevalence of female-headed households and reduced employment opportunities may force women 
and girls into risky forms of wage-labour, such as prostitution. However, while women often 
experience heightened vulnerability, Fordham (2004, 179) warns against generalisations: ‘Not all 
women are equal and the universality of women’s subordinate position in any society must always be 
questioned relative to other intersecting axes’.  
 
The role of gender relations in men’s vulnerability is a relatively neglected area of research (Enarson 
and Meyreles 2004). A notable exception is Klinenberg’s (2002) study of the 1995 Chicago heatwave 
that killed more than 700 people. At the onset of the heatwave, the U.S. Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention predicted that people who were socially isolated, lived alone, lacked access to 
transport, had a pre-existing medical condition and were without air conditioning would be most 
vulnerable. The greater number of older women living alone in Chicago suggested that more women 
would die from the heat than men. However, Klinenberg’s analysis found that older, low-income, 
black men died in greater number, chiefly because they were less well-integrated into social networks 
of support than women (see discussion of social capital above). This highlights the need to always 
assess vulnerability with fresh eyes, to avoid assumptions about who is most vulnerable. Most research 
on gendered vulnerabilities is implicitly quantitative and seeks to explain why women are more 
vulnerable to hazards than men. A broader research agenda would also encompass qualitative 
questions about the different vulnerabilities of women and men.  
 
It has been emphasised throughout this Chapter that vulnerability and resilience arise from the 
circumstances of everyday life. For sustainable livelihoods approaches, these circumstances are the 
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starting point for analyses of vulnerability to disasters (Twigg 2001). According to Chambers and 
Conway (1992, 7), 
 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (both natural and social) and activities 
required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while 
not undermining the natural resource base. 
 
Livelihoods approaches investigate ‘… how people obtain ‘assets’, what they do with then, and who 
controls the resources on which assets are based’ (Sanderson 2000, 96-97). In the context of hazards 
and disasters, the chief concern is how a person or household’s livelihood strategy influences their 
capacity to respond to shocks and stresses. For Scoones (1998, 7-8), people’s capacity to pursue 
different livelihood strategies is influenced by four types of ‘capital’:   
 
• Natural capital: the natural resource stocks (soil, water, air, genetic resources etc.) and 
environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks etc.) from which resource flows 
and services useful for livelihoods are derived. 
 
• Economic or financial capital: the capital base (cash, credit/debt, savings, and other economic 
assets, including basic infrastructure and production equipment and technologies) which are 
essential for the pursuit of any livelihood strategy. 
 
• Human capital: the skills, knowledge and ability to labour and good health and physical 
capability important for the successful pursuit of different livelihood strategies. 
 
• Social capital: the social resources (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, 
associations) upon which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies requiring 
coordinated actions. 
 
Livelihood diversity is an important element of adaptive capacity and resilience to environmental 
variability, hazards and disasters (Ellis 2000; Wisner et al. 2004; Adger et al. 2005). Households with 
diverse livelihood strategies are able to obtain assets and resources from a range of sources, which 
increases the likelihood that they will be able to meet their needs in times of crisis. For example, 
during periods of low rainfall Australian farmers may supplement their incomes by switching to 
drought-tolerant crops or livestock, gaining off-farm employment (e.g. in a local town or on a 
neighbouring property) or through loans, investment and government support. Economic diversity is 
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also important at the community or regional scale. Communities with low levels of economic diversity 
are more likely to suffer from crises and downturns in particular industries. This is particularly the 
case in resource-dependent communities, which are subject to external stresses and shocks in the form 
of environmental variability (e.g. agricultural pests or climatic extremes) and in the form of social, 
economic and political change (e.g. variability of world markets and commodity prices or changes in 
property laws) (Adger 2000). 
 
It is important to note that social science research has been criticised for neglecting analysis of the 
environmental factors influencing hazards and disasters. Blong (1997) argues that research usually 
considers the physical characteristics of hazards or the nature of human vulnerabilities, but rarely both. 
Similarly, Cardona (2004) maintains that the emphasis on understanding and modelling social 
vulnerability has led to the neglect of environmental factors in social science analyses. This point is 
most forcefully argued by Brookfield (1999, 4) who maintains that, ‘There are circumstances in which 
natural processes account for all the damage, the human contribution being merely to have been in the 
way’. Wisner et al. (2004, 9) insist that such simple ‘accidents’ are rare. Indeed, it is difficult to cite 
examples of where human action has not been implicated in the production of disasters (especially 
when ‘being in the way’ is part of the analysis, as it is here). Nevertheless, it is true that the reaction 
against the environmental determinism of past research has led to the neglect of environmental factors 
in social science analyses of hazards and disasters. Thus we can agree with Brookfield’s (1999, 10) 
statement that: 
 
The proper approach to analysis of vulnerability, whether on already impacted sites or in 
the abstract, is therefore to consider the geophysical and the human elements of the 
problem equally, without assuming that one or the other is dominant. It is wrong to 
neglect geophysical change and attribute all blame to human forces, as has been done in a 
significant part of the modern social science literature. What is needed most of all in 
dealing with problems of the human environment is a set of open minds. 
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Figure 2.2: The Pressure and Release (PAR) model: the progression of vulnerability  
Source: reproduced from Wisner et al. (2004) 
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Blaikie et al. (1994; Wisner et al. 2004) offer two interrelated models that can be used to understand 
processes of vulnerability at macro and micro scales. These are the ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) and 
‘Access’ models. The PAR model charts the progression of vulnerability from its root causes, to the 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions that create the potential for disaster in everyday life (Figure 
2.2). The model is underpinned by the idea that ‘… a disaster is the intersection of two opposing 
forces: those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and the natural hazard event (or 
sometimes a slowly unfolding natural process) on the other’ (Wisner et al. 2004, 50). The ‘chain of 
explanation’ begins with the root causes of vulnerability, which lie in the broad social, political and 
economic structures that govern society. Root causes include economic and political processes that 
affect the allocation and distribution of resources among different groups of people. People who have 
little command over resources or who live in hazardous or degraded environments are often most 
vulnerable to hazards, particularly because they are of marginal importance to those who hold political 
and economic power. The root causes of vulnerability thus reflect the distribution and exercise of 
power within a society. Root causes translate into dynamic pressures that are experienced locally 
through a lack of, for example, local institutions, appropriate training and skills, and local investments 
and markets; but also through ‘macro-forces’ such as rapid population change and urbanisation, debt 
repayment schedules and environmental degradation. Dynamic pressures in turn give way to unsafe 
conditions, which are manifested in the physical environment (e.g. dangerous locations and 
unprotected buildings and infrastructure), the local economy (e.g. low incomes and livelihood 
insecurity), social relations (e.g. ‘special groups’ at risk, weak local institutions) and in public actions 
and institutions (e.g. a lack of disaster preparedness and prevalence of endemic disease. When unsafe 
conditions interact with hazards – or more accurately, environmental processes – there is potential for 
disaster. 
 
The progression of vulnerability, as depicted in the PAR model, is illustrated in the following 
hypothetical example. Inequalities in political economic systems (root causes) can give rise to poverty 
and unemployment, which may force people to secure their livelihoods through activities such as 
illegal logging (dynamic pressures) that degrade their local environment and increase the 
hazardousness of the places they inhabit (unsafe conditions). The ‘release’ component of the model  
 
… arises from the realisation that to release the pressure that causes disasters, the entire 
chain of causation needs to be addressed right back to the root causes, and not just the 
proximate causes or triggers of the hazard itself or the unsafe conditions of vulnerability 
(Wisner et al. 2004, 87). 
 
The PAR model has been criticised for downplaying the importance of the environmental processes 
and events that trigger disasters (Turner 2003), for emphasising root causes at the expense of human 
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agency and ingenuity (Haghebaert, cited in Wisner et al. 2004), for being impractical and calling for 
‘… overall social revolution’ (Smith 1996, 51) and for neglecting the macro-political economic causes 
of vulnerability (Middleton and O'Keefe 1998). Wisner et al. (2004) acknowledge that the PAR model 
is essentially static and does not provide a framework by which to understand the conditions of 
‘normal life’ before a disaster, or the changes that may occur thereafter. Furthermore, the model ‘… 
exaggerates the separation of the hazard from the social processes in order to emphasise the social 
causation of disasters’ (Wisner et al. 2004, 92). To remedy these weaknesses, they offer the ‘Access’ 
model, which complements the PAR model by providing a framework for a more detailed analysis of 
the interactions of societies and environments at the ‘pressure point’ at which a disaster begins to 
unfold (the area depicted by the magnifying glass in Figure 2.2).   
 
The Access model centres on the analysis of household livelihoods before and during disasters (see 
Wisner et al. 2004, 89). In ‘normal’ times, households earn livelihoods and are subject to unsafe 
conditions, which occur within the broader political economic framework that is shaped by social 
relations and structures of domination. A specific hazard with particular time/space characteristics 
(where, how often, when) forms the trigger event that impacts directly on households, as well as social 
relations and structures of domination. The trigger event has the potential to break through layers of 
social protection, which includes the protection provided by structures and organisations that operate 
above the level of the household (e.g., the state, collective or community action).  When the trigger 
event breaks through the unevenly distributed layers of social protection, certain households are on the 
transition to disaster. The transition occurs and over time individual households respond and are 
impacted on different ways. The households that are least vulnerable to hazards and may be able to 
avoid disaster are those who have ‘… access to information, cash, rights to the means of production, 
tools and equipment, and the social networks to mobilise resources from outside the household’ 
(Wisner et al. 2004, 93). The final step in the Access model involves analysis of how the disaster 
altered pre-existing vulnerabilities and levels of social protection, and whether action can or will be 
taken to prevent future disasters.   
 
… the Access model sets out to explain at the micro-level the establishment and 
trajectory of vulnerability and its variation between individuals and households. It deals 
with the impact of a disaster as it unfolds, the role and agency of people involved, what 
the impacts are on them, how they cope, develop recovery strategies and interact with 
others (Wisner et al. 2004, 88). 
 
Haghebaert (cited in Wisner et al. 2004) has suggested that the Access model is more suited to the 
analysis of livelihoods than specific disaster processes and fails to adequately define issues of safety. 
He also argues that the model underemphasises non-tangible assets such as creativity, experience and 
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inventiveness, and provides a framework that does not link up with political and socio-economic 
processes. Wisner et al. (2004) maintain that the model is purposefully economistic and implicitly 
quantitative and structuralist, which enables the identification, modelling and prediction of regularities 
in the social and political processes that are part of ‘normal life’. Furthermore, they argue that, when 
the Access model is used in conjunction with the PAR model, linkages to broader political and socio-
economic processes are accounted for. Crucially, however, ‘It is very difficult to model, predict or find 
regularities in agency or inventiveness. Coping mechanisms in the face of disaster… can usually be 
described in a qualitative manner only’ (Wisner et al. 2004, 97).  
 
Having provided an overview of the literature on vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards 
and disasters, the Chapter now turns to social science literature on bushfires.  
 
2.5  Vulnerability and resilience to bushfires 
Australian bushfire research is historically the domain of the natural sciences. Consequently, the 
dominant approaches to bushfire hazard and disaster reduction have focused overwhelmingly on issues 
of fuel, weather, fire behaviour, and suppression (e.g. Cheney 1976; Luke and McArthur 1978; Gill et 
al. 1987; Cheney and Sullivan 1997; Gould 2006) and the performance (or ‘survival’) of buildings 
during bushfires (e.g. Barrow 1945; Wilson and Ferguson 1986; Ramsay et al. 1987; McArthur and 
Lutton 1991; Leonard and McArthur 1999). The natural sciences have achieved great success in 
limiting the incidence, extent and intensity of bushfires through practices such as fuel reduction 
burning and fire suppression in all but the most extreme weather conditions; however, bushfire 
disasters continue to occur. Recent fires like those in Canberra (2003), where four people died and 
more than 500 homes were destroyed, and the Wulgulmerang district, where losses were 
disproportionately high given the small size of the population, are reminders of the limits to technical 
response. A disaster was defined in Chapter 2 as a situation where a hazard causes severe damage 
and/or disruption to vulnerable people’s livelihoods, to the extent that recovery us unlikely without aid 
(Wisner et al. 2004). This definition implicates vulnerable people, livelihoods, recovery, and aid in the 
production of disasters, all of which are fashioned more by social systems than natural ones. 
 
To date, there have been no systematic analyses of human vulnerability to bushfire in Australia. 
Wettenhall’s (1975) study of the 1967 Hobart fires remains the only in-depth, social science analysis 
of an Australian bushfire disaster. Grounded in the sociological literature on disasters, Wettenhall’s 
primary interest lay in the organisational response to the fires during the primary emergency 
(‘rescue’), secondary emergency (‘remedy’) and recovery phases (Wettenhall 1975, 282). He notes 
that people around Hobart were largely unprepared for the fires, which was reflected in the widespread 
failure to remove shrubs and other fire hazards from around buildings. Fire authorities and government 
officials were also unprepared. For example, the Fire Brigade Act 1945 (Tas.) empowered urban fire 
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brigade boards to issue notices to residents and landholders to remove fire hazards, with a small fine 
for non-compliance. However, these boards had no record of residents and landholders and did not 
have the power to enter private property to remove the hazard. In any case, brigades ‘… always saw 
their main job as that of firefighting, not of administering clean-up campaigns’ (Wettenhall 1975, 71). 
The Local Government Act 1962 (Tas.) conferred similar powers on municipal councils, which also 
had no direct power to act; however, only four of the 18 councils in the area subsequently affected by 
fires had issued notices. With periods of fire danger occurring each summer, Wettenhall (1975, 71) 
suggests that ‘Tasmanians had heard it all before’ and thus responded to warnings with the attitude: ‘It 
can’t happen here’. 
 
As noted, Wettenhall’s (1975) main objective was to examine the role of government and other 
organisations in official and unofficial responses to the 1967 fires. In particular, he explores the 
interactions between government, non-government organisations and emergent groups during the 
emergency and recovery phases already mentioned. Having provided a thorough analysis of the 
administrative and political contexts in which the fires and subsequent responses took place, 
Wettenhall highlights the role of emergent organisations in filling the gaps in established 
organisations’ responses. Particularly in the area of ‘community relief and social welfare’, these 
emergent groups ‘… thrived at least in part because of the inability of other sections of the State’s 
administrative system to respond in sufficiently bold, sufficiently imaginative ways to the stimulus of 
disaster’ (Wettenhall 1975, 274). They included, for example, the Emergency Civil Relief and 
Rehabilitation Committee, which among other things became involved in housing and public health 
issues, and the Emergency Stock Control Committee, which helped farmers to agist, sell and slaughter 
surviving stock, dispose of dead stock, and re-fence their properties. While some might argue that ‘… 
something is lacking in a community that depends so heavily in a time of emergency on such 
unplanned, unstructured and spontaneous efforts’, Wettenhall maintains that they played a vital role in 
recovery efforts (Wettenhall 1975, 274). This view is supported by the disaster sociology literature, 
which confirms that emergent organisations often benefit emergency and disaster response, even if 
they sometimes complicate or frustrate official efforts (Drabek and McEntire 2003, see Appendix 2.1). 
Importantly, the analysis does not consider people’s differential vulnerability to the bushfires in any 
great depth, either in terms of hazard exposure or adaptive capacity. 
 
This section focuses on four broad areas of research that inform understandings of human vulnerability 
and resilience to bushfire hazards. These research areas are classified as: bushfire hazard perception 
and adjustment; protection of people and property; politics of fire and fire management; and 
‘emerging’ perspectives. 
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2.5.1  Bushfire hazard perception and adjustment 
A large part of the ‘social science’ literature on bushfires in Australia focuses on individuals’ 
perceptions of and adjustments to bushfire hazards (e.g. Learmont 1971; Edgell 1973; Edgell and 
Brown 1975; Mugford 1975; Immurs 1976; Fleeton 1980; Pagram 1989; Beringer 2000). It fits with 
the natural hazards perspective discussed above, and is best characterised as ‘behavioural’ rather than 
‘social’ science. These studies tend to emphasise the influence of factors such as hazard awareness, 
experience and self-efficacy in bushfire preparedness and response. Edgell and Brown (1975), for 
example, examined people’s perceptions of and adjustments to bushfire hazards in the Dandenong 
Ranges, Victoria. They reported a generally high level of bushfire awareness in the area, but noted that 
people who had direct experience of fires and/or lived in a more hazardous location exhibited a 
heightened awareness of bushfire hazards. Furthermore, they found that ‘People living in high hazard 
zones… appear to view the problem more seriously and to possess a more comprehensive knowledge 
of the possible range of adjustments than those living in low hazard zones’ (Edgell and Brown 1975, 
346-347). Responses to the survey question ‘What would you do if threatened by a fire?’ are taken to 
reflect people’s knowledge of hazards and adjustments, rather than assessments of what they 
realistically could or would do, given their personal circumstances (e.g. family and work 
responsibilities, financial resources, level of insurance cover, etc.) (see also Edgell 1973).  
 
It was noted in the earlier discussion of perception research that these studies assumed an objective 
hazard or risk, which can only be perceived by non-experts. This view is evident in Fleeton’s (1980, 
355) analysis of adjustment to bushfire hazards in New South Wales, which he opens with the 
statement: 
 
A distinction should firstly be drawn between the hazard environment as perceived by the 
population of the study areas and the hazard environment which this writer has attempted 
to describe in a scientific and objective manner. Essentially, there are two levels of 
perception involved here and these will be respectively labelled the ‘perceived 
environment’ and the ‘objective environment’. 
 
Fleeton (1980, 358-59) administered a questionnaire to parents of children at state primary schools, 
concluding that bushfire hazard perception and adjustment ‘… is largely a function of hazard 
experience’. People with direct experience of bushfires – usually those who had inhabited fire prone 
environments for long periods of time – were found more likely to make long-term adjustments. Those 
who perceived a high frequency of bushfires, but had not been personally threatened, were found more 
likely to take short-term, ‘emergency’ adjustments. For Fleeton, these findings highlight the need for 
education and publicity programs that are explicitly targeted at people who are migrating into fire 
prone environments with no prior experience of bushfires. Such programs, he argues, should 
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emphasise the need for long-term adjustments and ‘… endeavour to make residents aware of the real 
frequency of hazard occurrence and thereby attempt to raise levels of hazard perception and associated 
human adjustment’ (Fleeton 1980, 359).  
 
Beringer (2000) reports a high level of awareness of bushfire hazards among people living in fire 
prone areas of North Warrandyte, Victoria. He notes that although residents who recognise potential 
bushfire hazards are more likely to take protective action than those who don’t, ‘It is important to 
establish that awareness of bushfires as a hazard does not imply preparedness’ (Beringer 2000, 14). 
Moreover, he notes that information provision and receipt does not necessarily encourage protective 
behaviour. He argues that ‘passive approaches’, such as information campaigns, ‘… require a great 
deal of reinforcement before they produce any significant change in perception or behaviour’ 
(Beringer 2000, 14). Education and information campaigns must therefore be supported by programs 
that assist local people to take responsibility for their own fire safety (i.e. become self-reliant). 
 
In the United States, researchers have addressed questions of wildfire hazard perception and 
adjustment on a much larger scale. Studies have investigated individuals’ perceptions of and 
adjustments to wildfire hazards (e.g. Gardner et al. 1987; McCaffrey 2004; Martin, Bender, and Raish 
2007; Martin, Raish, and Kent 2007) and their preferences for various fire management strategies, 
including the use of prescribed fire to meet ecological and hazard reduction objectives (e.g. Taylor and 
Daniel 1984; Cortner et al. 1990; Nelson et al. 2004; Vogt et al. 2005). This latter work is geared 
predominantly toward increasing the social acceptability of land management practices such as 
prescribed burning, forest thinning and creating defensible space (Schindler 2007). Winter and Fried 
(2000), for example, found that because homeowners in rural Michigan viewed forest fires as 
uncontrollable, causing random destruction, they were only weakly supportive of investments in 
firefighting infrastructure and were unlikely to take all necessary precautions to protect their 
properties. Moreover, homeowners were found to have negative perceptions of prescribed fire, which 
effectively precludes its use to reduce hazard at the wildland-urban interface.   
 
McCaffrey (2004) argues explicitly for the application of natural hazards theory to the study of how 
individuals respond to wildfire hazards. The stated aim of her paper is to provide insights into these 
four interrelated questions:  
 
(1) How can people move into high-fire-hazard areas and not see the danger? (2) How 
can anyone experience a fire and still do nothing? (3) Why do they do nothing even when 
they’ve been given information about the danger? (4) Why do people who do understand 
the risk still do nothing? (McCaffrey 2004, 510) 
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McCaffrey searches for answers to these questions in individuals’ cognitive capacities to accurately 
perceive hazards; calculate probability or risk; and estimate potential damage. She argues that 
individuals manage the inherent uncertainty of hazards by ‘… resort[ing] to various mental strategies, 
often introducing misinformation and bias into their risk estimate in the process’ (McCaffrey 2004, 
511). Strategies to manage this uncertainty apparently include outright denial of the existence of risks, 
total faith in adjustments such as fire suppression, and the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (the belief that a recent 
event is unlikely to recur in the immediate future). One explanation for the failure to take action after 
having experienced a wildfire – or, perhaps more accurately, the failure to take actions that hazard 
managers deem necessary – is that people may have become ‘… so used to a hazard that it simply 
becomes part of life and mitigation is not even considered’ (McCaffrey 2004, 512). However, this 
would suggest that wildfires no longer constitute a hazard, for people have made livelihood or other 
cultural and economic adjustments and adaptations that render its impacts negligible, or at least 
tolerable (e.g. insurance, bearing losses etc.). However, the starkest omission from this attempt to 
explain individuals’ responses to wildfire hazards is any consideration of the social, economic and 
political contexts in which decisions are made. Nowhere is it considered that people may be compelled 
to inhabit hazardous areas, for example, by high property prices or rents. Moreover, the explanation of 
why ‘people who do understand the risk still do nothing’ neglects any consideration of how, for 
example, time and resource constraints may limit people’s capacity to take action.  
 
Questions of hazard perception and decision-making are undoubtedly important to understandings of 
how people prepare for and respond to bushfire hazards. However, no decision or action is ever free of 
context. Without more holistic analyses of the social, economic and political factors that influence 
decisions and enable and constrain human action, a sole focus on bushfire hazard perception and 
adjustment will facilitate little in the way of vulnerability reduction or enhanced resilience. Wisner et 
al. (2004, 7) suggest that: 
 
There is often a reluctance to deal with such factors because it is politically expedient (i.e. 
less difficult for those in power) to address the technical factors that deal with natural 
hazards. Changing social and economic factors usually means altering the way that power 
operates in a society. 
 
To be fair, many of those who work within fire and other emergency services appreciate the role of 
social, economic and political factors in the production of risk and vulnerability. However, given that 
these agencies are typically mandated with emergency response and/or recovery, their capacities to 
address the underlying causes of vulnerability are severely limited. Consequently, fire and emergency 
services tend to concentrate their efforts on measures that are directly related to the hazard(s) to which 
they respond. Hazard awareness and education programs (i.e. information provision) are regarded as 
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relatively cheap and easy ways to reduce community vulnerability, and this is reflected in the 
prominence of hazard perception and choice studies in social science research on bushfires. However, 
as noted earlier, the effectiveness (and thus cost-effectiveness) of these programs in promoting the 
adoption of protective behaviour remains largely untested. Vulnerability reduction is a ‘whole of 
government’ and ‘whole of civil society’ problem that requires strategic, integrated interventions at 
multiple scales. For these reasons, vulnerability reduction remains a fundamental challenge to state 
and non-state actors alike. 
 
2.5.2  Protecting people and property from bushfires 
As noted, Australian bushfire research has traditionally concentrated on the geophysical causes of fire 
hazards and disasters. Nevertheless, research from the natural sciences provides some evidence of 
differential vulnerability to bushfires, demonstrated by recurring patterns of disproportionate damage 
and loss among particular groups and individuals within fire-affected areas. For example, in an 
investigation into the causes of the 1967 Hobart bushfires in Tasmania, which claimed 62 lives and 
destroyed more than 1300 houses, fire scientists McArthur and Cheney (1967) found that the majority 
of those who died were old and infirm or suffered from a physical disability. Similarly, Wettenhall’s 
(1975) analysis reveals that 39 of the 53 people who died from burns were aged over 50 years. He 
concludes that, 
 
Older people thus suffered disproportionately to their numbers in the community, 
reflecting their decreased mobility and their susceptibility to the effects of prolonged 
exposure to heat and heavy smoke (Wettenhall 1975, 78). 
 
Similar results emerged from a study of Victoria’s 1983 ‘Ash Wednesday’ fires, which claimed 47 
lives and destroyed more than 2000 homes. In a case study of the Mount Macedon fires, Wilson and 
Ferguson (1984) found that the death rate for people aged over 50 years was seven times higher than 
for those aged 24 and under. Importantly, however, they observed cases where people in their 70s and 
80s actively and successfully defended their homes from the fires. In what can be seen as an early call 
for vulnerability assessment, they argued that, 
 
There are, however, persons who cannot defend themselves, for physical or psychological 
reasons. There is a clear need to develop means of identifying these people in advance, 
and to plan for their protection in the event of a bushfire (Wilson and Ferguson 1984, 
235).  
 
Another important finding of Wilson and Ferguson’s study was that 90 percent of houses that were 
actively defended by able-bodied occupants survived the fires, compared to 82 percent of attended 
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(but not actively defended) and just 44 percent of unattended houses. Consequently, it was concluded 
that, 
 
 … provided they are adequately informed of the danger and risks involved, mature, able-
bodied residents can minimise loss of life, and probably save their houses, by staying 
within the safety of their homes (Wilson and Ferguson 1984, 235). 
 
Research on building ignition during bushfires supports the assertion that well-prepared houses can be 
successfully defended and can provide safe refuge during the main passage of the fire front (Leonard 
and McArthur 1999). It shows that wind-blown embers – rather than direct flame contact or radiant 
heat – are the most common source of house ignition before, during and after the main passage of the 
fire front (Leonard 2003; Blanchi and Leonard 2008). For example, in their study of the Ash 
Wednesday fires in the Otway Ranges, Ramsay et al. (1987, 50) found that residents ‘… were able to 
save their houses by extinguishing small ignitions of the house itself before these fires became 
uncontrollable’. Evidence that ordinary people can protect their homes from bushfires by staying to 
actively defend them has been compiled by Handmer and Tibbits (2005).  
 
Research also confirms that late evacuation is a leading cause of fatalities in bushfires. An analysis of 
recorded bushfire fatalities in Australia (Tibbits et al. 2008) found that 78 percent of all deaths 
occurred outside or in an indefensible space. Late evacuations are typically triggered by the 
appearance of flames and/or heavy smoke in the vicinity of a person’s home. By this late stage, it is 
likely that driving a vehicle will have become very difficult, with flames, smoke, strong winds, fallen 
trees and the urgency of the situation increasing the likelihood that a driver will become disorientated 
or lose control of the vehicle. In the 2005 Eyre Peninsula bushfires, for example, eight of the nine 
people killed – including four children – died in or near their cars after attempting to flee the fires 
(Deputy State Coroner 2005). Similarly, in 1969 a fast moving grassfire at Lara killed 17 motorists 
who abandoned their cars on the Melbourne to Geelong Freeway. At least six people sheltered in their 
cars and survived (AFAC 2005a). However, sheltering in cars is not always a safe option. Luke and 
McArthur (1978) recount a case from the 1965 Longwood fires in Victoria where a party of seven 
women and children were advised to evacuate as the fire front approached. The car in which they were 
travelling crashed in heavy smoke, just 300 metres from the house. Their bodies were found outside 
the car, which would not have provided safe refuge due to heavy fuels. Nevertheless, Luke and 
McArthur (1978, 232) note that, 
 
Their safety could have been assured by staying at their house, for although it caught 
alight and eventually burnt down, the rate of burning was slow at first and the house 
could have been saved if able-bodied persons had been present. 
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Evidence that (a) late evacuation is a very dangerous response to bushfires and (b) that well-prepared 
houses can be successfully defended from bushfires and provide safe refuge for people during the 
main passage of the fire front has informed development of the Australasian Fire Authorities Council 
‘Stay and defend or leave early’ policy (AFAC 2005b). Australian fire authorities advise residents to 
decide, prior to the start of each fire season, whether they will prepare, stay and defend their property 
from bushfires or leave well before the fire arrives in their area. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
policy has been successful in reducing losses of human life and property from bushfires; however, its 
effectiveness is yet to be formally evaluated. Nevertheless, a survey by Rhodes (2005) found that 
although people agreed that the ‘stay and defend’ option protects property, they did not agree that it 
protects life. Furthermore, while people agreed that the ‘leave early’ option protects life, they did not 
agree that it protects property. Consequently, Rhodes found that most people prefer to ‘wait and see’ 
what happens before they make a definite decision and this creates potential for late evacuation.5 
Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) found high levels of awareness and support for the policy following the 
2003 Victorian bushfires. However, they identified two critical issues for implementation of the 
policy. First, they found that some of those who planned to leave early were unsure of when to leave, 
and were unable to recognise the point at which leaving early was no longer a safe strategy. Second, 
they reported that many of those who had planned to stay and defend their properties from the fires 
were not fully committed to doing so. It was revealed that many of these people consciously or 
unconsciously retained late evacuation as a last minute option, despite widespread recognition of the 
dangers of such a strategy. 
 
2.5.3  The politics of fire and fire management 
A number of social scientists have considered the politics of bushfires and their management. Robbins 
(1990) documents the protracted conflict that followed the 1980 Stirling bushfires in South Australia, 
where victims’ claims of liability against the local council developed into a long and costly legal 
battle. Claims of negligence against fire authorities and public land managers are increasingly 
common after bushfires, yet there has been little research in this area. In July 2005 it was reported that 
victims of the 2003 Canberra bushfires were pursuing civil action against the ACT, NSW and 
Commonwealth governments and the ACT Emergency Services Authority for an alleged 54 instances 
of negligence. These included allegations that authorities had failed to communicate adequate 
information to residents about the fires, did not implement an appropriate strategy to contain the fires, 
and had neglected fuel reduction on public land (Doherty 2005). Similarly, a group of farmers from 
north east Victoria threatened to sue the DSE for its alleged failure to manage fuel loads on public land 
prior to the 2003 Victorian bushfires (Hunt 2003). 
 
                                               
5
 Approximately 60 percent of respondents in Rhodes’ survey (n = 718) stated that they would wait and see what 
happened before making a clear decision to stay and defend or leave ‘early’. 
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Debates about bushfires often centre on issues of fuel management. Pyne (1998; 2006) has traced the 
history of fire management in Australia from its Aboriginal roots to the present day. Importantly, he 
highlights the role of culture and values in shaping the course of fire management. Most notably, the 
rise of modern environmentalism since the 1960s has seen increased concern about the ecological 
impacts of fire management strategies, particularly prescribed burning for fuel reduction. Throughout 
Australia, contemporary fire management has the dual aims of protecting human life and property 
from bushfires, and maintaining and conserving biodiversity. However, Gill (1981, 93) notes that,  
 
While particular fire regimes may be more desirable than others for the well-being of the 
biota, the best fire protection of human life and property is afforded by minimal fuel 
quantities maintained by frequent fires of low intensity. [In other words]… the fire 
regime best suited to the biota may differ widely from that best suited to fire protection. 
 
The issue of prescribed burning figured prominently in debates over fire management after the 2003 
Victorian bushfires. Many rural people demanded greater fuel reduction on public land to protect 
human life and private property, while conservationists argued for strategic fuel reduction, prescribed 
fire for ecological purposes or, in some cases, total fire exclusion (Whittaker and Mercer 2004).  
 
Gill (1994) examines the cultural politics of bushfire management in a conservation reserve on 
Kangaroo Island, South Australia. He focuses on the conflict between the local, rural community and 
the South Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (SANPWS). At issue was the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of fire management strategies, particularly the practice of fuel reduction burning. 
The SANPWS restricted its use of fuel reduction to small, strategic areas because, in their view, the 
practice: (a) does not necessarily prevent high intensity fires; (b) may in fact increase the available fuel 
load; and (c) may have negative ecological impacts. However, like most people in the Wulgulmerang 
district (see Chapter 5), Kangaroo islanders believe that regular and broad-scale fuel reduction burning 
prevents high intensity bushfires. As Gill points out, islanders’ calls for more fuel reduction and access 
tracks in conservation reserves (aiding fuel reduction and fire suppression) could be dismissed as 
evidence of indifference towards conservation efforts. However, he notes that ‘… both sides in the 
conflict appear to have best intentions with respect to conservation [which] raises the question of 
exactly what is the ‘environment’ that both are concerned to protect?’ (Gill 1994, 232). Highlighting 
the role of environmental values and beliefs in the debate, he suggests that ‘… global perspectives on 
environment and resource management issues are overtaking local perspectives’, with rising concern 
for environmental protection and conservation transforming public and private land management (Gill 
1994, 237). This shift is indicated in the increased number and size of conservation reserves, in 
citizens’ reduced access to public land, and in tighter controls on public and private land management, 
including the use of fire and native vegetation clearance. Or, as Gill (1994, 237) puts it, ‘They can no 
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longer burn, they can no longer clear, and access to some areas has been restricted’. He suggests that 
the processes of change on Kangaroo Island have led to the disempowerment and marginalisation of 
local people, who have effectively lost control over the place to which they feel a strong attachment. 
 
Gill’s (1994) study has special relevance for this research. Residents and landholders of the 
Wulgulmerang district also lament the transformation of public and private land management, which 
they attribute to the rise of modern environmentalism and rampant government bureaucracy. They too 
have seen an increase in the number and size of National Parks, the centralisation of, and reduced 
public participation in, public land management, and an increase in regulatory controls over the use 
and management of private land (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7). Importantly, however, Gill (1994, 237-238) 
concludes his paper with the strong argument that, 
 
Plurality of meaning on Kangaroo Island should not translate into an absolute respect for 
the position and arguments of the Islanders. To follow such a course is to veer close to 
uncritical acceptance of the status quo. In general, the status quo for Australia’s 
agricultural areas has been land degradation, loss of habitat and marginalisation and loss 
of flora and fauna. If the islanders were granted ‘responsible autonomy’ as they appear to 
desire, there is reason to believe that such processes would continue to a significant 
extent, for example, through inappropriate burning practices in native vegetation and 
continued native vegetation clearance. 
 
2.5.4  Fire, livelihoods and poverty 
Increasingly, researchers are investigating the role of fire in rural livelihood strategies; forms of 
community-based fire management; and disparities between resource-user and state fire management 
objectives in developing countries (e.g. Kull 2004; Kepe 2005; McDaniel et al. 2005; Mistry et al. 
2005; Tacconi and Ruchiat 2006; Eriksen 2007; Russell-Smith et al. 2007). Fire is used by indigenous 
and non-indigenous people across the world to manage vegetation for productive and ecological 
purposes. For example, Malagasy farmers and herders burn around half of Madagascar’s grasslands 
and woodlands each year to maintain pastures and woodlands, prepare crop-fields, control pests, and 
manage wildfires (Kull 2002b). Similarly, graziers in the Wulgulmerang district use fire to improve 
pasture for livestock and to reduce the amount of fuel for bushfire on their properties (see Chapter 4). 
Governments, however, are often less than enthusiastic about their citizens’ burning practices. In 
Madagascar, the state criminalised burning for fear that fire was destroying natural resources and 
hindering national development (Kull 2002b). In Indonesia, the government introduced legislation to 
outlaw landscape burning, despite its importance to rural livelihoods, due to concerns about the 
negative economic and environmental impacts of fires. In 1997/98 forest fires burned 11.7 million ha 
of forested and other land throughout the Indonesian archipelago at an estimated cost of more than 
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USD 5 billion. The fires also affected the health of millions of people in Indonesia and neighbouring 
countries, with smoke and haze stretching for more than 1 million km² (Tacconi and Ruchiat 2006). 
Residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district have also experienced an increase in 
regulatory controls over burning and other aspects of public land use.  
 
Resistance to state control of resource management is a recurrent theme in research on fire and 
livelihoods (Kull 2002b, 2004; Laris 2004; Laris and Wardell 2006; Rodríguez 2007; see Scott 1985). 
Centralised, top-down approaches to resource management and conservation consistently fail to 
achieve objectives and are often met with resistance from local people (Scott 1985, 1998). As Kull 
(2002a, 59) argues, ‘Powerful plans and ideas are constantly being subverted by situated practices; 
humans are creative and constantly carving complexities into grand simplifying ideas’. Fire, in 
particular, has often been used as a symbolically and materially powerful tool for rural resistance and 
protest. Kuhlken (1999, 360) notes that: 
 
… it is often the case that a restriction or prohibition on the use of fire is precisely what 
prompts an incendiary reaction. Where burning traditionally has been used to maintain 
lands in productive use, illegally set fires may be both practical and highly symbolic. 
 
A series of reports in the United States has attempted to understand the connections between wildfires 
and poverty (Niemi and Lee 2001; Lynn 2003; Lynn and Gerlitz 2005). Few studies have considered 
the relationship between economic capabilities and the potential for disastrous bushfires (or wildfires). 
The authors of the initial Wildfire and poverty report argue that ‘… poverty, in the context of 
wildfires, means people and communities unable, because of inadequate financial or non-financial 
resources, to take the steps necessary to protect themselves, their families, their homes, and other 
assets from the risks of wildfire’ (Niemi and Lee 2001, 29). Importantly, the report notes that 
economic damages from wildfires are often disproportionately large for poor households. This is 
because low income families often have a greater share of their total asset base, such as houses, 
vehicles and livestock, at risk from fires. Poor people are also more likely to live in areas with low 
levels of fire protection and are less likely to have the necessary insurance to replace damaged 
possessions.  
 
Wildfires intensify poverty by having a pervasive, disproportionately negative impact on 
those households and communities lacking adequate resources to reduce the flammability 
of nearby wildlands, fire-proof homes and other structures, respond quickly when 
wildfires occur, and recover from economic losses resulting from fires (Niemi and Lee 
2001, 1). 
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More recently, an attempt to map the relationship between wildfire and poverty found that more poor 
households are located in close proximity to federal lands and are therefore at greater risk (Lynn and 
Gerlitz 2005). Moreover, it was found that many of these households are located in areas that are not 
part of the ‘Wildland Urban Interface’, a zone that receives priority funding under the National Fire 
Plan.  
 
The economic context of the January 30 fires and the financial capacities of those who were affected 
figure prominently in the analysis of the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster that follows.   
 
2.6  Missing voices and situated knowledge 
Vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards are analysed or assessed in numerous ways. 
Approaches may be quantitative or qualitative, or combine elements of the two. Wisner (2004) 
identifies four main approaches to vulnerability assessment. Demographic approaches consider the 
vulnerability of people, things and systems concurrently. They adopt engineering-inspired definitions 
of vulnerability and, in the process of conceptualising whole systems, tend to lose sight of people’s 
differential vulnerability. Taxonomic approaches distinguish between different types of vulnerability – 
for example, social, economic, environmental and informational – and draw on empirically developed 
taxonomies to investigate why identifiable social groups are more vulnerable than others. For 
example, Buckle et al. (2000, 11) identify twenty ‘… groups that are more susceptible to loss’. These 
include people who are: aged; very young; non-English speakers; Indigenous Australians; socially 
isolated; physically ill; in large families; in single-parent families; on low incomes; tourists from 
overseas; and living close to areas of hazard. A degree of generalisation is always necessary for 
decision-makers; however, the huge variations that inevitably exist between and within these 
taxonomic groups (as distinct from social groups) raise doubts as to the value of such generalisation. 
Furthermore, taxonomies also run the risk of stigmatising those who may already be marginalised and 
disempowered. 
 
Rather than attempting to identify the ‘group’ a person or family belongs to, situational approaches 
seek to understand vulnerability in the contest of people’s everyday lives and how it changes through 
time (Wisner 2004). Disasters are viewed as manifestations of pre-existing, everyday problems, such 
as livelihood insecurity (Sanderson 2000), rather than exceptional events. Situational approaches to 
vulnerability assessment recognise three types of contingency. The first is that vulnerability is not a 
permanent property or status of an individual or social group, but is a situation that changes with 
respect to a particular hazard. Second, people’s situations change on a daily, seasonal and yearly basis, 
which means that their access to power and resources is constantly in flux. The third contingency 
concerns peoples’ constantly overlapping identities and forms of empowerment and marginality. 
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Consequently, situational approaches emphasise the dynamic and differentiated nature of 
vulnerability. 
 
Finally, contextual and proactive approaches draw on elements of the first three, but are distinguished 
by the involvement of ‘communities’ in the identification of their own hazard exposure and adaptive 
capacities (Wisner 2004). Most vulnerability assessments are undertaken by well-educated elites who 
work within scientific, expert knowledge systems that largely disregard local knowledge (Delica-
Willison and Willison 2004). An early study by Waddell (1975; 1983) showed that, following 
prolonged drought and a series of frosts in New Guinea, the imposition of a foreign famine relief 
program undermined the Enga’s traditional adaptive strategies. Despite ample evidence that local 
people knew how to cope with frosts, decision-making was centralised away from the disaster area and 
local officials and expertise were systematically bypassed (Waddell 1983). Clearly, there is a strong 
case for involving local people in assessments of, and strategies to reduce, their own vulnerabilities: 
 
Despite the difficulties and contradictions involved in ‘speaking for’ other human beings, 
much of the work on social vulnerability tries to break out of the hegemonic 
‘development’ and ‘disaster’ discourses by providing space for subaltern stories and 
voices (Wisner 2004, 189). 
 
It is important to recognise that the degree of involvement will depend on the capacities of those who 
participate. Most individuals, groups and communities will need at least some support from the 
‘experts’, if only to ensure inclusive and participative processes. A drawback of contextual and 
proactive approaches is that they require an investment of time that people may be unable or unwilling 
to make. 
 
The ‘missing voices’ of environmental hazards and disaster research is a recurrent theme in the work 
of Hewitt (1983a; 1995; 1997; 1998) and this has been particularly influential in the research 
presented throughout this thesis:  
 
To listen to, value, and try to understand the plight and experience of ordinary people in 
everyday settings, and the victims of disaster, presupposes a concern with who they are 
and where their experiences take place. To focus on their words is to recognise that these 
are the only way to recover experience in other places and times. To pay close attention to 
what they say, their story and concerns, gives them direct entry into the concepts and 
discussions of social and disaster research (Hewitt 1998, 42). 
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2.7  The conceptual framework of the research 
Contemporary perspectives on human vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards and 
disasters can be traced to early geographical studies of human adjustment to ‘natural hazards’ (White 
1945). These studies sought to understand processes of hazard adjustment by examining the ways in 
which people perceive hazards and the range of possible adjustments, and then choose among the 
options that seem available to them (Burton et al. 1978). This emphasis on human perception and 
individual decision-making engendered a policy approach to hazard and disaster reduction based on 
education and information provision (Sims and Baumann 1983). Despite their prevalence, there 
remains little evidence of the effectiveness of awareness and education programs in reducing damage 
and loss from hazards and disasters (Mileti 1999). Natural hazards research attracted sustained 
criticism for neglecting analysis of the social, political and economic constraints on choice, which 
reflect social inequalities and disparities in power. Consequently, perspectives on human vulnerability 
emerged that sought to understand people’s exposure to hazards and their capacities for adapting to 
potential impacts in the contexts of their everyday lives. 
 
Despite the diversity of perspectives on vulnerability and resilience, the basic approach is governed by 
the idea that ‘… the natural forces that are present in any environment have enormous power to affect 
society; but it is society that actualises the potential of the hazard’ (Oliver-Smith 2004, 19). Research 
attempts to de-naturalise hazards and disasters by demonstrating that their causes and impacts are 
generated primarily by social rather than natural causes. It dismisses the idea of disasters as 
unanticipated Acts of Nature that randomly inflict damage on those who happen to find themselves in 
the way. Instead, analyses of human vulnerability and resilience ask why some people, in the courses 
of their everyday lives, are more vulnerable (or resilient) to these seemingly natural events. This 
research is explicitly framed by the concept of vulnerability, which, unlike resilience, enables analysis 
of two fundamentally important elements of any hazard or disaster: (a) people’s exposure to hazards; 
and (b) their capacities for coping and adapting to hazard impacts. Consequently, two key questions lie 
at the centre of vulnerability analysis: 
 
• How and why are people differentially exposed to environmental hazards (which includes 
analysis of their capacities to reduce their exposure)?; and 
 
• How and why are people differentially capable of coping with or adapting to potential hazard 
impacts? 
 
While resilience is not the overt focus of this thesis, the resilience concepts and research reviewed in 
this Chapter have direct relevance to this thesis and have influenced the analysis that follows. 
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Figure 2.3: The conceptual framework of the research 
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Figure 2.3 outlines the conceptual framework of this research. Analysis begins with people’s exposure 
to hazards, which entails investigation of the geophysical processes and the human locations, land uses 
and activities that give rise to bushfire hazards. Household and state capacities for mitigating and 
responding to hazards and emergencies are also examined. The second part of the framework 
concentrates on household and state capacities to cope with and adapt to actual or potential hazard 
impacts. Primary impacts include direct damages and loss; for example, the destruction of a home or 
livestock. Secondary impacts are the longer-term consequences of primary impacts and of responses to 
primary impacts; for example, inequitable distribution of relief and recovery funds. Where household 
and state capacities are inadequate for coping with primary and secondary impacts, there is potential 
for disaster. Finally, there may be rare instances, as depicted by the broken arrows, where geophysical 
processes are the prime cause of disasters. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the philosophy, strategy and methods that were used to investigate the research 
aims and questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2. It is organised into five sections. First, the philosophical 
framework that underpins the research is outlined. The ontological and epistemological foundations of 
critical realism are discussed. This philosophy asserts that objects (and phenomena), including social 
objects, exist in the world regardless of human knowledge about them, which is always transitive and 
fallible (Scott 2007). Second, the intensive research strategy employed throughout the thesis is 
examined. A distinction is drawn between intensive research, which places a premium on 
understanding how things happen, and extensive research, which is principally concerned with how 
often things happen (Gregory 2000). Justification is provided for the case study approach and the 
primarily qualitative research methods that are used to investigate human vulnerability to bushfires in 
the Wulgulmerang district. Third, the research methods that were used to collect data are outlined. 
Particular attention is paid to the semi-structured, in-depth interviews and participant observations that 
yielded the bulk of the data. The fourth section discusses the methods and procedures that were used to 
analyse the qualitative data. The final section examines the ethical and political considerations of the 
research and the measures that were taken to ensure the dignity, safety and wellbeing of informants. 
 
3.2 Philosophical framework 
3.2.1 Ontology and epistemology 
Assumptions about human knowledge and the realities encountered in the human world permeate all 
stages of the research process. These assumptions shape the meaning of research questions, the 
purpose of research methods, and how research findings are interpreted (Crotty 1998). This point is 
well made by Sayer (1992, 2), who argues that: 
 
So much depends in social research on the initial definition of our field of study and on 
how we conceptualize key objects… All such starting points are fraught with problems 
which, whether noticed or not, shape the course of research long before ‘methods’ in the 
narrow sense of techniques for getting and interpreting information are chosen. 
 
Consequently, before entering into discussion of the methods that were used to gather and analyse 
data, it is necessary to elucidate the philosophical framework on which the research rests. This 
requires examination of the ontological and epistemological positions that I take as a researcher. 
Ontology, the study of being or existence, questions the way things are in the world, whereas 
epistemology, the study of the nature of knowledge, questions how human beings attain knowledge 
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about the world (Ashe et al. 1999). Social research is characterised by an array of ontological and 
epistemological positions. Bryman (2004) argues that two are dominant: objectivism and 
constructionism. Objectivism is the belief that ‘… things exist as meaningful entities independently of 
[human] consciousness and experience, [and] that they have truth and meaning in them as objects’ 
(Crotty 1998, 5). Ecocentric philosophy, for example, is underpinned by an objectivist ontology that 
asserts the intrinsic value of all animate and inanimate entities, regardless of their utility or value to 
human beings (Eckersley 1992). Constructionism, on the other hand, rejects notions of objective truth 
and asserts that all meaning is constructed or produced by social actors. An element of 
constructionism is evident in Ewald’s declaration that: ‘Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in 
reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, 
considers the event’ (1991, 199, emphasis in original).  
 
Hughes (1990) argues that social research is characterised primarily by positivist and hermeneutic (or 
interpretivist) epistemologies. Positivism emerged in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, principally in the thought of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), René Descartes (1596-1650) and, 
later, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Positivism is the dominant epistemology in the natural sciences 
and, to a lesser degree, the social sciences. Delanty (1997) identifies five core tenets of positivism: 
 
i. There is no essential difference between the methods of natural science and those of social 
science. Natural science is the model for all sciences. 
ii. There is unity in the subject matter of science, which is reducible to observable units or 
naturalistic phenomena. Positivism therefore entails: (a) reductionism or atomism; (b) 
belief that the truths of science correspond with the nature of reality; and (c) an objectivist 
view that nature exists outside of science and can be neutrally observed. 
iii. Science involves direct observation and verification by way of experimental method (i.e. 
empiricism). Scientists conduct experiments to discover objectively existing, general laws 
that can be used to generate hypotheses, make predictions and explain phenomena. 
iv. Science is value-free. Scientific truth is a verifiable and explanatory statement about an 
objectively existing reality and is therefore free of scientists’ subjective social and ethical 
values. Scientific knowledge is different from all other kinds of human knowledge 
because it can be verified and can therefore be said to be universally true. 
v. The aim of science is to discover instrumental knowledge; that is, knowledge that is 
technically useful, for example, for creating vaccines or new technologies. 
 
Throughout the twentieth century and especially since the 1950s, social scientists began to challenge 
the hegemony of positivist science. This saw the emergence of hermeneutic epistemologies, anchored 
in constructionist ontology. Hermeneutics is characterised by six dominant tendencies: 
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i. Hermeneutics subordinates the explanation and description of social reality – which is too 
complex to be comprehended simply through observation – to the interpretation of 
meaning. 
ii. It entails a separation of the social and natural science, both in terms of method and 
subject matter. 
iii. Hermeneutical approaches are typically relativist and are uncritical of their subject matter.  
iv. Nevertheless, these approaches acknowledge that the possibility of interpretation 
presupposes the unity of human nature. ‘Thus, while different cultures and historical 
periods may have different values, there is an underlying human nature that remains 
constant: the belief that the world cannot be meaningless’ (Delanty 1997, 40). 
v. Hermeneutics emphasises the importance of language in the constitution of social 
structure and therefore challenges the methodological individualism of positivism. 
vi. In stark contrast to positivism, hermeneutical epistemologies emphasise the inter-
subjective relationship between science and its object and therefore the role of cultural and 
social factors in the production of knowledge.  
 
3.2.2  Critical realist philosophy 
Critical realism is a philosophy of science that developed from critiques of both positivism and 
hermeneutics (Bhaskar 1975; 1979). Indeed, Sayer (1992, 3) notes that critical realism simultaneously 
challenges common conceptions of natural and social science and therefore ‘… proposes a way of 
combining a modified naturalism with a recognition of the necessity of interpretative understanding of 
meaning in social science’. Critical realism upholds the distinction between ontology and 
epistemology; that is, between an objectively existing world and human knowledge of it (Yeung 
1997). This is evident in Bhaskar’s (1975) distinction between the ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ 
dimensions of knowledge. The objects of science, such as physical processes or social phenomena, 
constitute the intransitive dimension, while theories and discourse, which are the media and resources 
of science, represent its transitive dimension. Sayer (2000) demonstrates this distinction by noting that 
the shift from a flat to a round earth theory (transitive dimension) was not accompanied by a change in 
the shape of the earth itself (the intransitive dimension). It is also worth noting that although we now 
know that the flat earth theory was wrong, it influenced the way people acted in the world (e.g. 
seafaring) and therefore had real, material consequences. 
 
Critical realism also distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical. The real denotes any 
natural or social phenomena that exist, regardless of human knowledge about them. These objects 
have structures and causal powers (or mechanisms) that enable them to behave in particular ways, but 
also make them susceptible to certain kinds of change. Realists, then, ‘… seek to identify both 
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necessity and possibility or potential in the world – what things go together, and what could happen, 
given the nature of objects’ (Sayer 2000, 11). The actual refers to what happens (or is produced) when 
an object’s causal powers are activated. A social network, for example, may have a structure that 
enables it to communicate information and distribute resources to its members quickly and efficiently 
during an emergency (the real), but these powers may never be realised (the actual). The empirical 
refers to the domain of experience and requires knowledge of the real or the actual, which may or may 
not be observable.  
 
Critical realism challenges positivist analyses of causation, which entail the search for regularities 
among sequences of events. This approach is successful in the natural sciences, where the objects of 
research exist naturally in closed systems (such as the biosphere) or in artificially reproduced ones (as 
in laboratory experiments). By producing the appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic conditions, scientists 
are able to produce regular sequences of events and can therefore observe more clearly the operation 
of causal mechanisms (Sayer 1992). The social sciences, on the other hand, concentrate on inherently 
open systems, where it is impossible to create the controlled environments required for positivist 
experimentation. The same social science experiment may be exactly replicated in another place – or 
simply at another time in the same place – and produce vastly different results. In part, this is because 
human beings are capable of actively interpreting, learning and adapting to social conditions, whereas 
the objects of natural science are not. Chouinard et al. (1984, 358) note that realist natural science is 
different from realist social science because: 
  
Unlike the causal mechanisms of the natural world, the mechanisms of the social world, 
which generate social activity, are themselves social products… [and] cannot be 
empirically identified as separate from the activities they generate. 
 
Consequently, there are no universal social laws waiting to be discovered. Social science is inherently 
messier than natural science and requires fundamentally different types of analysis.  
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Figure 3.1: Critical realist view of causation  
Source: Sayer (2000) 
 
In the critical realist view of causation (Figure 3.1) all objects are structures, or parts of structures, 
which have particular causal powers or mechanisms. Whether and how these mechanisms are 
activated is dependent upon other conditions, which co-determine the form that the effect or event 
takes. Because of the countless possibilities for different conditions to combine with causal 
mechanisms, critical realism calls attention to the continual emergence of new phenomena in the 
world (Sayer 2000). 
 
Critical realists argue that the fallibility of human knowledge – the fact that we can and do get things 
wrong – is evidence that the world exists regardless of what people happen to think about it (Collier 
1994). This philosophy avoids the relativism of some hermeneutical approaches by embracing ‘… a 
set of epistemic principles in which fallibilism is explicitly combined with the view that it cannot be 
the case that all beliefs about the world are equally valid’ (Groff 2004, 138). The recognition and 
utilisation of ‘local’ knowledge is a recurrent theme throughout this thesis. Residents and landholders 
of the Wulgulmerang district argue that their knowledge of the area and of land and fire management 
is ignored by land and fire management agencies. Through the process of conducting interviews for 
this thesis, it became apparent that although some residents and landholders have developed a 
sophisticated knowledge of the physical and social environments they inhabit, others have not. In 
some instances, such as debates about the effectiveness of prescribed burning and cattle grazing in 
reducing the incidence, extent and intensity of bushfires, there is a direct clash between local (or lay) 
and scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is certainly fallible; however, unlike lay knowledge, it 
is produced with methodological procedures and rigour (such as empirical testing and peer review) 
that enable its validity and reliability to be judged. Yet despite the shift to more deliberative, inclusive 
and participative processes in environmental and disaster management (Dovers 2004), there has been 
mechanism 
structure 
effect / event  
conditions (other mechanisms) 
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little consideration of the criteria by which lay knowledge may be evaluated or the processes through 
which it could inform policy and management. This is essential if lay knowledge is to be used to its fill 
potential in hazards and disaster management, but also to minimise the dangers of using it uncritically: 
 
Since social science includes common sense among its objects, it cannot avoid a critical 
relationship with it… [T]he effects of actions which are informed by false ideas will often 
differ from those which actors expect them to have. If we are to represent such situations 
adequately, we must attempt both to report those ideas, as they are held, authentically, 
and show in what respects they are false (note that to criticize an idea as false is not to 
deny that it is held or that it has consequences.) Therefore, in order to understand and 
explain social phenomena, we cannot avoid evaluating and criticizing societies’ own self-
understanding (Sayer 1992, 39, emphasis in original). 
 
3.3  Research strategy 
3.3.1  Intensive and extensive research 
In social science research, critical realism draws a distinction between the identification of causal 
mechanisms, which is the concern of intensive research, and the identification of empirical 
regularities, which is a matter of extensive research (Table 3.1). Intensive research asks ‘how does 
something happen?’, while extensive research asks ‘how widespread is something?’ (Gregory 2000, 
673). Critical realist analyses typically employ intensive research strategies: 
 
What causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have 
observed it happening. Explanation depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms 
and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what 
conditions (Sayer 2000, 14). 
 
This research employs an intensive research strategy. It is directed by research questions that seek to 
identify the causes of human vulnerability in the Wulgulmerang district. It does not seek to identify 
regularities or patterns from which generalisations about the nature of vulnerability to bushfires can be 
drawn. Instead, as a fine-scale and localised case study, it aims to provide a rich explanation of the 
causes and effects of vulnerability in the district. 
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Table 3.1: Intensive and extensive research – a summary 
 INTENSIVE EXTENSIVE 
Research question • How does a process work in a particular case or small 
number of cases? 
• What produces a certain change? 
• What did the agents actually do? 
• What are the regularities, common patterns, 
distinguishing features of a population? 
• How widely are certain characteristics or processes 
distributed or represented? 
Relations • Substantial relations of connection. • Formal relations of similarity. 
Type of groups studied • Causal groups. • Taxonomic groups. 
Type of account produced • Causal explanation of the production of certain 
objects or events, though not necessarily 
representative ones. 
• Descriptive and representative generalizations, 
lacking in explanatory penetration. 
Typical methods • Study of individual agents in their causal contexts, 
interactive interviews, ethnography.  
• Qualitative analysis. 
• Large-scale survey of population or representative 
sample, formal questionnaires, standardized 
interviews.  
• Statistical analysis. 
Limitations • Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are 
unlikely to be ‘representative’, ‘average’ or 
generalizable.  
• Necessary relations discovered will exist wherever 
their relata are present, e.g. causal powers of objects 
are generalizable to other contexts as they are 
necessary features of these objects. 
• Although representative of a whole population, they 
are unlikely to be generalizable to other populations at 
different times and places.  
• Problem of ecological fallacy in making inferences 
about individuals. 
• Limited explanatory power. 
Appropriate tests • Corroboration. • Replication. 
Source: Sayer (1992)
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3.3.2  Case study 
The case study approach adopted in this research is consistent with an intensive research strategy. A 
case study is an empirical mode of inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-
life context, particularly when there is no clear line between the phenomenon and its context (Yin 
2003). Case studies may be exploratory, descriptive and/or explanatory, can incorporate qualitative 
and quantitative methods, and can include a wide range of evidence and data sources (e.g. interviews, 
observation and documents) to triangulate research findings (see 3.3.4). Although data collection and 
analysis are guided by the development of theoretical propositions, the case study approach can 
accommodate varying epistemological positions, as well as inductive and deductive analyses. It is 
important to recognise that case study ‘… is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be 
studied… By whatever methods, we choose to study the case’ (Stake 2005, 443, emphasis in original). 
Cases are often individuals, households, neighbourhoods or organisations, but can also be systems, 
incidents, policies, programs and so forth. Patton (2002) explains how case studies can be layered; that 
is, how they can incorporate different units of analysis (e.g., individuals and households). He argues 
that data should always be collected at the lowest possible unit of analysis, since it is always possible 
to build larger case studies out of smaller ones, but not vice versa. Once raw data has been collected 
for the case, it is organised, classified and edited into a manageable and accessible file known as the 
case record. The case record is then used to complete the final analysis and to compose the case study 
report (Patton 2002). 
 
The case study approach is often said to lack rigour, but this criticism pertains not so much to the 
approach as to those who adopt it (Yin 2003). Yin argues that case study research has too often been 
sloppy and unsystematic, allowing personal bias to influence the direction of research findings and 
conclusions. There is nothing inherently weak about the case study approach; like all other 
approaches, it requires careful and systematic design and method. Nevertheless, the value of case 
studies is often drawn into question because they provide little basis for the scientific generalisation of 
findings (Bryman and Burgess 1999). However, as Yin (2003, 10) points out, ‘… scientific facts are 
rarely based on single experiments; they are usually based on a multiple set of experiments that have 
replicated the same phenomenon under different conditions’. Furthermore, although the results of case 
study research may only be generalised to theoretical propositions, not populations, this is also the 
case with scientific experiments.  
 
A number of factors motivated the decision to select the Wulgulmerang district as the case for this 
research (see, also, Chapter 1.4). I first read about the Wulgulmerang fires while conducting research 
for my Honours degree on debates over fire management after the Victorian bushfires of 2002 – 2003 
(Whittaker and Mercer 2004). It wasn’t until mid 2004, however, that I received a scholarship from 
the Bushfire CRC to undertake research for a PhD and selected the Wulgulmerang district as the case 
 71 
for an in-depth study of human vulnerability to bushfires. My initial reading of the vulnerability 
literature encouraged me to think about the social, economic and political contexts in which bushfires 
take place, and how these can influence people’s capacities to prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from fires. The Wulgulmerang district had sustained very high rates of damage and loss relative to the 
small size of the population, and particularly when compared with other parts of Victoria that were 
affected by bushfires that summer. Local residents and landholders were furious with government 
departments and authorities, who they alleged had allowed fuels to accumulate on public land and had 
responded to the fires in an ineffective and overly bureaucratic manner. The social and economic 
challenges facing the Wulgulmerang district – including its remoteness; the ageing and diminishing 
population; drought; declining farm incomes; and the loss of essential services, such as the local 
primary school – suggested an ideal opportunity to investigate the nature of human vulnerability to 
bushfires.  
  
The Wulgulmerang district, rather than the January 30 bushfires, was deliberately selected as the case 
for the research. A focus on the district encourages a longer-term and more contextualised view of the 
causes of human vulnerability to bushfires, and avoids treating the disaster as a sudden and discrete 
event. Such an approach is consistent with the social science literature on vulnerability and resilience 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, the January 30 fires are an important focus of the research, since 
this is when people’s vulnerability to bushfire became most apparent. In other words, the research is 
an inquiry into the causes of human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district; the 
January 30, 2003, fires provide an ideal opportunity to examine how that vulnerability was manifested.  
 
The historical geography of the Wulgulmerang district is explored in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.3  Qualitative and quantitative research 
Discussion thus far has introduced a range of contrasting approaches to social research, including 
objectivist and constructionist ontologies, positivist and hermeneutic epistemologies, and intensive and 
extensive research strategies. In theory, objectivist ontologies engender positivist epistemologies and 
extensive research strategies. Constructionist ontologies give rise to hermeneutic epistemologies, 
which are reflected in intensive strategies. A further distinction can be drawn between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to social research. Quantitative research typically invokes traditional scientific 
methods and statistical techniques to test hypotheses and verify theory. In the social sciences, 
quantitative approaches are usually associated with large samples or data sets and social survey 
techniques such as structured interviews, questionnaires, experiments, content analysis and 
demographic analysis (Philip 1998). Qualitative approaches, on the other hand, employ interpretive 
methods and techniques ‘… to pursue the epistemological mandate of the philosophies of meaning’ 
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(Smith 2000, 660). Meanings vary in different disciplinary and practical settings; however, Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005, 3) offer the following generic definition: 
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists 
of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices 
transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field 
notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this 
level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. 
This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
 
As Hammersley (1992, 40-41) has noted, qualitative and quantitative research are often regarded as 
polar opposites. Seven dualisms are especially apparent: 
 
i. Qualitative versus quantitative data. 
ii. The investigation of natural versus artificial settings. 
iii. A focus on meanings rather than behaviour. 
iv. Adoption or rejection of natural science as a model. 
v. An inductive versus a deductive approach. 
vi. The identification of cultural patterns as against seeking scientific laws. 
vii. Idealism versus realism. 
 
Quantitative ‘purists’ believe that social phenomena should be viewed in the same way that natural 
scientists view physical phenomena (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14). In this view, research is 
objective, since observers are separate from the phenomena under observation and act to detach 
themselves and eliminate bias from the process of inquiry. This is reflected in writing styles that 
employ impersonal, passive voices and use technical terminology to describe findings in a supposedly 
objective way. However, as Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) point out, subjectivism inevitably 
creeps into quantitative research. Researchers must, for example, decide what to study (i.e. what are 
important problems?), develop instruments that measure what the researcher views as the target 
construct, select tests and items for measurement, interpret scores, draw conclusions, decide what 
elements of the data to emphasise or publish, and decide what findings are practically significant: 
‘Obviously, the conduct of fully objective and value-free research is a myth, even though the 
regulatory ideal of objectivity can be a useful one’ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 16). Qualitative 
purists, on the other hand, reject positivism and maintain that all research is value-laden. There is no 
single reality, but multiple ‘constructed’ realities that are always subjective and embedded in particular 
space/time contexts. Qualitative purists maintain that the knower and the known are inseparable, since 
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the subjective knower is the only source of reality. This is reflected in writing styles that adopt 
personal and informal voices to provide detailed, rich descriptions of the phenomena of interest and 
researchers’ findings. The main criticism of qualitative purists, where they exhibit an unqualified or 
strong relativism, is that their position is logically self-refuting and that it prevents the development 
and use of systematic standards for judging research quality (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).  
 
An important difference between quantitative and qualitative research concerns the logic of sampling 
(Brannen 1992a). In most cases, quantitative research aims to generalise findings to a general or parent 
population. Samples must therefore be ‘representative’ of that population; that is, the participants or 
subjects of the research must, as a whole, proportionally reflect the characteristics of the wider 
population to which the findings are to be generalised. Basic demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender and race are usually used to judge the representativeness of a sample. However, in reality, a 
sample could be constructed to be representative of any number of characteristics, including more 
complex qualities such as political or religious affiliation. This depends on the purposes, aims and 
questions of the research, but also on individuals’ assumptions about the features of social life that are 
important. Qualitative research, on the other hand, typically does not aim to generalise findings; 
instead, results are extrapolated to test or develop existing theories and explanations (Brannen 1992a). 
Consequently, it is appropriate to construct samples based on theoretical rather than statistical criteria: 
‘The basic question of theoretical sampling is which case or group to turn to next in the analysis and 
with what theoretical purpose’ (Brannen 1992a, 9). Purposive rather than statistical sampling was used 
to develop the interview sample for this research, and is discussed below (see 3.4.2).  
 
Some relative strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research are outlined in Table 
3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research 
 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Strengths  Tests and validates already constructed theories about how (and 
to a lesser degree, why) phenomena occur. 
 Tests hypotheses that are constructed before the data are 
collected. Can generalise research findings when the data are 
based on random samples of sufficient size. 
 Can generalise a research finding when it has been replicated on 
many different populations and subpopulations. 
 Useful for obtaining data that allow quantitative predictions to be 
made. 
 The researcher may construct a situation that eliminates the 
confounding influence of many variables, allowing one to more 
credibly assess cause-and-effect relationships. 
 Data collection using some quantitative methods is relatively 
quick (e.g. telephone interviews). 
 Provides precise, quantitative, numerical data. 
 Data analysis is relatively less time consuming (using statistical 
software). 
 The research results are relatively independent of the researcher 
(e.g. effect size, statistical significance). 
 It may have higher credibility with many people in power (e.g. 
administrators, politicians, people who fund programs). 
 Useful for studying large numbers of people. 
 Data are based on the participants’ own categories of meaning. 
 Useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth. 
 Useful for describing complex phenomena. 
 Provides individual case information. 
 Can conduct cross-case comparisons and analysis. 
 Provides understanding and description of people’s personal 
experiences of phenomena. 
 Can describe, in rich detail, phenomena as they are situated and 
embedded in local contexts. 
 The researcher identifies contextual and setting factors as they 
relate to the phenomena of interest. 
 The researcher can study dynamic processes (i.e. documenting 
sequential patterns and change). 
 Grounded theory may be used to inductively generate a 
tentative but explanatory theory about a phenomenon. 
 Can determine how participants interpret ‘constructs’. 
 Data are usually collected in naturalistic settings. 
 Responsive to local situations, conditions and stakeholders’ 
needs. 
 Responsive to changes that occur during the conduct of study. 
 Qualitative data in the words and categories of participants lend 
themselves to exploring how and why phenomena occur. 
 Determine idiographic causation. 
Weaknesses  The researcher’s categories that are used may not reflect local 
constituencies’ understandings. 
 The researchers’ theories that are used may not reflect local 
constituencies’ understandings. 
 The researcher may miss out on phenomena occurring because of 
the focus on theory or hypothesis testing rather than on theory or 
hypothesis generation (called the confirmation bias). 
 Knowledge produced may be too abstract and general for direct 
application to specific local situations, contexts, and individuals. 
 Knowledge produced may not generalise to other people or 
other settings. 
 Difficult to make quantitative predictions. 
 Difficult to test hypotheses and theories. 
 May have lower credibility with some administrators and 
commissioners of programs. 
 Data collection and analysis may be more time consuming than 
is usually the case with quantitative research. 
 Results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal 
biases and idiosyncrasies.  
Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004)
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In practice, most researchers are more pragmatic in terms of the perspectives they bring to research 
and in their selection of particular research methods or techniques. Hammersley (1992, 51) argues that 
the selection of qualitative and quantitative methods ‘… ought to depend on the circumstances of the 
research, rather than being derived from methodological or philosophical commitments’. Pragmatists 
are more likely to select methods that are appropriate to particular research questions and problems, 
and are therefore more likely to produce results that are practically useful. Consequently, considerable 
attention has been paid to the philosophical and methodological challenges of ‘mixed methods’ 
(‘multi-methods’, ‘multi-strategy’ etc.) research; that is, research that combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods (e.g. Brannen 1992b; Creswell 2003; Brewer and Hunter 2006; Creswell and 
Plano-Clark 2007). A number of methods may be used to address a single research question; 
alternatively, different methods may be suited to specific questions, or during different phases of the 
research process (Philip 1998). 
 
This research has employed predominantly qualitative research methods. The dearth of research on 
human vulnerability to bushfires in Australia means that this study is exploratory in nature. Qualitative 
methods are better suited to developing highly contextualised understandings of complex and dynamic 
phenomena as they are experienced by people in everyday life (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). 
Moreover, the small population of the Wulgulmerang district necessitated a small sample size, which 
would not have provided statistically significant results. Nevertheless, basic quantitative methods were 
used, particularly to analyse secondary demographic and economic data. 
 
3.3.4  Triangulation 
In social research, triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods or data sources to validate 
research findings about a particular social phenomenon (Bryman 2004). The triangulation metaphor is 
drawn from land surveying and navigation, where the term denotes a process of using two known 
points to accurately locate the position of an unknown third point (Thurmond 2001). As a research 
strategy, triangulation assumes that social research ‘… is a discovery process designed to get at an 
objective truth… [and] that looking at an object from more than one standpoint provides researchers 
with more comprehensive knowledge about the object’ (Miller and Fox 2004, 36). It therefore fits well 
with the critical realist philosophy that informs this research. There are four types of triangulation in 
social research: 
 
i. Data triangulation: the use of a variety of data sources in a study; 
ii. Investigator triangulation: the use of several different researchers; 
iii. Theory triangulation: the use of multiple perspectives to interpret single sets of data; 
iv. Methodological triangulation: the use of multiple methods to study a single phenomenon  
(Denzin 1989). 
 76 
Patton (2002) draws attention to the common misunderstanding that the aim of triangulation is to 
produce the same results or findings from different data sources or research methods. He argues that 
rather than undermining the credibility of research, differences in findings that result from 
triangulation provide opportunities to gain insights into the relationship between the research methods 
and the phenomenon under study. Similarly, Yeung (1997) dismisses the idea that triangulation is 
about replication and maintains that it is about using the most appropriate combination of methods to 
make connections within particular cases. He notes that where different methods are used to 
investigate different aspects of the same phenomenon, the findings tend to be complementary. There 
is, however, a danger that triangulation will amount to mere eclecticism if data from different contexts 
or methods are combined without adequate cross-examination and scrutiny (Yeung 1997). In a 
practical sense, the potential to triangulate may be limited by the budget and time constraints that are 
inevitably imposed on research projects (Patton 2002).  
 
This research employs both data and methodological triangulation to ensure the validity and reliability 
of the research findings. Data is sourced from informal discussions, participant observations, 
documents and policies, various databases (e.g., The Australian Census of Population and Housing) 
and semi-structured, in-depth interviews. A general inductive approach is taken to analyse qualitative 
data, particularly interview transcripts, while basic quantitative methods are used to analyse 
demographic and economic data. 
 
3.4  Data collection 
3.4.1  Initial, informal discussions 
The field research began with a visit to the Wulgulmerang district in April 2005. The purpose of the 
visit was to familiarise myself with the area and to make some initial contacts. Informal discussions 
with a small number of local residents focused on their experiences of the January 30, 2003, fires and 
their thoughts on why the district was so severely affected. Discussions also took place in Traralgon 
with the CFA’s Manager of Community Safety for Region 11 (East Gippsland) and in Lakes Entrance 
with the East Gippsland Shire Council’s (EGSC) Municipal Emergency Resource Officer. Detailed 
notes were taken and these were used to compile a brief report (see Appendix 3.1 for extracts). These 
informal discussions provided initial insights into the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster and informed 
the development of questions for the semi-structured, in-depth interviews. 
 
3.4.2  Semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
As a basic method of data collection, the interview is used extensively in social research. The most 
common form of interview involves individual, face-to-face verbal interchange; however, interviews 
may also take the form of group interchange and telephone surveys. Interviews may be structured, 
semi-structured or unstructured. Structured interviews aim to gather precise, codeable data to explain 
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social phenomena within pre-established categories, whereas unstructured interviewing aims to 
understand those phenomena without imposing a priori categorisations that may limit the field of 
inquiry (Fontana and Frey 2005). The focus here is on semi-structured, in-depth interviews. This 
method of data collection is guided by the principle that ‘… the participant’s perspective on the 
phenomena of interest should unfold as the participant views it… not as the researcher views it’ 
(Marshall and Rossman 2006, 101). Typically, then, researchers ask open-ended questions to explore a 
few general topics, allowing interviewees to frame and structure their responses. The main advantage 
of this approach is that it alerts the researcher to the issues that participants believe are most important. 
It can therefore help researchers to identify new issues and lines of questioning not previously 
considered. 
 
Two groups of interviewees were sought: (1) residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district 
who were directly or indirectly affected by the fires; and (2) others who were involved in the 
Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster. 
   
Interviews with residents and landholders of the district 
Between January and December, 2006, interviews were conducted with 39 residents and landholders 
of the Wulgulmerang district. Names of potential interviewees were identified from public documents 
(such as newspaper reports, submissions to post-bushfire inquiries, etc.) and the initial, informal 
discussions detailed above. Given the small population and informants’ detailed knowledge of the 
people who live in the district, this was a relatively simple task. Postal addresses and telephone 
numbers were obtained for most of these people using the local telephone book. A letter of invitation 
was sent to each household and landholder to explain the purpose of the research and to forewarn them 
that I would be telephoning them to personally invite their participation (Appendix 3.2). On the whole, 
people were keen to participate in the interviews. A small number, however, either: (a) expressed 
reservations about revisiting their experiences of the fires; (b) were cynical about the value of research 
and what it could achieve, and therefore regarded participation as a waste of time; or (c) were 
suspicious of my motives and allegiances as a researcher. In the latter instance, a relatively lengthy 
telephone conversation ensued in which I explained the purpose of the research and assured the 
potential interviewee that I was not associated with, nor obligated to, any government department or 
authority (i.e. the CFA or DSE). In all but one case, any misgivings were allayed and interviews were 
organised for a time and place of the participants’ choosing, most commonly in their home.  
 
Each participant was interviewed once. Subsequent, less formal encounters provided opportunities to 
further discuss and clarify issues that had arisen in the interviews, as well as to check the validity of 
emerging themes and findings. The initial interview sample was purposefully expanded to 
accommodate a range of issues raised in the course of the research (Robson 2002). For example, the 
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perceived influence of a neighbouring community of ‘alternative life-stylers’ on regional fire 
management policy necessitated additional interviews in the W-Tree area. Interviewees also 
commonly identified additional residents, landholders and agency personnel who were able to 
contribute to the research. Consequently, the interview sample was thorough and inclusive of the 
different people and perspectives in the district (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: Some basic characteristics of research participants (residents and landholders) 
 All1 The district 
Gender   
Men 22 (56%) 19 (56%) 
Women 17 (44%) 15 (44%) 
  
 
Age   
18 – 24  0– 0– 
25 – 34  02 0(5%) 02 0(6%) 
35 – 44 03 0(8%) 02 0(6%) 
45 – 54  08 (21%) 07 (21%) 
55 – 64  13 (33%) 10 (29%) 
65+ 13 (33%) 13 (38%) 
  
 
Place   
Gelantipy 11 (28.2%) 11 (32%) 
Seldom Seen 02 0(5.1%) 02 0(6%) 
Wulgulmerang / 
Black Mountain 
 
16 (41.0%) 
 
16 (47%) 
Suggan Buggan 04 (10.3%) 04 (12%) 
Other 06 (15.4%) 01 0(3%) 
  
 
Time in area   
00 – 04 years 03 0(7.7%) 02 0(6%) 
05 – 14 years 03 0(7.7%) 02 0(6%) 
15 – 24 years  08 (20.5%) 06 (18%) 
25 – 50 years 15 (38.5%) 14 (41%) 
50+ 10 (25.6%) 10 (29%) 
 
 
 
Type of residence   
Full-time 31 (79%) 26 (76%) 
Part-time/absentee 08 (11%) 08 (14%) 
 
 
 
Property type   
House – residential 
block 
0 
02 (5.1%) 
0 
01 0(3%) 
House – hobby 
farm/small acreage 
 
12 (30.8%) 
 
09 (26%) 
House – large farm 
property 
 
24 (61.5%) 
 
23 (68%) 
Farm – no house 01 0(2.6%) 01 0(3%) 
                                               
1
 Includes research participants from W Tree. 
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Table 3.3 presents some basic demographic characteristics of participants, which was collected by way 
of a simple questionnaire at the end of each interview. The initial questionnaire included questions 
about people’s income and level of debt; however, it became clear after a few interviews that people 
were uneasy about disclosing this information. On the advice of my research supervisors, I decided to 
remove these questions from the questionnaire. We agreed that it was not worth jeopardising the trust 
of research participants and, in any case, insights into the financial position of people in the district 
could be gained by other, less intrusive means.  
 
The interviews commenced some time after the initial field research due to personal matters. Eight 
open-ended questions were developed and incorporated into an interview guide (see Appendix 3.3). I 
relied fairly heavily on the guide in the first few interviews, but used it progressively less as I became 
more comfortable with the interview process and increasingly familiar with the main questions and 
themes. This enabled me to listen more closely to what participants were saying, to ask relevant 
follow-up questions and, when necessary, to probe responses for deeper insights or clarification 
(Rubin and Rubin 2005). It also facilitated greater flexibility in the interview process, which allowed 
new themes and lines of questioning to emerge. Nevertheless, the interview guide was always at hand 
to ensure that key topics were discussed and the potential for unproductive digressions was minimised. 
 
The conduct of an interview and the quality of information it yields is largely depends on the 
relationship between the interviewer and interviewee (Fontana and Frey 2005). In particular, it is 
important that researchers build trust with participants and establish rapport. To build trust, interviews 
began with an explanation of the research project and the interviewees’ rights as participants (see 3.6). 
These informal discussions also provided participants with opportunities to ask questions about the 
research and, in some cases, about my background and interests as a researcher. Enduring anger over 
the January 30 fires and resentment toward the ‘overeducated idiots’2 who are in charge of public land 
and fire management made this, at times, a difficult task. There was a strong belief among 
interviewees that management should come from local people, not bureaucrats in Traralgon or 
Melbourne or, for that matter, university students:  
 
Look, you’re a university student. I know you’re a university student, right? But that’s not 
where management should come from. If a person’s got a patch of [national] park out 
there – and this is all park, right around us – the people who are eligible for managing 
the park are its neighbours. Everyone adjoining a park is entitled to a place on managing 
the park. That’s the way I see it. They are the people who have been through it and know 
what it’s like. You university students have come out of university, [but] you’ve never had 
                                               
2
 Informants 4 and 22. 
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the actual experience of a bad fire… Management of the park should come from people 
adjoining the park. 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
Nothing would change the fact that I was an outsider in this isolated, rural community. Nevertheless, I 
gave careful consideration to how I should present myself to local people (without deceiving them) in 
order to gain their trust and facilitate their participation in the research. Most basically, this meant 
wearing clothing and footwear that were suitable for farms and the bush. Furthermore, given that 
many people blamed the CFA and DSE for the disaster, I was careful to stress my independence as a 
university researcher, despite these organisations’ participation in the Bushfire CRC (which funded the 
research). Trust and rapport was further developed by staying with and sharing meals with some 
participants (see 3.4.3). To ‘fit in’ I also began to eat meat again (I had been vegetarian for five years), 
which seemed a respectful and culturally appropriate thing to do given that most of the research 
participants farmed cattle and sheep for their meat. Originally, however, I had feared that my 
vegetarianism would lead participants to view me as a city-based ‘greenie’ and that this would hinder 
the research.3 While I share many of the beliefs and concerns held by those labelled 
‘environmentalists’, I firmly believe that the goals of environmental, social and economic 
sustainability are mutually dependent. Nevertheless, there were times when I found myself in strong 
disagreement with the views expressed by research participants. In such cases, I attempted to be 
objective and refrained from sharing my opinion. In the analysis and writing of research findings, 
these viewpoints were only challenged where they were clearly contradicted by the evidence. 
 
Social scientists sometimes draw a distinction between ‘regular’ interviewing and ‘elite’ or 
‘specialised’ interviewing (Dexter 1971; Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987). Elite interviews involve 
experts or people in prominent positions and are said to be characterised by markedly different power, 
in that the balance of power lies with the interviewee. Swanson (2008) questions the assumption that 
researchers always have power in their relationships with ‘regular’ people. From her own experiences 
of fieldwork with indigenous women and children who beg and sell on the streets of Ecuador, she 
demonstrates that, although not without power and privilege, her position as a ‘vulnerable’, 
‘incompetent’ and ‘intrusive outsider’ meant that, at times, she ‘… felt more marginal than powerful’ 
(Swanson 2008, 62). As the above passage from Joe suggests, there were instances where my role as a 
researcher was anything but powerful. This enabled rather than hindered the research. By 
acknowledging my ignorance and demonstrating an enthusiasm to listen and to learn, I became a non-
threatening and sympathetic outsider. This role allowed me to ask ‘stupid’ questions that may seem 
                                               
3
 Environmental management and fire protection objectives are often seen to be in conflict. Consequently, 
debates over fire management often pit ‘environmentalists’ against those representing ‘rural’ interests (see 
Chapter 4). 
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obvious to local people or experts and thus enabled me to clarify and explore participants’ knowledge 
and experiences in great depth. 
 
Interviews typically lasted for between one and two hours and, with each participant’s consent, were 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. Fortunately, most people soon forgot that they were being 
recorded and therefore seemed uninhibited in their responses. Notes were taken during and after the 
interviews to insure against the possibility of a failed audio recording (of which there was one), but 
also to record details of the interview setting, participants’ non-verbal cues or responses, and personal 
reflections on the conduct of the interview and the responses elicited. These notes were consulted prior 
to analysis of each interview, which aided their interpretation. For example, notes taken immediately 
after one interview recorded my suspicion that the participants had overstated their losses to add 
weight to their assertion that fire authorities were to blame for the disaster (see Chapter 5). Analysis of 
the transcript revealed a number of inconsistencies in stated losses, which were then checked against 
other sources. 
 
Although the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee classified the research as ‘minimal risk’, 
some participants found parts of the interview to be emotionally challenging. During the first round of 
interviews I responded to informants becoming upset by changing discussion to another topic. As I 
became more comfortable with and experienced in conducting interviews, it became clear that the best 
and most sensitive way to manage these situations was to momentarily concentrate on taking notes, 
which allowed the informant time to recover. More often than not, informants resumed from where 
they had left off and therefore were able to offer difficult but incredibly valuable contributions to the 
research. 
 
Interviews with others involved in the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster 
In addition to residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district, interviews were also conducted 
with 24 people who were involved in the bushfire disaster in an official or unofficial capacity. They 
were identified from public documents, interviews with residents and landholders, and by contacting 
relevant government departments and other organisations. On the whole, these interviews were more 
easily organised than those with residents and landholders. These participants were mostly involved in 
the disaster in a professional or official capacity and were therefore available during business hours 
and at more accessible locations. The organisations and individuals represented include: 
 
 Anglican Parish of Bruthen 
 Buchan Bush Nursing Association 
 Buchan Neighbourhood House 
 Country Fire Authority 
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 Department of Human Services 
 Department of Sustainability and Environment 
 East Gippsland Shire Council 
 Forest Science Centre 
 Gelantipy District Bush Nursing Centre 
 Gippsland Lakes Community Health Centre 
 Independent MP, East Gippsland 
 Lions Club of Lakes Entrance 
 Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner 
 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
 Red Cross 
 Victoria Police 
 Victorian Farmers Federation 
 Volunteers (acting in a private capacity) 
 
The diversity of roles, responsibilities and expertise of these interviewees meant that it was not 
possible to prepare a standardised interview guide. Instead, general questions and topics for discussion 
were developed for each interview. Discussions centred on participants’ association with the 
Wulgulmerang district and their involvement in the response to the 2003 bushfires. These interviews 
also provided opportunities to investigate specific claims or issues that were raised in interviews with 
residents and landholders. For example, some residents named individuals from government 
departments or authorities who they believed had acted improperly or negligently during the bushfires. 
Interviews with those individuals, or their organisations, provided an opportunity to investigate these 
allegations and incidents more thoroughly.   
 
I fully transcribed all of the interviews with residents and landholders of the district; however, time 
constraints prohibited full transcription of all of the other interviews. Interviews that were deemed 
especially important were transcribed in full, with detailed notes and direct quotations taken from all 
others. For example, an interview with the CFA Operations Manager for Region 11 during the 
Wulgulmerang bushfires was considered a rich source of detailed, first-hand information about the 
fires and their management and therefore warranted full transcription.  
 
3.4.3  Participant observations 
Participant observations played a minor but important role in developing an understanding of 
vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district. Bryman defines participant observation as ‘… 
the sustained immersion of the researcher among those whom he or she seeks to study with a view to 
generating a rounded, in depth account’ (Bryman 1988, 45). Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, 17) 
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take a broader view, arguing that ‘… there is a sense in which all social research takes the form of 
participant observation: it involves participating in the social world, in whatever role, and reflecting on 
the products of that participation’. Sustained immersion in the social world of the people of the 
Wulgulmerang district was precluded by the limited opportunities for social activity in the area. The 
lack of public space in the district means that people spend almost all of their time on their properties 
with their families (see Chapter 4). As a researcher, this made it difficult to observe people outside of 
the interview setting. Nevertheless, occasions such as community meetings and local cattle sales 
provided opportunities for observation. Most valuable, however, were the many meals I shared with 
particular families at their homes, where informal discussions provided opportunities to gain insight 
into everyday life in the district.  
 
3.4.4  Documents and policies 
A broad range of documents and policies was used in the course of this research. These included: 
government and other reports on the 2003 bushfires; survivors’ written accounts of the disaster; 
newspaper reports; local histories and other accounts of life in the district; and a range of legislation 
and policies affecting the district (Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4: Examples of documents and policies used in the research 
Document type Examples 
Government and 
other reports 
 Gelantipy / Wulgulmerang, 30 January 2003: summary of 
Near Miss Investigation for Chief Officers of CFA and DSE 
and their response (CFA and DSE 2003). 
 East Gippsland fire recovery report: December 2004 (LECH 
2004). 
 Report of the inquiry into the 2002 – 2003 Victorian bushfires 
(Esplin, Gill, and Enright 2003).  
Survivors’ accounts  Flames across the mountains: personal accounts of the 
Bogong, Razorback and Pinnibar fires, East Gippsland 2003 
(Appleby 2004). 
 Written submissions to the Inquiry into the 2002 – 2003 
bushfires (DPC 2003) and the Inquiry into the recent 
Australian bushfires (Parliament of Australia 2003). 
 Participants’ personal notes and diaries. 
Newspaper reports  Reports from Victorian and local newspapers on the 2003 
fires. 
 Historical and contemporary reports on the Wulgulmerang 
district (State Library of Victoria Microfilm). 
• Local histories and documents (Royal Historical Society of 
Victoria library). 
Local histories and 
other accounts of 
life in the district 
 O’Rourke graves at Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain 
(O'Rourke Family no date).  
 Historical notes (Rogers 1972). 
 A man from Gelantipy (Sykes 1982). 
Legislation and 
policies 
• Country Fire Authority Act 1958. 
• Forests Act 1958. 
• Position paper on bushfires and community safety (AFAC 
2005b). 
 
3.5  Data analysis 
3.5.1  Qualitative data analysis 
Prominent approaches to qualitative data analysis include grounded theory (e.g. Strauss and Corbin 
1990), discourse analysis (e.g. Phillips and Jørgensen 2002) and narrative analysis (e.g. Leiblich 
1998). This thesis employs a more general inductive approach that aims to (a) condense extensive and 
varied raw data into a brief, summary format, (b) establish clear links between research objectives and 
summary findings derived from the raw data, and (c) to develop a model or theory about the 
underlying experiences or processes which are evident in the raw data (Thomas 2006). Thomas (2006, 
239-40) identifies a range of principles that underpin a general inductive approach to qualitative data 
analysis:  
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i. Data analysis is guided by research objectives, which identify domains and topics to be 
investigated (deductive). The analysis is carried out through multiple readings and 
interpretations of the raw data (inductive). Although the findings are influenced by the research 
objectives or questions outlined by the researcher, the findings arise directly from the analysis of 
raw data. The research objectives provide a focus or domain of relevance for conducting the 
analysis, not a set of expectations about specific findings. 
ii. The primary mode of analysis is the development of categories from the raw data into a model 
or framework. This model contains key themes and processes identified and constructed by the 
researcher during the coding process. 
iii. The findings result from multiple interpretations made from the raw data by researchers who 
code the data. Inevitably, the findings are shaped by the assumptions and experiences of the 
researcher conducting the study and carrying out the data analyses. For the findings to be usable, 
the researcher must make decisions about what is more and less important in the data. 
iv. Different researchers may produce findings that are not identical and that have non-overlapping 
components. 
v. The trustworthiness of findings derived from inductive analysis can be assessed using similar 
techniques to those that are used with other types of qualitative analysis  
 
Initially, it was proposed that the grounded theory method would be used to analyse data. Grounded 
theory has certainly influenced the analysis;4 however, in relation to the first point above, it became 
evident that the processes of data collection and analysis were both deductive and inductive. As 
Pidgeon and Henwood (2004) note, it is important to recognise the influence of the pre-existing 
conceptual frameworks that researchers inevitably bring to the task of interpretation and analysis. The 
                                               
4
 Glaser and Strauss (1967, 2) developed grounded theory to enable ‘… the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research’. Grounded theory was developed to counter what Glaser and 
Strauss saw as an overemphasis on theory verification, rather than theory generation, in sociology. They argued 
that the grand theories of thinkers such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim dictate the course of social research long 
before empirical investigation can identify emergent questions and concepts that are appropriate to the specific 
research problem and context. Consequently, they sought an alternative approach in which theory is inductively 
developed from the data of social research. Grounded theory challenges the idea of theory as a definite, static 
product that is simply confirmed or refuted, and instead emphasises theory as a process that is progressively 
informed by the collection and analysis of data. According to Turner (1981, 226-227), a great strength of 
grounded theory is that: 
 
It promotes the development of theoretical accounts and explanations which conform closely to the 
situations being observed, so that the theory is likely to be intelligible to, and usable by, those in 
the situations studied, and is open to comment and correction by them. The theories developed are 
likely to be complex rather than oversimplified ways of accounting for a complex world, and this 
quality is likely to enhance their appeal and utility. 
 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 24, emphasis added) later defined grounded theory as ‘… a qualitative research 
method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a 
phenomenon’; however, in the original formulation it was maintained that both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and data could be used to generate and verify theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
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development of interview questions was guided by my initial framing of the research problem (i.e. one 
of ‘human vulnerability’ to bushfire hazards), my reading of the relevant literature, and the 
development of overarching research questions. Much of the vulnerability literature, for example, 
asserts the importance of livelihoods in shaping people’s capacities to cope with the impacts of 
environmental hazards (see Chapter 2). Consequently, livelihoods were a topic of discussion in 
interviews with residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district, and this information was 
purposefully sought during the analysis of the resulting interview transcripts. Nevertheless, grounded 
theory’s emphasis on the generation of theory from data has heavily influenced my approach to the 
research. In particular, care was taken to ensure that the research questions and the interview questions 
were not prescriptive and could therefore allow new issues and themes to emerge from the data.  
 
The Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) NVivo Version 7 was used to 
manage the large volume of data and to assist the analysis. Data analysis began with a close reading of 
the interview transcripts. Full transcription was a time consuming process; however, the hundreds of 
hours spent listening to and transcribing interview recordings enabled me to develop a thorough and 
sophisticated knowledge of their content. During the first reading, notes were taken on the types of 
information and themes that were emerging from the interviews. The long list that resulted was used to 
develop potential categories into which segments of interview text could be grouped to enable closer 
analysis and comparison. This process of grouping qualitative data into categories is known as coding. 
In the NVivo 7 program, categories are referred to as nodes. In the general inductive approach to 
qualitative data analysis, general categories are developed from research objectives or questions, while 
more specific categories emerge from multiple interpretations of the raw data (Thomas 2006). The 
latter is referred to as in vivo coding, whereby categories are created directly from the text. The 
categories for this research were developed from the research aims and questions, largely derived from 
the literature review (deductive), but also from the process of coding the data (inductive). For 
example, ‘Impacts’ was an initial node that, through the process of in vivo coding, was subdivided to 
include nodes for information on: (a) direct Losses from the fires; (b) Financial and livelihood 
impacts; (c) Health impacts; (d) Social impacts; and (e) Environmental impacts. In this case, Impacts 
was the ‘parent’ node and the specific types of impacts were ‘child’ nodes. The iterative process of 
coding thus led to the creation of categories that better reflected the content of the interview 
transcripts, enabling important issues and themes to be identified and data on these to be more closely 
analysed and compared. 
 
The many advantages of using CAQDAS include an enhanced capacity to manage large quantities of 
data, convenient coding and retrieving, and comprehensive and accurate text searches. However, as 
van Hoven (2003, 472) points out, computer software has the potential to alienate the researcher from 
the data, resulting in a ‘mechanistic’ analysis. At the outset of the research, one of my research 
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supervisors advised against fully transcribing the interviews, a task he believed would be overly time-
consuming and would detract from the time spent analysing their content. As noted above, the process 
of transcribing residents’ and landholders’ interviews, which amounted to almost 500 pages, enabled 
me to develop an intimate knowledge of their content. Furthermore, the NVivo program proved to be a 
quick and relatively simple way to organise and manage the data, which was then analysed following 
the process described above. Most importantly, however, having full transcripts of the interviews 
made it easy to go back and check interviews for emergent issues and themes that may not have been 
initially identified. 
 
The results of the qualitative data analysis are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. Quotes 
were selected because they were typical or illustrative of interviewees’ experiences of and perspectives 
on the issues and themes of interest. A range of measures were undertaken to ensure the ethical 
treatment of participants, which includes a guarantee of anonymity in the communication of research 
findings. The ethical and political considerations of the research are now discussed. 
 
3.6  Ethical and political considerations 
The critical realist philosophy that underpins the research asserts that there is an objectively existing 
reality, which human beings can only know subjectively. It therefore follows that researchers are 
overtly involved in the production of knowledge. It is therefore important that researchers consider the 
political and ethical dimensions of their work. The Association of American Geographers’ (AAG 
2005) Statement on professional ethics and the American Anthropological Association’s (AAA 1998) 
Code of ethics were used as guides for the ethical design and conduct of the research. Important 
recommendations include: 
 
 The protection and preservation of the animate and inanimate subjects of field research should 
be built into research design. 
 Researchers should consider the potential uses of data generated by their work over time. In 
particular, they should consider potential ‘misuses’ of information by third parties, and the 
economic and environmental impacts of projects that may arise from the research. 
 Prior to participation, informants and local collaborators have a right to know the purpose of 
the project and the end uses of the information. 
 Researchers should obtain, in advance, the informed consent of persons being studied. 
Informed consent does not necessarily imply or require a particular written or signed form. It 
is the quality of the consent, not the format, which is relevant. 
 The dignity, safety and well-being of informants and local colleagues should always have 
precedence over the goals of the project. 
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 Informants and local colleagues should be asked whether they prefer anonymity or 
recognition, and the project should be implemented and its results presented in keeping with 
these individuals’ preferences. 
 
The AAA’s (1998, 2) Code of ethics includes the particularly strong statement that: 
 
Anthropological researchers have primary ethical obligations to the people, species, and 
materials they study and to the people with whom they work. These obligations can 
supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge, and can lead to decisions not to undertake 
or to discontinue a research project when the primary obligation conflicts with other 
responsibilities, such as those owed to sponsors or clients. 
 
RMIT University requires all research involving human participants to be approved by its Human 
Research Ethics Committee prior to commencement. Consequently, ethical considerations were taken 
into account during the design phase of the research. An application for ethics approval was submitted 
to the Committee and subsequently approved. It includes a commitment to protecting the privacy of 
participants by not revealing their identities in the thesis or any other reports or papers flowing from 
the research. Participants are given pseudonyms and details of their true identities are kept separate 
from the data, which is stored in a locked filing cabinet at the School of Mathematical and Geospatial 
Sciences, RMIT University. Only I have access to the raw data. The research also requires the 
informed consent of participants. A ‘plain language’ statement was prepared to inform people about 
the purpose of the research and their rights as participants. With particular reference to the semi-
structured interviews, it states: 
 
You don’t have to answer certain questions if you don’t want to, and you can end the 
interview at any time. You can also speak to me at a later date if you wish to change 
anything you said, would like a copy of the notes or transcript from your interview, or 
would like to discuss anything else. 
 
Information that you provide can only be disclosed to a third party if: (1) it is to protect 
you or someone else from harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the 
researcher with written permission to do so. Your name and identity will not be revealed 
in research reports and papers, unless I have your permission to do so. Your name will 
not be recorded on any documents containing raw data, and all of the information 
collected will be stored in a locked cabinet at RMIT University. 
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As the AAA’s (1998) Code of ethics points out, it is the quality of the informed consent, not the 
format, that matters. Rather than having participants read the plain language statement, informed 
consent was gained prior to each interview through informal discussions about the research and 
participants’ rights. This was a more personal and relaxed way to begin the interviews. Nevertheless, 
each participant was provided with a copy of the statement.  
 
The main ethical challenge for this research has been to maintain confidentiality and ensure the 
anonymity of participants. The Wulgulmerang district has a very small population, and this means that 
everyone knows each other. This was apparent in many interviews, where it was not uncommon for 
interviewees to reel off the names of all the families, past and present, living between Gelantipy and 
Suggan Buggan. There was potential for confidentiality to be compromised during interviews, 
particularly when interviewees asked questions about other informants and the information they had 
disclosed. Care was taken to ensure that no personal or sensitive information was divulged to 
participants. The most serious ethical issues, however, have arisen in the writing-up of the research 
findings. In his study of social inequality, cohesion and belonging in the small, rural community of 
‘Smalltown’, Victoria, Dempsey (1990) protected participants and others in the research setting by 
concealing the true identity of the town and its people. Gray (1991), on the other hand, used the real 
names of public figures but concealed the identities of other informants in his study of social power 
relations in the rural Shire of Cowra, New South Wales. Given the distinctive nature of the 
Wulgulmerang bushfires and the need for a highly contextualised analysis of the underlying causes of 
human vulnerability, it was not practicable to conceal the case study location. In any case, many of the 
residents and landholders who contributed to the research did so because they wanted their 
experiences and grievances about disaster to be recorded. 
 
Pseudonyms are used throughout this thesis to protect the identities of informants, except where 
recognition has been explicitly requested and does not compromise the anonymity of other informants. 
Public figures such as politicians and high ranking officials in government departments and authorities 
are named, where it is appropriate to do so. Despite every effort to conceal informants’ identities, 
some people may be identifiable to those who know the district. Due to the small population, the 
disclosure of even basic information (such as age, occupation or whether they have school-aged 
children) may be enough to reveal informants’ identities. Where controversial issues or topics have 
been raised, such as allegations of impropriety or negligence against neighbours or government 
officials, all identifiers of the individuals involved have been removed and quotations are attributed to 
an ‘Anonymous informant’. Finally, in keeping with the maxim that the dignity, safety and wellbeing 
of informants should always have precedence over the goals of the project, a small number of findings 
have not been reported.  
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3.7  Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the critical realist philosophy, intensive research strategy and predominantly 
qualitative research methods that were used to gather and analyse data on human vulnerability to 
bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district. An intensive research strategy that is explicitly concerned with 
how and why, rather than how often, things happen, is most appropriate given the exploratory nature of 
this research. This is reflected in the core research questions that guide the research, which ask how 
and why people in the Wulgulmerang were vulnerable to the January 30, 2003, bushfires and their 
impacts: 
 
 How and why were people exposed to hazards during the January 30, 2003, bushfires? and 
 How and why were people differentially capable of coping and adapting to the impacts of the 
fires? 
 
The research has employed primarily qualitative methods to gather and analyse data on vulnerability 
to bushfires in the district. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with residents and 
landholders who were directly and indirectly affected by the Wulgulmerang bushfires and with others 
who responded to the fires in an official or unofficial capacity. These provided a wealth of first-hand 
information about the fires and the district. Participant observations were also an important source of 
information; however, opportunities for observation were restricted by the limited opportunities to 
observe residents and landholders outside of the interview setting.  
 
The district’s tiny population meant that almost all of those who were directly affected by the January 
30 bushfires were interviewed for the research. This has enabled a fine-scale, in-depth analysis of 
human vulnerability to bushfires that is inclusive of the different people and perspectives represented 
in the district. However, the fine-scale of the analysis has also posed significant challenges throughout 
the research process. In particular, concerns about maintaining confidentiality and the anonymity of 
informants prevented the collection of some types of information and the reporting of some findings. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the research strategy and methods that were employed, on the 
whole, yielded valuable information about the nature of human vulnerability to bushfires in the 
Wulgulmerang district. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LIFE IN THE WULGULMERANG DISTRICT 
 
The days of that old Mercedes parked under the grazier’s back door are gone. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This thesis employs the concept of human vulnerability to understand the causes and impacts of the 
Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster. It is clear from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 that people’s 
vulnerabilities to environmental hazards and disasters arise from the circumstances of their everyday 
lives, which are shaped by factors both within and beyond their control. It follows that the analysis of 
‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ life is a crucial component of vulnerability analyses. This Chapter examines 
the nature of everyday life in the Wulgulmerang district in order to identify the root causes of people’s 
vulnerability to bushfires. It is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a brief history of the 
district.1 It is arranged around six important periods and themes, including: Aboriginal history; 
European settlement; economy and politics; accessibility and remoteness; land management and 
environmental change; and bushfires. Having developed an historical perspective, the second part 
examines contemporary life in the district. It draws heavily on local people’s accounts of living in the 
district and their experiences of the pressures and challenges of everyday life. These include a range of 
pressures on people’s livelihoods, such as declining farm incomes and drought, and critical 
community-scale challenges such as population change and the inaccessibility of basic services. The 
Chapter concludes with a statement on the conditions of life in the district preceding the 
Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster.  
 
4.2  A brief history 
4.2.1  Original inhabitants 
Traditionally, the Wulgulmerang district is part of the territory and range of the Ngarigo and 
Krauatungalung peoples. The boundaries of Aboriginal territory in south-eastern Australia are not 
precisely known; however, Timdale’s (1974) assessment is generally considered most accurate. 
Ngarigo territory is thought to have stretched from the northern reaches of the Monaro Tableland 
around Queanbeyan, to its southern extensions into Victoria, namely the Wulgulmerang Plateau. 
Krauatungalung territory extended along the Victorian coast from Lakes Entrance to Point Hicks, 
inland to about Black Mountain. Flood (1980) has claimed that Krauatungalung territory ran as far 
north as Willis, with the Ngarigo people holding the upper reaches. Whatever the case, Seddon has 
                                                 
1
 The Wulgulmerang district has received relatively little attention in histories of East Gippsland. This is 
particularly evident when compared to places like Omeo, of which there are many histories. Consequently, much 
of the material included in this section is drawn from the periphery of histories of other, more celebrated parts of 
East Gippsland. 
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pointed out that ‘… the Krauatungalung were essentially coastal people whose range included the 
Buchan and Murrindal valleys with their sweet grass and abundant game, but they seem rarely to have 
ventured further north’. Archaeological evidence from Cloggs Cave at Buchan, south of the 
Wulgulmerang district, dates human occupation of the area to at least 17,000 years (Flood 1973). The 
discovery of campsites near the confluence of the Deddick and Snowy Rivers is further evidence of 
Aboriginal occupation of the northern reaches of the district. Flood (1980) has argued that the Ngarigo 
people inhabited these areas during the winter months, as they ate the warmest and most sheltered 
parts of the alpine region, before moving north into the High Country to feast on aestivating Bogong 
moths. This was contested by Seddon (1994), who found no evidence to suggest that these areas were 
not inhabited all year round. 
 
The arrival of Europeans in East Gippsland began a wave of disease, displacement and violence that 
decimated Aboriginal populations. Australia’s pre-1788 population was earlier estimated at around 
300,000 (Radcliffe-Brown 1930); however, recent assessments suggest a population of between half 
and three-quarters of a million is more realistic (Flood 2006). According to Gardner (1993), Gippsland 
Aborigines fiercely resisted European invasion. This is supported by Thompson (1985), who argues 
that resistance in Gippsland was stronger than in other parts of Victoria, due largely to the rugged and 
heavily forested landscape into which Aborigines could escape and from which they could support 
themselves. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a number of massacres of Aborigines in the 
Wulgulmerang district and its surrounds. According to one account, retold many years later: 
 
When the first settlers came down to Gelantipy there were many wild blacks in the 
district. Two men with cattle for their settlement camped about a mile north of the Lower 
Gelantipy State School, putting their cattle in a small yard by their camp. Some time 
during the night the blacks stole up and speared the sleeping men, and then they killed the 
cattle in the yard, not even taking their flesh or skins. When the murder was discovered, 
all the settlers gathered together and shot as many of the blacks as they could, and the rest 
fled from the district… and the place where these men were killed is called Butchers 
Ridge and the creek that flows nearby was called Butchers Creek (cited in Gardner 1993, 
93). 
 
Gardiner (1993, 82) also presents an account of a massacre that is alleged to have taken place at 
Suggan Buggan: 
 
Blacks were spearing cattle along the Snowy in the Suggan Buggan area. [In] Those days 
the bush was much better for cattle than it is now, it was more open and grew much better 
feed with the result that the cattle bred freely and thrived. The whites again rode out and 
caught up with the blacks on the banks of the Snowy and shot them down as they did in 
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the other two incidents. While the shooting was taking place a gin swimming the river 
with her piccaninny on her back was shot, floated away and sank, the little piccaninny 
was washed out and was picked up many hours later by a friendly member of the Orourke 
[sic] family, who had taken no part in the shooting. The man took him home and he was 
brought up and cared for as though he was a member of his own family. He grew up to be 
a fine and useful stockman and lived with the Orourke [sic] family for many years and 
later went to live at Lake Tyers. 
 
Thompson (1985) has suggested that Gardner overemphasises the role of massacres and that smaller 
skirmishes were probably more typical of the period. Furthermore, as the passage above suggests, 
some of the early settlers were humane in their relations with Aboriginal people, and vice versa.2 
 
Questions of Aboriginal fire management and its impact on the environment of the Wulgulmerang 
district are addressed below (see 4.2.5).  
 
4.2.2  European settlement 
The European history of the Wulgulmerang district is closely tied to that of the Monaro region of New 
South Wales. Europeans first discovered the Monaro plains in 1823 when Captain Mark Currie, R.N., 
led a small expedition south from Lake George (near the present-day site of Canberra) to find new 
pastures for the Colony’s cattle and sheep (Hancock 1972).3 Land was quickly taken up, despite the 
limited agricultural potential imposed by poor soils, low rainfall, unsuitable terrain and low 
temperatures. Landholders favoured cattle, which could be left unattended and required little labour 
(Dovers 1994). By the early 1930s most of the land between Sydney and the Murray River was 
occupied and, due to drought and increasing demand for pasture, new land was sought further south 
(O’Bryan 1983). George McKillop, Alexander Livingstone and James MacFarlane set out in 1835 to 
find a land route from the Monaro to Port Phillip Bay, where the city of Melbourne had been 
established that year. On their way, they discovered the pastures of the Omeo plains and established 
the township of Omeo, East Gippsland’s first settlement (Pendergast 1968; Pearson 1969). 
 
European settlement of the Wulgulmerang district, east of Omeo, commenced shortly thereafter. 
Claims to first settlement of the district are disputed, since pastoralists who ventured south from the 
Monaro did not publicise their discoveries for fear that others would beat them to the best pastures 
(Buchan Sesquicentenary Committee 1989). In her history of the Aboriginal peoples of East 
Gippsland, Thompson (1985, 21), rightly argues that historians of the region have focused too much 
                                                 
2
 This is evident in the case of the missing O’Rourke child, discussed below (see 4.2.3). 
3
 It has been suggested that European Australians inhabited the Monaro at an earlier date, but did not advertise 
their presence as they were running stolen mobs of cattle and sheep (Dovers 1994). 
 94 
on ‘… the conflicting but essentially irrelevant claims about who was actually the first white man in 
the area’. In any case, history records Edward Bayliss to be the first landholder in the Wulgulmerang 
district, having laid claim to the ‘Callantipy’ (Gelantipy) run in March of 1839. In 1840, James 
O’Rourke, an Irish immigrant, sold his two holdings on the drought-stricken Monaro to take up 
property at Black Mountain, where he built the first permanent homestead in the district (Stephenson 
1988). O’Rourke family history suggests that Richard Brooks, of Gegedzerick Station on the Monaro, 
had briefly occupied Black Mountain in 1834 (O’Rourke 1936), but there are no other records to 
confirm this. O’Rourke relocated to Wulgulmerang in 1845, where he had built another homestead. 
His brother, Christopher, moved from Appin, south of Sydney, to take over Black Mountain Station. 
The licence for the Suggan Buggan run was issued to William Woodhouse in 1843 and passed through 
several hands before it was purchased by the 19 year-old son of James O’Rourke, Edward, in 1858. 
Edward built the Suggan Buggan schoolhouse from local cypress pine in 1865 and employed a teacher 
who would later educate 13 of his children. The schoolhouse, constructed as a slab hit with a shingle 
roof, was restored in the 1970s and is cared for by the Gelantipy Historical Society (Appendix 4.1). It 
survived the January 30, 2003, bushfires and stands as a memorial to the O’Rourkes, ‘… the first 
settlers to establish permanent homes in the Snowy River area of East Gippsland’ (Wakefield 1969, 
17). 
 
4.2.3  Accessibility and remoteness 
Family histories from the Wulgulmerang district testify to the difficulties of pioneers’ lives on the 
rugged and remote East Gippsland frontier. By all accounts, the physical and social isolation of the 
district made for a hard life. Adams (1981, 49) notes that:  
 
The station homesteads in this country were very often rough slab and bark huts. 
Amenities were few and life could be lonely, and when Aborigines were around, 
frightening. Social life was very limited. There was an occasional visit from an itinerant 
clergyman, and medical help was not readily available. Small graveyards round the old 
homesteads recall the ruggedness of life here…  
 
The isolation of early settlers is illustrated by O’Rourke family history, which recounts the tragic 
deaths of two young children. Andrew O’Rourke, son of James and Eliza, was four years old when his 
nightgown caught fire as he stood near the fireplace in 1851. Severely burned, he survived an 
agonising 24 hours without medical treatment. His father and uncle were away mustering cattle at the 
time of the accident, as were all the men from neighbouring properties. Eliza and her sister-in-law dug 
a grave and placed the boy’s body between two sheets of bark. They buried him while their children 
stood graveside, reciting prayers. James learned of his son’s death upon his return a week later. Grief-
stricken, they sold their property and relocated to Reedy Creek, near Yarram, in 1852. Tragedy also 
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befell David and Mary Agnes O’Rourke in 1866 when their daughter of 18 months, Elizabeth, 
wandered away from the family home at Wulgulmerang. Everyone in the district helped search for the 
child, whose body was discovered a year later by a group of Aborigines. Agnes was so frightened that 
they waited for David to return and took him to the place, about a mile from the house, where the child 
had fallen from a cliff and broken her neck. Many years later, Mary Agnes spoke of her gratitude to 
the Aborigines and insisted, ‘I was never frightened of them again’ (O’Rourke Family no date, 2). 
 
The isolation experienced by early settlers eased slightly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
with major land reforms encouraging a small growth in the district’s population. The Gippsland 
Squattage district was proclaimed in 1843; however, the Wulgulmerang Plateau and the country 
further south effectively remained an isolated subdistrict of the Monaro until the mid-1850s (Seddon 
1994). With the establishment of the Colony of Victoria in 1851, responsibility for the administration 
of land was progressively transferred from Sydney to Melbourne. The Nicholson Land Act of 1860 
marked the beginning of a period of major land reform that aimed to remedy the slow rate of 
agricultural development and thus reduce prices for agricultural products (O'Bryan 1983). Crown land 
was made available for selection by agriculturalists and by 1875 most of the Wulgulmerang Plateau 
had been selected. Although still small, the district’s population began to grow, particularly around 
Gelantipy and Butchers Ridge (lower Gelantipy) (Adams 1981; Seddon 1994). This growth in 
population created a small demand for basic infrastructure, goods and services. In 1888, a post office 
opened in Gelantipy, followed by another at Wulgulmerang the following year. By the 1890s 
Gelantipy had its own hotel, which incorporated a blacksmith shop, and there were cricket and 
Australian Rules football teams that competed irregularly but successfully with teams from Buchan 
(Buchan Sesquicentenary Committee 1989). Improvements to roads and the extension of telephone 
services to Gelantipy in 1921 marked a major step forward for the district, which, by 1935, had its 
own Progress Association and, by 1939, a branch of the Country Women’s Association (Adams 1981).  
 
Historically, access to education has been a major issue for the small and remote communities of the 
Wulgulmerang district. The Education Act 1872 established a system of free, compulsory, secular 
education in Victoria. In remote communities, it was common practice for parents to create lists of 
potential students and to then lobby the Education Department for the establishment of a State School 
(Mirams 2007). In 1891, the Victorian Government’s Inspector of Schools pleaded with the Education 
Department to open a primary school in the district. He wrote: ‘The children are growing up savages 
in the heart of the mountains, more than 70 miles from a railway’ (cited in Adams 1981, 221). With 
just 12 prospective students, the Gelantipy Primary School (State School No. 3153) opened in 1892, 
only to close two years later when enrolments fell below 10 students. Local parents campaigned 
successfully to have the school re-opened, part-time, with a new school at Butchers Ridge (No. 3293, 
est. 1895). Correspondence files for the Gelantipy and Butchers Ridge primary schools record regular 
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appeals by parents and community leaders to retain or re-open the schools. In 1916, for example, the 
Head Teacher at Gelantipy wrote to the Education Department seeking to have the school re-opened 
after its previous closure in 1913:    
 
There are now 13 children of school age living in Gelantipy receiving no education 
whatsoever. The residents of that vicinity have asked me to ask you if you would be good 
enough to join that school in with Lower Gelantipy [Butchers Ridge] and W Tree State 
Schools No. 3239 and 3624 so that their children would be able to get a little schooling. 
Some of the children are now nearing age 13 years and have no education (cited in 
Department of Education no date, no page). 
 
Later, in 1924, the Education Department received a letter from the Head Teacher at W Tree: 
 
I have the honour to inform you that as Mr. Havers is leaving Gelantipy and taking with 
him his family, there will be, for some time, no children of school age in the district. It, 
therefore, seems necessary to close the school (cited in Department of Education no date, 
no page). 
 
It is clear that depopulation and limited access to essential services, such as education, are interrelated 
and longstanding problems in the district. From their inception, local schools have been locked in a 
cycle of closures, re-openings and mergers. Butchers Ridge Primary School last operated in 1971, 
while Gelantipy closed in 2001 due to inadequate enrolments. Current residents doubt whether 
Gelantipy Primary will ever re-open and thus are pessimistic about the prospects of attracting new 
families and revitalising the area. 
 
The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period of significant development for the Wulgulmerang district. 
Improvements to roads, including the construction of a road between Suggan Buggan and Willis, 
greatly increased access to and within the district. Homes and businesses in Buchan received 
electricity supply in 1968, followed by Gelantipy, Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain in 1971. 
Despite these developments, residents remained highly isolated and, in 1974, the Isolated Districts 
Association of East Gippsland was formed by residents in Gelantipy. In the space of a few months it 
had 150 members and was lobbying for improvements to local services, including the school bus and 
mail services (Adams 1981). Limited access to basic services such a healthcare, education and public 
transport remains a significant issue for residents of the Wulgulmerang district to this day. 
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4.2.4  Economy and politics 
By the late 1880s, Buchan had become established as a farming district, with barley, hops, oats and 
other crops under cultivation. Dairying also played an important role in Buchan’s economy, with 
butter and cheese factories operating in the area from the early to mid-1900s (Adams 1981; Buchan 
Sesquicentenary Committee 1989). The inaccessibility of the country further north meant that cattle 
and sheep farming remained the primary forms of industry in the Wulgulmerang district. Like their 
predecessors on the Monaro, graziers favoured cattle over sheep as they could be left unattended and 
were less labour-intensive. Furthermore, dingoes were a significant barrier to sheep farming until 
around 1915, when fences became common (Rogers 1972). Although sheep farming thereafter became 
more viable, dingo predation remained a significant problem for local graziers, as it does today (see 
4.3.2). Rabbit plagues posed a problem for the district’s landholders after 1898, when they were first 
sighted at Black Mountain. Many local men have supplemented their incomes over the years by 
trapping rabbits and dingoes (Sykes 1982). 
 
The development of rail infrastructure in East Gippsland, which by 1916 linked Orbost with 
Bairnsdale and Melbourne, provided a boost to agricultural industries in the region. Producers were 
now able to freight large quantities of fresh produce to distant markets more quickly and efficiently. 
However, the inaccessibility of the Wulgulmerang district from rail services – a product of distance, 
difficult terrain and poor road quality – meant that these developments had little impact on the local 
economy. This inaccessibility turned to advantage during the Great Depression of 1929, when the 
local population was largely protected from the influx of workers into rural areas in search of work. 
The district even benefited from the Depression when the Country Roads Board used unemployment 
relief funds to finances gangs of unemployed men to improve the road between Buchan and Gelantipy 
and, later, the Snowy River Road between Wulgulmerang and Suggan Buggan (Geysen 2002).  
 
Adams (1981, 371) notes that: 
 
The post war years promised an exciting future for the country further north of Buchan. 
These were the years when many of the cattle and sheep breeding properties developed 
and achieved wide fame for the quality of their stock. 
 
Since 1949 the Gelantipy calf sale has been an important economic and social event for the 
Wulgulmerang district. The Bairnsdale Advertiser (Author unknown 1949, 1) hailed the inaugural sale 
‘… an important event in the history of Gelantipy’ because it indicated that ‘… the district had 
developed and progressed significantly to warrant the sale yards being erected’. More importantly, the 
consistently high quality of stock offered at the sale meant that the district developed an excellent 
reputation for producing top-quality cattle (Balmer 1993).  
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The Australian agricultural sector as a whole grew steadily in the years after the Second World War. 
This was due largely to the expansion of markets for Australian exports and the protectionist trade 
policies of Australian governments (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005). Since the 1970s, however, Labor 
and Liberal governments have progressively implemented neoliberal strategies based on economic 
deregulation, privatisation of state-owned assets, a reduced commitment to social welfare, and a focus 
on international competitiveness (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005). Successive governments 
believed that deregulation and free trade would eventually occur on a global scale and that it would be 
advantageous for Australia to increase efficiency and adapt early to likely future circumstances 
(Vanclay 2003). Many other countries have not followed suit and, most notably, the United States and 
European Union continued to protect their agricultural producers from competition with Australia and 
other nations. In 2005, Australia provided the second lowest level of government support to 
agriculture, after New Zealand, among OECD countries (Productivity Commission 2005). These 
changes have forced restructuring in Australia’s agricultural sector which has triggered profound 
social, economic and environmental changes throughout rural Australia. Most notably, agricultural 
producers’ exposure to volatile market fluctuations and declining terms of trade (where costs of 
production increase at a rate greater than prices received for agricultural output) have forced more 
intensive and ‘efficient’ farming. The Productivity Commission (2005) recently reported that 
Australia’s agricultural output more than doubled over the four decades to 2003-04 and almost tripled 
in value since the mid 1970s. It also reported, however, that the number of farms in Australia declined 
from around 178,000 to 132,000 in the 20 years to 2002-03. Over this period, the average size of farms 
increased by around 23 percent and, although the agricultural sector is still mostly comprised of small 
family farms, production has become concentrated on large enterprises. In 2005, 20 percent of 
broadacre farms accounted for 64 percent of Australia’s agricultural output (Productivity Commission 
2005). The East Gippsland Catchment Management Authority (EGCMA 2005, 7) makes note of the 
increasing pressures on agricultural producers in the region: 
 
Throughout Victoria, the agricultural sector continues to experience declining terms of 
trade for many products, particularly those of the traditional grazing enterprises. This 
creates pressure to increase productivity, increase farm size and seek greater off-farm 
income. Farming properties around East Gippsland experienced difficult operating 
conditions during the 1990s with severe drought, floods, low commodity prices and an 
outbreak of Ovine Johne’s disease in sheep. 
 
Drought and wild dogs have also placed significant pressure on many agricultural producers.4 The 
changing economics of agriculture has encouraged farm enlargements and amalgamations in the 
                                                 
4
 The pressures of drought, OJD and wild dogs on agricultural producers are discussed in greater depth in section 
4.3.2. 
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district. By increasing the size of holdings and reducing their total inputs (costs of production), many 
farmers have been able to achieve greater economic efficiency and productivity. This type of farming 
may be economically optimal within the bounds of the current economic system; however, it is far 
from being socially and environmentally optimal. Farm amalgamations have, in part, contributed to 
the process of depopulation that has undermined the social viability of the Wulgulmerang district. The 
largest farm, for example, is an amalgamation of about 10 family farms and comprises an area of 
approximately 4,500ha. It is owned by an absentee landholder who employs one person to manage the 
property. Residents express concern not just for the social implications of such farming, but also for its 
environmental ramifications. A number of interviewees claimed that large farms operated by absentee 
landholders were often poorly managed, particularly in terms of pest plant and animal control. 
 
The Wulgulmerang district’s firm agricultural base is reflected in its strong tradition of conservative 
politics. Conservative political parties, particularly the National and Liberal parties (in their various 
guises), have held the Federal seat of Gippsland since federation in 1901 and the Victorian seat of 
Gippsland East since 1889 (Australian Electoral Commission 2007; Victorian Electoral Commission 
2007). The National Party, which formed in 1920 (as The Country Party) to represent the interests of 
primary producers, has historically received strong support from residents of the district. Gelantipy 
had its own branch of The Country Party for a short time during the 1960s. Most residents and 
landholders, however, have preferred to engage in politics at the local level. Keith Churchill Rogers, 
of Black Mountain, was a Councillor for the Buchan Riding of the Tambo Shire between 1948 and 
1971, after which the position was taken up by Norman Woodhouse of Gelantipy (Adams 1981). 
Local people have also engaged in politics through various agriculture-based organisations, such as the 
Victorian Farmers Federation (VFF) and Mountain Cattlemen’s Association of Victoria (MCAV). The 
Gelantipy Progress Association has historically been an important vehicle for residents and 
landholders to raise and resolve issues and problems that face the district.   
 
As discussed above, radical economic reform and subsequent restructuring in the agricultural sector 
have forced profound changes on many rural communities. In Victoria, the Liberal-National Coalition 
government (1992 – 1999), led by Premier Jeff Kennett, embarked on an aggressive program of 
reform which saw deregulation of the Victorian economy, privatisation of State-owned assets, 
downsizing of the public service, and the ‘rationalisation’, out-sourcing and withdrawal of government 
services (Costar and Economou 1999). The impacts of these reforms on rural and regional Victoria 
caused serious tensions within the National Party and between the Coalition partners (Costar 1999). 
The Kennett Government received severe criticism for its Melbourne-centric policies and neglect of 
rural communities, which suffered most obviously from the withdrawal of government services. 
Indeed, a rural backlash cost the Liberal-National Coalition government at the 1999 election when 
three independent candidates from rural Victoria won seats and, holding the balance of power, entered 
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into an agreement with the Labor Party to form government. One of the independents was Craig 
Ingram, a former abalone diver from East Gippsland. Elected primarily on a platform of restoring 
environmental flows to the Snowy River, Ingram (cited in Parliament of Victoria 1999, 194) used his 
inaugural speech to Parliament to highlight the plight of rural Victorians: 
 
The shock wave that swept through the city in late September did not begin at the polling 
booths; it had been shaking regional Victoria for years. It began when rural communities 
lost their trains, their schools, their banks and their access to local government and it 
strengthened as health services shrank and suicide statistics shot up. Country people 
watched in horror as everything being said at the local level was left silent in state-wide 
debates. Rural communities were in a static state of chronic erosion, but no-one in Spring 
Street seemed to care. Country people did not want new exhibition centres or grand prix 
in their towns; they just wanted their towns. Those who were spared the suffering in 
recent times cannot imagine how deeply those who suffered felt or how real the sense of 
betrayal became. The chasm between the haves and the have-nots was getting too wide, 
with whole communities starting to fall into the gap… 
 
Local government amalgamations have also had a profound impact on the Wulgulmerang district. The 
Kennett Government reduced the number of municipalities in Victoria from 210 to 78 (Kiss 1999). 
The City of Bairnsdale and the Shires of Bairnsdale, Omeo, Orbost and Tambo were amalgamated to 
form the East Gippsland Shire Council (EGSC), which covers an area of 20,901 square km and is the 
second largest municipality in Victoria. As a result of the amalgamation, the EGSC inherited large 
debts and an ageing infrastructure. Moreover, debt repayment and infrastructure maintenance was 
made difficult by the relatively small population from which rates could be levied.5  
 
4.2.5  Land management and environmental change 
The advent of European land uses and management practices has profoundly transformed the natural 
environment of the Wulgulmerang district. Fire management has long been a contentious issue, with 
debates focusing largely on questions of prescribed burning. In particular, debate has centred on the 
necessary frequency, intensity and scale at which vegetation should be burned in order to reduce the 
amount of fuel that is available for bushfires. To grossly simplify, those who prioritise livelihood and 
asset protection often argue for regular and broad-scale burning to reduce fuel loads, while those who 
give precedence to environmental protection often argue that such burning is detrimental to 
biodiversity. In reality, there is a broad range of perspective between these two poles (Whittaker and 
Mercer 2004). Perspectives on prescribed burning are often based on assumptions about the effects 
                                                 
5
 Municipal Emergency Resource Officer, East Gippsland Shire Council [Informant 33]. 
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and effectiveness of past burning practices, including Aboriginal people’s use of fire. In the 
Wulgulmerang district, these debates are complicated by incomplete and often contradictory 
observations and records of fire, prescribed or otherwise, and their impacts on native vegetation.  
 
It is widely recognised that Aboriginal people’s use of fire transformed many Australian environments 
(Kohen 1995). At the landscape scale, fire has been used for a range of purposes, including for 
clearing vegetation, promoting plant growth, controlling insects and vermin, hunting and waging war 
(Nicholson 1981). The use of fire to increase the productivity of the land has been termed ‘fire-stick 
farming’ (Jones 1969). Scientists generally agree that Aboriginal firing of the landscape influenced the 
geographic range and demographic structure of many vegetation types (Bowman 1998). However, it 
has been argued that Aborigines’ use of fire ‘… had little impact on the environment’ and that 
contemporary vegetation patterns are a product of climate change (Horton 1982, 287). It remains 
unclear precisely how long Aborigines have been burning Australian landscapes, how deliberately and 
carefully they did so, and with what intensity (Bowman 1998). Nevertheless, it is commonly thought 
that they burned the bush more regularly and with lower intensity than the Europeans who displaced 
them.6  
 
Little is known about Aboriginal burning practices and their environmental impacts in the 
Wulgulmerang district. There are very few Aboriginal people left in East Gippsland and a great wealth 
of historical and ecological knowledge has been lost.7 Alfred William Howitt, who was Mining 
Warden in 1863 and later a police magistrate in North and East Gippsland, spent almost 40 years 
documenting the natural and human history of East Gippsland (Seddon 1994). In a paper titled ‘The 
Eucalypts of Gippsland’, Howitt (1890) claimed that Aboriginal people had burned the bush on an 
annual basis ‘… to keep the forests open, and to prevent the country from being overgrown’. He 
maintained that these fires kept the bush open and grassy by consuming standing and fallen timber and 
by killing saplings that had sprouted after past fires. As Zylstra (2006) has pointed out, although 
Howitt knew the country and its people well, he provides no evidence that he actually witnessed an 
Aboriginal burn taking place and thus cannot confirm that it was a local practice. Nevertheless, Howitt 
maintained that European settlement had put an end to these practices, leading to more widely 
                                                 
6
 In 1788, Governor Arthur Phillip remarked that ‘… in all the country thro’ which I have passed I have seldom 
observed a quarter mile without seeing trees which appear to have been destroyed by fire’ (cited in Pyne 1998, 
103). Almost a century later the Victorian squatter, Edward Curr (1965, 88), wrote that Aborigines were ‘… 
constantly setting fire to the grass and trees, both accidentally, and systematically for hunting purposes’. He 
doubted whether such ‘… constant and extensive conflagrations could have occurred without something more 
than temporary consequences’ and questioned whether ‘… any section of the human race has exercised greater 
influence on the physical condition of any large portion of the globe’. 
7
 At the 2006 Australian Census of Population and Housing (ABS 2006), no person from the Wulgulmerang 
district identified as being of indigenous descent. 
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extended and dense forests throughout Gippsland. With special reference to the northern reaches of the 
Wulgulmerang district, Howitt claimed that:   
 
The valley of the Snowy River, when the early settlers came down from Maneroo to 
occupy it, as for instance, from Willis downwards to Mountain Creek, was very open and 
free from forests. At Turnback and the Black Mountain, the mountains on the western 
side of the river were, in many parts, clothed with grass, and with a few large scattered 
trees of E. hemiphloia.  
 
The immediate valley was a series of grassy alluvial flats, through which the river 
meandered. After some years of occupation, whole tracts of country became covered with 
forests of young saplings… and at the present time these have so much increased, and 
grown so much, that it is difficult to ride over parts which one can see by the few 
scattered old giants were at one time open grassy country. 
 
Evidence that this country was less densely vegetated than it is today was compiled by Pulsford et al. 
(1993) in their study of the land use history of the white cypress pine forests around Willis. They cite 
Robinson’s description of the area in 1844, shortly after the first Europeans arrived in the valley: 
 
Callitriss [sic] from four to five feet in circumference grew amid shrubs of every tint. The 
Country is well grassed and abounds with Cattle, the Soil varies from a rich black mould 
to a chocolate (cited in Pulsford et al. 1993, 88; emphasis added). 
 
A little more than a century later, Costin (1954) reported that the same area was characterised by 
dense, regenerating thickets of white cypress pine and bare, eroded soils. Pulsford et al. (1993, 89) 
also cite Harnett’s 1948 recollection:  
 
The old stockmen told me that Willis was ‘good’ until the young pine came in like wheat 
in 1878, before that there were only large trees… it killed all the grasses and clovers and 
the topsoil then washed away… 
 
While little is known about how the Ngarigo people managed the landscape and may have 
manipulated vegetation cover, it is clear that their stewardship of the land came to an abrupt halt with 
graziers’ occupation of the valley. Pulsford et al. (1993, 100) speculated that the Aboriginal fire 
regime in the white cypress pine forests around Willis would have been relatively ‘benign’, removing 
litter and stimulating plant growth without inflicting damage on the tree strata. However, around 1840, 
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graziers introduced the practice of burning unpalatable vegetation to encourage new, succulent 
pasture. Thus the arrival of Europeans in the valley corresponded with an increase in fire frequency: 
 
The combined record from official records and tree dating show that after an apparently 
long quiescent period, regular fires occurred about every six (range 3 – 11) years soon 
after the entry of Europeans and their grazing animals into the valley. 
 
If only for the area around Willis, this casts doubt on Howitt’s (1890) claim that fire frequency 
declined with the arrival of Europeans, a claim that continued to be put forward by many of those who 
argue for more regular and broad-scale prescribed burning. 
 
In his ‘Notes on changes in mountain areas’, the late K.C. Rogers (1896 – 1978), a cattleman and 
naturalist from the Wulgulmerang district, noted that around the time of the early settlers ‘… a large 
part of both tableland and valley was quite open forest, with much less undergrowth than one sees 
today (Rogers 1976, 3). Wakefield (1970) investigated the relationship between fire frequency and 
vegetation change in the Wulgulmerang district. He quotes from a letter in which Rogers, whose father 
settled in Black Mountain in 1902, explains the history of burning practices and their impacts on 
vegetation in the district:  
 
In those days John O’Rourke of Wulgulmerang and others used to tell of the open, clean-
bottomed, park-like state of the forests of this tableland and adjacent areas, which they 
could well remember from earlier days. The Pendergasts of Benambra, whose cattle runs 
adjoined ours at the Dividing Range, told the same story. Over a period of years, before 
we came to the district, it had been the accepted thing to burn the bush, to provide a new 
growth of shorter sweet feed for the cattle. 
  As soon as we boys were old enough, we were keen to do the burning. The 
practice was to burn the country as often as possible, which would be every three or four 
years according to conditions. One went burning in the hottest and driest weather in 
January and February, so that the fire would be as fierce as possible, and thus make a 
clean burn. As a general practice, in the valleys, we would light along the rivers and 
creeks so that the fire would roar up the steep slopes on either side, making a terrific 
inferno and sweeping all before it. The hotter the fire, the sweeter and better the feed for 
the cattle after the new growth came. The tablelands received special attention, for the 
high country, though more tedious to burn, provided the most feed… 
  In short, the run-holders, until regulations prevented, would consistently burn 
the bush as often as possible. The only area where this procedure did not apply 
extensively was the White Box country of the Snowy River and Suggan Buggan valleys, 
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for the grass there was sweet without fire. It would seem that the long-followed practice 
of regularly burning the bush in the hot part of the year has resulted in a great increase of 
scrub in all timbered areas except the box country (Rogers, cited in Wakefield 1970, 153). 
 
Again, this conflicts with Howitt’s (1890) claim that a decline in fire frequency after European 
settlement transformed the vegetation of East Gippsland to dense and scrubby forests. Rather, it 
appears that graziers burned the vegetation more frequently than their Aboriginal predecessors and that 
this caused an increase in dense and scrubby vegetation. With reference to the Wulgulmerang district, 
Wakefield concludes:  
 
… the salient points are (i) that for about a hundred years there was a regime of rotational 
burning at 3-4 year intervals, of many or most areas of dry sclerophyll forest, and (ii) that 
during this regime there was a marked increase in scrubby undergrowth in these forests. It 
is significant that such evolution of scrub occurred in areas subjected to maximum 
possible fire frequency. This appears to demonstrate, conclusively, that the more grassy 
and less scrubby forests known to the earliest settlers were not a deflected climax due to 
high fire frequency but were, on the contrary, a state of vegetation associated with 
comparatively low fire frequency (Wakefield 1970, 87; emphasis added).  
 
A more tightly regulated fire management regime has since put an end to these practices. This has 
caused over-mature scrub and dead vegetation to accumulate, with potential to fuel destructive 
bushfires such as those that swept parts of the district in 1952, 1965 and 2003. It is important to note 
that Wakefield (1970, 157) insists that his findings are ‘… of academic rather than practical 
importance’, and that the challenge for fire managers is to reduce the flammability of these scrublands 
to protect people and property. For Rogers (1976, 5), there is only one practical way to achieve this 
objective: 
 
The practice of summer burning has long since ceased, and rightly so, but there is still a 
place for spring or autumn fuel reduction firing, which tends to reduce scrub, and is a 
necessary safety precaution. 
 
This view is supported by the Mountain Cattlemen’s Association of Victoria (MCAV 2003), which 
lobbies for, among other things, more regular, broad-scale fuel reduction on public land.  
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4.2.6  Bushfires 
As noted in Chapter 1, bushfires are an ever-present threat to human life and property in the 
Wulgulmerang district. Most fires have been small and inconsequential in terms of human life and 
property losses. Clyde Sykes (1982) recalls a small fire entering his property at Black Mountain during 
the early 1930s. His wife, who was home alone with their infant child, was told by a neighbour to 
leave their bark hut and seek refuge in the river if the fire got too close. In what can be considered 
early evidence in support of the ‘Stay and defend or leave early’ policy, ‘Every time the fire got near 
the bark hut she dashed out of the river and threw water on the fire and the hut, which she saved’ 
(Sykes 1982, 19-20). Bushfires burned 16,800 ha in the Reedy Creek and Buchan River area in the 
summer of 1937/38. In 1951/52 fires burned 6,800 ha on the Gelantipy Plateau (which lies to the east 
of the district) (Zylstra 2006).8 These areas are uninhabited and would have caused little, if any, 
damage to private property.  
 
Fortunately, the Wulgulmerang district was spared the disaster of the 1939 ‘Black Friday’ bushfires. 
These fires followed a prolonged period of severe drought in south-eastern Australia. Fires had been lit 
during spring to reduce the availability of fuel for bushfires and, left unattended to burn out, continued 
to burn into summer (Zylstra 2006). January of 1939 saw record high temperatures in Melbourne, 
reaching an all-time high of 45.6ºC (114ºF) on January 13. High temperatures and strong winds 
between January 13 and 15 brought hundreds of small fires together with devastating consequences. 
The Black Friday fires – the most disastrous bushfires in Australia to date – burned almost two million 
ha of land in Victoria and claimed 71 lives (Department of Sustainability and Environment 2007). 
While these fires did not directly affect the Wulgulmerang district, the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission that followed (Stretton 1939) eventually led to the creation of the Country Fire Authority 
(under the Country Fire Authority Act 1944) (Murray and White 1995).9 The district had long had a 
local fire brigade; however, the subsequent establishment of the Gelantipy CFA brigade saw the 
beginning of an officially organised approach to firefighting in the area.  
 
In 1965 Gippsland was ravaged by bushfires. Over a period of 17 days – from February 21 to March 
13 – fires burned more than 300,000 ha of forest and 15,000 ha of grassland, destroying more than 60 
buildings and 4,000 head of stock (DSE 2007). Earlier that year seven people had died at Longwood in 
northern Victoria and three had died at Eltham on Melbourne’s north-eastern fringe. On March 6, fire 
spotted from Bindi into the Buchan Valley and burned eastwards through extremely rugged and 
inaccessible country towards Gelantipy (Author unknown 1965a). Firebreaks were cleared to protect 
                                                 
8
 The Gelantipy settlement is located on the Wulgulmerang Plateau.  
9
 The impetus to act on Stretton’s recommendations was a spate of destructive bushfires in the early to mid 
1940s, most notably a blaze that destroyed 58 houses in the Melbourne suburb of Beaumaris in 1944 (Barrow 
1945). 
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private property and back-burns were lit to the north and west of Gelantipy. By March 8, Forest 
Commission officers were concerned that a large uncontrolled fire in the Buchan River headwaters 
was ‘… burning steadily toward the Gelantipy settlements area and throwing spot fires miles ahead of 
it’ (Author unknown 1965f, 1). The fires, which also threatened valuable stands of timber to the west 
of Gelantipy, were contained on March 11 with only minimal damage to private property. Some 
current residents witnessed the 1965 fires, which they compared to those of January 30, 2003: 
 
I saw 1965 and it was ember attack from the same direction, in behind Seldom Seen. It 
was a wooden fire tower on [Mt.] Seldom Seen and the fire wiped it. It was exactly the 
same: over it came, landed in the paddock. You never knew where it was going to land. 
You’d close it down and then half an hour later you’d be on the job again, killing another 
one. 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
However, as another long-term resident pointed out, there were significant differences between the 
1965 and 2003 fires: 
  
As far as we’re concerned, it wasn’t as devastating. There were no houses burnt in the 
area. It came through in the night, too, not in the middle of the day. It burnt quite a lot of 
fencing. I don’t think there was a lot of stock burnt, if I remember rightly. But no, it 
certainly didn’t create the damage in our area that this one did. And it came through in 
March. 
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
Public responses to the 1965 fires were also significantly different. While many residents were 
scathing in their assessments of the Victorian government and its departments’ responses to the 2003 
fires (see Chapters 5 and 6), Gelantipy residents roundly praised all those involved for their efforts in 
the 1965 fires (Author unknown 1965b). Nevertheless, as was the case after the 2003 fires, a wider 
debate ensued over the Forest Commission’s role in fire protection and, more specifically, its policy 
that restricted prescribed burning in the summer months (Author unknown 1965c). As a Councillor 
with the Tambo Shire, K.C. Rogers of Black Mountain moved that the Forests Commission’s policy 
be altered ‘… to permit protective burning of all bush and scrub area adjacent to settlement during 
spring and autumn’ and to extend the period in which prescribed burning could be carried out in 
higher altitude areas (cited in Author unknown 1965d, 1). Rogers insisted that the Forests Commission 
and CFA had been ‘… wonderful and effective’ organisations in the battle against bushfires in East 
Gippsland, but argued that greater fuel reduction was the only way to prevent disastrous bushfires 
(cited in Author unknown 1965c, 1). Rogers’ views were supported by other local residents, including 
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A.W. Baker, who declared that ‘… the bush should be burnt [sic] from time to time instead of having 
restrictions all the time. Fire conditions are aggravated by the Commission’s policy’ (cited in Author 
unknown 1965e, 7). 
 
4.3  Contemporary life 
4.3.1  People 
The 2001 Australian Census of Population and Housing (ABS 2001a) recorded a population of 192 
people (113 men and 79 women) between north Buchan and the NSW border.10 This area includes the 
settlements of Murrindal, W Tree, Timbarra, Butchers Ridge, Gelantipy, Seldom Seen, 
Wulgulmerang, Black Mountain and Suggan Buggan (see Figure 1.1).11 The population density of this 
area (2,150 sq. km.) was very low, with an average of one person for every 11 sq. km. Although the 
precise distribution of the population across this area cannot be stated with certainty, it is clear that 
there is a significantly higher concentration of people living in the W Tree area, where there is an 
established ‘alternative lifestyle’ community. A community leader from the Wulgulmerang district 
declared that there were 77 people living either full- or part-time between Gelantipy and the border 
[Informant 24]; however, others suggested that this was an overstatement.  
 
The aged and diminished state of the local population was a recurrent theme in interviews with 
residents and landholders. This is supported by official demographic data, as well as data collected 
from research participants. Figure 4.1 compares the age of residents in the CD and Victoria. First, it 
can be seen that 22% of the CD’s population is aged 0-14 years, which is higher than the Victorian 
average (20%). This reflects the large number of children living in the W Tree community. That there 
are proportionally fewer people aged 20-34 in the CD (11%) than in Victoria (22%) is consistent with 
observations that many young adults leave the district to pursue work and other opportunities. Most 
significantly, however, it can be seen that a far greater proportion of the CD’s population (46%) is 
aged over 45 than in Victoria as a whole (36%). Given that the interest here is the Wulgulmerang 
district, it is significant that these figures are skewed by the larger and younger population at W Tree 
and other southern locations (from which schools are more accessible). Excluding part-time residents 
and absentee landholders, more than two-thirds (69%) of the Wulgulmerang district residents who 
were interviewed for this research were aged over 55. More than a third was aged over 65 (see Table 
4.1). These figures support local people’s observations that the district’s population has aged. 
 
                                                 
10
 Unless otherwise stated, this section uses Census data from 2001. While data from 2006 are available, 2001 
data better reflect the characteristics of the population prior to the 2003 bushfires. 
11
 The Census Collection District (CD) is the finest scale at which official demographic information is collected. 
While the size of CDs varies greatly, each contains an average of 225 dwellings. Urban CDs are typically small 
and densely populated, while rural CDs tend to be larger and more sparsely populated. ‘CD 2040201’ is the area 
in question and is hereafter referred to as ‘the CD’.  
 108 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
 0-4
 10-14
 20-24
 30-34
 40-44
 50-54
 60-64
 70-74
80-84
90-94
100+
Y
ea
rs
 
o
f a
ge
Percentage of population
Victoria
CD 2040201
 
Figure 4.1: Age structure of population  
Source: ABS (2001a) 
 
  
Table 4.1: Proportion of people aged over 45, 55 and 65 years 
 Victoria CD 2040201 Research participants12 
Over 45 36% 46% 88% (n = 23) 
Over 55 22% 28% 69% (n = 18) 
Over 65 13% 12% 38% (n = 10) 
(Source: ABS 2001a) 
 
Residents identified population change as the most critical issue facing the local community. 
Interviewees described the exodus of young people from the district and the subsequent ageing of the 
remaining population. This trend is evident in many parts of rural Australia and is not a new 
phenomenon (Hugo 2005). The 2006 ‘Inquiry into Retaining Young People in Rural Towns and 
Communities’ (Rural and Regional Services and Development Committee 2006) reported to the 
Parliament of Victoria that the main reason young people leave rural areas is to gain access to 
education, training or employment. As noted above, the limited opportunity for education is 
historically a major cause of depopulation in the district. A lifetime resident of Gelantipy summed up 
the situation: 
                                                 
12
 These figures are for full-time residents of the Wulgulmerang district only – part-time residents, absentee 
landholders and W Tree residents are excluded. Given the small population and interviewees’ frequent 
recounting of the people who live in the district, the interview sample can be taken as broadly representative of 
the population as a whole (see Chapter 3). 
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There’s no primary education now and it’s difficult for secondary education because it’s 
so far away. You’ve either got to board the kids or move somewhere where they can go to 
school. It’s always been like that up here. There was no secondary education when we 
went to school.  
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
Stories of people leaving the district to educate their children were common among residents and 
landholders of the district.13 In 1973, for example, Barney and his family left their home at 
Wulgulmerang so his children could attend secondary school. Now an absentee landholder, he 
explained: 
 
The biggest change, I suppose, is the lack of people. I was on the committee when we put 
the power through here [late 1960s and early 1970s]… Between Buchan and Black 
Mountain, there were 65 connections. Today, more than two-thirds of those houses would 
be empty. I don’t know how many families there are living there now – I don’t think 
there’d be 20... The young people had to go because there wasn’t enough money on the 
farms for people to pay their sons. We moved out for secondary education for the kids. 
Rather than sending them away to boarding school, we thought we’d move down to here.  
– Barney, Absentee landholder, Wulgulmerang 
 
More recently, Jane and Gavin moved from Wulgulmerang to Buchan so that their children could 
attend secondary school in Bairnsdale. They plan to return to Wulgulmerang when their children have 
finished school: 
 
We can only live there on weekends with the kids, because it’s just too far to school. As it 
is, it’s an hour and a half by bus to Bairnsdale [from Buchan]. So you’re looking at kids 
travelling three hours a day to go to school. From up there [Wulgulmerang] it’s another 
hour each-way. 
– Jane, Buchan 
 
A major consequence of the ageing and diminishing population has been a reduction in opportunities 
for social interaction (see 4.3.3). This has provided further impetus for young people, in particular, to 
leave the district. At the root of the contemporary depopulation problem, however, are radical changes 
to the nature of livelihoods and the local economy. 
 
                                                 
13
 Informants 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 37. 
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4.3.2  Livelihoods and local economy 
In 2001, half of the CD’s working population (n = 87) was employed in industries included in the 
Census category ‘Agriculture, forestry and fishing’ (ABS 2001a). These industries employed 32% of 
working men and 32% of working women. Given the CD is 50km from Lakes Entrance, the centre of 
the local fishing industry, at its nearest point, it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of these 
people were employed in agriculture. This is certainly the case in the Wulgulmerang district, where 
70% of research participants derived an income directly from agriculture. Cattle and sheep farming are 
the dominant forms of agriculture, with 90% of the agricultural landholders interviewed grazing beef 
cattle and, in some cases, sheep for fat lamb and wool production. Despite limited opportunities for 
alternative employment, two-thirds of the households where agriculture was the primary livelihood 
strategy had at least one person engaged in off-farm employment on a casual or part-time basis. For 
men, off-farm employment included jobs such as truck driving, dog trapping (with the DSE) and 
working on absentee landholders’ properties – for example, maintaining fences or mustering livestock. 
Significant industries of employment for women included health and community services (17%), 
education (15%) and hospitality (15%) (ABS 2001a). 
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Figure 4.2: Individual weekly incomes for people aged 15 years and over  
Source: ABS (2001a) 
 
In 2001, the average weekly income for individuals living in the CD was lower than the Victorian 
average (ABS 2001). Figure 4.2 shows that, as a proportion of the total population, there were more 
people in the CD on low incomes (and thus fewer on high incomes) than in Victoria as a whole. In 
2006, the median weekly individual and household incomes for the CD were $261 and $566, 
 111 
respectively, compared to $466 and $1,027 for Australia (ABS 2006b).14 Again, given that the people 
of the Wulgulmerang district are the subject of this research, these data are skewed by the larger 
populations to the south. Financial information was not directly collected from research participants 
(see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, these figures are consistent with the qualitative data presented 
throughout this thesis, which suggest that many were struggling financially prior to the fires (see 
below). Furthermore, the CD was ranked in the top 40% of most disadvantaged CDs in Australia on 
the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage/Disadvantage (IRSEAD) and in the lowest 10% on 
the Index of Economic Resources (IER) (ABS 2001b).15 
 
Economic downturn in agriculture 
Due to its lack of economic diversity and dependence on cattle and sheep farming, the Wulgulmerang 
district is extremely vulnerable to shocks and crises in the agricultural sector. As noted earlier in the 
Chapter, agricultural producers have experienced declining terms of trade since the 1970s, when 
Australian governments began to dismantle economic protections for Australian exports and expose 
producers to competition in world markets. It was also noted that in 2005 Australia provided the 
second lowest level of government support to agriculture among OECD countries (Productivity 
Commission 2005), putting Australian producers at a distinct disadvantage in the global marketplace. 
To remain competitive, farmers have improved production efficiency by increasing the size of their 
operations and reducing inputs. In the Wulgulmerang district, as in many other parts of rural Australia, 
the restructuring of farm businesses to achieve economic efficiency has seen farm enlargements and 
amalgamations and a drastic reduction in opportunities for employment on farms and in other 
businesses that service the agricultural sector. The pursuit of economic efficiency at the individual 
farm level has undermined the social and economic viability of the district as a whole by creating 
unemployment, which sets in motion a cycle of out-migration, reduced demand for local goods and 
services, closure of local businesses and withdrawal of public services, and diminished opportunities 
for cultural and social interaction. The connections between the economic downturn in agriculture and 
                                                 
14
 Data of this precision could not be obtained for 2001. In 2001, the median individual and median weekly 
income for the CD was between $200-299 and $400-499, respectively, compared to $300-399 and $700-799 for 
Australia (ABS 2001a). Note that median income data is based on information collected for ‘place of 
enumeration’ rather than ‘place of usual residence’. All other Census data used in this thesis is for place of usual 
residence, unless otherwise stated. 
15
 These indexes are part of the ABS’s ‘Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas’ (SEIFA), which are used to measure 
the social and economic welfare of Australian populations. The IRSEAD is derived from variables that are said 
to reflect socio-economic advantage and disadvantage within an area, including income, educational attainment 
and employment. The IER is used to profile the economic resources of families within an area based on variables 
such as income, expenditure and wealth. In both cases, index scores are standardised to have a mean of 1,000 
and a standard deviation of 100. This means that around 95% of all index scores for CDs are between 800 and 
1200. Lower index scores (i.e. below 1000) indicate areas of relative socio-economic disadvantage and/or few 
economic resources (see Trewin 2003). In 2001, CD 2040201 scored 965 on the IRSEAD (ranked 14,218 of 
35,695) and 880 on the IER (ranked 3,335 of 35,695) (ABS 2001b). For a discussion of the uses and limitations 
of socio-economic indicators, including SEIFA, in vulnerability analysis see King (2001). 
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the social and economic demise of the Wulgulmerang district were captured perfectly by Dennis, a 
lifetime resident and grazier of the district: 
 
Our biggest problem, as far as the farm economics side of things is concerned, really 
goes back to Whitlam…16 He wanted to get at the ‘Collins Street Farmers’, 17 so he tried 
to make sure that all the tax advantages that there were with farming were taken out. So 
he took out all those bigger people and, what he did by doing that, he took out fencing 
contractors and all these guys and managers that used to work on those properties. They 
became redundant. We used to have three fencing contractors living in this area alone… 
Wombargo Station [for example], was 5000-odd acres. And they seemed to have money… 
They’d do things that we probably couldn’t afford to do, but they were employing people 
by doing it. So once you knock them out of the system, then we started to get this drain of 
people leaving, until we got back to a stage where there was only the people that actually 
owned the place that were working the place. They didn’t employ managers anymore… 
And of course, there was enough money in the area that people would stop and play sport 
and things on the weekend and what-have-you. It was a pretty good social environment, 
really. But because people don’t have the time anymore – we’ve all got that much 
pressure on us now – we’re all working seven days a week… My parents would never 
have worked seven days a week. They worked very hard, [but] Sunday was always a day 
off, and [they had] Saturday afternoon off. I suppose I’m the maker of my own problem: 
we work seven days a week. But we shouldn’t. So you don’t have much time to go and do 
working-bees. And that’s an economic thing [but] it comes down to social fabric. I think 
they’ve gotta change the economics so there’s enough money in the job. We all need to 
make enough money that the guys who work with us can get paid well enough. And we 
shouldn’t have to work seven days a week, either. The days of that old Mercedes parked 
under the grazier’s back door are gone. But they used to be. When I was a kid: ‘There 
goes Mr. Hodge’, a pretty respected man, a fair bit of money. Nowadays those properties 
are owned by somebody who works. ‘Mr Hodge’ is not paying a manager anymore. And 
that’s pretty sad, because a lot of that country’s not being managed all that well. There’s 
bloody heaps of fencing to be done everywhere…  
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
                                                 
16
 Gough Whitlam was the Prime Minister of Australia between 1972 and 1975. 
17
 Collins Street is the premier street in Melbourne’s Central Business District. The term ‘Collins Street Farmer’ 
is used to refer to those who invest in farm properties, often for tax reasons, but who lives and works in 
Melbourne.   
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As Dennis pointed out, the majority of farm businesses no longer employ managers or workers, as it is 
not economically feasible to do so. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of large 
farming properties that are owned by absentee landholders and operated with a bare minimum of staff. 
The implications of this type of land tenure for the local community were a major concern for many 
local residents.18 There are now a number of absentee landholders in the district. However, interview 
discussions often revolved around the practices of the largest of these, who had been progressively 
acquiring large tracts of land since the 1970s. Percy, another lifelong resident and grazier of the 
district, was adamant that he would never ‘sell-out’ to an absentee landholder. Yet he conceded that 
his son may one day run the property as an absentee landholder, so that his children could attend 
school. Using the largest absentee landholder in the district as an example, Percy explained why he 
thinks this type of tenure is a problem for the local community:  
 
He’s good on fencing and things like that, but he employs one person on about 13,000 
acres… where 12 or 14 families used to live. One person owns it now and he lives at 
Clydebank and he employs one man, who hasn’t even got a wife… He just increases his 
holding all the time and doesn’t put anybody on, doesn’t give anyone else a job. That’s 
part of why there’s such a decay in the population. That’s what I’m saying, there’s not 
much employment round the district compared to what there used to be. 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
In a similar vein, another resident grazier noted that: 
 
There’s one guy who tries to buy up every little scrap of land that comes up in the 
district… And that type of ownership is a concern for small communities, because he’s 
trying to run those properties with beyond the minimum of staffing requirements. So he’s 
not providing any extra jobs or anything when he’s buying these farms. One guy’s got to 
run the whole lot. 
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
 
Interviewees frequently connected the increase in large, absentee landholdings to the problems of 
depopulation and community decline. Farmers also expressed concern that absentee landholdings were 
not being properly managed. There was a perception that some absentee landholders were neglecting 
to maintain their fences and manage weeds and that overstocking – driven by the need for greater 
efficiency and productivity – was creating potential for erosion and land degradation.  
 
                                                 
18
 Informants 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34 and 35. 
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Climatic variability 
East Gippsland is renowned for its temperate climate and reliable rainfall. In the Wulgulmerang 
district, climate data are sourced from the Automatic Weather Station at Gelantipy (AWS no. 084142). 
The climate is mild, with average maximum temperatures between 21°C and 23°C in summer and 9°C 
and 12°C in winter (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Monthly mean temperature at Gelantipy, 1992 – 2008 
Source: BoM (2008) 
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Figure 4.4: Monthly mean rainfall at Gelantipy, 1992 – 2008 
Source: BoM (2008) 
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On average, there are 11 days each year when the temperature exceeds 30°C and 16 days below 0°C. 
The average rainfall in Gelantipy is 727.3mm, which is relatively evenly distributed throughout the 
year (Figure 4.4). However, it is important to note that there is considerable climatic variation within 
the district, in terms of rainfall and temperature. Differences in topography mean that Gelantipy 
receives more rainfall than the other main farming settlements, Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain. 
An absentee landholder at Wulgulmerang explained: 
 
Gelantipy has got a higher rainfall and they get by, most years, quite well. It seems that 
the weather hits the hills and drops its load, and the clouds lift as they get to 
Wulgulmerang, [by which time] they’ve dropped their load, it’s gone. We’re quite a few 
inches below them in rainfall. 
– Barney, Wulgulmerang 
 
Dan, a Black Mountain grazier, estimated that the average annual rainfall at Gelantipy is 10 inches 
(approx. 250mm) higher than at Black Mountain and Wulgulmerang. Furthermore, the higher 
elevation of Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain (800 – 1000m compared to 755m at the Gelantipy 
AWS) means that winter conditions are often more severe. Winter can be a difficult time for graziers, 
as low temperatures and occasional snowfalls prevent grass from growing: 
 
You need a bit more country up there, because you have fantastic seasons, but every now 
and then you get a real humdinger dirty one. And you get hard winters. You gotta prepare 
for your winters. 
– Valerie, Wulgulmerang   
 
To survive the harsh winters, many graziers send their livestock to properties that they own or lease in 
the lower country. 
 
We sent all the cattle from that end away on agistment anyway, because we couldn’t feed 
them here coming on to winter. It seems strange to say – in January – ‘coming on to 
winter’, but winter starts here in about the start of May and it goes right through to the 
end of September. So we’ve got a fairly long winter when we get one, and there’s no hope 
of growing anything then…  
– Rory, Wulgulmerang 
 
 116 
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
196
2
196
4
196
6
196
8
197
0
197
2
197
4
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
Actual rainfall (mm)
Average annual rainfall (mm)
 
Figure 4.5: Annual rainfall at Gelantipy, 1962 – 1975 and 1995 – 200719 
Source: BoM (2008) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, annual rainfall in the Wulgulmerang district is highly variable. The 
highest annual rainfall on record is 1190mm (in 1966), compared to a low of 516mm (in 1997). The 
chart supports local people’s observations that they are ‘… in a dry run of years’ (Alan, 
Wulgulmerang). Between 1962 and 1975 the average annual rainfall at Gelantipy was 881mm, 
compared to just 728mm between 1995 and 2007. There has been just one year since 1995 when 
annual rainfall surpassed the 1962 – 1975 average (916mm in 2005): 
 
It [the climate] has certainly changed. We lived in Wulgulmerang from ’58 to ’73. ’67 
was a bad year.’71 or ’72, around about then, there was another one. But the rest of the 
years, we’d have grass this high [gestures to his waist] every summer, every summer. You 
could not get enough stock to eat the grass. But this last 20 years, we haven’t seen that; 
only on the very odd occasion. Well [sighs], what are we looking at? Are we looking at 
years now where we’re going to continue to get this lower than average rainfall? 
– Barney, absentee landholder, Wulgulmerang 
 
Most significantly, very low rainfall was experienced in 1997 and 1998, five years prior to the 2003 
bushfires. This drought decimated cattle and sheep stocks throughout district. Farmers were forced to 
sell their stock at low prices and faced high prices for hay and agistment to keep remaining animals 
alive. Figure 4.6 shows the average saleyard price for Australian beef cattle between 1982 and 2003. It 
                                                 
19
 This chart incorporates all available rainfall data for Gelantipy. Data for the period 1962 – 1975 were taken 
from the old AWS (084057) and data for 1995 – 2007 was taken from the current AWS (084142). 
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can be seen that farmers received their lowest prices for beef cattle in 1997, which was the year when 
rainfall was lowest. Low rainfall meant that many farmers were unable to feed their livestock and sent 
them to market, pushing prices down. Furthermore, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 triggered a 22% 
fall in the value of Australia’s live cattle exports (ABS 2005).  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Average saleyard price for Australian beef cattle, 1982 – 2003 
Source: Gleeson et al. (2003) 
 
At Wulgulmerang, Joe and Maureen estimated that it cost them $75,000 in 1998 to feed their cattle 
and sheep through the drought. Eight years later, they were still feeling the affects of the drought: 
 
We’re still under drought assistance. And if it wasn’t for the drought assistance a lot of 
us would not be here, put it that way. We would not be here. So it’s just hand to mouth… 
– Maureen, Wulgulmerang 
 
The decline of sheep farming 
In addition to economic downturn in agriculture and drought, the decline of sheep farming has placed 
further strain on local livelihoods. Graziers began to farm sheep in the district after about 1915, when 
fences became prevalent and reduced the risk of predation by dingoes. Sheep have been particularly 
profitable at times, both for wool and fat lamb production. The early 1950s, in particular, was a time of 
great economic prosperity in many rural areas, due largely to high wool prices and the success of The 
Country Party in implementing protective measures, such as tariffs and marketing schemes such as the 
Australian Wool Board (Davison 2005). The significance of wool to the national economy led to the 
well-known adage that Australia was ‘Riding on the sheep’s back’. Although Australia remains the 
world’s largest exporter of wool, the role of sheep in the national economy has declined significantly 
since the 1970s. As noted early in this Chapter, the Wulgulmerang district began and is renowned as a 
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cattle farming area. Percy, however, recalled a time when there were actually more sheep in the 
district: 
 
When I was young, there wasn’t a property here that didn’t have sheep on it. These days 
you’ve got a job to find a property with sheep on it. Back in those days, every year there 
was employment for quite a lot of young people shearing the sheep… These days, with 
cattle, that doesn’t happen. 50 to 60 years ago, it would’ve been 60% sheep, 40% cattle. 
I’d say it would be well over 90% cattle now. 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
According to local graziers, there are two main reasons for the decline of sheep farming in the district. 
First, predation by dingoes (or ‘wild dogs’) has forced many people out of sheep. While dingoes have 
always posed a threat to sheep in the district (see Sykes 1982), local graziers claim that the problem 
has recently become far worse. They attribute the increase in attacks on sheep to the DSE’s and Parks 
Victoria’s failure to control dogs on public land, particularly in national parks. For example, Fred 
explained why he was no longer able to run sheep on his property that adjoined national park: 
 
We had to go out of sheep because of the dingoes. This was before Johne’s [OJD]. It was 
just too severe. They wouldn’t let us poison round the farm because there were a couple 
of tiger quolls, and then they found rock wallabies20… There are dingoes out there and 
we still can’t run sheep. One year, we lost an entire lamb crop…  
 
He maintained that electric fences weren’t a viable option for him, as the property in question was in 
rocky and uneven terrain and was not supplied with electricity. All in all, Fred insisted that the costs of 
establishing and maintaining an electric fence system were too great.  
 
As far as I’m concerned, being completely surrounded by national park, I’ve given up 
running sheep because I don’t think an electric fence would keep the dogs out of there, 
with the type of country it is, and I don’t see why the hell I should go to that expense to 
keep the Department’s dogs out… 
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
The perception that these were ‘the Department’s dogs’ and therefore ‘the Department’s problem’ was 
widely held:  
 
                                                 
20
 A rare and endangered species (see Chapter 1). 
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Dingoes have been a big problem. For many years now it’s been almost impossible to run 
sheep safely, because the DSE have neglected to control the dingoes out in the bush. Our 
country joins the national park and I’m quite sure I couldn’t run sheep. If you had a bit of 
a barrier between you and the national park you could run sheep, perhaps. 
– Barney, Wulgulmerang 
 
Also responsible for the decline of sheep farming in the district was an outbreak of Ovine Johne’s 
Disease (OJD) in 1998. OJD is a bacterial disease that attacks the intestinal tract of sheep and causing 
a severe ‘wasting’ condition. Animals typically starve to death within 6-12 weeks once symptoms 
appear, possibly months or years after infection. OJD was first detected in Victoria in 1995. The State 
government responded by implementing a control program which saw infected properties quarantined 
and stock eradicated. The disease continued to spread between 1996 and 1999, prompting a more 
extensive control program. Infected properties were de-stocked and animals slaughtered, with the 
government compensating producers by paying slaughter values for destroyed stock. Those who 
refused to de-stock were placed under strict quarantine, which included strict restrictions on stock 
trading, while ‘suspect’ properties were placed under surveillance (Hood and Seedsman 2004). A 
small number of sheep on a handful of properties in the Wulgulmerang district were found to be 
infected with OJD.  
 
I’ve got stud sheep. I haven’t got as many as I used to have, because the Johne’s wiped 
me out in about ’98. They strung my whole stud up. I lost the whole stud, all my sheep – 
the lot. About 35 years of stud breeding went over the hooks in the abattoirs.  
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
We used to have sheep until Ovine Johne’s Disease came along. The rules were: ‘Get rid 
of your sheep, we’ll buy them, we’ll give you something for them, and you’re not allowed 
to have another sheep on the property for 2 years’. Those were the rules. 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
A study of farmers’ experiences of the outbreak (Hood and Seedsman 2004) found that while the 
economic impacts of OJD were significant for farming communities, it was the Victorian 
government’s response that caused the most distress. Specifically, the authors claim that ‘A lack of 
confidence in bureaucratic processes, a diminished sense of autonomy and a social environment 
characterised by suspicion and blame undermined rural networks and resulted in the stigmatisation of 
individuals and the isolation and dislocation of families from communities’ (Hood and Seedsman 
2004, 59). Joe and Maureen’s experiences of OJD support these conclusions. Joe described the 
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government’s management of the outbreak as ‘Nothing else but a government mess up’21, as it has 
since been found that the destruction of all sheep from an infected flock is unnecessary.22 They were 
clearly still angry about the government’s handling of the outbreak and the inadequate compensation 
they received. Maureen recalled the following encounter with a government official, having applied 
for additional financial assistance: 
 
I said: ‘We’ve got big overheads. We’ve borrowed money. We’re paying up to 20-odd 
percent [in interest]. How are we going to meet our payments?’ If you get rid of your 
assets [their sheep], how the hell can you meet your payments? He said: ‘Join the dole 
queue’. That’s what he said, at a public meeting! I’d been working up in Thredbo – we 
were going through a drought. All my money I was sending home for Joe to pay the 
bills… They said we had too many assets. I said to the chappie who said ‘Join the dole 
queue’: ‘We’ve got the assets but no bread to go with it. Assets make a lousy filling for a 
sandwich, mate, if you’ve got nothing to go with it’. And he just looked at me with a bit of 
a grin on his face… 
– Maureen, Wulgulmerang 
 
OJD saw many farmers bow out of sheep altogether, while others spent years re-building their flocks, 
with the added threat of dingoes. The result has been a greater dependence on cattle to sustain 
livelihoods. At the time of the interviews, cattle prices were relatively high. However, in the words of 
one local resident: ‘It’s better to have both than just one. It means we’re diversifying a bit’ [Kelvin, 
Seldom Seen]. The district’s economic dependence on cattle farming renders it vulnerable to shocks 
and crises in the cattle industry. More basically, cattle farming cannot create the jobs that are needed 
to attract new residents to the area and revitalise the local economy and community. 
 
4.3.3  Community and social life 
Changes to livelihoods and the local economy have transformed the social landscape of the 
Wulgulmerang district. As has already been noted, local people identified depopulation as a critical 
issue facing their community. Discussions revealed an acute awareness that depopulation and 
community decline are symptoms of deeper problems largely brought on by the restructuring of 
agriculture, which has seen a shift to larger and more productive farms that provide fewer 
opportunities for local employment: 
 
                                                 
21
 In reference to OJD and the 2003 bushfires, Joe said: ‘We’ve just about been put to the brick wall twice – 
through government’.  
22
 De-stocking is now voluntary in Victoria (see White 2006). 
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The main thing affecting a community like this is the shrinking population. A lot of the 
things that used to bring the community together are diminished or don’t exist anymore, 
just because of numbers, the ‘critical mass’ of people, that it takes to have a community. 
And this is going to be an ongoing thing. It’s one of those things with rural Australia: 
farming demands bigger and more efficient farms. So unless there’s an independent 
influx, some other industry, some other reason to populate the area, it’s just going to keep 
losing facilities. It’s below critical mass now. It’s shrinking, the school’s gone, the 
services that are here are underused and subsidised. So I don’t know where it goes from 
here. I don’t know how it can be built back up to that sort of population again. 
– Gary, Seldom Seen 
 
In addition to the withdrawal of services, depopulation has further reduced the opportunities for social 
interaction in the district. Residents frequently recalled times when there were numerous opportunities 
to socialise with others in the district, particularly through sporting clubs: 
 
As far as the district goes, if you go back a few years, we had a pony club – we used to 
hold gymkhana [equestrian] one-day-events – we had a tennis club, a badminton club, we 
had dances three or four times a year and perhaps the odd picture show here and there. 
Now there’s one dance held and one gymkhana-type thing and there’s no tennis club, no 
badminton club, there’s no pony club. It gives you an idea of how the population has 
dwindled in the area. The other thing, I suppose, is that people are more mobile 
nowadays and they get about a lot more and have diverse interests, [so] it’s hard to keep 
numbers here. 
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
Due to the limited opportunities for social interaction in the district, community life largely revolves 
around people’s participation in local volunteer groups and organisations. These include groups such 
as the Gelantipy CFA brigade, the Gelantipy Ladies’ Association, the local Progress Association, 
Landcare, and the committees of management for the Gelantipy District Bush Nursing Centre, the 
Gelantipy Hall, and the Wulgulmerang Recreation Reserve. The fact that there are now fewer people 
living in the district means that those who remain devote more of their time to keeping the various 
groups and committees operating.  In 2006, two-thirds of the residents and landholders interviewed for 
this research were actively involved in a local community group or committee. 
 
As is the case in most communities, people in the Wulgulmerang district do not always agree or get 
along. For as long as most interviewees could remember, community life in the district had been 
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marked by social divisions between particular families and individuals, but more generally between 
the northern and southern ends of the district. A lifetime resident of the district explained: 
 
There’s always been an upper and lower end of the district. But it’s only a few – you 
can’t say it’s all over the district. It’s just two or three people who keep it going. But 
yeah, there’s definitely a difference between Gelantipy and Wulgulmerang, for sure. 
– Mick, Gelantipy 
 
Another local grazier put it more strongly. I asked him: 
 
Socially, do people have their own… 
 
Little groups? Yeah. Well, the top end don’t have anything to do with the bottom end 
[laughs]. You’ve heard that I s’pose? 
 
Yeah, repeatedly. 
 
I’ve got country at both ends! I have to work in with both lots. When you’re up that end 
you don’t mention the ones down this end, and when you’re down this end you don’t 
mention the ones up that end! [laughs] 
– Rory, Wulgulmerang 
 
This is something of an overstatement, as there are many residents who have good relations with 
people at both ends. Nevertheless, it is clear that social divisions exist between some people in the top 
and bottom ends of the district. These divisions are important to understanding the events of January 
30, 2003, and their aftermath (see Chapter 6). 
 
4.5  Conditions preceding the bushfires of January 30, 2003 
This Chapter has examined the nature of life in the district in order to understand the social, economic, 
political and environmental contexts in which the January 30 bushfires occurred. Given that 
vulnerability to hazards and disasters arises from the circumstances of people’s everyday lives, this is 
a critical component of the analysis. The first part of the Chapter provided a brief history that explored 
the district’s Aboriginal past and its economic and political development since European settlement. In 
particular, it was noted that residents have historically encountered a range of challenges due to their 
remote location, particularly their limited access to goods and services. It was also suggested that, 
contrary to popular belief, the arrival of graziers and the advent of European land management 
practices actually increased fire frequency and promoted the spread of flammable, scrubby vegetation 
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in the area. Planned and unplanned fires were shown to be a longstanding feature of life in the area, 
with the bushfires of 1965 and 2003 considered to be the most significant in the district’s history.  
 
The second part of the Chapter examined life in the district immediately prior to the bushfires of 
January 30, 2003. Local people characterised their community as being in a state of social and 
economic decline. The ageing and diminishing population and the limited accessibility of goods and 
services, particularly schooling, were chief among their concerns. The district’s economic dependence 
on cattle and sheep farming meant that the community was profoundly affected by economic 
restructuring in the agricultural sector, which saw a shift to larger and more productive farms that 
provided fewer opportunities for local employment. This began a cycle of out-migration, reduced 
economic activity and service withdrawal that was intensified by governments’ reduced commitment 
to social welfare. Interviews revealed that declining terms of trade, drought and the demise of the local 
sheep industry had placed many farmers under great financial pressure. This was reflected by the fact 
that the district was considered to be among the 10% most economically disadvantaged areas in 
Australia (ABS 2001b). Finally, it was noted that longstanding social divisions existed between some 
people in the north and south of the district. Nevertheless, the vast majority of residents were found to 
be actively involved in local community groups and committees. 
 
It can be concluded that, immediately preceding the fires, residents and landholders of the 
Wulgulmerang district faced a range of pressures and challenges that shaped their vulnerability to 
bushfires. The connections between the conditions of everyday life in the district and the impacts of 
the January 30 bushfires are explored in the following Chapters.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE JANUARY 30 FIRES 
 
5.1  Introduction 
On January 8, 2003, lightning strikes from a dry thunderstorm ignited more than 80 fires in the 
predominantly forested and alpine areas of north-east Victoria and East Gippsland. Three weeks later, 
on January 30, fires swept the Wulgulmerang district, causing extensive damage to homes, livelihood 
assets and public infrastructure. This Chapter examines people’s exposure to bushfire hazards during 
and immediately after the January 30 fires. Given that an aim of the thesis is to listen to and learn from 
the experiences of those who encounter disaster, the Chapter is organised around the discussions and 
themes that emerged from the interviews, and not the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 
(the research findings are applied to the conceptual framework in Chapter 7). It begins with an 
examination of the physical characteristics of the fires, drawing on evidence gathered from land and 
fire managers and research scientists. Local people’s accounts of the fires are then brought together to 
provide a brief narrative and overview of the key events immediately preceding and during the 
January 30 fires. The Chapter then compiles evidence of the factors that local people and officials 
believe contributed to the destructiveness of the fires. These factors include: the management of public 
land prior to the 2003 fire season; levels of household preparedness; household responses; and 
firefighting and emergency responses. Conclusions about people’s exposure to bushfire hazards are 
drawn in Chapter 7. 
 
5.2  Physical characteristics 
The severity and longevity of the 2003 bushfires can be attributed to the extraordinary climatic 
conditions that preceded and extended into the summer of 2002/03 (Bureau of Meteorology 2003c). A 
weak to moderate El Niño event had a strong impact on Australia in 2001 and 2003, with large areas 
of the continent experiencing serious or severe rainfall deficiencies for the period commencing March 
2002 (Bureau of Meteorology 2007, Figure 5.1).1 Severe droughts in Australia are usually associated 
with El Niño events, during which days of extreme fire weather are more frequent. Parts of Victoria 
that were subsequently affected by bushfires received between 65 and 80 percent of long-term average 
precipitation between April and September of 2002; however, significantly drier conditions were 
experienced from October to December, with these areas receiving just 20 to 40 percent of their 
average rainfall. The absence of any significant rain for a period of 50 days once the fires had begun 
also contributed to the long duration and severity of the fires (Bureau of Meteorology 2003a), which 
burned for a total of 59 days. Furthermore, from March 2002 daytime maximum temperatures were 
well above average in most of eastern Victoria – by 2ºC to 3ºC between August and January. 
                                                 
1
 ‘Serious rainfall deficiency’ is defined as rainfall among the lowest ten percent of recorded rainfall totals for 
the period in question, while ‘severe rainfall deficiency’ refers to rainfall among the lowest five percent of 
recorded rainfall totals for the relevant period (Bureau of Meteorology 2003a). 
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Exceptionally high inland temperatures caused a number of heatwaves during summer, including one 
event on January 25 when temperatures of 43ºC to 46ºC were recorded at lowland weather stations in 
southern Victoria. The culmination of rainfall deficiencies, low atmospheric humidity and cloudiness, 
and high daytime temperatures resulted in the early curing of fuels throughout southeast Australia 
(Bureau of Meteorology 2003a). It is normal for fine fuels to become well cured during summer; 
however, the conditions preceding the 2003 fires also resulted in the curing of heavy fuels, which 
significantly increased the available fuel load (Taylor and Webb 2005).2 
 
A day prior to the Wulgulmerang bushfire disaster, the CFA declared that January 30 would be a day 
of Total Fire Ban (TFB) for the North-Eastern and Eastern TFB districts. TFBs are declared when 
weather conditions create a high risk of fire occurrence and the potential for fires to spread quickly 
and become difficult to control. To minimise this risk, members of the public are prohibited from 
lighting fires, using incinerators and engaging in a range of activities such as welding and grinding. 
Strict conditions are placed on the use of equipment and appliances such as tractors, chainsaws, 
lawnmowers and barbecues (see CFA 2006). January 30 exceeded fire authorities’ expectations, with 
some of the most extreme fire weather and behaviour occurring on this day. The day was characterised 
by large fire runs and long-distance spotting throughout north-eastern Victoria and East Gippsland 
(CFA and DSE 2003; Wareing and Flinn 2003; Taylor and Webb 2005) and was later described as ‘… 
the most significant ‘blow-up day’ during the entire episode’ (Bureau of Meteorology 2003c, 20).  
 
At 7am on January 30 the Swifts Creek Incident Control Centre (ICC) identified extreme fire 
behaviour at Limestone Creek, east of Benambra and approximately 30km north-west of 
Wulgulmerang. The fires were crowning and continued to do so until they reached Wulgulmerang 
later in the day. Residents and landholders recall that embers began to land behind the ‘Wire Paddock’ 
at Wulgulmerang just before 2pm, igniting a number of spot fires.3 Flame heights in forested areas 
ranged from 10 to 30 metres, with rates of spread between three and five kilometres per hour and fire 
intensities of more than 40,000 kilowatts per metre (kW/m). Flame heights in the predominantly 
grazed grasslands of the Wulgulmerang Plateau were between one and three metres, with fire 
intensities of approximately 7,000 kW/m (CFA and DSE 2003). 
                                                 
2
 The composition of fuel varies in forest, grassland and heathland, as each produces a range of materials that 
differ in size, shape, flammability, moisture content, quantity and spatial distribution (both horizontal and 
vertical) (Walker 1981).  A distinction can be made between total fuel and available fuel: the total fuel is the 
maximum quantity of that can be burnt under extreme conditions – including all combustible material, from 
decomposed organic matter on the soil surface to leaves in the forest canopy – while the available fuel is the 
portion that is burnt under less extreme conditions (Tolhurst and Cheney 1999).  Fine fuels are the most 
important fuel type influencing fire behaviour – particularly rate of spread (ROS) – because they are readily 
ignited, generate radiant heat and are rapidly burnt.  Fine fuels are generally considered to include fuels such as 
grasses, leaves, pine needles, and fine twigs that are less than 6mm in diameter when dead and less than 2mm in 
diameter when alive (Tolhurst and Cheney 1999). 
3
 The ‘Wire Paddock’ was the first paddock in the district to be fenced with wire. 
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The Forest Fire Danger Index reached ‘Extreme’ (FFDI 52) on January 30. FFDIs are produced using 
the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Meter, which produces a fire danger index by calculating the 
combined influence of (a) air temperature, (b) relative humidity, (c) wind speed and (d) the long- and 
short-term effects of drought on the likelihood of a fire starting, its rate of spread, intensity and 
difficulty of suppression. Fires run faster, hotter and are more difficult to suppress at higher FFDIs, 
particularly when fire danger is ‘Extreme’ (FFDIs between 50 and 100). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Australian rainfall deciles, March 1, 2002 to January 31, 2003 
Source: Bureau of Meteorology (2007) 
 
Fire authorities were expecting that fires would reach the Wulgulmerang district on February 2. As the 
CFA and DSE (2003, 4) later noted: 
 
Fire behaviour experts predicted that, as a worst case scenario, the fire could impact on 
Gelantipy late in the day of January 30 but more likely 3 days later on Sunday 2 
February. 
 
Despite this worst-case scenario, fire managers were surprised that the fires reached Wulgulmerang 
that day. An experienced fire research scientist who served as a fire behaviour specialist in the 
operational response to the 2003 bushfires suggested that while the maximum rate of spread predicted 
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by the McArthur Meter is 3km/h, the fire that ran from Benambra to Wulgulmerang averaged 4km/h 
and may have reached rates of 8km/h [Fire research scientist].4 
 
If you could have picked a really ugly spot to be that day – in terms of extreme fire 
behaviour – it was there in Wulgulmerang. The only thing they had going for them was 
that thin stretch of cleared land. 
– Fire research scientist 
 
Extreme fire behaviour was caused by the coming together of two runs of fire when the south-west 
change hit later in the afternoon. One run of fire began on private property north-east of Beloka; the 
other at Mt Leinster, near Benambra. The two fires burned under strong north and north-westerly 
winds into the Wulgulmerang district where, at approximately 3.30pm, the latter fire was blown into 
the first by the wind change (see Appendix 5.1). Particularly extreme fire behaviour and intensity was 
experienced at Seldom Seen, the junction zone for the two fires. Extreme fire behaviour continued in 
Seldom Seen and parts of the district further north. However, the wind change effectively abated fire 
activity in Gelantipy and further south [Fire research scientist].  
 
5.3  Accounts and experiences 
5.3.1  The build-up 
The build-up to the Wulgulmerang bushfires began on January 25 when the CFA held a community 
meeting in Gelantipy to inform residents about the fires and to advise them to make appropriate 
preparations. On January 28 an ICC was established at Orbost to coordinate management of the fires 
in Far East Gippsland. DSE personnel began protective works in the area, which included bulldozing 
fire breaks around homes and farm buildings. A Divisional Command Point (DCP) was set up at 
Karoonda Park (a farm and adventure camp at Gelantipy) the following day. Fires had been burning in 
north-eastern Victoria and East Gippsland for three weeks and firefighting resources were stretched. 
On the eve of the January 30 fires 68 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) personnel, mostly 
volunteers, were deployed to Gelantipy to support Victorian crews. It was the first time QFRS crews 
had been to Victoria to support local firefighters. 
 
                                                 
4
 An anonymous informant associated with a fire authority doubts that the fires could have spread so quickly, 
and insists that there must have been an undetected fire between Benambra and Wulgulmerang: 
 
I still firmly believe that there was fire generated from the community that day. I’ve got no doubts 
about that, no doubts about that at all. […] The fire was coming through anyway, and I don’t think 
it made any difference to the end result, but I think a lot of that fire was started locally. 
 
The informant believes a number of locals may have lit a backburn to reduce the availability of fuels when the 
main fire front came through, but that it got out of control. This claim remains unsubstantiated. 
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As noted, Thursday January 30 was a day of Total Fire Ban in eastern Victoria. By 11.30am the 
temperature in Gelantipy had reached 33.4ºC with relative humidity at 17 percent and strong north-
westerly winds of 37km/h, gusting to 65 km/h (Bureau of Meteorology 2003b, see Appendix 5.1). By 
this time, the FFDI at Gelantipy had reached Extreme and remained at Very High to Extreme until 
3.30pm (CFA and DSE 2003). Experts’ predictions that the fires would not arrive until Sunday 
February 2 were met with scepticism by many locals. A lifetime resident and grazier of 
Wulgulmerang, explained: 
 
I didn’t take much notice of what they were telling us, so I went out and had a look to see 
where it was – which was about 15 to 20 kilometres out – and we knew then that it would 
be there that day. So we came home and made final preparations, and along she came. 
– Reg, Black Mountain 
 
Others noted that: 
 
It came through a lot earlier than the experts predicted. The CFA had guaranteed that it 
wasn’t going to come for another two or three days. The locals knew that it was coming 
up out of the Buchan Valley and it was going to be a hell of a lot sooner. 
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
They claimed it wouldn’t be here ‘til the Sunday and, of course, it came through on the 
Thursday. Some people said that they knew it would, but I don’t know – it’s easy to say 
that afterwards. But Thursday morning: it was very obvious that it was going to get here. 
Embers, big pieces of bark, were landing, and that meant it had to be coming, or not that 
far away. 
– Mick, Gelantipy 
 
5.3.2  Preparing 
With an expectation that the fires would arrive sometime that day, most residents spent the morning 
preparing themselves and their properties. These were mostly finishing touches to preparations that 
had begun days or weeks earlier. 
 
I s’pose we were lucky in one respect, in that we knew probably ten days before that we 
were going to get burnt out. So we had plenty of time to prepare… Anything that looked 
like it might burn – we either burned it or slashed it. We covered all the windows right 
round the house and underneath so nothing could get in. So we were prepared as we ever 
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could be. In that respect we were lucky. And when the fire came through, it proved to be 
successful. 
– Reg, Black Mountain 
 
We always felt that it wasn’t a matter of ‘if’ a fire comes – it was a matter of ‘when’. 
When we built our house we built a dedicated sprinkler system – galvanised pipes with 
metal sprinklers all over the roof – and when we turn that on it’s like a big umbrella of 
water over the whole house. So we felt quite safe having that. We’ve always done cool 
burns in the bush around us. We never have much junk lying around. The wood’s always 
stacked in one place away from the house. And under the house is always raked and bare 
dirt. That morning we were out weeding and mowing to the last millimetre of what grass 
was left and raking, so it was really pretty clear. We’d also decided that we’d send the 
kids down to Bairnsdale [a town approximately 140km away], so they weren’t here when 
the fire came through. 
– Jane, Wulgulmerang 
 
By all accounts, the January 30 fires were very different from those locals had experienced in the past. 
The Captain of the Gelantipy CFA brigade suggested that most people probably weren’t physically or 
psychologically prepared for bushfires of that severity. Residents’ and landholders’ preparedness for 
the January 30 fires is discussed in greater depth below (5.4.2). 
 
5.3.3  The fires arrive 
Barney was waiting by the road in Wulgulmerang when the fires arrived. As an absentee landholder 
who had returned to the district to protect his property, he was asked by the Captain of the Gelantipy 
CFA brigade to lead visiting firefighters on a tour of the area. He had given them a tour of the Black 
Mountain area earlier in the day, before all firefighters were directed to return to the Gelantipy DCP 
for a briefing and lunch. He arranged to meet them by the road in Wulgulmerang at 1pm so that he 
could continue their tour of the area:  
 
I assumed they’d be back, but at 12 minutes to two [o’clock], this fire came up out of the 
Buchan River Valley, which is a very steep range, and we at Wulgulmerang knew the fire 
was there. At 12 minutes to two we rang the Control Centre [DCP] down at Gelantipy 
and reported it, and we assumed they would come up to help us, but they didn’t send 
anybody ‘til nearly four o’clock. 
– Barney, absentee landholder, Wulgulmerang 
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Thus, by Barney’s eyewitness account, fire spotted from the Buchan Valley in behind the ‘Wire 
Paddock’ on the Wulgulmerang Plateau at 1.48pm. Most residents and landholders estimated that the 
fires burned intensely for between 20 minutes and an hour once they reached their property, with most 
of the damage occurring within this time. As noted, a cold front moved in from the south west at 
approximately 3.30pm, causing extreme fire behaviour at Seldom Seen and further north, but halting 
the progress of the fires into Gelantipy. While there was some damage to property at Gelantipy, the 
heaviest losses were incurred further north at Seldom Seen, Wulgulmerang, Black Mountain and 
Suggan Buggan. Rory was in Gelantipy when the fires hit: 
 
I was sitting there in the paddock – I don’t know what time it was – and it was getting 
roaring and all the heifers came up to the fence and were pretty frightened. I was just 
sitting there watching and there was a big roar and everything went red. Then this 
fireball came out of Boundary Creek and headed for [a local grazier’s] house – straight 
at it – and I thought, ‘What should I do? Sit here or go help them?’ I would’ve had to go 
through bush to get there and if I got caught I would’ve been in trouble, so I just had to 
sit there and watch what happened. And that was the worst part of it – having to sit there 
and knowing I couldn’t do anything. And then after that it died down a bit. All the smoke 
lifted and I could see right through to Black Mountain and I thought, ‘Right, it’s gonna 
die down now’. It lifted for about five minutes and then the smoke came down and 
everything just went red, real bright red. And then, I don’t know how long it was, five or 
ten minutes, all the smoke lifted again and all I could see was that from Seldom Seen 
right through to Black Mountain – the whole lot was on fire. 
– Rory, Wulgulmerang 
 
CFA, DSE and QFRS crews had arrived at the Gelantipy DCP the previous evening and had spent the 
morning of January 30 familiarising themselves with the district, carrying out reconnaissance and 
undertaking protection works around private property. At approximately 12pm, these crews were 
directed to return to the DCP at Gelantipy for lunch and a briefing. A Red Flag Warning was issued 
from the Orbost ICC at around 1.30pm to draw firefighters’ attention to the deteriorating weather 
conditions and the increasingly extreme and erratic fire behaviour. However, ‘Because of the urgency 
of calls for help from members of the local community, from about 1400 hrs crews were progressively 
deployed back into the Wulgulmerang area to undertake asset protection, and to support residents’ 
(CFA and DSE 2003, 7). A second Red Flag Warning was issued at 4.15pm and crews were informed 
of the possibility that they may need to retreat to pre-prepared safe areas or defendable properties. A 
short time later, crews were ‘caught’ in three separate locations by fallen trees and heavy smoke, with 
some crews forced to bunker down in the cabins of their tankers under fire blankets. A third Red Flag 
Warning was issued at 6pm directing ‘All fire fighting appliances to immediately take a position to 
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their closest safe area. Units can move to a defendable property or refuge area only. All fire fighting in 
forested areas is to cease forthwith’ (CFA and DSE 2003, 8). This directive was not lifted until 
7.35pm, despite advice from the DCP that conditions had abated after 6.30pm. These incidents were 
the subject of a ‘Near Miss Investigation’ by the CFA and DSE (2003). A timeline of key events 
relating to firefighting is provided in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Timeline of key events relating to firefighting in the Wulgulmerang district on January 30, 2003 
Date Approx. 
time 
Event 
Jan. 25 – CFA Community Meeting held in Gelantipy. 
 – CFA and DSE personnel begin planning and conducting works for the protection of communities potentially in the path of the fires. 
Jan. 26  Benambra, approximately 40km WNW of Wulgulmerang, is impacted by fires. Over the course of January 25 and 26, extreme fire weather causes the 
fires to grow by more than 100,000ha. 
Jan. 27 – Protective works in the Wulgulmerang districts intensify. 
Jan. 28 – Incident Control Centre (ICC) established at Orbost. 
Jan. 29 – CFA declares that January 30 will be a day of Total Fire Ban for the North-east and Eastern TFB districts. 
 – Divisional Command Point (DCP) established at Gelantipy. 
 Evening CFA, DSE and QFRS crews are deployed to the Gelantipy DCP. They arrive after dark. 
Jan. 30 0700hrs Swifts Creek ICC confirms that fire is crowning in the Limestone Creek area, approximately 30km north-west of Wulgulmerang. 
 0900hrs Crews assemble at the Gelantipy DCP for a briefing. Crews are assigned tasks and deployed.  
 0945hrs Reports of extreme fire behaviour in the Limestone creek area are passed on to the Orbost ICC. It is unclear whether this information is communicated 
to the Gelantipy DCP. 
 1100hrs Officers undertaking reconnaissance in the northern area of the Division identify fires in the north end of the Buchan River Valley, north-west of 
Wulgulmerang. This information is relayed to the Gelantipy DCP. 
 1130hrs Records from the Gelantipy Automatic Weather Station (AWS) show that the Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) reached Extreme and remained at Very 
High to Extreme until 1530hrs. 
 1200hrs Firefighting crews that had been tasked with orientation, reconnaissance and protection works around the district are requested to return to the DCP for 
lunch and a briefing. Fire behaviour begins to intensify. 
 1320hrs Gelantipy DCP receives reports of spot fires occurring near the Bush Nursing Centre and several crews are deployed. 
 1330hrs A ‘Red Flag Warning’ is issued to firefighting crews to draw their attention to deteriorating weather conditions and increasing fire intensity. 
 1400hrs Gelantipy DCP receives calls for help from residents and landholders. Crews are progressively deployed back into the Wulgulmerang area to undertake 
asset protection and to support residents. As crews proceed north, weather conditions continue to deteriorate and become extreme as the fire begins to 
impact on the road between Gelantipy and Wulgulmerang. 
 1530hrs The Gelantipy AWS records a major weather change with the wind moving from north westerly to southerly at 22km/h, gusting to 33km/h (see 
Appendix 5.1). 
 1600hrs Crews report difficulty proceeding further north due to encroachment by fire.  
 1615hrs A second ‘Red Flag Warning’ is issued. Crews are warned of the possibility that they may need to retreat to safe areas, or defendable properties. 
 1640hrs A crew is sent from the Gelantipy DCP to assist crews that are caught on the road by fallen trees. 
 1800hrs A third ‘Red Flag Warning’ is issued by the Orbost ICC. Crews are directed to cease all firefighting and retreat to a defendable property or refuge area. 
 1935hrs Despite advice from the fire ground that conditions had abated after 1630hrs, the directive contained in the third ‘Red Flag Warning’ is not lifted until 
1935hrs. Crews spend the evening undertaking fire suppression around homes. 
Sources: Research participants and CFA and DSE (2003)
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The extreme fire behaviour and subsequent decisions taken by authorities to ensure the safety of 
firefighters meant that residents and landholders did not receive the level of firefighting support they 
had expected. A number of informants maintained that they were assured, contrary to official CFA 
policy (see 5.4.4), that there would be a tanker to help protect each property during the passage of the 
fire front. 
 
It came through a lot earlier than the experts predicted… The CFA had guaranteed that it 
wasn’t going to come through for another two or three days. The locals knew that it was 
coming up out of the Buchan Valley and it was going to be a hell of a lot sooner. When it 
arrived the CFA were totally unprepared for it… On the Thursday that the fire arrived 
some of them didn’t even have their tanks filled with water. They went for a drive up the 
road, came back again and when they got back here and filled their tankers up it was too 
late. The fire was there and some bloody dropkick from the CFA – I don’t care whether 
you publish that or not – put on a red alert and the trucks weren’t allowed out. 
Consequently, the residents right up as far as Black Mountain were left on their own and 
they had to fend for themselves. If the trucks had done as they were supposed to do… I 
think bloody 75 percent of the houses could have been saved.   
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
Fire authorities’ failures to meet these expectations are pivotal to understanding the anger and 
resentment that followed (Chapter 6) and are examined in greater depth below (see 5.4.4).  
 
It is important to note that people’s experiences of the fires varied throughout the district. Differences 
in terrain, weather conditions, vegetation and land uses meant that fires burned at different times and 
with varying intensities across the area. 
 
Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain 
Embers began landing at Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain from the north-west at around 2pm on 
January 30, igniting spot fires throughout the area. As noted, once the spot fires had taken hold, the 
largely cleared and grazed grasslands carried flames of between one and three metres, at an intensity 
of approximately 7,000 kW/m (CFA and DSE 2003). Leigh described the onset of the fires at 
Wulgulmerang, where he stayed to defend the two houses and other assets on his family’s cattle and 
sheep farm: 
 
It was probably about one or two o’clock in the afternoon when it started. It went pitch 
dark and I thought, ‘This isn’t looking too good’. Then all the wind and everything 
dropped and it just went completely still and eerie. I remember thinking later on that we 
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were probably in the vortex of the storm when it did all this. It only maintained that 
stillness for about 20 minutes or so, and whilst it was doing that I thought, ‘We’re in a bit 
of shit here’. Burning leaves and bark started spotting the grass around the buildings and 
I started putting those out with mops and buckets of water. Then the wind hit and there 
were embers the size of matchboxes – big, solid embers flying through the air. As they hit 
the ground, with the wind behind them, they were just exploding on the ground and 
racing off. There were flames everywhere and I thought at that time that I’d better get 
some shelter, so I went into one of the houses […]. I was looking out the windows, 
watching these embers hit the ground, exploding everywhere, and it was within a very 
short period of time, just everything, all the trees, everything just ignited around the 
building outside. The house was up on stumps and the flames roared up one side and 
totally engulfed the house on the outside. And then the windows went ‘Pop, pop, pop’ and 
just started exploding, and then flames started coming in all the windows. 
– Leigh, Wulgulmerang 
 
Leigh was ultimately unsuccessful in his bid to defend the family farm, where two houses, 800 sheep, 
12 cattle and 16km of fence were destroyed. Another Wulgulmerang grazier described a similar 
scenario, which began with the showering of embers from the Buchan Valley and escalated when the 
cool change hit from the south-west at around 3.30pm: 
 
It went pitch dark and we just drove in and out of the vicinity just looking for flames, 
because there was hot bark landing all the time. Next thing [my wife] is on the radio, 
‘The fires going just down there’. We thought we might as well put it out […]. We 
rounded that spot fire up and virtually had it out, but by that time they were just landing 
everywhere – spots everywhere – so we gave that away and came back [to the house…]. 
Anyway, the cool change hit at the same time as the fire. It blew oxygen in under it, like a 
blow-torch effect, and then it really got going. I’d go in under the house for a bit to get 
my breath back, [but] I just couldn’t stay. I wanted to get around, so I’d get out and run 
around to see what I could do. At one stage I had a pump going out there, spraying on the 
house and into the fire, which was working quite well. But the fire got too hot and the 
pump stopped. 
– Alan, Wulgulmerang 
 
Fortunately, Alan’s family was able to save their home. However, they suffered heavy losses of assets, 
including 900 sheep, 40 heifers, 70km of fence, two haysheds and most of their pasture and hay.  
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Suggan Buggan 
Suggan Buggan is an especially hazardous location during bushfires as it is situated in a steep and 
densely forested valley that is accessible by only one narrow, steep and winding dirt road. The area is 
enclosed by public land and is home to just a few permanent residents. A resident who stayed to 
defend his home and orchard recalled that embers began to land in the area sometime after 2pm, 
igniting spot fires an estimated 15km ahead of the main fire front. These fires quickly burned out of 
control, destroying one homes, sheds, fences and other assets, including much of the fruit and nut 
orchard: 
 
There were three of us in here and the fires were still 15 kilometres away, at Native Cat. 
The ember attack started here and there were fires starting all over the place on all of the 
ridges. We put two fires out ourselves – spot fires – and when it was out of control in the 
end there were at least six [fires] that I could see that were burning, from ember attack, 
and the fire [front] was still 15 kilometres away. So, all of the preparations meant 
nothing, because the embers just went past them. The preparations we’d made were for a 
general direction fire… It was burning here for about two hours. It was then safe to go 
outside. Everything was still burning. Every tree that had a bit of a hollow was on fire 
and that burned for a week or more. There were little bits that the fire hadn’t burned and 
the fire went back up the range in the opposite direction to the general direction of the 
fires. All these valleys were all burned out the day after. 
– Steve, Suggan Buggan 
 
Seldom Seen 
The few people who live at Seldom Seen experienced extreme fire behaviour as a result of the two 
runs of fire, described above, coming together. Residents reported ember showers, crown fires, thick 
smoke and debris driven by strong winds. One resident estimated that the main fire front burned 
intensely for a period of about 20 minutes, after which smaller and less intense fires continued to burn. 
The road between Gelantipy and Black Mountain traverses gently undulating and largely cleared land; 
however, the section that passes through Seldom Seen is marked by steep and densely forested terrain. 
Consequently, the road is narrow, steep and winding, and there is an abundance of fuel along 
roadsides and in close proximity to residences. After the fires, Seldom Seen residents experienced 
difficulty leaving the area due to fallen trees. A resident of Seldom Seen described the ferocity of the 
fire front when the two runs of fire came together: 
 
The fire came in at about 3.20pm from the west. At first it was coming from the north and 
it wasn’t so bad, but then it came in from the west, a westerly wind, and then we had 
embers and little spot fires that we managed to put out. Then the main fire front came in 
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and we had huge wind and smoke and flames. It was probably a hundred kilometre wind 
– hard to stand up in. And then everything was burning. Fireballs were coming through. 
Bare paddocks were burning. I was trying to get some stuff out of the shop. I was loading 
it into a car and it came in so quickly I didn’t have time to drive the car down to open 
ground. So it burnt, the shop burnt. It was so fierce the house went up like… I had to 
leave it. I grabbed the dog and got into the dam, perhaps three-quarters of an hour, I 
don’t know.  
– Kelvin, Seldom Seen 
 
Another resident likened the January 30 fires to a sandstorm. He was able to successfully defend his 
home and workshop from the blaze: 
 
The workshop – I expected it to burn. I couldn’t see that far – there was so much smoke, 
so much noise. You’d sort of get glimpses of maybe 20/30 metres away and that was it. 
The light was like a welding light – blue light. The heat wasn’t so noticeable, but the wind 
and debris [was]. I didn’t have goggles on and the debris was cutting my glasses, so I 
couldn’t see. The fire was veering around a little bit and so there was always a busy side 
and a quiet side [of the house]. So you could be in the quiet side and spray from there 
and then when it got too hot just duck around the other side and do it from there. 
– Gary, Seldom Seen  
 
Gelantipy 
As noted above, the south-westerly wind change that occurred at approximately 3.30pm abated the 
spread of fires into Gelantipy and the country further south. The main fire burned onto some properties 
to the north of Gelantipy; however, most residents and landholders in this part of the district reported 
only ember showers or smaller spot fires. 
 
You could hear this roar, ‘cause the fire went along the back of the mountain there. And 
we just thought, ‘Oh god. Any minute this is going to get us’. And then [my friend] came 
in and said, ‘Prepare for ember attack’ because the fire was just about to hit us. And 
then, suddenly, just like that, the wind turned and it all stopped. 
– Anne, Gelantipy 
 
Similarly, another resident of Gelantipy, who was not at home when the fires threatened, explained: 
 
The only thing that saved this house was the wind change. Our neighbour came up the 
road to check on our place and started throwing water around. They decided to get out 
because of the radiant heat and they all jumped in the ute [‘pickup truck’] and began to 
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drive down the driveway. Then [my neighbour] said, ‘Hang on. Just hang on a minute’, 
and he could feel a breeze coming up the bloody Snowy Valley. And that’s the only reason 
this joint’s here: it [the wind] sat the fire on its arse. 
– Bryan, Gelantipy 
 
A selection of photographs taken by residents during the fires is presented in Appendix 5.2. 
 
5.4 Factors contributing to the scale of damage and destruction 
Having provided a brief account of people’s experienced of the January 30 bushfires, this section 
examines the factors that contributed to their destructiveness. All interviewees – including residents 
and landholders and others who were involved with the fires, such as fire managers – were asked why 
they thought the Wulgulmerang district was so severely affected by the fires (see Appendix 3.3). 
Overwhelmingly, residents and landholders attributed the ferocity and destructiveness of the fires to 
the alleged failings of government departments and authorities. In particular, it was claimed that public 
land managers had created the conditions for disaster by failing to conduct enough prescribed burning 
prior to the 2003 fire season. Similarly, the CFA was lambasted for not providing the level of 
protection expected by local people. Fire managers and others who were involved with the fires tended 
to take a more detached view, suggesting that fuel on public land, extreme weather conditions and 
highly varied levels of household preparedness had all contributed to the disaster. 
 
5.4.1  Public land management preceding the fires 
Approximately 80 percent of East Gippsland is reserved as public (or ‘crown’) land. The 
Wulgulmerang district is flanked on either side by national parks, with many hundreds of kilometres 
of interface between private and public land. Not surprisingly then, local residents and landholders 
take a keen interest in issues of public land management. Given their recent experiences, interviewees 
focused their discussions on matters of fire management. A significant majority of informants believed 
that the intensity and destructiveness of the January 30 bushfires was a direct consequence of the lack 
of prescribed burning on public land in the years preceding the fires. More broadly, the interviews 
revealed widespread concern that public lands are being mismanaged by government departments 
(DSE and Parks Victoria) that are too bureaucratic, poorly resourced and overly influenced by 
powerful, city-based environmentalists.  
 
Prescribed burning 
The issue of prescribed burning featured prominently in all of the interviews with residents and 
landholders. Analysis of the qualitative data revealed that the vast majority (74%) of interviewees 
supported the practice of regular, prescribed burning to reduce the availability of fuels for bushfires. 
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The remainder expressed concern about the impacts of prescribed burns on native flora and fauna 
(13%) or were uncommitted or unsure about the merits of the practice (13%). 
 
It was generally acknowledged that extreme fire weather had contributed to the fires’ severity; 
however, there was strongly and widely held view that the accumulation of fuels on public land, 
particularly that to the north and north-west of the district, was the prime cause: 
 
All the bush country around us hadn’t been fuel-reduced for years and years. We knew 
what a hell of a mess it was in and there was no way of stopping it on a bad day. We’d 
been at them for many years to do fuel reduction, and they more or less laughed at us and 
said: ‘We can handle any fire that comes along’. We warned them and warned them that 
we’d be burnt out one day if they didn’t do something – and we were right unfortunately. 
– Reg, Black Mountain 
 
I think it was just the day. The day and the fact that the bush behind us was so dirty. The 
Buchan headwaters, as I said before – we’ve been trying to get that burnt for twenty 
years. Ever since the cattlemen were stopped from burning, they won’t burn it. The 
Department will just say: ‘It’s not a concern of yours. It’s too far away; it’s of no 
concern’. They just wouldn’t burn it. So yeah, it’s burnt now! The fire tower is just out 
there [points to the north-west]. Well, north of there is our biggest threat. If you get [fires 
and] north-westerly winds, that country just explodes, as it did, obviously.  
– Mick, Gelantipy  
 
Clearly, local people harboured concerns about the accumulation of fuels in the Buchan River Valley 
long before the 2003 bushfires. However, the fires added weight to calls for a more intensive program 
of fuel reduction in this area.5 Some interviewees shared their observations of the effectiveness of 
prescribed burning in reducing the intensity of bushfires in areas that had been fuel-reduced prior to 
the 2003 fire season. In particular, it was noted that in areas that had been heavily grazed or burned, 
fires burned with a reduced intensity and caused less damage to both the environment and human 
property.6 
 
Perceived barriers to prescribed burning 
Interviewees attributed the lack of prescribed burning that preceded the 2003 fires to a number of 
radical changes in the way land is used and managed in the region. These changes included: the rise of 
‘green’ values and politics within and outside the district; local people’s reduced access to public land; 
                                                 
5
 Informants 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 32, 33 and 34. 
6
 Informants 1, 5, 7, 13, 18 and 29. 
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the bureaucratic nature of government departments; and the resource pressures created by population 
growth and development nearer the coast. 
 
A small proportion of local people oppose regular, broad-scale prescribed burning on the grounds that 
it adversely impacts on native flora and fauna.7 Concerns about the environmental impacts of 
prescribed burning are shared by many residents of the W Tree area, which is noted for its community 
of ‘alternative lifestylers’ (see Chapter 4). For example, the W Tree Progress Association (WTPA 
2005, 2) recently made a submission to the DSE calling for specific areas of rainforest and wet 
sclerophyll forest to be reclassified from ‘Priority Fuel Management Zone 3’, where broad-scale fuel 
reduction is permitted, to Zone 4, where ‘… fuel reduction burning and other fire management 
activities would only occur after consideration of ecological factors’. Citing scientific evidence to 
support their case, the WTPA (2005, 2) argued that: 
 
… the current fire plan poses a significant risk to the rainforest ecology and its ecotones 
and a possible future increased fire risk to the W Tree area by the replacement of fire 
resistant [sic] rainforest and wet forest species with fire dependent sclerophyllous 
communities. 
 
While there are those in the district who prioritise asset protection and those who prioritise 
biodiversity conservation, these concerns are not mutually exclusive. For example, one proponent of 
prescribed burning explained that care must be taken when conducting spring burns in the lower 
country around Suggan Buggan to avoid interfering with the nesting of birds [Dennis, Gelantipy]. 
Similarly, an author of the WTPA submission stressed that he was not totally opposed to fuel 
reduction, particularly around assets, provided that areas of ecological significance are protected 
[Informant 39]. Nevertheless, some residents and landholders believed that local and non-local 
environmentalists have influenced fire management policy, leading to reductions in the amount of 
prescribed burning on public land.8 Christine, who runs cattle and sheep farms with her husband at W 
Tree and Wulgulmerang, offered the following example of how, in her opinion, the ‘greenies’ at W 
Tree had created problems for local farmers: 
 
These people have come into the area and they want to live a peaceful and happy life, 
which is wonderful, but they then turn around and point the finger at anybody who’s 
having a go at running a business. So, for example, we run a farm there and they say: 
‘You shouldn’t be using chemicals and you shouldn’t be doing that and don’t shoot the 
roos’ [Kangaroos]… They have no comprehension that they’re impacting on our 
                                                 
7
 Informants 25, 26, 30, 31 and 39. 
8
 Informants 12, 13, 14, 20, 32 and 33 
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livelihood. And it’s the same with burning off and logging. They actually stopped a burn 
that was going to happen last spring. We’d put in a submission [to the DSE] to have the 
Mt Dawson area burned and they managed to stop it. So I rang [DSE FMO] and said 
‘That’s not good enough’ and, you know, rocked the boat a little bit, and he said: ‘Well, it 
will go ahead but it will be a modified burn’. So these people – and we have nothing 
against them personally – they just have a very different way of thinking about it.  
– Christine, Wulgulmerang 
 
Farmers and others who make their livelihood from their land will obviously seek to protect it from 
threats such as bushfires. In contrast, non-farming residents’ livelihoods are rarely threatened by 
bushfires and, because they usually have insurance for their homes and contents (see 5.4: Household 
preparedness), they are less likely to stay and defend their homes from fires. Christine continued: 
 
Even though they were all very distressed when the fire was coming through and there 
was a very real potential for them to be burned out, they basically just uprooted and 
shifted out. If the fires had come through they would’ve collected their insurance, rebuilt, 
got a new house and lived happily ever after. They took their valuables, yet they feel 
they’ve got the right to stop a safety burn. I don’t think they’ve got that right if they’re not 
going to stand and fight and face the demon. They’ve got no right to put other people at 
risk.    
– Christine, Wulgulmerang 
 
Residents and landholders often spoke of how their rights to use and manage public land had been 
rolled back over time. Restrictions on popular activities such as horse and trail-bike riding – as well as 
road and track closures in national parks – were particularly unpopular with local people. However, at 
the time the interviews were conducted, the Victorian State Government’s decision to end cattle 
grazing in the Alpine National Park was the most contentious local issue with regard to public land 
management. It is widely believed that ‘Alpine grazing reduces blazing’ and that the Mountain 
Cattlemen should be allowed back into the national park to use and manage it as they had done in the 
past. 
 
Back in the days of the cattlemen, the cattlemen leased that country from the government 
and took their cattle on it, and they were getting their fuel reduction done for nothing 
because the cattlemen were doing it for them, and knew how to do it too. They could still 
have that situation – free labour to light it up. The cattlemen have been around in the 
bush all their life so they know when they can light it safely or not. And now they’re 
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whinging about the cost of it! They could save all that cost by leaving the cattlemen in the 
bush. 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
The fire regimes have changed. Getting the cattlemen out of the High Country will 
change it more. The cattle don’t do much in terms of reducing that heavy fuel load, 
because they obviously don’t eat brush and bark and what-have-you. But they do thin 
down the grassy flats and at least keep them fresh. They’re not as good as a spring fire 
would be, in terms of environmental assistance and keeping things open, but they’re 
better than bloody nothing and that’s what we’ve got at the moment. There are places in 
the High Country where Dad used to rise from one spot to another without much problem 
at all. Now you can’t get through it. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
Mountain Cattlemen were renowned for burning their leases, usually during spring, to promote the 
growth of pasture for their stock and reduce the availability of fuel for bushfires. However, other 
landholders who bordered or were in close proximity to public land were also known to engage in 
these practices: 
 
Years ago, when everything was run locally, we had a Forestry Officer here and he was a 
very good fellow and he used to say: ‘Well, where do you reckon we ought to put a burn?’ 
Then we’d all go out and burn it.   
 – Bernie, Wulgulmerang 
 
These practices continued until the mid 1960s when, after the 1965 bushfires, ‘… they started to put a 
lot of regulations and constraints in place’, including a permit system for lighting fires [Dennis, 
Gelantipy]. The management of fuels along roadsides also became more tightly regulated: 
 
The roadway used to be burnt on a regular basis. If you looked at our fire plans years 
ago, the road was classed as a fairly major fire break. It’d annoy you a bit too, because 
they’d burn your bloody fences and things, but the drovers would go down the road with 
stock and would drop matches and burn along the roadsides. But for the last 20 years, 
other than [local grazier] with his cattle alongside the road [see photo, Appendix 5.3], 
the roadsides have been quite a large container for fuel, rather than a firebreak. 
Nobody’s game to light a fire anymore – if you do, they’ll bloody prosecute you. I carry a 
box of matches all the time but, by god, I’m a bit more careful about where I throw ‘em 
now; and it’s not because I’m frightened about a fire getting away – I don’t want to be 
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prosecuted. So they’ve changed the way people think and operate because of the fear of 
being prosecuted. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
Indeed, years before the January 30 bushfires, a prominent local grazier was prosecuted for lighting a 
fuel reduction burn in national park adjoining his property, after becoming frustrated by authorities’ 
failure to burn it. 
 
The failure of land management authorities to meet local expectations for fuel reduction was often 
attributed to their ‘bureaucratic’ nature. Interviewees associated bureaucracy with a non-local, overly 
procedural and risk-averse approach to land management. This style of management contrasts starkly 
with the highly localised, practical and unregulated approach to land management of the past. Local 
people resent their loss of control over land and resources, and this is a major cause of the breakdown 
in their relationship with public land management authorities: 
 
They never trusted us, the authorities. They reckoned we get out there and light fires 
indiscriminately. If anyone was going to do that they deserve to get burnt-out. You can 
work with the authorities, but you’ve got to have the right blokes to talk to. I call them 
‘overeducated idiots’, because they go to university, learn how to fight a fire, and tell you 
how to do it. But they don’t know the lay of the land. You’ll never get two fires the same, 
even in the same country. But at least the local bloke knows the lay of the land and knows 
where it’s likely to come from. 
– George, Wulgulmerang  
 
Disdain for land management authorities is compounded by their procedural and prescriptive approach 
to management, which is seen as inherently impractical and inefficient. In terms of prescribed burning, 
authorities are seen to be hamstrung by rules and regulations, and overly risk-averse:  
 
They plan to burn so many hundred thousand hectares a year and when the time comes to 
do it they only do twenty or thirty because they’re too scared to do it. And, of course, they 
got a real public belting over the one that got away on Wilsons Prom. So they’re damned 
if they do and damned if they don’t. 9 
– Steve, Suggan Buggan 
                                                 
9
 On April 1, 2005, a 20ha prescribed burn in the Wilsons Promontory National Park escaped containment lines, 
forcing the evacuation of 600 campers and burning 6000ha. The DSE attracted intense media scrutiny and public 
condemnation for the escape, which is estimated to have cost $2m to suppress and blackened large parts of this 
popular tourist destination. The escape prompted an investigation into prescribed burning practices in Victoria 
(ESC 2005) and is popularly thought to have engendered a more cautious approach to prescribed burning.  
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They’re locked into prescriptions where the fire’s got to be contained by nightfall or 
within 24 hours and all that sort of thing. It’s just not possible in this country. You’ve 
gotta be prepared to let a fire run – it might be burning out there for a week or two, but it 
doesn’t mean it’s out of control.  
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
Finally, some interviewees attributed the lack of prescribed burning in and around the Wulgulmerang 
district to DSE’s prioritisation of time and resources to more densely-populated and developed 
localities near the coast: 
 
They’ve been at it more and they’ve got more local input, but the problem is that a lot of 
people down in the lower country want more done and they’re doing it in little lots. They 
did twice as many burns last year for about half the area… So while it’s helped the 
people down south, which is a good thing, it’s actually made it harder for us, because to 
get a big burn done the manpower is limited and we’ve only got so much time in the year 
to do it, [so] they sort of run out of time.  
– Mick, Gelantipy 
 
The priority has probably always been asset protection rather than environmental burns.  
So they’ll try to protect the towns and the infrastructure and then they’ll worry about the 
environmental burns as a second priority. And I think while they do that, we’ll never get 
this area out the back of us burnt. And I don’t think in an isolated area like this we should 
have to follow the same burning prescriptions you do close in around towns where you’ve 
got people or infrastructure to worry about. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
Public land managers’ views on prescribed burning 
The public land managers interviewed for this research included the Chief Ranger for Parks Victoria’s 
East Gippsland District (and Incident Controller at the Orbost ICC) and Fire Management Officers 
(FMOs) with the DSE. The issue of prescribed burning was one of many topics discussed during these 
interviews, which provided opportunities to explore land managers’ perspectives on the causes and 
management of the bushfires and the disaster. Importantly, these interviews also provided 
opportunities to investigate the claims and issues raised by residents and landholders, particularly 
those regarding the apparent lack of prescribed burning on public land.  
 
The public land managers all asserted the importance of prescribed burning as a strategy for managing 
fuel loads and reducing the intensity of bushfires. Furthermore, all provided in-principle support for 
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residents’ and landholders’ appeals for more prescribed burning. Nevertheless, the interviews revealed 
some uncertainty as to whether more fuel reduction would have significantly reduced the intensity of 
the January 30 fires. A fire behaviour specialist explained that fuel, topography and weather conditions 
exert a roughly equal influence on fire behaviour up until FFDIs of about 50 (Extreme), at which point 
weather conditions begin to dominate: ‘As weather gets worse, the effect that fuel and topography 
have on fire behaviour starts to diminish’ [Informant 51]. He noted that very few of the previous fuel 
reduction burns were effective in slowing the spread of fires on January 18, 26 and 30, which were all 
days of Extreme fire weather. The Incident Controller at the Orbost ICC was also uncertain about the 
effect that greater fuel reduction might have had on the fires at Wulgulmerang: 
 
Had we been able to do more, yep, it might’ve helped… But fuel reduction burning isn’t 
necessarily a buffer to the onset of heavy-going fire. It is often really helpful to slow a fire 
and you can deflect it… if you’re lucky and the fire isn’t running too hard. But there are a 
number of things to consider. Fuel reduction in itself, on a location, doesn’t necessarily 
mean a fire won’t happen three years later. But look, had we done more fuel reduction in 
some of that area, it may have been an advantage, it’s difficult to tell. 
  – Chief Ranger, East Gippsland District, Parks Victoria 
 
These land managers identified a range of constraints on prescribed burning that had prevented their 
organisations from achieving fuel reduction on the scale that residents and landholders expect. 
Interviewees’ perceptions of the barriers to greater fuel reduction were fairly accurate; however, their 
understandings of these constraints were often limited. According to the land managers, tight 
prescriptions on burning, which have been introduced to reduce the potential for damage to private 
property, infrastructure and ecosystems, make it difficult to reach their fuel reduction objectives: 
 
The rules and regulations have got tighter… much tighter. They probably needed to 
tighten up a fraction, but we’ve got to be careful that, as a Department, we don’t regulate 
ourselves into a corner where we’re too busy doing paperwork and consultation and not 
getting anything done on the ground. The other thing is that it’s really hard these days to 
get a sizeable burn approved because you’ve always got constrains. You’ve either got 
logging constraints, flora and fauna constraints and other constraints and by the time you 
account for all of those you’ve got very little that you can burn.  
 – Senior Fire Management Officer, DSE 
 
The Chief Ranger of National Parks in East Gippsland explained that land managers like to meet their 
fuel reduction objectives; however, restrictions on the timing of burns are in place to ensure that fires 
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do not escape and develop into large, destructive bushfires. He emphasised the difficulty of meeting 
these objectives under highly uncertain and variable climatic conditions: 
 
We do have a process of trying to do as much fuel reduction burning as we can, but the 
problem is that we can’t fuel-reduce in the summer, because there’s a high chance you’ll 
burn people out and incinerate them, and you can’t burn in the winter ‘cause it won’t 
burn. You can only load so much fire into the landscape in the spring because, in this 
part of the world, we get equinoctial gales every year around September / October. In 
spring, East Gippsland, equinoctial gales and fire are all synonymous. So, October the 
2nd 1980: 200 personnel, seven army Iroquois helicopters, volunteers and god knows 
what are all at Orbost, equinoctial gales, driving winds, two wildfires – driven all the 
way to the coast. And that’s typical of what you can get at that time of the year. And 
communities and people aren’t geared to fire that early in the season, but it happens in 
this part of the world. So if we load fire into the landscape in spring, particularly 
broadacre, we’re setting up a potential disaster. We can do small burning, but it’s got to 
be small stuff that we can knock out pretty quick – so settlement protection, small stuff 
around the back of towns and that sort of stuff. Weather predictions in the spring are only 
good for a couple of days. The onset of gales is hard to predict. So if you try to reduce 
fuel at that time of year, you are doing so with high risk and you’re putting the public at 
risk. 
– Chief Ranger, East Gippsland District, Parks Victoria 
 
Autumn, when the weather is typically stable, provides ‘a window of opportunity’ to get burning done; 
however, this opportunity is easily lost if there is significant rain in late February through to March. 
The conduct of prescribed burning has become even more challenging due to below-average rainfall 
throughout Victoria. Species and communities of vegetation that usually would not burn are now 
flammable, which makes it difficult to create a mosaic of burnt areas [Senior Fire Management 
Officer, DSE]. 
 
As noted, many residents and landholders believe that public land management authorities have 
become too risk-averse when it comes to prescribed burning, chiefly because they are concerned about 
litigation. Indeed, the land managers interviewed for this research all expressed concern about their 
personal liability if something were to go wrong during a prescribed burn. The government’s response 
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to the incident at Wilsons Promontory, where a fire escaped and subsequently burned 6000ha of 
national park, is a source of discontent for many land managers:10 
 
Fire managers certainly have to jump through more hoops to get prescribed burns done 
than they used to. The guy who lit the Wilsons Promontory burn nearly got the sack. He 
ended up just being disciplined, but the way the whole inquiry was dealt with really put 
the wind up a lot of people and now some Officers in Charge are hesitant to burn. 
– Fire research scientist 
 
It was quite clear out of the inquiry on Wilsons Prom that the Department is saying that 
individuals will be held accountable. They’re saying that as long as you follow all the 
required processes and procedures and everything’s ticked off and then something goes 
wrong, then you’ll be supported. But if you haven’t done all that or you’ve left parts of it 
undone – then don’t expect support. That’s the way it’s been, anyway. And that’s causing 
a lot of grief. I mean, we’ve got a couple of people who won’t do Burn OIC work now. A 
lot of quite experienced firefighters won’t complete the training or accreditation 
processes. They won’t do it because they don’t want to be held accountable. They’ll come 
and give you a hand if you want to do a burn, but they won’t be responsible. 
– Senior Fire Management Officer, DSE 
 
Another FMO claimed that ‘an enormous amount’ of prescribed burning was conducted after the 2003 
bushfires, but that after the Wilsons Promontory incident ‘it virtually stopped’. He too was 
disappointed with the way the subsequent inquiry was handled, because it gave the impression that an 
OIC ‘is on his own’ if there is an escape. Nevertheless, he believed this situation to be changing and 
claimed that more burning was being conducted [Fire Management Officer, DSE].  
 
5.4.2  Household preparedness 
Given the preoccupation of many interviewees with issues of fire management on public land, it was 
important to ask them about their own level of preparedness. It is important to acknowledge the 
possibility that some interviewees’ assessments of their own preparedness may have been exaggerated, 
either consciously or unconsciously, to bolster claims that public authorities were responsible for the 
disaster. This is the problem of ‘retrospective redescribing’, whereby interviewees reinterpret their 
experience to fit a dominant narrative or explanation (Quarantelli 2002). Regardless, analysis of the 
interviews revealed three distinct reasons why people prepare themselves and their properties for 
                                                 
10
 See footnote 9. While this incident occurred after the January 30, 2003, bushfires, the concerns it raised are 
indicative of broader trends in land and fire management.  
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bushfires. These are: to protect human life; to protect homes and contents; and to protect livelihood 
assets. 
 
Table 5.2: Preparatory actions to protect human life 
• Decision to prepare, stay and defend or leave early. 
• Decision to relocate children to a safe location. 
• Discussion of ‘fire plan’ with family and/or friends and agree on rules, roles and 
responsibilities during fires. 
• Attend CFA and DSE ‘community meetings’ to obtain information about bushfires. 
• Organise CFA ‘telephone trees’. 
• Ensure appropriate clothing. 
 
Protecting human life from bushfires was the ultimate concern for all residents and landholders (Table 
5.2). Most informants believed that, although not entirely without risk, staying to defend their homes 
and other assets from the fires was a safe strategy. Two of the three families with school-aged children 
decided to send them to stay with relatives and friends in the Gippsland towns of Bairnsdale and Sale, 
approximately 130 and 200km respectively, by road from Wulgulmerang. Only one family that was 
interviewed for the research had made a clear decision to leave early: 
 
I guess we made the decision in the end that we were fully insured and, because we live 
on a bush block, we felt particularly vulnerable. In the end, we just decided that our lives 
were more important. 
– Gavin, Wulgulmerang 
 
The interviews revealed that most residents and landholders had formulated ‘fire plans’ to ensure the 
safety of those who had stayed to defend their property. It is important to note that these were not the 
formal, written plans that the fire authorities encourage residents to develop through publications such 
as the Bushfire survival plan workbook (CFA 2004). Instead, these plans most often took the form of 
informal discussions where household members agreed on the rules, roles and responsibilities that 
would guide each person’s behaviour if or when the fires arrived. For example, one Wulgulmerang 
family discussed their fire plan over dinner each night. Each member of the family, including the 
children, was responsible for undertaking particular preparations and activities during the fires 
[Informant 1]. 
 
A CFA and DSE information session was held at the Gelantipy CFA shed on January 25. Residents 
and landholders were informed about the location and progress of the fires and were advised on how 
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best to prepare themselves and their properties. ‘Telephone trees’ were also set up at this meeting, with 
specified people taking responsibility for relaying information to residents and landholders 
immediately before and during the fires. Some of those who attended this meeting claim that they 
were provided with a guarantee from the CFA that they would each receive firefighting support. 
Although there is no evidence to support these claims, many residents and landholders did expect to 
receive assistance from fire authorities (discussed below, 5.4.4). Importantly, the research found no 
evidence that the expectation of firefighting support led to lower levels of individual or household 
preparedness. 
 
Long before the January 30 fires, most residents had bought home and contents insurance, which 
covers damage and destruction caused by bushfires (Table 5.3, below). Of the 24 households 
represented in the interview sample, all but three (88%) had their homes insured.11 The high level of 
insurance cover for homes and contents reflects the high rate of home ownership among the interview 
sample.12 Two of the three uninsured houses, all of which were fully owned by the occupant, were 
destroyed by the fires. One resident attempted to take out insurance 48 hours before the fires, but was 
refused cover. The long duration of the bushfires, which had been burning throughout eastern Victoria 
for three weeks, enabled a number of residents to increase their level of insurance cover before the 
fires arrived [Informants 21 and 22]. Some informants who had their home and contents insured had 
felt they were significantly underinsured.13 Nevertheless, residents’ homes and contents were, on the 
whole, well-insured for the 2003 bushfires.  
 
                                                 
11
 This figure excludes absentee landholders who do not have a house on their property. 
12
 Of the 24 households represented, all were fully owned by the occupant (or, in the case of properties with farm 
managers, their employer) except one, which was rented. 
13
 Informants 4, 13, 30 and 33. 
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Table 5.3: Preparatory actions to protect home and contents 
Prior to bushfire season: 
• Home and contents insurance. 
• General property maintenance. 
• Decision to stay and defend. 
• Obtain specialist firefighting equipment (e.g. slip-on unit, water tanks and pumps, rooftop 
sprinkler system). 
• Ensure reliable or dedicated water supply. 
• Ensure spare equipment (buckets, hoses, torches, etc.) 
• Obtain battery-powered radio. 
 
Once fires threatened: 
• Attend CFA and DSE ‘community meetings’ to obtain information about bushfires. 
• Organise CFA ‘telephone trees’. 
• Arrange for family and/or friends to help prepare for and respond to the fires. 
• Discuss ‘fire plan’ with family and/or friends and agree on rules, roles and 
responsibilities. 
• Plan for safety of pets. 
• Remove flammable material from around the home by carting, raking, weeding, mowing, 
grazing, slashing and burning (i.e. create a ‘defendable space’). 
• Selectively remove trees from around the home. 
• Water grass and garden around home to keep it lush. 
• Plough, grade or bulldoze firebreak around the home. 
• Set up sprinkler system around the home. 
• Clear roof and gutters of leaf debris. 
• Block downpipes and fill gutters with water. 
• Cover windows, eaves, vents and spaces underneath house to prevent entry of embers. 
• Cover inside of windows with blankets. 
• Remove valuables, important documents, etc., from home. 
• Move vehicles to a safe location. 
 
Of the 24 households represented in the interview sample, a decision had been made for at least one 
person to stay and defend the home in 19 cases (79%). It is significant that all of those who decided to 
leave early, or were otherwise absent, did not have a direct commercial interest in their property. In 
two of these cases the house was not the primary place of residence and in one case the house was 
rented. In contrast, in all of the households where livelihoods were dependent upon the primary place 
of residence (15 of the 24), a decision had been made to stay and defend the home, as well as 
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livelihood assets (see below). Alan, a Wulgulmerang grazier, was asked whether he had ever 
considered leaving early. He replied: 
 
No, not really. It’s not really an option. We’ve got all our animals [livestock] and things 
that were probably considered almost part of the family, so it just… We never considered 
it. 
– Alan, Wulgulmerang 
 
In stark contrast, the lone renter in the interview sample had considered staying to defend, but instead 
prepared to leave early: 
 
At first I thought I’d stay and defend, but it’s a rented house and I didn’t feel that strongly 
about it. I just felt like I probably wouldn’t be there [when a fire came through] or I’d get 
caught or something. So yeah, I packed a carload of stuff and sent my cat to Melbourne. 
– Anne, Gelantipy 
 
When the fires finally arrived, circumstances prevented some people from acting on their decision (see 
5.4.3). Nevertheless, informants’ original intentions reflect the high level of commitment to staying to 
defend property from bushfires in the district. 
 
Regardless of their decision to stay and defend or leave early, most residents and landholders utilised 
their informal social networks when preparing for the bushfires. When it became clear that the fires 
would reach the area, people began organising for relatives and friends to help them prepare and 
defend their properties. These social networks were typically familial, but almost entirely non-local. 
Access to help through non-local social networks was particularly important given the aged and 
diminished state of the population and the shift to larger landholdings and asset bases. There simply 
were not enough local people with a physical capacity to adequately prepare and defend assets spread 
over such a large area. As was discussed in Chapter 4, many families and young people have relocated 
to better serviced towns and regional centres, such as Bairnsdale, due to the extremely limited 
opportunities for local education and employment. The long lead-up to the fires meant that residents 
had sufficient time to make these arrangements, and relatives and friends were able to travel these long 
distances and arrive in time. In a fast onset bushfire, it is unlikely that residents and landholders would 
receive this vital support. 
 
With or without help, residents undertook a range of actions to physically prepare their homes (Table 
5.3). ‘General maintenance’ formed the basis of most people’s preparedness, including things that 
people would do regardless of bushfires, such as maintaining the condition of the house and keeping 
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grasses, shrubs and weeds around it to a minimum. Prior to the bushfire season, some residents had 
purchased or made their own firefighting equipment, including ‘slip-on’ units, water tanks and pumps. 
These were mostly people who had agricultural and other livelihood assets to protect. Some residents 
had a battery-powered radio and torch at the ready, in case of a power outage, as well as spare 
equipment such as buckets, mops and hoses. Again, the long lead-up to the fires meant that residents 
had plenty of warning and time to prepare. Most residents began to create a ‘defendable space’ by 
removing flammable materials from around their homes. Other important preparations included 
clearing rooves and gutters of debris, blocking downpipes with tennis balls and filling gutters with 
water and covering eaves, vents and spaces underneath houses to prevent the entry of embers. Most 
people removed valuable and irreplaceable items such as family heirlooms and important documents 
and shifted them to a safe place.  
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Table 5.4: Preparatory actions to protect livelihood assets 
Prior to bushfire season: 
• Insurance. 
• General property maintenance. 
• Decision to stay and defend. 
• Obtain specialist firefighting equipment (e.g. slip-on unit, water tanks and pumps). 
• Ensure reliable or dedicated water supply. 
• Backup generator for pumps and other equipment. 
 
Once fires threatened: 
• Attend CFA and DSE ‘community meetings’ to obtain information about bushfires. 
• Organise CFA ‘telephone trees’. 
• Arrange for family and/or friends to help prepare for and respond to the fires. 
• Discuss ‘fire plan’ with family and/or friends and agree on rules, roles and 
responsibilities. 
• Remove flammable material from around assets by carting, raking, weeding, mowing, 
grazing, slashing and burning. 
• Selectively remove trees from around the home. 
• Water grass and garden around home to keep it lush. 
• Plough, grade or bulldoze firebreak around assets (e.g. sheds, stockyards and fences) 
• Selectively remove trees from around buildings.  
• Graze pastures down. 
• Confine livestock to heavily grazed or ploughed paddock. 
• Open internal gates to allow movement of stock / close internal gates to allow movement 
of stock. 
• Relocate stock to areas unlikely to be affected by fires. 
 
Despite high rates of home and contents insurance, most residents and landholders had only partial 
cover for their agricultural and other livelihood assets (Table 5.4). For example, farmers often had 
only one or two of their hay or wool sheds insured. Most commonly, however, farmers had little or no 
insurance on their livestock and fences. At Wulgulmerang, one family had insured the two houses on 
their large grazing property, as well as hay and wood sheds and their contents (hay, wool presses, etc.). 
They did not, however, have insurance cover for their stock, stockyards and fences: 
 
We had very poor insurance. We didn’t have any fence insurance. We weren’t told you 
had to be insured for at least a month before you’re entitled to any insurance on it. And it 
 153 
was two days before. We realised we were goners then – [given] the way the fires were 
going through Beloka and those places. 
– Valerie, Wulgulmerang 
 
Another Wulgulmerang grazier explained that:  
 
All the insurance I had was on my house and hay shed, but I didn’t have the hay insured. 
When we had the drought a few years ago I had no hay in the shed and I said: ‘Well, I’ve 
got no hay, so it’s no good me paying insurance on it’. I never got around to doing it 
again. 
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
In a few cases, people’s underinsurance was the result of an oversight or inaccurate valuation of assets. 
Most commonly, however, low levels of insurance cover for livelihood assets were a direct 
consequence of the financial pressures facing many people (see Chapter 4). Pervasive drought, rising 
costs of production and declining farm incomes have forced many people to reduce expenditure on 
farm business management, including insurance. The link between financial pressures and the 
widespread underinsurance of livelihood assets was illustrated by Joe, a Wulgulmerang grazier, who 
explained:  
 
We didn’t have fences insured, because when you’re going through drought you’ve got to 
get your priorities right – you’ve got to keep your money to keep your stock alive. You’ve 
got to either agist them out or, if you can’t find agistment, you feed [with bought hay]. So 
you need all your resources to feed your stock to get them through. 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
These issues are discussed in greater depth in Chapters 6 and 7, where it is shown that the insurance of 
livelihood assets is a fundamental component of a household’s capacity to cope and adapt to bushfire 
impacts. The key point here is that financial pressures have prevented many people from obtaining an 
adequate level of insurance. 
 
It was noted above that all of the agricultural landholders interviewed for this research had made a 
decision to stay and defend their homes and livelihood assets. To leave early simply wasn’t considered 
to be a realistic option. Consequently, all had at least some firefighting equipment, most commonly 
water tanks and pumps. Some farmers had dedicated firefighting pumps, which can spray water at 
higher pressure and over longer distances than a basic pump. One family, for instance, had purchased 
a 22,000 litre semi-trailer tanker with a four-inch pump to protect the buildings on their farm property. 
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They considered the water tanker ‘… pretty cheap insurance’ and took confidence from their capacity 
to protect assets with large volumes of water [Leigh, Wulgulmerang]. While the cost of such 
investments may be prohibitive for most farmers, particularly in the context of longstanding drought 
and other financial pressures, many had slip-on units which they had made themselves with existing 
tanks and pumps. Indeed, improvisation played an important role in many people’s preparedness, with 
everyday farm equipment being adapted for use during the fires. Some farmers, for example, created 
mobile firefighting units by loading water tanks and pumps onto trailers behind 4WD vehicles. 
 
Agricultural landholders undertook a range of actions to prepare their properties for the bushfires and 
to protect their assets (Table 5.3). As noted, most people received help to prepare through their non-
local social networks, which were fundamentally important given the small size of the population, the 
limited physical capacity of some older people, and the broad distribution of assets. The DSE, 
although responsible for managing public land, also assisted landholders to prepare their properties by 
clearing firebreaks around farmhouses, sheds and other assets. Some farmers cleared their own 
firebreaks and reduced the amount of flammable materials on their properties by grazing down 
pastures and fuel reduction burning. The safety of livestock was a high priority, for obvious financial 
reasons, but also to prevent the suffering of animals. Most farmers put their stock in heavily grazed or 
ploughed paddocks immediately before the fires or, where possible, moved them to other properties or 
areas that were unlikely to be affected by the fires. Interviews revealed different views on the question 
of how best to ensure the safety of stock during bushfires, with some people leaving gates open to 
allow animals to move to safe areas and some confining stock to specific areas to restrict their 
movement.   
 
Levels of preparedness 
As noted, it is difficult to assess how well-prepared residents and landholders were for the January 30 
bushfires. During interviewees, some were uncritical of their own level of preparedness and focused 
instead on the perceived failures of fire authorities and government departments. Nevertheless, some 
informants, including local CFA volunteers, offered their own assessments of people’s preparedness 
for the fires, as did representatives of fire authorities and government departments who worked in the 
area. 
 
Most people interviewed for the research had made a decision to stay and defend or leave early. Most 
had also formulated ‘fire plans’ with rules, roles and responsibilities agreed for each household 
member. The physical preparedness of people’s properties appears to have been far more varied. A 
small number of interviewees spoke at great length about the measures they had taken to prepare their 
homes and farms for the fires, listing most of the preparatory actions listed above (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). 
A very small proportion of people appear to have been largely unprepared, as in the aforementioned 
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case of the resident who attempted to insure his home 48 hours before the fires and had done very little 
to physically prepare his property. Most people fell in the middle-range, having undertaken a range of 
basic preparations, but not all. An experienced volunteer firefighter with the Gelantipy CFA 
maintained that a basic level of preparedness would have been adequate in a ‘normal’ bushfire, but 
that the January 30 bushfires were different, requiring a higher level of preparedness: 
 
They were just going on fires that had gone through in the past, where you could get out 
with a wet bag and put it out. This wasn’t like that at all – it was a different kettle of fish. 
– Pseudonym withheld 
 
Similarly, another volunteer explained that: 
 
We’ve all seen fires before and we’re used to working with it. But nobody had ever seen 
anything like this before. It came through harder and faster than anybody had ever 
expected. I thought we’d have time to get from one place to another, but there was no 
time – it hit everybody all at once. So I think people thought they could contain it, that 
they’d be able to manage it when, in fact, this job, it wasn’t manageable. Most farmers 
are pretty practical people. They’ve got pumps and things around that they set up. It’s not 
like they’re people who aren’t familiar with running equipment. I’d say preparedness was 
reasonable. I wouldn’t say it was terrific. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
A grazier with a 700 ha sheep and cattle farm at Wulgulmerang drew a distinction between ‘normal 
bushfires’ and ‘firestorms’. He claimed that the accumulation of fuel on public land led to the 
firestorm of January 30, for which there was little he could have done to prepare: 
 
In a bushfire situation people can be prepared, but in a firestorm situation they can’t. It 
just depends on what the fuel load is around the area. I remember, sometime before the 
fire came through here, seeing footage of the Canberra fires on the TV and it was very 
spectacular and I thought: ‘Jeez, that’s a hell of a situation to be in’. But that was a bush 
picnic compared to what it was like up here. I hadn’t really thought that much about a 
firestorm compared to a bushfire. A bushfire is something that’s an out-of-control fire 
and it’s menacing, but it’s a bit like being caught out in a shower of rain or a lightning 
storm. A firestorm… it’s something that I couldn’t comprehend. 
– Leigh, Wulgulmerang 
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There was general agreement among those with past experience of bushfires that the January 30 fires 
were an exceptional event. Clearly, perceptions of adequate bushfire preparedness were formed on the 
basis of past experiences of smaller, more manageable fires. Conclusions about people’s level of 
preparedness for the 2003 fires are drawn in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4.3  Household responses 
As noted above, the majority of residents and landholders were committed to staying to defend their 
homes and other assets. More than three-quarters (79%) of the households represented in the interview 
sample had planned for at least one person to stay and defend. The remainder planned to leave early or 
stay away from their property altogether. Analysis of the interviews revealed that most people (21, or 
88% of households) acted on these intentions. Importantly, those who stayed to defend their homes 
and assets from the fires did so actively. For example, Percy, an elderly sheep farmer from Gelantipy, 
ignored his wife’s request for him to shelter inside their home and instead stayed outside to patrol for 
spot fires:  
 
My wife was in the house the day the fire came through and my son was outside the 
house. I was driving around in the ute looking for spot fires and when I went near the 
house she would come out and go crook [get angry] at me for driving around, because 
they were on the wireless saying you should get in your house and stay in it. And I said: 
‘Well, I’m not getting in the house and staying in it, because I know what fires do and if 
there’s a spot fire I want to be able to put the damn thing out…’. If I had of stayed in the 
house and done nothing, that spot fire over there in the paddock might’ve got going and 
burnt most of Gelantipy out. 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
At Black Mountain, graziers Sarah and Dan were forced to shelter in their house during the main 
passage of the fire front due to the extreme weather conditions and fire behaviour. They continued, 
however, to patrol the immediate exterior of the house: 
 
We were pretty much in and out constantly, running from window to window just 
checking that nothing outside the house was catching fire. 
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
 
Gary actively and successfully defended his Seldom Seen home and workshop for the estimated 20 
minutes it took for the main fire front to pass. Extreme heat, gale-force winds and debris occasionally 
forced him to seek shelter behind the house. At one point, he found that an ember had lodged in a wall 
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of his shed. Thus, by actively defending his property, rather than passively sheltering, he was able to 
prevent the fire from becoming large and consuming the building (see quote on page 134). 
 
Of the 24 households represented in the interview sample, 18 (75%) were attended and, where 
necessary, actively defended from the fires. Three of the six homes that were destroyed were 
unattended during the fires. Of the remaining three homes that were unsuccessfully defended, one is 
well known to have been un-defendable (due to poor preparation), while the other two were defended 
by the same person, who was physically overwhelmed by the task. 
 
It is important to note that fires continued to pose a threat to human life and property in the hours and 
days after the main fire front had passed. At Wulgulmerang, Leigh noticed that there were ‘… 
probably five or ten minutes of main front, but the wind and embers hung around for half an hour or 
more’. Indeed, after the main front had passed residents and landholders throughout the district battled 
smaller blazes that threatened assets including sheds, pasture and fences. Early in the morning after the 
fires, Gavin and Jane, thinking that the threat had passed, left their Wulgulmerang home. Gavin 
returned an hour or two later to find it again under threat: 
 
We got up the next morning and was quite cool, very smoky around us of course, 
everything was very calm, no flame anywhere, no smoke coming off trees or anything. So 
I took Jane down to Buchan and went back up there in the truck and by the time I got 
back up there I’m driving along the open country and I was saying to my co-worker 
‘There’s smoke coming up there, that looks like around near my place’ and sure enough 
the areas that hadn’t burnt the day before were now all on fire and the fire was like a 
metre from the house, burning across all the dead grass and that. So there was a mad 
panic to get all that under control. But yeah, that was quite a surprise that it all looked 
very calm but it all just sprung up out of nowhere. So obviously they’re right when they 
say: ‘Don’t leave’. And that was it – we weren’t going to leave then for about a week! 
– Gavin, Wulgulmerang 
 
With roads strewn with fallen trees and debris in the days after the fires, travelling around the district 
was a laborious and time-consuming process. Percy, a local grazier, helped the Bush Nurse to 
complete her rounds after the fires. They arrived at a farm in Black Mountain to find a fire burning 
toward the house: 
 
Up at Black Mountain there was a house with a friend of mine… a lady lives in the house, 
she’d be about 60, and her husband was away looking at his stock or something. Anyway, 
there was a big line of fire about 200 yards long burning down towards the house, and 
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she was inside. There were some bails of hay sitting there that it hadn’t gotten to. 
Anyhow, the Bush Nurse went to talk to the lady who came out to the door and I said, 
‘Listen, that fire’s going to be down here in the garden in a few minutes. I’ll get my 
knapsack and see if I can put it out’. It was only a grassfire about that high [gestures to 
about one foot], but it would’ve got awful hot when it hit the hay…  
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
While most people were able to implement their ‘fire plans’, some were not. Dan and Sarah, for 
instance, made a rule that they would stay with their house if the fire arrived. However, prior to the 
main front, they received a call from a neighbour who informed them that a spot fire was burning in 
one of their paddocks. Breaking their rule, they went to fight the fire. They soon returned to their 
home, having seen the main front approaching: 
 
When we came back from the spot fire we went to put the sprinkler system on and we 
pulled the rope straight out of the pump and had to fix that. By the time we got all that 
started up, Dan told me to go to the back fence and have a look where the fire was. It was 
only 500 metres away, so it was moving really quickly. From then on we decided we were 
going to get inside. It was pitch black and we couldn’t see where we were going. We 
we’re going by feel through the yard and Dan nearly ran straight into the clothesline 
[laughs]. So it would’ve been great trying to haul 90 odd kilos inside if he’d knocked 
himself out. So, really, the visibility was terrible – and you couldn’t hear anything. We 
basically had to yell in each other’s face to hear each other, and we’d agreed that we 
wouldn’t go outside the house-yard or anything without each other, but I couldn’t find 
Dan at one stage and I thought he’d gone up to the shed, so I was getting ready to go up 
to the shed when he walked back inside [laughs]. So, it’s really easy for all your best laid 
plans to fall apart – and merely because you can’t see anything and you can’t hear 
anything, which causes a bit of panic.  
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
 
Jane and Gavin were also unable to implement their fire plan. They had decided to leave early and 
were in the process of leaving when they received a telephone call to inform them that the fires were 
close and that it was too late to leave.  
 
We hadn’t really ever intended to stay. If the fire came, I really wasn’t keen to stay. 
Gavin would’ve, but I wasn’t happy with the idea. So we just started packing, [getting] 
ready to leave. We’d actually taken a lot of stuff when we took the kids to Bairnsdale… so 
we didn’t have a lot of stuff up there anyway. The last of the things we were going to 
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evacuate were on the kitchen floor, and then we got the call to stay… We wouldn’t have 
made it out. If we tried to leave we would have been barbecued. It was lucky that we got 
the call that we did when we did, ‘cause probably fifteen minutes later we would’ve been 
on the road.  
– Jane, Wulgulmerang 
 
Fortunately, Gavin and Jane were very well prepared (see quote on page 127) and thus were able to 
successfully stay and defend their home. In stark contrast, George, who had planned to stay and 
defend, left his home at the last moment on the advice of a neighbour. He and two visiting family 
members, all of whom were elderly, were alone at the house and were relying on receiving firefighting 
support: 
 
My plan was to stay, because I thought there was going to be a fire truck here to give me 
a hand… When the fire-spot blew into the paddock next door… a neighbour rang up and 
said, because he didn’t know I had people with me: ‘Well, you better get out’, because 
they could see the fire. I said: ‘Well what’s going on?’ and he said ‘Well, there’s fire in 
the Wire Paddock and it’s going your way and it’s going hot and fast’. I said to him: 
‘Where’s our fire brigade?’ He said: ‘We haven’t got one’. He more or less said that they 
weren’t going to come, or words to that effect… 
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
George’s home burned down. He is adamant that it could have been saved if a fire tanker had been 
there to protect it.  
 
5.4.4  Firefighting and emergency responses 
Community expectations of fire authorities 
As discussed, the extreme fire behaviour experienced on January 30 and the decisions taken by fire 
authorities to ensure the safety of their personnel meant that firefighting activity in the Wulgulmerang 
district was limited. Authorities’ have attracted sustained criticism for their response to the fires. Many 
residents and landholders had expected to receive firefighting support during the main passage of the 
fire front. These expectations were formed despite the CFA’s (2004, 3) official message to the public 
that: ‘During a bushfire there will not be a fire truck available to protect every property’. This message 
recognises that fires may threaten property with very little warning and that during large bushfires – 
such as those of January to March, 2003 – resources may be severely limited due to commitments 
elsewhere in the State. Consequently, people must be prepared to stay and defend their property, or 
leave early (see Chapter 2). Paradoxically, it appears that interviewees’ expectations of firefighting 
support were formed on the advice of fire authorities, including professional staff and volunteer 
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firefighters, and from assumptions about authorities’ responsibilities to protect individuals and 
households during bushfires.  
 
We were all a bit suspicious that when the chips are really down we’ll be on our own, 
and that’s the way it turned out… even though they promised a fire truck for every 
household. 
– Reg, Black Mountain 
 
They said the tankers were going to be at each house. They said they couldn’t do anything 
to stop it [the fire], but they were going to be at each house. 
– Rory, Wulgulmerang 
 
A number of interviewees alleged that senior CFA officials had assured them that there would be a 
tanker to help protect their property. For example, Reg was adamant that ‘the chap in charge’ at 
Gelantipy had told him there would be a tanker to help protect his Black Mountain property during the 
fire. Similarly, Alan of Wulgulmerang insisted that ‘They came here and looked around the night 
before and shook me by the hand and said they’ll be with us’. This was supported by the Captain of 
the Gelantipy CFA, who recalled that: 
 
One of the fellas at Wulgulmerang had heard that they wouldn’t go up there, because his 
property is off the main road… I told [the Divisional Commander] about this and he 
said: ‘I’ll go see him’. So he took off by himself and went up and saw this bloke, shook his 
hand and said there was no trouble: ‘We’ll be here’, eye-to-eye. So that’s where all the 
trouble started. He obviously shouldn’t have said that, because there’s no way he 
could’ve guaranteed that they’d have a truck there. 
– Captain, Gelantipy CFA brigade 
 
The Operations Manager for CFA Region 11 was responsible for strategic management of the 2003 
fires throughout East Gippsland. He suggested that volunteer firefighters may have been responsible 
for raising people’s expectations of fire authorities: 
 
It was the blokes on the back of the fire truck [who were saying]: ‘We’re here. We’ll be 
here to protect you’ and, you know, making promises they weren’t able to deliver. If they 
had been in place when the fire came through, most people would’ve had a fire truck with 
‘em. But we had 15 fire trucks and there are more than 15 properties that were affected. 
So, someone was always going to miss out… 
– Operations Manager, CFA Region 11 
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Others assumed that because there were firefighting appliances in the area, each household would 
receive individual protection: 
 
We had a meeting at the CFA shed on the Tuesday before the fire, but it wasn’t 
particularly useful. The only thing that came out of it was that we knew there were almost 
30 tankers in the area. So, effectively, there was a tanker for every house.  
– Gary, Seldom Seen 
 
A number of local people believed that they were entitled to firefighting support, because the CFA is 
partly funded by fire service levies on insurance premiums (see CFA 2008). Dan, who stayed to 
defend a large cattle farm at Black Mountain, described the fire levy as ‘a bloody con job’. Others 
shared this sentiment: 
 
I’ve paid my fire levy for 40 years or more and, as far as I’m concerned, that’s the same 
as paying insurance. You pay your insurance every year and if something happens you 
collect your insurance. I paid that fire brigade levy for all those years and got nothing, 
absolutely nothing. 
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
I heard a fellow, he was asked recently on the radio and he said ‘Our attitude is: human 
life is paramount’. Now, that’s okay, but why do we have to pay… every insurance policy, 
a big proportion of that goes to the CFA to protect our property. The time comes and they 
run away… 
– Barney, Wulgulmerang 
 
While there were many residents who felt that the CFA had not fulfilled their duty, others were more 
pragmatic. People in Suggan Buggan, in particular, were aware of the hazardousness of their locations 
(see 5.3.3) and therefore did not expect firefighters to risk their lives by attempting to fight the fires: 
 
I wouldn’t have expected the CFA, no matter where they were from, to be in here. I don’t 
know if I’m the only one who thinks that, but I would’ve thought it’s a very dangerous 
situation because they don’t know the area. They could easily get stuck in a bad spot. 
– Art, Suggan Buggan 
 162 
I can understand the locals being angry. But if it came to the CFA coming down here… 
no, I didn’t blame them at all for not coming down here, at all! 
– Marie, Suggan Buggan 
 
Anne felt that it was unrealistic for people to expect that each household would be protected by a fire 
tanker. The volunteer firefighters had arrived the previous evening and were unfamiliar with the area. 
Furthermore, she pointed out that fire authorities faced the prospects of the fires spreading further 
south, toward the coast:  
 
If the weather hadn’t changed, the fire would’ve gone and burnt the rest of the place, and 
there certainly couldn’t possibly have been fire trucks at every single place. People say: 
‘There were 50 trucks and there was this and there was that and there could’ve been 
three fire trucks at each house…’ I think that if you wanted to carry that argument to the 
n’th degree, then every house between here and Lakes Entrance should’ve had three fire 
trucks. I think it’s just that thing of people needing to have someone to blame. 
– Anne, Gelantipy 
 
In contrast, those who did not expect to receive help from authorities to defend their properties had 
prepared themselves to face the fires alone: 
 
We went to one of the meetings prior to the fire coming and they basically said: ‘We 
haven’t got enough resources’ and, basically, ‘You’re on your own’… If you know that 
you’re on your own, then you can cope. 
– Christine, Wulgulmerang 
 
A lot of locals had other people there with them, but it was just Gavin and I here…. We 
knew that we were totally on our own. In some ways we were probably better off, because 
we knew no one was coming. Whereas they all thought someone was coming – and they 
didn’t. So, psychologically, maybe we were better off. 
– Jane, Wulgulmerang 
 
The damage caused by the January 30 bushfires may have been reduced had there been a tanker at 
each property. In particular, homes may have been saved. However, it is unlikely that greater 
firefighting support during the main passage of the fire front would have significantly reduced losses 
of agricultural and other livelihood assets, which are typically spread over large areas (the average size 
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of participants’ agricultural holdings was 646 ha) and are difficult to defend.14 It is also important to 
emphasise that resources were limited due to the broad scale of the fires, which by January 30 had 
burned 465,000ha of forested land and were threatening communities throughout north-east Victoria 
and East Gippsland. The Manager of Operations for East Gippsland emphasised the limited resources 
due to the sheer scale of the fires: 
 
It was the first time in my career that you’d ring Headquarters and say: ‘I’m gonna need 
five or six strike teams to come up to this part of the world’, and we were just told that 
there was none available. And then they rang back and said: ‘We’ve got these 
Queenslanders if you want them’, and I said, ‘We’ll have them. We’ll take anything’. 
– Manager of Operations, CFA Region 11 
 
Perceived barriers to firefighting support 
According to interviewees, fire authorities were unable to provide local people with an adequate level 
of protection because of their ‘bureaucratic’ structure and approach to firefighting. Again, bureaucracy 
was associated with a non-local, procedural and overly risk-averse approach to firefighting.15 In 
particular, people were critical of the centralised approach to management, which meant that important 
decisions were being made in distant locations such as Melbourne and Orbost. 
 
They came in and they were controlling it from Orbost or bloody wherever else they were 
controlling it from.  But, you know, people here knew what was going on and what 
needed to be done, except they didn’t take any notice of that. 
– Anne, Gelantipy 
 
Word was coming from Traralgon or Orbost or some big mob somewhere, sitting on his 
bloody arse in a town or a city giving the orders. Decisions like that should be made by 
the blokes on the tankers or the Captain of the fire brigade one the spot… 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
 
 
I heard them say that there was a serious discussion as to whether those trucks would 
ever return to this area. But at 1.50pm, when the fire call went out that the fire was on its 
way, they were between a rock and a hard place. And they finally got the trucks on the 
road after a lot of fiddling around, but it was too darn late and the trucks never arrived… 
                                                 
14
 There were, however, greater opportunities for crews to save pasture and fences in the days after January 30. 
15
 Informants 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 36 and 37. 
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They shut the whole thing down, Orbost, not Gelantipy. Orbost shut the whole thing 
down! How can Orbost see what’s going on? 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
There was a strong perception among interviewees that fire authorities’ reluctance to take risks during 
the January 30 bushfires was a product of the Coronial Inquest into the Linton bushfire of December 2, 
1998.16 In this incident, five volunteer firefighters with the Geelong West CFA brigade were killed 
when their tanker became entrapped by fire. The Coroner found that the CFA and DSE and the actions 
of two professional firefighters had contributed to the deaths. The report of the inquiry (Johnstone 
2002) offered 55 recommendations to fire authorities to increase the safety of firefighters. These are 
popularly thought to have created a culture of risk-aversion among fire authorities: 
 
The Controller was frightened that he’d get people burnt, get the firemen burnt, and he 
wanted them out of harm’s way. Because after the Linton Inquiry they’d been told that if 
any other firemen got burnt then heads would roll. It wasn’t just the CFA that were going 
to take the blame – it was the people who made the decisions. So they were frightened. I 
s’pose you can’t blame ‘em… 
– Captain, Gelantipy CFA 
 
I think from the firefighters getting killed at Linton, the CFA has gone overboard on 
safety to the point where they’re not going to fight fires anymore. All they’re going to 
think about is people running away from their houses or staying and defending them, and 
I think that’s wrong. They’ve gone too far that way. 
– Alan, Wulgulmerang 
 
Red tape is a real issue for the CFA… well, it is for everyone now. Like that lady 
[volunteer firefighter] who got killed the other day – the first people on the bloody scene 
were WorkSafe! So it’s been taken to the extreme. And that’s what really got on our goat, 
‘cause during the fires the CFA weren’t allowed to do anything. They weren’t allowed to 
go off the main road. Even two days after the fire, they couldn’t go and fight a bloody fire 
up in the paddock that they could see from the main road. And that really cheesed us off. 
 – Dan, Black Mountain 
 
A common criticism of fire authorities was that, since Linton (1998), strike teams could not be 
separated, which is impractical when fighting fires in areas like the Wulgulmerang district where 
                                                 
16
 Informants 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 21 and 37. 
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people and assets are sparsely distributed. The Manager of Operations for CFA Region 11 referred to 
this as ‘Linton Syndrome’, the idea that ‘… you’ve got to have five trucks within spitting distance’. 
Management of a strike team, he maintained, required trucks to be able to communicate, which means 
that crews could be spread out over two or three kilometres. He rejected the assertion that the CFA had 
been ‘hamstrung’ by rules and regulations. He acknowledged, however, that there was a perception 
among professional and volunteer firefighters that individuals would be held responsible if things went 
wrong: 
 
The orders that are given ‘upstairs’ are very conservative, because, you know: ‘It’s my 
arse that’s going to be on the ground’. The last serious event we had was Linton, where 
you got six months of court proceedings and things like that where everyone’s pointing 
the finger at everyone else. 
– Manager of Operations, CFA Region 11 
 
He accepted that fire authorities were more risk-averse during the 2003 campaign. Nevertheless, he 
maintained that authorities had taken on the recommendations from the Linton inquiry and were 
beginning to strike a balance between their responsibilities to protect people and property and to 
ensure the safety of professional and volunteer firefighters.  
 
5.5  Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has explored residents’ and landholders’ experiences of the January 30 bushfires. It has 
also examined interviewees’ perspectives on why the Wulgulmerang district was so severely affected. 
In Chapter 7, these findings are integrated into the conceptual framework of the research and are 
discussed in relation to the wider vulnerability literature.  
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CHAPTER SIX: AFTER THE FIRES 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district experienced a range of impacts from the 
bushfires of January 30, 2003. Given that fewer than 100 people live between Gelantipy and Suggan 
Buggan, the scale of damage and loss from the fires was exceptional. Six homes, 40 farm buildings, 
thousands of head of sheep and cattle, hundreds of kilometres of farm fences and countless tonnes of 
hay and pasture were destroyed. While these losses and their subsequent impacts on people’s finances 
and livelihoods were the most visible outcome of the fires, people’s health and social lives were also 
affected. Health service providers harboured concerns for the long-term psychological health of some 
residents and landholders after the fires. Illnesses such as post-traumatic stress and depression were 
compounded by a general reluctance, particularly among men, to seek help. Furthermore, despite an 
initial period of social cohesion, the trauma of people’s experiences and their grievances with the way 
that government departments, fire authorities and fellow community members responded to the 
challenge of the fires created tensions and exacerbated social divisions among some local people. 
 
This Chapter examines the impacts of the January 30 bushfires on local people and the strategies they 
adopted to cope and adapt. Three broad categories of impact are identified, including: human health; 
finances and livelihoods; and social and community life. The main aim of this Chapter is to provide an 
account of local people’s experiences and responses to the many impacts of the fires. Conclusions 
about people’s coping and adaptive capacities are drawn in Chapter 7.  
 
6.2  Human health 
6.2.1  Impacts 
Although no one was killed or seriously injured by the bushfires, the impact on people’s psychological 
health has been profound. The Gelantipy District Bush Nursing Centre is the primary healthcare 
provider in the district and played a vital role in service provision immediately after the fires and 
during the longer-term recovery process. On the evening of Thursday, January 30, the Gelantipy Bush 
Nurse treated a number of residents and firefighters for smoke inhalation and eye irritations. She noted 
that: 
 
Considering how terrible it was, there were hardly any injuries. There wasn’t really 
much physical stuff that I had to do. Most of it was just talking to people, because people 
just wanted to talk about it over and over and over again. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
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Similarly, a counsellor with Lakes Entrance Community Health (LECH), who provided ‘personal 
support’ services to residents and landholders after the fires (discussed below), spent a great deal of 
time talking with people about their experiences. She identified a range of health impacts, including: 
 
• Post-traumatic stress disorder; 
• Depression; 
• Anxiety; 
• Sleeplessness; 
• Triggering of past trauma and underlying mental illness; and 
• Neglected symptoms of physical health. 
 
Given the scale of destruction, losses of homes and other assets in the fires were an obvious cause of 
trauma and distress. However, interviews revealed that the most traumatic experiences of the fires 
came from witnessing the suffering of animals and the difficult task of destroying injured stock (see 
photographs, Appendix 6.1). Having lost his home in the fires, a Wulgulmerang cattle grazier 
explained that: 
 
The worst part of the whole business wasn’t losing the house… it was shooting injured 
stock. You couldn’t see anything wrong with them, but you knew they were going to die. 
That was the very worst part of the lot. And I had to shoot about, oh myself, I only shot 
about three or four or five or something like that. You’d drive around the paddock 
looking for stock, and you knew they were going to die… So you just had to do something 
about it. 
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
Similarly, a resident who operated a small business from his Seldom Seen home was deeply troubled 
by his inability to protect his pets and a small number of livestock from the bushfires: 
 
Losing the house was pretty hard, because there was a lot of family stuff in there – 
antiques, books, photos. I used to collect all sorts of things. But probably the animals… I 
felt bad about them because I was responsible for them. I tried to get a horse float to shift 
the emu and the ostrich [to a safe location], but I couldn’t get hold of one. And the 
cattle… they all had names. They used to follow me. I always used to watch them down in 
the paddock, count them and make sure they were alright. I did it for years. And I let them 
down. 
– Kelvin, Seldom Seen 
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Bearing witness to the suffering of native animals also deeply affected many local people. Maureen, a 
Wulgulmerang grazier, recalled walking through the bush a few days after the fires. She discovered a 
severely burnt kangaroo but, with nothing to euthanise it, was forced to leave it to die. ‘It was the 
cruellest thing I’ve ever had to do’, she said. Interviewees also recalled that the ground was littered 
with dead birds after the fires and that the weeks and months that followed the fires were marked by 
an eerie silence. 1 Valerie, another Wulgulmerang farmer, put it simply: ‘… the suffering of animals 
has a tremendous impact on you’. 
 
In some cases, the impacts of the fires on people’s psychological health were immediately apparent. 
Some interviewees recognised that they were suffering from shock after the fires, noting that it took 
weeks before they could think clearly and begin to work toward recovery.2 Residents and landholders 
worked tirelessly in the weeks and months after the fires, often from dawn until dusk, to clear their 
properties of debris and to repair and replace burnt assets, particularly fences. Some people were so 
busy that they did not recognise symptoms of poor physical and psychological health that would later 
become more serious. Indeed, the LECH counsellor noted that throughout East Gippsland: 
 
People were so busy that they weren’t looking after symptoms of physical health. And I 
know of two or three people who died after the fires, with illnesses. The general 
perception, which I agree with, is that perhaps they didn’t pick up on the signs early 
enough, because they were so busy.  
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
Indeed, after the fires, one resident passed away after a brief battle with cancer. Another resident 
believed the impacts of the fires had accelerated his illness:  
 
We didn’t even realise he was crook. He wasn’t crook until the fire… He and his wife 
worked up there for months and then he died, but that was the cancer, which I think was 
accelerated by the trauma of the fires. 
– Valerie, Wulgulmerang 
 
Some psychological impacts took longer to emerge. At Wulgulmerang, a grazier who suffered huge 
losses of stock and other assets explained that he coped ‘… pretty good for a start, but I had a rough 
stage after nine to twelve months, after I started to despair quite a bit’ [Alan, Wulgulmerang]. Indeed, 
the LECH counsellor reported that ‘… a lot of people fell over’ between 12 and 18 months after the 
fires, when most of the bushfire recovery programs had ended. In addition to residents and 
                                                 
1
 Informants 3, 9, 11, 13, 18, 30 and 34. 
2
 Informants 5, 6 and 9. 
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landholders, these were often service providers, such as nurses and teachers, and other community 
members who took on leadership roles after the fires. For example, the Gelantipy Bush nurse noted 
that:  
 
I thought I coped pretty well for about ten months or so, and then I just realised that I 
wasn’t really coping. I just got really stressed. I didn’t have a nervous breakdown or 
anything. Like, I found that every time I drove up there [to Wulgulmerang etc.] I had this 
feeling like I was going to die. I was so grateful that no one had died. I just kept 
thinking… And I can’t even remember when it stopped. It was one day when I drove 
through Seldom Seen – you know, that shocking area through Boundary Creek – that I 
kind of realised I didn’t have that feeling of dying. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
 
Many interviewees declared that they wanted to put their experiences of the January 30 bushfires 
behind them and get on with their lives (discussed below). The charred landscape, however, served as 
a daily reminder of the disaster in the years that followed. 
 
Indeed, the impact of the fires on people’s psychological health was apparent in interviews conducted 
almost three years later, with a significant number of male and female interviewees breaking down 
while recounting their experiences. These moments were usually brief and were prompted by a diverse 
range of emotions and experiences. One resident, for example, began to cry when she recalled hearing 
an emergency message on ABC radio: ‘… sorry, every time I say this I get really upset… about 
hearing that thing that comes over the radio… the one that says ‘prepare your… prepare your [fire 
plan]…’ Another resident broke down when describing the uncertainty of not knowing whether his 
house had burned down. The house survived; however, he expressed something akin to ‘survivor 
guilt’: ‘I suppose it’s like any catastrophe or disaster – you always ask yourself the question, ‘Why 
me?’ or ‘Why not me’ or whatever…’ His wife continued:   
 
We’re really good mates with [X] and he got his whole house destroyed. That could’ve 
been us. That was hard to cope with, that people up there at Wulgulmerang and Black 
Mountain had lost so much, and we had everything. But in some things, we went through 
exactly the same thing… 
 
The lasting psychological impact of the disaster became most apparent in an interview with a farming 
couple at Wulgulmerang. They had suffered heavy losses including hundreds of sheep, sheds, hay, 
fences and most of their pasture. Like many others, they expected to receive firefighting support and 
were furious with the CFA for not providing it. At first, the woman farmer declined to participate in 
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the interview, instead busying herself around the house while her husband spoke. When discussion 
turned to the issue of firefighting support, she returned to the room, angered and visibly distressed: 
 
I’ve just got to interrupt here. There was a lot of effort after the fires to twist our words to 
make out that we were blaming the volunteers – and we never did that. It was the 
hierarchy that basically left us for dead. All that mattered was Omeo and Buchan – 
Wulgulmerang didn’t really exist… we just didn’t matter. 
 
She produced a copy of the CFA’s (2003) Campaign fires publication and opened it to page 85: 
 
This is the official, one little paragraph: ‘… possible new fires reported around Gelantipy 
and Wulgulmerang’ [breaks down]. And as you might’ve read [slamming a copy of 
‘Flames across the mountains’ onto the table], half of that book is what actually 
happened. And the CFA has made a concerted attempt to cover it up.3 
 
The strained relationship between some local people and the CFA was evident in the small number of 
volunteer resignations after the fires (see 6.4.2). Allegations that the CFA attempted to ‘cover up’ what 
happened were countered by CFA claims that many people were unreceptive to the explanations and 
support (including counselling) that were offered by the CFA after the fires [Manager of Operations, 
CFA Region 11]. Whatever the case, residents’ experiences of the disaster appear to have confirmed 
their deep sense of marginality and abandonment, which has prolonged their trauma and grief. Valerie, 
of Wulgulmerang, put it simply: ‘One of the things that would’ve helped was the government to 
recognise their responsibility’. Indeed, it was local people’s feelings of not being heard that led to the 
publication of Flames across the mountains (Appleby 2004), in which residents and landholders 
throughout East Gippsland shared their accounts of the fires. To many interviewees the book is an 
important public record and goes some way toward having their stories heard: 
 
X organised it from this end and taped the stories of anybody who wanted to tell their 
story, which was nearly everybody. They put together a pretty good book with lots of 
photos, some very graphic photos. And the proceeds, when they get into profit, are going 
to help these communities. So it was pretty worthwhile. 
– Kelvin, Seldom Seen 
 
Importantly, the editors of the book chose not to incorporate many of the controversial issues and 
complaints that residents and landholders had with the firefighting and government responses to the 
fires. Consequently, the book emphasises more positive experiences, such as the cooperation and 
                                                 
3
 Flames across the mountains: personal accounts of the Bogong, Razorback and Pinnibar fires, East Gippsland, 
January 2003 (Appleby 2004). 
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support provided within affected communities. It was for this reason – to also have their grievances 
aired – that many people agreed to participate in this research. 
 
The CFA also published a short article on the Wulgulmerang fires in its Brigade magazine. Bearing 
the title ‘Wulgulmerang’s fighting back’ (Philip 2004), the double-paged spread provided a brief 
overview of the disaster and a few quotes from local residents. Kelvin’s response to the article again 
highlights residents’ and landholders’ need for recognition: ‘They still didn’t admit any fault. But at 
least we got a mention’. 
 
6.2.2  Coping and adaptive strategies 
Accessing health services 
All of the health service providers who were interviewed spoke of the challenges of engaging local 
men in health promotion programs and in getting them to recognise and seek treatment for physical 
and psychological ill-health.4 The Gelantipy Bush Nurse and the LECH counsellor both noted that 
men were generally slow to access healthcare services after the fires, if they did at all: 
 
In the early days, men tended not to come forward. I saw a lot of women about their own 
stuff and concerns for their partners, but it was much later that the men did come 
forward. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
 
People were depressed – that was another hard thing after the fires, especially for the 
men. The women would come to talk to me and they’d say, ‘My husband’s not sleeping…’ 
and just [described] all the classical signs of depression. But they [the men] wouldn’t see 
a doctor for depression in a fit. Some of them finally did, which was good, but some of 
them didn’t and it was just through time that they came good. 
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
The Buchan Bush Nurse, who provided support to her colleague at Gelantipy after the fires, described 
farming men as ‘… a pretty hard group to engage’, noting that the most successful program in terms of 
men’s participation was the annual ‘sunspot’ skin cancer clinic. In her experience, ‘… the blokes: you 
really find it quite difficult to get them into a medical setting. It’s a lot easier to deal with them 
socially’. Indeed, she held the liquor licence at the Buchan Football Club for some time: 
 
                                                 
4
 Informants 44, 53 and 56. 
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A lot of the blokes will actually talk to me once they’ve had a few beers. And I certainly 
think that helped a lot, particularly in those couple of years after the fires… 
– Bush Nurse, Buchan 
 
Table 6.1: Personal support services provided by Lakes Entrance Community Health,  
February to March 2003 
Community No. of clients* 
No. of clients 
phone contact 
only* 
No. of clients 
visited once* 
No. of clients 
visited more 
than once* 
Omeo 37 11 10 16 
Swifts Creek/ 
Bindi 3 1 0 2 
Gelantipy/ 
Wulgulmerang 23 4 8 11 
Buchan 5 2 1 2 
Bendoc/ 
Deddick 6 1 5 0 
Unknown 
location 11 11 0 0 
Total 85 30 24 31 
* Includes families                                                                                                   Source: LECH (2004) 
 
Under the East Gippsland Shire’s ‘Emergency Recovery Plan’, LECH is the lead agency in the 
provision of ‘personal support’ services after disasters (see Appendix 6.2). Personal support is 
considered an early intervention, because it involves the identification and treatment of symptoms of 
distress, with the aim of reducing the likelihood of ongoing or long-term impacts (LECH 2004). These 
services were provided to residents and landholders on a weekly basis for a period of 10 weeks. 23 
people from the district accessed this initial support, with a little over half (58 percent) of them using 
the service more than once (Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.2: Outreach counselling services provided by Lakes Entrance Community  
Health, June 2003 to November 2004 
Community No. of 
clients 
No. of 
females 
No. of 
males 
Aged < 50 
years 
Aged 50+ 
years 
Issues 
directly 
related to 
bushfires 
Omeo/ 
Cobungra 42 26 16 16 26 13 
Benambra/ 
Glenn Valley 53 36 17 8 45 49 
Swifts Creek/ 
Cassilis 33 17 16 12 21 18 
Gelantipy/ 
Wulgulmerang 39 22 17 9 30 34 
Buchan 17 12 5 9 8 6 
Bendoc/ 
Deddick 13 8 5 1 12 12 
Total 197 121 76 55 142 132 
Source: LECH (2004) 
 
Between June 2003 and November 2004, LECH provided an additional ‘outreach counselling’ service 
to people throughout East Gippsland who had been affected by the bushfires, including local health 
and community workers. This service was initially funded for 12 months but was extended for an 
additional six months due to ongoing drought (LECH 2004). A slightly larger number of people from 
the Wulgulmerang district (n = 39) accessed the outreach counselling service than the personal support 
service (Table 6.2). Given that there were far fewer women in the district at the time of the fires (a 
ratio of approximately 40/60), it is significant that more women used this service than men.5 More 
than three-quarters (77%) of those who used the outreach counselling service were over 50 years’ age. 
Again, this is not surprising given the aged state of the population: of the 39 residents and landholders 
interviewed for the research 26 (67%) were aged over 55 years.6 Significantly, the vast majority (87%) 
of people who used the service were counselled for issues directly related to the January 30 bushfires 
(rather than drought). 
 
As noted, health service providers experienced difficulty delivering healthcare to men who had been 
affected by the fires. Importantly, they all emphasised the advantages of adopting an informal and 
social approach to their work.7 The LECH counsellor attributed the relatively high rate of participation 
                                                 
5
 At the 2001 Census there were 113 men and 79 women living in the ‘2040201’ CCD, which roughly equates to 
the Wulgulmerang District, as defined in this thesis. 
6
 Given the large proportion of the district’s bushfire-affected population interviewed for this research, this 
figure can be taken as being more or less representative. 
7
 Informants 44, 53 and 56. 
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in the outreach counselling service to the informal and adaptive approach she took. Having grown up 
at Tubbut, a similarly small and remote community on the eastern side of the Snowy River (see Figure 
1.1), she knew that people would be deterred by an overly formal approach: 
 
I changed everything that my agency told me that I needed to do. My boss had the idea 
that I needed to register everybody, you know – names, dates of birth and all that sort of 
stuff. I needed to have extensive file notes. And I knew that just wouldn’t go down. So I 
didn’t do any of that. I went to visit the people that I met straight after the fires, to see 
how they were going and tell them what I was doing. Often it was just like having a chat, 
but next time I went up I’d call back. So it was that continuation, and down the track they 
talk. I certainly didn’t sit there taking notes with people, except if I was concerned about 
their safety and then we’d talk about that. I met a lot of people at community events – you 
know, there’d be a forum, something about the fires or something about the drought, or if 
there was a dance or a social thing, I’d go, to just try to get a presence. And I was very, 
very careful, of course, about confidentiality. 
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
Health service providers emphasised the need for government and other organisations to deliver their 
services in a culturally sensitive manner. In the Wulgulmerang district, this requires service providers 
to act in a practical, informal and straightforward way, and to listen to and value local people’s 
experiences and knowledge: 
 
That’s the level you really need to work at with those communities. Not as a professional, 
even though you do have those skills, it’s as another human being who’s interested. 
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
Equally important, however, is that post-disaster health services are funded beyond the immediate 
crisis and short-term recovery phases, to ensure that people with ongoing health issues are given the 
support they need. This is particularly important given that, as stated above, symptoms of physical and 
psychological illness may take many months to present: 
 
A couple of weeks later our secretary said: ‘How long will it be before everything gets 
back to normal?’, because we had to apply for some extra funding... I said three or four 
weeks. But, you know, it went on for months, years… I just had no idea of the impact it 
would have and just how long it would all take. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
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I believe that in vulnerable communities where there are very few resources and services, 
what you put in after a disaster needs to be much more ongoing… Part of agencies’ 
funding should be to deliver services to remote areas…  
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
The Internet was suggested as a means for improving the delivery of health services in the 
Wulgulmerang district and other remote areas; however, this would require substantial investments in 
communications infrastructure.  
 
6.3  Finances and livelihoods 
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 1991; 2003) offers a 
useful framework for estimating the socio-economic effects of disasters. It identifies three classes of 
disaster damage and effects. First, direct damage is property damage that occurs with the impact of a 
hazard, including immediate damage to infrastructure, buildings, machinery, equipment and 
agricultural land. Second, indirect damage refers to disruptions to flows of goods and services – which 
may cease to be produced or provided – due to direct damage to productive assets and social and 
economic infrastructure. Indirect damage includes losses of income resulting from reduced 
productivity or demand for goods and services, as well as increased costs to operate or re-establish 
livelihoods. Finally, secondary (or macroeconomic) effects refer to the impacts of direct and indirect 
damage on the performance of the main economic variables of the affected country. Important 
macroeconomic effects of disasters include those that influence: growth in gross domestic product and 
sectoral production; the current account balance; indebtedness and money reserves; and public 
finances and gross investment (ECLAC 2003). The impacts identified by interviewees (reported 
below) constitute direct and indirect damages.8 For example, many farmers lost significant amounts of 
pasture and hay in the fires (direct damage), which meant that they had to buy additional feed or 
reduce livestock numbers (indirect damage). Despite the unprecedented level of damage and 
destruction at the district scale, the disaster was relatively insignificant in macroeconomic terms. The 
impacts of the larger complex of bushfires that burned throughout north-east Victoria and East 
Gippsland in 2003 may be amenable to macroeconomic analysis; however, this is beyond the aims and 
scope of this thesis. 
 
                                                 
8
 Interviewees were asked to list the losses they incurred as a result of the fires, as well as the impacts of these on 
their livelihoods in the longer-term (see Appendix 3.3). 
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6.3.1  Impacts 
Within a context of longstanding drought and declining farm incomes (Chapter 4), the bushfires had a 
range of short and longer-term impacts on people’s finances and livelihoods.9 Table 6.3 presents the 
results of the Department of Primary Industries’ (DPI) initial assessment of agricultural assets that 
were damaged and destroyed by the bushfires (‘direct damage’) in north-eastern Victoria and East 
Gippsland.10 Although incomplete, both in terms of the number of farms assessed and the number of 
assets lost, it provides insight into the types and scale of losses in the Wulgulmerang district. First, it 
should be noted that a larger number of commercial farms were assessed in East Gippsland (136 
compared to 87) but that more hobby farms were assessed in north-eastern Victoria (63 compared to 
40). This reflects the more traditional agricultural economy of East Gippsland and the mixed economy 
of north east Victoria. Despite the firm agricultural base of the Omeo region’s economy, its increasing 
diversification is reflected in the larger number of hobby farms assessed than in the Wulgulmerang 
district (38 compared to 2). A comparison of agricultural losses in Omeo and the Wulgulmerang 
district is appropriate to highlight the scale of damage and destruction in the latter, especially 
considering the media focus on Omeo during and after the fires, which was a common cause of 
discontent among interviewees. 
 
                                                 
9
 Except where interviewees estimated economic losses and costs, these impacts are difficult to quantify. It was 
decided that baseline financial data would not be collected from research participants, due to their reluctance to 
disclose it and to protect their privacy. Instead, data from the 2001 and 2006 Censuses were used, collected at the 
lowest available scale (Census Collection District). Furthermore, most participants were unable to accurately 
quantify these impacts, because they did not keep accurate records of their losses or of the costs of repairing and 
replacing assets. Many are yet to repair or replace all of what was damaged or destroyed, and the fires are 
continuing to have an impact on people’s businesses and livelihoods. Nevertheless, some interviewees offered 
estimates that provide insight into the direct financial costs of the fires and, more importantly, explain how 
(rather than just ‘how much’) the fires have impacted on their livelihoods. 
10
 The ‘Alpine/Gelantipy’ category includes all bushfire-affected parts of the Wulgulmerang district. 
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Table 6.3: Assessment of agricultural losses for North East Victoria and East Gippsland 
NORTH EAST EAST GIPPSLAND Agricultural asset 
category Eldorado Stanley Alpine Alpine/Omeo Alpine/Gelantipy 
Total 
No. of farms 
assessed 
(commercial) 
26 14 47 118 18 223 
No. of farms 
assessed (hobby) 
37 10 16 38 2 103 
Area burnt (ha) 2,640 238 5,150 39,753 9,965 57 746 
Farmhouses burnt 1 1 0 16 6 24 
Farm buildings 
lost 
42 4 8 129 40 223 
Sheep lost 14 0 5 5,835 2,003 7,857 
Beef cattle lost 17 0 180 2,243 675 3,115 
Dairy cattle lost 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Horses lost 0 0 0 7 5 12 
Other stock lost 58 32 42 38 2 172 
Crown boundary 
fencing destroyed 
156 25 175 956 167 1,479 
Internal boundary 
fencing destroyed 
89 23 84 1,225 200 1,621 
Fodder lost 
(square bale 
equivalents) 
11,659 500 1,950 114,075 37,999 
  
166,183 
Source: Department of Primary Industries, cited in Wareing and Flinn (2003) 
 
In each of the agricultural asset categories, losses were proportionally higher in the Wulgulmerang 
district (‘Alpine/Gelantipy’).11 A comparison of losses in the Wulgulmerang district and the Omeo 
region is illustrative: 
 
• For every ten farms that were assessed in the Omeo region, one house was destroyed. In the 
Wulgulmerang district, three of every ten properties lost a house. 
 
• The average area burnt on farms was 498ha, compared to 255ha in the Omeo region. 
 
• An average of two farm buildings were destroyed on each property at Wulgulmerang, 
compared to less than one (.80) at Omeo. 
 
                                                 
11
 These figures are for both commercial and hobby farms. Given the larger number of hobby farms in the Omeo 
region, it is likely that losses of agricultural assets would have been greater on commercial properties. 
Regardless, when the hobby farms are omitted from the calculations for both ‘Alpine/Omeo’ and 
‘Alpine/Gelantipy’, the scale of damage and destruction in the Wulgulmerang district remains significantly 
higher in each asset category. 
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• Stock losses were significantly higher in the Wulgulmerang district, with nearly three times as 
many sheep (an average of 100 compared to 37) and more than twice as many cattle (34 
compared to 14) killed on each property than at Omeo. 
 
• Farmers lost an average of 18km of farm fences in Wulgulmerang, compared to 13km in 
Omeo. 
 
• The amount of fodder lost per farm averaged 1900 square bale equivalents, compared to 731 
at Omeo. 
 
These figures testify to the scale of destruction at Wulgulmerang and the severity of the financial and 
livelihood impacts of the fires on agricultural landholders. 
 
Residents and landholders reported a range of financial and livelihood impacts arising from the fires, 
including direct and indirect damage, most of which related to their farm businesses. At Black 
Mountain, two graziers estimated the financial cost of losing more than 300 cattle at between 
$150,000 and $200,000. These were mostly young cows that would have increased in value 
[Informants 19 and 20]. A specially convened calf sale was held at the East Gippsland Livestock 
exchange in Bairnsdale on February 19, 2003. Of the 2200 cattle offered for sale, 1900 sold. Heavier 
steer calves sold for up to $1.60/kg liveweight, while those weighing between 280kg and 300kg sold 
for up to $1.80/kg. A livestock manager from Elders VP Bairnsdale, a local agribusiness, observed 
that, ‘There were some magnificent drafts of cattle, which was surprising considering a lot of them had 
been run on burnt country’ (cited in Mitchell 2003, 19). Despite receiving reasonable prices, he 
considered that ‘… some producers were probably a little disappointed that they couldn’t hang on to 
their cattle for a bit longer’, to maximise their returns (cited in Mitchell 2003, 19). 
 
Drought, and the large amount of fodder destroyed by the fires, meant that many graziers had very 
little pasture or hay with which to feed their stock. The manager of a 1400ha cattle farm estimated that 
85 percent of the property was burnt in the fires [Rory, Wulgulmerang]. Others claimed to have lost 
even more. Consequently, some graziers were faced with the decision of whether to reduce their herds 
and flocks, or accept the additional expense of agisting or purchasing hay to feed stock. This dilemma 
became apparent during a discussion with two graziers, Maureen and Joe, at Wulgulmerang. They 
explained why, like others, they took on the financial cost of ‘feeding through’ the lack of pasture: 
 
You’ve got a choice: 250 head of stock – do you try to feed them through, or do you just 
sell the whole lot and start again…? 
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… And get a pittance for them… [when] you’ve built your herd up, you’ve got your stock 
and you know what you’re breeding. Then you have to buy [new stock]. You never buy 
tops from anybody, because they keep them for themselves. They even keep their seconds, 
so if you want to buy stock, you’ll buy the third grade stock […] and you’ve gotta try and 
build your herd up again with these cast-offs. So when you’ve got a good herd, and you 
know its breeding, you hang on to it and you feed through. 
– Joe and Maureen (respectively), Wulgulmerang 
 
The prevailing drought conditions throughout Australia at the time (see Figure 5.1) meant that hay 
supplies were limited and prices high. The Weekly Times (Author unknown 2003) reported that for the 
week ending February 12, pasture hay traded in the Gippsland town of Sale for between $220 and 
$280 per tonne.12 Lucerne hay sold for between $300 and $480 per tonne, depending on quality. 
Maureen and Joe elected to buy hay from Western Australia at $180 per roll ($55, plus $125 freight), 
at an estimated total cost of $60,000 for the year. Those who chose to agist their stock in areas 
unaffected by the fires also faced large upfront costs. Over a five-month period, one farming business 
spent in excess of $50,000 to graze around 500 cattle at Bega on the south coast of New South Wales 
and at Glenthompson in Western Victoria ($5 per head, per week, plus freight):  
 
It’s certainly another economic impact. And you’ve got to have some sort of cash reserve 
or cash flow to support that kind of an outlay, which I’m sure made it hard for a lot of 
people.  
– Dan, Black Mountain 
 
Damage to and destruction of fences was another major economic impact on farmers, particularly as 
many had little or no insurance (Chapter 5). An immediate concern was to re-establish boundary 
fences to contain stock; however, few people had the resources to do this. Consequently, donated 
materials and volunteer labour were crucial to these efforts. The task of re-fencing vast agricultural 
properties, including internal fences, had been an ongoing and costly process. Three years on from the 
fires, some farmers were still fencing fire-damaged parts of their properties: 
 
We sent about 500 head of cattle away on agistment, because we’d run out of hay. And 
during that time we tried to get some parts of the place decently fenced. We knew we 
didn’t have the finances to go out and fence the whole place – which no one would have – 
                                                 
12
 The Weekly Times newspaper, which circulates throughout Victoria, claims to represent ‘the voice of the 
country’. Its focus is on rural issues, particularly the politics and economics of agriculture and land management. 
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so it was just [a case of] isolating areas and working from there. And we’re just about to 
do another three weeks of fencing, coming up next week. 
– Dan, Black Mountain 
 
I just did the last fence about four months ago [late 2005], the last bit of boundary fence. 
All the internal fences have still to be done yet. I patched them up to hold stock, but it’s 
all got to be done. It’s a big job. I worked out [we lost] $350,000 worth of fence. Only a 
little bit was covered by insurance. Should’ve insured the lot if I knew that was going to 
happen. 
– Rory, Wulgulmerang 
 
We had fences insured to the value of $50,000, when in actual fact we lost $450,000 
worth of fence. I’ve never taken the time to think what the fencing was worth […]. 70km 
was fire affected. It wasn’t all flat on the ground. We’ve resurrected a lot of it. A lot of it 
will have to be replaced well before the end of its normal life. The posts are burnt and 
there are rusty wires that are breaking all the time. 
– Alan, Wulgulmerang 
 
The financial costs of buying hay, agistment and fencing materials were eased by donations and 
volunteer labour from individuals and organisations such as the Lions Club, Rotary and the Victorian 
Farmers Federation (VFF) (see 6.3.2). 
 
The productive capacities of many businesses were also reduced by the fires. Months were spent 
clearing properties of debris and replacing and repairing livelihood assets before many businesses 
began to operate. A lack of pasture, hay and fences reduced the carrying capacity of many farms, with 
graziers commonly reporting reduced incomes as a direct result of running fewer cattle and/or sheep. 
By January 2006, some farmers were still down 25 percent on the number of animals they would 
usually run.13 However, the fires have impacted on people’s livelihoods in less obvious ways. At 
Black Mountain, Sarah observed some unexpected impacts on the health of her cattle: 
 
We found that when a fire goes through, any livestock health issue that you’ve got 
escalates. So any metabolic disease that’s present will probably be worse because you get 
the potassium in the system from all the ash that’s around, and that inhibits the uptake of 
other trace elements and all of a sudden you’ve got diseases happening and their immune 
systems are weaker. Their immune systems were absolutely shattered. It mainly affected 
                                                 
13
 Informants 1, 16, 19 and 20. 
 181 
calves that were being born. They’d get to about two weeks of age and die from a variety 
of things like pneumonia or ulcers. 
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
 
Similarly, another farmer spoke of the problems caused by the lack of internal fencing on his family’s 
cattle farm at Wulgulmerang: 
 
Bulls were with cows, so we ended up having lots of these young heifers that shouldn’t 
have been joined. By the time we got our shit together and we got a few fences up, we 
were too busy doing other things, but we should’ve aborted all these heifers that we 
didn’t realise would be in calf. And later on, when they did end up calving, we lost 
probably 40 or so of them because they were just too small to calve. 
– Leigh, Wulgulmerang 
 
For another Wulgulmerang grazier, the fires didn’t just reduce the profitability of his livelihood, they 
changed it entirely. George had always farmed Hereford cattle and considered himself a ‘Hereford 
man’. While just nine of his 70 cows survived the fires, it was the destruction of his stockyards that 
ultimately triggered his livelihood change. He explained that after the fires: 
 
The company said they’d reduce the price by fifteen percent for anyone who had their 
yards burnt in the fire. So I thought, ‘I’ll apply for that’, and I wish I hadn’t done now, 
but anyway I have. I got them, and I call them ‘dirty cow yards’ because if you’ve got a 
couple of big Hereford cows in there they’ll just knock ‘em to pieces. What I’ve got there 
are a lot of Jersey cross cows, which are good vealer mothers, but I’m not in the right 
country to breed vealers. […] When a vealer’s ready to go it’s more or less a perishable 
product, [but] you’re that far away from town that you’ve got to rely on when the truck is 
going… Well, if your vealers are ready today, this week, and the truck’s not going for a 
month you can’t afford to send two cattle down to Bairnsdale at four hundred dollars a 
trip. That’s two hundred dollars a vealer. By the time you sell it, you’ve really got 
nothing left. This is one of the problems up here.  
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
Since the fires, then, George has faced increased financial risks and a significantly less secure 
livelihood. 
 
Although cattle and sheep farming are the dominant livelihood strategies in the district, a small 
number of people earn their living from other industries that were negatively affected by the fires. 
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Tourism declined significantly after the fires due to the aesthetic of the burnt landscape and damaged 
infrastructure at popular tourist spots, such as the burnt viewing platform at Little River Gorge. A local 
tourism business, which provides part-time employment for a number of local people, and the Seldom 
Seen Service Station suffered as a result of the reduced tourist flow. A local furniture maker lost his 20 
year collection of local hardwood in the fires. At Suggan Buggan, fires razed a stone fruit and nut 
orchard. In addition to the trees and irrigation piping that were destroyed, the orchard owner has 
endured decreased yields of lower quality fruit: 
 
I haven’t sold fruit of any consequence in three years. It’s still small this year. So yeah, 
hopefully next year it will be right and I’ll be able to be back into production, because my 
markets are fairly exclusive markets, being tree-ripened and naturally-grown… It all 
goes to hotels and restaurants, so it’s got to be right. It’s no good sending little ones. And 
the flavour’s still not quite right. 
– Steve, Suggan Buggan 
 
6.3.2  Coping and adaptive strategies 
Insurance 
Insurance is the most straightforward way to recover losses from the impact of bushfires and other 
environmental hazards. It was revealed in Chapter 5 that many residents and landholders were 
significantly underinsured for the fires. While the vast majority of residents had their homes and 
contents insured, most commercial landholders had only partial coverage for their livelihood assets. 
Many farmers, for example, had little or no insurance for their livestock and fences. Also noted in 
Chapter 5, some people were underinsured due to the high cost of premiums or because they had 
forgotten to reinsure. Others discovered the extent of their underinsurance when the time came to 
make a claim. A number of farmers found that they were underinsured as a result of inflation, the 
Goods and Services Tax (GST) or because they had not accurately valued their assets. For example, 
Alan’s family had the fences of their 500ha cattle and sheep farm insured to $50,000, but estimated the 
cost of replacing the fences at almost ten times that much (approx. $450,000). Similarly, the insurance 
payout Valerie and Bernie received was not enough to cover the cost of replacing their woolshed and 
shearing equipment, which was subsequently subject to the Goods and Services Tax (GST). George, 
who rebuilt his home after the fires, claimed that his underinsurance was a direct consequence of 
inflation, which had increased the cost of rebuilding: 
 
Everyone was underinsured. I know the first thing the agent said to me when I told him 
what happened was: ‘Well, you’re underinsured – you know that?’ Well, we had the 
drought and inflation going every year. I s’pose this house cost me 100,000 to build, but 
even with deterioration, inflation will make it worth 110,000 next year. If the house 
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burned down tomorrow, I’d get that money, but it wouldn’t be enough to rebuild. And 
that’s what happened.  
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
The shift to larger agricultural holdings, partly a result of drought and the economic decline of 
agriculture, has further reduced the affordability of insurance for livelihood assets. With a greater 
share of income being invested back into farm businesses and debt repayments, many farmers found 
themselves in situations where they had an increased asset base – including more kilometres of fence 
and more sheds, livestock and pasture – but fewer financial resources to insure them. Furthermore, the 
rising cost of insurance premiums had added to the financial pressures on farmers and exacerbated the 
underinsurance problem:  
 
Yes, we were insured, and I might add that the insurance company was incredibly good 
after the fires and paid everything up. But since then the premiums have gone up quite a 
lot and we’ve had to change our insurance around a bit, insuring some things for more 
and some things for less. 
– Alan, Wulgulmerang  
 
The ultimate consequence of the widespread underinsurance has been that many people have had to 
take out loans to repair and replace damaged livelihood assets, thus placing even greater financial 
pressure on businesses and households.  
 
Government assistance 
In addition to counselling and other health services, local and State government offered financial 
assistance to help those affected. Under the Australian Constitution, responsibility for disaster relief 
falls primarily on the government of the affected State or Territory. Consequently, the State 
Government of Victoria provided the majority of disaster relief to affected households and businesses, 
including:14 
  
• Personal hardship and distress payments to buy emergency food and clothing, or to pay for 
accommodation, essential housing repairs and replace essential household goods. 
• Low interest loans to farmers, small businesses and voluntary organisations to replace 
damaged assets; 
• Payments to restore or replace essential public assets; 
• Payments for financial and psychological counselling. 
                                                 
14
 By declaring a ‘natural disaster’, the Victorian government was able to receive partial reimbursement for 
disaster relief from the Commonwealth government. 
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People who had lost their principal place of residence were entitled to apply for three types of 
assistance, totalling a maximum of $22,800. These included: 
 
• An ‘Initial emergency’ grant of up to $900 per household ($360 per adult and $180 per child), 
available in the first 72 hours to cover costs such as accommodation, food and clothing; and 
 
• A ‘Temporary living expenses’ grant of up to $7,300 over a six month period to cover the 
costs of temporary accommodation while the principal place of residence is being rebuilt. 
 
• A ‘Two-part re-establishment’ grant totalling $14,600, consisting of two grants of up to 
$7,300 to contribute to the costs of (1) structural repairs and (2) replacement of essential 
household contents such as furniture, whitegoods and other appliances. 
 
An overview State government’s response to the bushfires, including initiatives and funding for 
community, economic and environmental recovery, is provided by the Ministerial Taskforce on 
Bushfire Recovery (2003). 
 
Interviews revealed that the formal procedures for accessing government assistance discouraged some 
people from applying.15 It is notable that women often took responsibility for seeking information as 
to the types of government assistance that were available, negotiating with officials, completing 
necessary paperwork and dealing with insurance companies.16 Many of these women were or had 
previously been employed in professions that require these skills, included business administration, 
nursing and teaching. Others were or had previously been active as Presidents or Secretaries of various 
local organisations, such as the local fire brigade or VFF branch, and were highly capable of 
performing these tasks. While some people, particularly men, were discouraged from applying for 
government assistance by the seemingly endless questions and paperwork, most were eventually 
persuaded to do so and were helped through the process by relatives, friends or others in the district. 
George, who lost his home in the fires, explained: 
 
The government made a big announcement that we get twenty-something thousand for 
anyone that lost a house. Well, I finished up getting – I forget how much it was – about 
three thousand or something like that, or five thousand… I wasn’t going to do it, actually. 
But a friend of mine said she’d fill in all the forms. I said: ‘I can’t be bothered doing all 
those stupid forms…’ You’ve only got to contradict yourself once – you might say the 
fridge was worth $30 and the next time you might say $60 – and you’ll be up the pole 
                                                 
15
 Informants 3, 4, 9, 11, 12 and 14.   
16
 Informants 3, 13, 19, 31, 33 and 35. 
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[laughs]! So anyway, she said: ‘Well, I’ll do it’, which was very kind of her, and she did 
all the paperwork. 
– George, Wulgulmerang 
 
Kelvin also received some financial assistance from the government after losing his home. Like 
George, he was dissatisfied with the amount he received, but was grateful for the help he got in filing 
his application: 
 
After a lot of paperwork and a lot of messing around and telling them all the ins-and-outs 
of everything they gave me… not very much money at all. I didn’t have insurance. The 
Shire put on a bloke, I’m not sure what title they have him [Community Development 
Officer], but he’s been terrific in helping us apply for whatever was available. 
– Kelvin, Seldom Seen 
 
Local people’s unfamiliarity with bureaucratic processes was a recurrent theme in the interviews. The 
Gelantipy Bush Nurse recalled the frustration people experienced in dealing with government 
authorities after the fires:  
 
That was one thing that really got to people after a while, just answering the same 
questions over and over and over again. It was unbelievable the number of times they had 
to repeat themselves. People just go: ‘I don’t care. I just don’t want to have to fill in 
another form, to go through another process’, because they were just so stressed by all 
that. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
 
Local people’s distrust of authorities was also cited as a reason why some people were reluctant to 
apply for government assistance. Joe and Maureen, for example, spoke at length about the Victorian 
government’s management of the OJD outbreak in the late 1990s. They were scarred by their 
experience of being forced to destroy their flocks of sheep, which they believed was unnecessary, and 
the inadequate compensation they received from the government. Thus with regard to the bushfires, 
Joe noted that: 
 
Everything the government offered, there was this much [gestures] paperwork and strings 
attached. If you accepted something from the government, then you had to allow the DPI 
people free run of your property to find out what was going on and all the rest. 
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
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George and Kelvin, both of whom lost their homes in the fires, were unaware that the ‘Temporary 
living expenses’ and ‘Two-part re-establishment’ grants, totalling $7,300 and $14,600, respectively, 
were subject to an income (or means) test (Ministerial Taskforce on Bushfire Recovery 2003). For 
many local people, the fact that those who lost their homes did not receive the full amount was taken 
as further evidence of their marginality to government. Cynicism about the ALP State government was 
summed up by Reg:17 
 
The Commonwealth government and volunteer groups and various organisations were all 
very, very generous… all bar the Bracks’ government – they were mean as hell and they 
still are. They’re not worried about country people, because we don’t vote for them. It 
might have been different if it happened this year, coming up to an election.   
– Reg, Black Mountain 
 
Despite all this, most of those who were directly affected by the fires did apply for and receive some 
form of government assistance [Community Development Officer, East Gippsland Shire]. The 
appropriateness of means-testing as a mechanism for allocating disaster relief funds to farmers is 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Donated goods and volunteer labour 
After the fires, an influx of donated goods and volunteer labour helped to alleviate some of the 
financial and livelihood impacts of the fires. This support came from a range of sources, including: 
local and non-local social networks; charities and other organisations (e.g. the Country Women’s 
Association, churches and sporting clubs); local businesses (e.g. bakeries and stock agents); and 
private citizens. Donations of food were particularly important in the days after the fires as they 
enabled those who had been burnt-out to concentrate on tasks such as clearing properties of debris and 
disposing of dead stock: ‘The fresh vegies and stuff meant that we didn’t have to drive anywhere to 
get any groceries, so we could just keep on working’ [Sarah, Black Mountain]. Food and other 
essentials were provided by businesses from nearby towns such as Buchan and Bruthen, but also from 
residents of the district who had not been affected by the fires. Donations of domestic goods flowed 
into the district from countless organisations and private citizens for months after the fires. A retiree 
from Bairnsdale, for instance, volunteered to coordinate donations of goods after hearing about the 
bushfires on the radio [Informant 49]. For six months, she distributed goods such as clothing, linen, 
furniture and whitegoods to people in the Wulgulmerang district and other areas that had been affected 
by the fires. Some residents even received cash donations. 
                                                 
17
 The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has traditionally been associated with (moderately) progressive and urban 
politics. As noted in Chapter 4, the Wulgulmerang district shares with many rural areas a strong tradition of 
conservative politics. 
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The amount of volunteer help, as far as groups, clubs and churches and that type of thing 
was concerned, was unreal. The amount of help and finance and goods and materials that 
they pumped into the district… I wouldn’t know how much there was, but there really was 
a hell of a lot. They really did a terrific job. 
– Fred, Gelantipy  
 
Farmers who suffered losses in the fires also received donations of materials, such as fence posts and 
wire, and volunteer labour to help re-establish their livelihoods. The Bruthen and Lakes Entrance 
Lions Clubs, for instance, helped to ‘clean up’ 15 properties, including 20 damaged farm buildings, 
between Seldom Seen and Suggan Buggan. They also created packages of fencing materials that 
farmers could buy at a third of the price, since many were reluctant to accept them for free [President, 
Lakes Entrance Lions Club]. These and other organisations also volunteered an enormous amount of 
labour to help residents and landholders re-establish fences. 
 
I think it was Rotary that took on the task of giving everyone a boundary fence. That was 
just wonderful .These fellows got themselves organised, got to work, and they put up 
miles and miles of boundary fence and the crew went around every property. The 
subdivisions weren’t perfect, but at least you had a boundary fence round the outside.  
– Joe, Wulgulmerang 
 
For months after the fires, donated hay was trucked in to help graziers feed their surviving stock. The 
majority of this was donated by organisations and individuals associated with the agricultural sector, 
such as the Victorian Farmers Federation (VFF) and local stock agents. However, hay and other 
materials were also donated by CFA brigades that were in the area at the time of the fires. 
 
The Lions Club and the Rotary and the CFA, particularly that Mt Taylor CFA, just did an 
enormous job – just amazing. And the Drouin CFA, they sent a hell of a lot of fodder up 
here, truckloads of fencing material and stuff. Most of it ended up around Wulgulmerang 
and Black Mountain. 
– Dennis, Gelantipy 
 
There were an awful lot of organisations and volunteers coming and helping up the road 
and that sort of thing. We didn’t see that much of them here, but up that end 
[Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain] they did. There was hay by the mile and people that 
got burnt-out were collecting it and feeding their cattle on it for six months or so. 
– Percy, Gelantipy 
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Residents and landholders unanimously praised the organisations and individuals who donated goods 
and volunteered labour to relieve the impacts of the fires and begin the recovery process. Alan, for 
example, questioned whether his family would have been able to re-establish their sheep and cattle 
farm without this support: 
 
We received help from Lions, Rotary, fire brigades… One bloke, he took two months off 
and just went to everyone’s place for a week. All we had to do was put him up and he 
worked… People sent anonymous cheques, you couldn’t trace them. They just turned 
up… We were donated a lot of agistment. I dare say we wouldn’t be here if we hadn’t 
received that help.  
– Alan, Wulgulmerang 
 
As was the case with health services provided after the fires (see 6.2.2), those involved in the 
allocation and distribution of donated goods and volunteer labour noted that it was difficult to get 
some people, particularly farmers, to accept the help that was offered.18 The following explanation of 
farmers’ reluctance to accept charity was representative of the attitudes of interviewees:  
 
As a rule, we don’t take from anybody. You’ll find farmers are pretty… we don’t accept 
charity gracefully… No, you don’t accept charity, full stop. If somebody does something, 
you pay them for it. That’s how farmers normally operate. But by gees, we learned the 
hard way: you accept charity very gracefully; you eat humble, by gees. 
– Maureen, Wulgulmerang 
 
Similarly, another interviewee explained that graziers’ sense of pride meant that they were reluctant to 
accept help.  
 
They were some of the wealthiest landholders in East Gippsland. I think that makes it 
hard for them to accept any help. It’s a very class-conscious place, the bush. And the 
wealthy graziers, they’re at the top of the tree. They’re very, very proud. And they’re used 
to being the ones that other people would go to for assistance. 
– Kerry, Bairnsdale 
 
Most people eventually sought help to cope with the financial and livelihood impacts of the fires. 
However, a Community Development Officer with the East Gippsland Shire Council maintained that 
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 Informants 19, 20, 46, 47, 48 and 49. 
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people were ‘too honest’ and tended to underestimate their ‘fair share’ [Informant 46]. Consequently, 
many of those who were affected did not take full advantage of the help that was available.  
 
Commodity prices and off-farm income 
A number of graziers noted that cattle prices had been high since the fires and that this had helped 
them to re-establish their livelihoods and begin to recover.19 A Gelantipy grazier who lost fences and 
some of his pasture in the fires explained that cattle prices: 
 
… have been exceptionally good ever since and, well, before they’d been extra good. It 
probably would’ve been a lot worse if the prices hadn’t been good, because we wouldn’t 
have had the money to keep doing the fences. Normally you get the dry period, the 
drought, and all the prices drop ‘cause there’s a glut of cattle. But that didn’t happen this 
year. 
– Mick, Gelantipy 
 
Barney, an absentee landholder with a large cattle farm at Wulgulmerang, explained that the lack of 
pasture – a result of both drought and the fires – had forced him to reduce the size of his herd. High 
prices, however, had reduced the financial impact of having to run fewer cattle: 
 
It’s just another droughty year, and we’re getting used to them actually [laughs]. But it 
does appear that we’re just gonna have to run less stock. But luckily the stock are worth 
twice as much as they used to be. See, we used to run 300 breeders on the 1100 acres up 
there, and now I’m planning to run 180-200. It seems with the seasons evolving the way 
they are, that might be as much as I can carry. But luckily the cattle have doubled in 
value, so financially we’re going okay. 
– Barney, Wulgulmerang 
 
Of course, all agriculturalists are exposed to environmental and market variability. Graziers are 
acutely aware that the drought could worsen and cattle prices could plummet.   
 
The last few years have been exceptional because of commodity prices. Beef’s been worth 
a fair bit. Ah, it’s farming… It’s cyclical. In five years it’ll be a big drought and beef will 
be worth a dollar a kilo. Yeah, it’ll come ‘round again. You’ve just got to prepare for it: 
put away money or invest elsewhere – off-farm income.  
– Dan, Black Mountain 
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 Informants 4, 10, 18, 20 and 37. 
 190 
Indeed, many residents and landholders have diversified their livelihood strategies to supplement their 
primary income. As noted in Chapter 4, two-thirds of the households where agriculture was the 
primary livelihood strategy had at least one person engaged in off-farm employment on a casual or 
part-time basis.20 Off-farm employment for local men included jobs such as truck driving, dog 
trapping (with the DSE) and working on absentee landholders’ properties. Some women farmers had 
taken additional employment as nurses, teachers and at a farm-stay and adventure camp in Gelantipy, 
which is the largest employer in the district. Maureen, a Wulgulmerang grazier, was unable to find 
work locally, so took a seasonal job at the snowfields in southern New South Wales: 
 
I’d been working up in Thredbo – we were going through a drought. All my money I was 
sending home for Joe to pay the bills. I came home and I wanted a job, even if I was on a 
‘Job Search’ or ‘Job Start’ or something, to try and help us through. 
– Maureen, Wulgulmerang 
 
It is important to emphasise that declining farm incomes and longstanding drought, rather than the 
January 30 fires, are the main reasons why people have sought off-farm employment. Indeed, most of 
those who were engaged in off-farm employment did so prior to the 2003 fires. Nevertheless, due to 
the diminished productive capacity and reduced income of most agricultural businesses since the fires, 
alternative sources of income have been an important driver of recovery. By compensating for lost 
income, off-farm employment has helped people to satisfy basic household needs and to cover some of 
the upfront costs, such as re-fencing and buying hay to feed stock. Nevertheless, households have 
absorbed some of the costs arising from drought and the fires, including those of reduced business 
productivity and increased debt. Common adaptive strategies included reducing wages taken from the 
business, utilising personal savings and restricting expenditure on household items and non-essentials, 
such as foodstuffs and leisure activities. 
 
6.4  Social and community life 
6.4.1  Social cohesion 
As was noted in Chapter 4, the people of the Wulgulmerang district are imbued with a strong sense of 
independence and self-reliance. Despite an element of social division between some people in the 
north and south of the district, there remains a definite sense of community throughout. Despite their 
heterogeneity, people’s shared isolation and alliances around local issues and challenges means that 
they generally consider themselves to be part of ‘the’ local community. Like all communities, 
however, people do not always agree or get along. Community life prior to the January 30 bushfires 
was marked by longstanding social divisions between certain families and individuals but more 
generally between people in the top and bottom ends of the district. Consequently, the most significant 
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social impact of the fires was the initial breakdown of these divisions as people worked cooperatively 
to recover from the disaster. A resident described the sense of caring and goodwill that ensued, which 
helped people to get through ‘… those first terrible days’: 
 
Before the fires there were divisions; long-standing generational things – ‘this family 
doesn’t talk to that family’ and that sort of stuff. And then when the fires came through, 
everyone came together and even though it was terrible and everyone had lost shocking 
numbers of stock and everything, there was an incredible feeling of everyone working 
together and caring about each other. And people who hadn’t talked for years, suddenly 
they’re best friends! It was just this most incredible feeling of goodwill and caring about 
each other. And I think that was something that got people through those first terrible 
days, the feeling that ‘Yep, people really do care about me’. That lasted for a while, and 
there was this huge in-pouring of stuff being donated and people were feeling like ‘We 
are being recognised’. 
– Anne, Gelantipy 
In similar fashion, another resident observed: 
 
Interestingly enough, straight after the fire we had people talking on the radio that hadn’t 
spoken for years. So it sort of broke down those barriers initially – they’re back in place 
now – but for a few months we were all working together as a community, but actually we 
were still only working on our own properties, working individually. Like, we wouldn’t go 
work with a neighbour or anything, because we all had too much to do on our own. But 
we were certainly getting together as a community more often. We had a whole lot of 
meetings and that just to talk about how things were going. And even now we probably do 
it more so than what we were prior to the fire. 
– Dan, Black Mountain 
 
Shared experience, a spirit of altruism and the need to work cooperatively to allocate and distribute 
donated goods and volunteered labour all figured in this newfound sense of social cohesion. 
Immediately after the fires, most residents and landholders began to visit or radio their relatives, 
friends and neighbours to ensure they were safe. Those with four-wheel drive vehicles and chainsaws 
were able to clear the roads of fallen trees and debris, while others, having lost telephone connection, 
were reliant on UHF radios for communication. ‘Almost everyone was checking on their immediate 
neighbours, and would then go back and see what they could do in the aftermath’ [Kelvin, Seldom 
Seen]. The vast majority of people interviewed noted that people worked cooperatively after the fires. 
Mick, a grazier from Gelantipy, stated that: 
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I think overall they worked well together, particularly the people who actually got burnt 
out. The others, some of them supplied a bit of hay, helped out with fencing and that sort 
of thing. Apart from one or two, I’d say the district has really pulled together. For sure, 
there’s always the odd one who doesn’t for some reason. 
– Mick, Gelantipy 
 
This social cohesion was strengthened by a series of social events that were held after the fires. These 
included impromptu get-togethers immediately after, where people shared their experiences of the 
fires over a few drinks, as well as more organised events such as the ‘Great Balls of Fire’ night, which 
was catered for by the Lakes Entrance Lions Club. An organiser of the latter event noted that: 
 
It was a free night for everybody and it was a fantastic night. It got them all out, but 
we’ve never really sort of gone on with it. We’ve all been too busy. We all do our own 
thing, I suppose. 
– Ellen, Gelantipy 
 
Another active community member agreed that these events were an important distraction for those 
who had been burnt out, but complained that they were difficult to organise due to the diminished 
population [Fred, Gelantipy]. 
 
Meetings to organise the allocation and distribution of donated goods and volunteer labour and to have 
their plight heard by politicians and journalists also provided opportunities for social interaction.21 
Gary, of Seldom Seen, explained that ‘It’s been a bonding thing. It has broken down some barriers, 
[through] shared experience and a shared animosity too’. This animosity has largely been directed at 
fire and land management authorities, particularly the CFA and DSE, which held a number of public 
meetings after the fires. While these were good opportunities for people to get together and discuss 
their experiences, some local people felt that they created more trouble. For example, one volunteer 
with the Gelantipy CFA, himself critical of some aspects of the CFA’s strategic and tactical response 
to the fires, believed that ‘… the biggest hassles have been these odd meetings they’ve had to calm 
things down. I’m sure they’ve made things worse’ [Anon.]. Indeed, while these meetings provided 
opportunities for social interaction, any benefits in terms of greater cohesion and solidarity among 
local people may have been overridden by their effect of perpetuating anger and frustration at the State 
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 A number of politicians, including the Independent MP for Gippsland East, Craig Ingram, and the National 
Party MP for Gippsland Province, Peter Hall, visited the Wulgulmerang district soon after the fires. Claire 
Miller, an environment reporter with The Age newspaper, also visited the district to meet a group of locals and 
subsequently reported on their plight (Miller 2003). 
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Government and its departments’ responses to the fires. Nevertheless, the fires and their aftermath 
provided rare opportunities for wider social interaction:   
  
The various inquests and talk-sessions afterwards just had them physically in the same 
place… Again, it’s usually social events or particular interests that are going to bring 
any group together. Think of how hard it would be to get all the people in one suburb in 
one area. You’ve got diverse interests, so it’s really difficult. It takes a major event to get 
everybody to have the same interest, and that’s what the fire did. 
– Gary, Seldom Seen 
 
We met quite a lot for various things, various meetings after the fires. Everybody had a 
similar experience and similar opinions on lots of things. But now it’s gone back to just 
the social events. You can still talk to them, but you don’t have a reason to half the time. 
And they’re the same. Everybody’s busy doing their own thing. 
– Steve, Suggan Buggan 
 
Again, it is important to acknowledge the assistance offered by local people, both in terms of donated 
goods and volunteer labour, to those who were severely affected by the fires. As noted, interviewees 
tended to focus on the contributions of those outside the district, since these were far greater in 
number. However, the efforts of local people were materially and symbolically significant, particularly 
given the longstanding tensions between the top and bottom ends of the district (and the fact that 
Gelantipy had not been burnt out). A number of families from Gelantipy donated food, hay and other 
goods and volunteered to help with tasks such as removing dead stock, clearing roads, and re-
fencing.22 It is also important to acknowledge those who, although severely affected by the fires, took 
on additional roles and responsibilities for the greater good of the community, such as those who 
volunteered to organise the allocation and distribution of donated goods and volunteer labour: 
 
It certainly did [cause stress]. And I didn’t mind doing it, because I knew that if we had 
some sort of problem – which we never had, really – where someone was worried about 
us giving a friend more fencing or whatever… we thought: ‘Well, we’ll be gone from the 
district’, because we’re going to move, obviously, for [our child] to start school and 
those sorts of things. We thought it would be better for us to do it than someone who 
would be here forever, and for those divides to go on for the next 50 years. 
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
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6.4.2  Social exclusion and division 
The increased social cohesion that followed the fires was neither all-encompassing nor lasting. Despite 
agreement among most interviewees that people had worked together in a spirit of cooperation and 
goodwill immediately after the fires, a small number of people felt that the communal response was 
socially exclusive and divisive. A couple at Wulgulmerang, for example, had not considered 
themselves part of the local community because they were not farmers and only lived at their home on 
a part-time basis. Consequently, they did not expect to receive help from their neighbours: 
 
I guess, in a way, because we’ve always been outsiders in the community, we expect to 
have to deal with things on our own. We’ve really been separated from the community up 
there because we’re really only there on the weekends and we don’t really see a lot of 
them. So they kind of forget that we’re there. I saw some people a few months later and 
they said, ‘Oh, were you there during the fires? I didn’t even think of you being there’. 
– Jane, Wulgulmerang 
 
There also appears to have been some conflict over the allocation of donated goods and volunteer 
labour. Many graziers were in urgent need of hay after the fires to feed their stock. A Wulgulmerang 
grazier explained that there were no rules to govern the allocation of hay, insisting that ‘… people just 
used what they had to. No one got more than their share. It worked really well’ [Alan, Wulgulmerang]. 
This view was supported by a grazier from Gelantipy who, although only minimally affected by the 
fires, observed a high level of cooperation among people at the top end of the district, who were 
allocating and trading materials based on individual need [Percy, Gelantipy]. Sarah, who volunteered 
to manage the allocation of donated goods and volunteer labour explained: 
 
I’d also done event coordination and that kind of thing, so I knew a little bit of what to 
do. So yeah, it worked out really well in this area, because I was open with everything. 
Everyone knew what everyone else was getting. We kept a hay book in each of the 
tractors that were at each of the hay dumps, so anyone could look it up and see how much 
hay everyone else was getting. There was no secrecy about anything, and that worked 
really well. And everyone else sort of knew, roughly, the figures of what everyone else 
had lost. And I mean, there were a few people who had problems with the assistance that 
was going around, but mainly they were people who hadn’t lost very much. 
– Sarah, Black Mountain 
 
Nevertheless, the conflict over the allocation of donated hay is evidence that many were unhappy with 
the process. The manager of an absentee landholder’s farm property recalled that: 
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Some started arguing and fighting and carrying on, especially over hay and that. 
Everybody wanted more. They didn’t want us to have any… A few of them got in control 
of the hay and reckoned it was their’s and nobody else’s. That started a few arguments. 
– Anon. 
 
Another put it more bluntly, alleging that particular people had deliberately distorted the system, for 
instance, by re-directing trucks that were delivering donated hay: 
 
Everybody’s saying everybody pulled together and did marvellous things, but I know 
what happened and I’m not impressed, because a lot of self-service went on. And you 
can’t say anything, you can’t say a name. But you live with it and it’s a bit heartbreaking, 
actually, when you know some people have had it really tough and some people have 
really looked after themselves. 
– Anon. 
 
Although these allegations remain unsubstantiated, they raise questions about the process and fairness 
of the informal, needs-based system that was developed to allocate donated goods. Clearly, there is 
potential for conflict where those who are personally affected by a disaster are involved in the process 
of assessing others’ needs and are making decisions about the allocation of resources.  
 
Some informants also claimed that people from outside of the district (south of Gelantipy) had 
received donated goods and other assistance under false pretences. A number of incidents raised the 
ire of locals, including cases where people who hadn’t been burnt-out received donated hay and cases 
where residents of areas not directly affected by the fires had received financial assistance offered as 
part of the Victorian State Government’s bushfire relief and recovery programs.23 
 
As is suggested in a number of passages above, the social divisions that existed prior to the bushfires 
gradually became re-established after an initial period of cohesion. One resident suggested that such 
cohesion ‘… is pretty normal in the case of emergencies, particularly in country areas. You’ll find 
people pulling together a lot more and friends and relations come and help’ [Fred, Gelantipy]. 
However, as the passages above also suggest, this cohesion was not all-inclusive. Many residents and 
landholders spoke of sharpened social divisions between the northern and southern ends of the district, 
both immediately after the fires and in the longer-term. Again, the contentious issue of firefighting 
support appears to have been a major driver of this ill-feeling. According to a resident of Gelantipy: 
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… There was [a split], because the top thought the bottom was getting all the help, which 
we weren’t… We just let them know that we didn’t get any help, and they realised that we 
were in a situation ourselves. 
– Ellen, Gelantipy 
 
Nevertheless, some people’s experiences of the fires continue to influence their relationships with 
others in the district. This became evident in an interview with a resident of Wulgulmerang, conducted 
almost three years after the fires: 
 
My personal opinion is that afterwards – and I don’t know whether it was through guilt 
or what, because they weren’t affected like us – some people from Gelantipy tried to 
make out that we were crying over spilt milk, particularly as all the fire trucks were down 
there when it came through. I personally think it’s highlighted that there is a district up 
here and a district down there. But that might just be me personally. 
– Jenny, Wulgulmerang 
 
Despite these tensions and divisions, local people have continued, when necessary, to work together 
and participate in community life. In 2006, two-thirds of the residents and landholders (26/39) 
interviewed for the research were actively involved in a local community group or committee (see 
Chapter 4).24 Nevertheless, a small number of people resigned as volunteers with the CFA, or scaled 
back their involvement. A volunteer with the local fire brigade for more than 50 years explained his 
resignation following the January 30 fires: 
 
They [the CFA bureaucracy] were very well aware that it was a hell of a stuff-up. Of 
course we all resigned from the CFA. We want nothing more to do with them, ‘cause 
there’s no point. They wouldn’t help us when we needed them. 
– Anon. 
 
Without exception, those who criticised the CFA stressed that their complaint was with the CFA 
bureaucracy and not the local brigade and its volunteers. Regardless, the Captain of the Gelantipy 
brigade maintained that these grievances and tensions had filtered through to the local level. He 
downplayed the impact of the few resignations on the brigade: 
 
Well we haven’t got any [volunteers] anyway! [Laughs] Ah, look, I think it just needs 
another [major] fire to come through and they’ll realise they need a brigade and it’ll be 
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alright again. But yeah, there’s definitely a couple of them who aren’t doing the brigade 
and don’t want to belong to it.   
– Captain, Gelantipy CFA 
 
Another volunteer was more critical of the former volunteers: 
 
I just don’t understand it. I don’t want to be in the CFA. I’ve got enough to do and so has 
our fire Captain and probably everyone else in the area. But we do it because we believe 
there’s got to be a fire strike team in the area… Look, a town brigade or just near a town 
– it’s a hobby for some of these guys. They love getting the uniform on, they love playing 
with trucks and things like that. But we do it as our way of life. We see it as a necessary 
part of the district working… And they’ll still call us up. We were up at the 
Wulgulmerang Reserve this year putting out a fire. They’d been clearing up around that 
new recreation ground and the fire truck went up there and we all went up and put the 
fire out and spent quite a bit of time there: that’s what our local truck is for. I think they 
shouldn’t get tied up in one incident where they didn’t get enough help. I think they 
should look at the big picture. 
– Anon. 
 
6.5  Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has examined the bushfires’ impacts on the health, livelihoods and social lives of 
residents and landholders and the strategies they adopted to cope and adapt. In the Chapter that 
follows, these findings are integrated into the conceptual framework of the research and are discussed 
in relation to the wider vulnerability literature.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HUMAN VULNERABILITY TO BUSHFIRES 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This thesis is a study of human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district of East 
Gippsland, Victoria. On January 30, 2003, the small population of this isolated farming community 
was devastated by bushfires. Fires destroyed homes, agricultural assets and infrastructure and 
adversely affected the health, livelihoods and social lives of many local people. The conceptual 
framework of the research was developed in Chapter 2, where literature on human vulnerability and 
resilience to environmental hazards and disasters was reviewed. Following Winchester (1992) and 
Bohle et al. (1994), vulnerability was defined as a spatially and temporally dynamic social space 
wherein people differentially experience heightened exposure to hazards and a diminished capacity to 
cope with and adapt to possible impacts. Consequently, the research aims to understand (1) how and 
why people were exposed to hazards during the January 30 bushfires and (2) how they coped and 
adapted to the fires’ impacts. Chapter 3 outlined the research methods that were used to achieve these 
aims, in particular semi-structured interviews with local people and others who were involved in the 
disaster. Chapter 4 explored the nature of everyday life in the district, past and present, as a basis for 
understanding the root causes of people’s vulnerability to bushfires. Chapters 5 and 6 then examined 
the January 30 fires and their aftermath, focusing explicitly on local people’s accounts and experiences 
of their disaster. Although these Chapters dealt with matters of hazard exposure and coping/adaptive 
capacity, respectively, they were organised around the discussions and themes that emerged from the 
interviews. This minimised the temptation to exclude topics that did not fit neatly into the conceptual 
framework (the interview questions were sufficiently open to allow new themes and lines of 
questioning to emerge) and allowed for a truer representation of people’s experiences and thoughts 
about the disaster. 
 
This Chapter integrates the research findings into the conceptual framework and discusses them in 
relation to the wider literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The first part of the Chapter introduces a simple 
model of human vulnerability to bushfires (a restatement of the framework presented in Chapter 2) 
and discusses findings about people’s exposure to hazards during the fires and the strategies they 
adopted to cope and adapt to their impacts. In the second part, the research findings are discussed 
more broadly in relation to the vulnerability literature. Conclusions about the nature and causes of 
human vulnerability to bushfires in the Wulgulmerang district are drawn in the final Chapter. 
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Figure 7.1: A simple model of human vulnerability to bushfires 
HUMAN VULNERABILITY 
TO BUSHFIRE DISASTER 
 
Physical 
characteristics of 
bushfire 
 
 
Bushfire hazard 
 
 
State capacity to 
mitigate bushfire 
hazard 
 
 
Household / business 
capacity to mitigate 
bushfire hazard 
 
 
Response to bushfire 
 
 
State capacity for 
firefighting and 
emergency response 
 
 
Bushfire hazard 
impacts (short- and 
long-term) 
 
 
Coping and adaptive 
strategies 
 
 
Locations, land uses 
and activities 
 
 
Impacts of coping 
and adaptive 
strategies 
 
 
State capacity for 
relief, recovery and 
reconstruction 
 
 
Household / business 
capacity to stay and 
defend or leave early 
 
 
Household / business 
capacity to cope and 
adapt 
 
 200 
Figure 7.1 presents a simple model of human vulnerability to bushfires based on the conceptual 
framework outlined in Chapter 2. It is explained as follows. Bushfires are hazardous when they 
threaten human life, assets and other things we value. They are a product of geophysical processes or 
events that trigger fires, as well as the land uses and activities that place people in locations that are 
subject to bushfires. The state has a capacity to mitigate bushfire hazards, for example, by regulating 
human locations and land uses and by manipulating environmental conditions through land 
management practices such as prescribed burning. Households (and businesses)1 also have the 
capacity to mitigate bushfire hazards, for example, by designing and constructing their homes to 
minimise the impact of bushfires and by removing flammable materials from around buildings and 
other assets. In the event of a bushfire, the state and households have capacities to respond, with the 
former providing firefighting and other emergency services and, ideally, the latter either staying to 
defend against bushfires or leaving early. Together, these factors determine people’s exposure to 
bushfire hazards and, ultimately, the damages and losses that are incurred. These are bushfire hazard 
impacts, including losses of life, injury and damage to private and public property, which may 
manifest over the short- to long-term. The strategies that people adopt to cope and adapt to these 
impacts are determined by the capacity of their household or business, as well as the state’s capacity to 
provide for relief, recovery and reconstruction. When these strategies are inadequate for coping with 
hazard impacts – be they economic, health or social – people may be considered ‘vulnerable’ to 
bushfire disaster. Importantly, the strategies that are adopted to cope and adapt to hazard impacts may 
have their own impacts, whether positive or negative. This captures the longer-term impacts of hazards 
and of human vulnerability. 
 
7.2  Hazard exposure 
Locations and land uses 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that environmental hazards arise from the interactions of natural and social 
systems. Hazards are distinguished from environmental processes and events, which are only 
hazardous insofar as they threaten human life, assets and other values. This perspective recognises the 
benefits and resources that environmental processes and events may provide and that hazards are often 
created when people occupy locations and engage in land uses to exploit those benefits and resources 
(Burton et al.1993; Hewitt 1997). Indeed, the relatively clear and open grasslands of the 
Wulgulmerang Plateau, despite being surrounded by rugged and densely forested terrain, were first 
settled by graziers who sought to capitalise on its rich pastures.  
 
The predominant land uses that gave rise to bushfire hazards during the January 30 fires were 
agriculture and residential and holiday homes. Geographically, agriculture was the dominant private 
                                                 
1
 In the context of this research, households and businesses are one in the same. 
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land use, with most landholders grazing cattle or sheep for beef, fat lamb and wool production. These 
properties comprised a range of assets that were threatened by the fires, including: family homes and 
belongings; livestock; fodder; fences; sheds; stored produce; and farming equipment. The broad 
distribution of these assets across properties made them difficult to prepare and defend, particularly 
given the small population and limited local firefighting capacity. Many of the residential and holiday 
properties were located in areas of high amenity that tended to be isolated, inaccessible and in close 
proximity to native vegetation (see Appendix 1.1, Photograph 5). Bushfires are particularly hazardous 
at many of these properties due to the abundance of unmanageable fuel loads, the steep narrow and 
poorly-surfaced access roads (which may become blocked by fallen trees) and because residents are 
less likely to receive neighbourly and firefighting support in these locations during a fire. 
 
These two types of land use gave rise to very different types and degrees of hazard exposure. On the 
whole, farmers and others who earned their livelihood from their primary place of residence arguably 
experienced greater hazard exposure than residential and holiday home owners. While the latter 
potentially faced greater risks to life due to their high fire-risk locations, the research found that these 
people were more likely to leave early or stay away from their properties during a bushfire. In 
contrast, farmers typically had a greater share of their total asset base threatened by fires and were 
found to be more likely to accept the risks to life of staying to defend their property and livelihoods. 
Consequently, not only are economic damages from bushfires disproportionately large for farming 
households (c.f. Niemi and Lee 2001), they also face greater risks to life and health when, in their 
long-term economic interests, they are compelled to stay and defend their livelihoods. 
 
State capacity to mitigate bushfire hazards 
Hazard mitigation by the state is part of what Cannon (2000) refers to as ‘societal protection’ from 
hazards. The capacities and willingness of states to protect their citizens are highly uneven. Wealthier 
states may have a greater capacity to protect their citizens, while those that are inequitable and corrupt 
may provide protection only for a privileged few. Relatively plentiful resources and experience with 
managing large and destructive bushfires means that the State of Victoria is well-equipped to protect 
its citizens through bushfire hazard mitigation. Because bushfire hazards result from the interaction of 
natural and social systems, there are two main mitigation strategies available to the state. First, 
governments may regulate land use in order to control or prevent development in areas that are subject 
to bushfires. This mitigation strategy attends to the ‘social’ component of bushfire hazards; that is, the 
human locations and land uses that give rise to hazards. Second, governments can manage the land to 
reduce the potential for destructive bushfires. This strategy addresses the ‘natural’ component of 
bushfire hazards through modification of the geophysical conditions that culminate in potentially 
destructive bushfires. State and local governments employ land use planning and land management 
strategies to mitigate bushfire hazards in Victoria. 
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An assessment of natural hazards in the United States (Mileti 1999, 155-6) led to the conclusion that 
‘No single approach to bringing sustainable hazards mitigation into existence shows more promise at 
this time than increased use of sound and equitable land-use management’. To mitigate hazards, land 
use regulations stipulate where development will be permitted and how it must occur in order to 
minimise risks to life and property from environmental processes or events such as bushfires (Burby 
1998). In Victoria, the use and development of land is regulated through a system of planning schemes 
established by the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic.). One of the many objectives of the East 
Gippsland planning scheme (EGSC clause 15.07-1) is ‘To assist the minimisation of risk to life, 
property, the natural environment and community infrastructure from wildfire’. The scheme requires 
planning and responsible authorities to consider a range of documents – including Municipal Fire 
Prevention Plans and the Code of practice for fire management on public land (DSE 2006) – when 
considering land use or development in high bushfire-risk areas. Once identified, these areas are 
assigned to the ‘Wildfire Management Overlay’ (WMO). The purpose of the WMO is ‘To ensure that 
development which is likely to increase the number of people in the overlay area: [a] Satisfies the 
specified fire protection objectives; [and b] Does not significantly increase the threat to life and 
surrounding property from wildfire’ (EGSC 2007, clause 44.06). All subdivisions and most buildings 
and works in the WMO are subject to permits with specified fire protection objectives. Examples of 
permit requirements include: that water is available to landholders and emergency services to enable 
life and property to be defended from bushfires; and that buildings are designed and sited to minimise 
the risks to life and property from bushfires (EGSC 2007).  
 
Parts of the Wulgulmerang district are covered by the WMO (see Appendix 7.1). However, the 
regulatory power of the WMO can only be exercised for new developments or redevelopments of land. 
The vast majority of homes pre-date these controls and, given the limited economic resources of many 
households, are unlikely to be rebuilt or substantially renovated in the near future. There has been a 
small influx of people seeking residential amenity; however, the overall trend in recent decades has 
been one of depopulation and socio-economic decline, not ‘development’. Consequently, while the 
WMO will protect against hazardous development in the future, its utility for mitigating bushfire 
hazards for current residents and landholders is fundamentally limited.   
 
Whereas land use planning aims to mitigate hazards by regulating human locations and land uses, land 
management seeks to modify the geophysical conditions that give rise to hazards (the ‘natural’ 
component of the hazard). This is an area that has been neglected in many recent social science 
analyses of vulnerability (Cardona 2004) because physical exposure to hazards has been regarded as a 
matter for the natural sciences (and not a social process) or for fear that consideration of 
environmental factors equates to environmental determinism (see Chapter 2). Prescribed burning is a 
fundamentally important management practice for mitigating bushfire hazards on public land. It 
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entails the deliberate application of fire to an area under specified conditions to achieve well-defined 
management objectives (Wade and Lunsford 1989) and is the only practical way to reduce fuel loads 
over large areas. Gould (2006, 21) notes that:  
 
The damage caused by wildfires and the ability of suppression forces to control them is 
strongly linked to fire intensity, which is governed by fuel, weather and topography. Of 
these factors, only the fuel level can be manipulated, and fuel management is the basis of 
wildfire prevention throughout much of Australia.  
 
Prescribed burning may influence fire behaviour by reducing: (a) the growth of a fire from its ignition 
point; (b) the height of flames and rate of spread; (c) the potential for spotting; and (d) the total heat 
output or intensity of a fire. However, prescribed burning is not a panacea for fire control and is not 
intended to stop fires. By reducing the intensity of bushfires, prescribed burning aims to make 
suppression safer and more effective (Gould 2006). 
 
Scientific debates about the effectiveness of prescribed burning in mitigating bushfire hazards are 
complex and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is 
significantly more debate about the limits to fuel reduction in the scientific literature than there is in 
lay discourse. There is a popular perception – evident in submissions to various bushfire inquires, 
media reporting and interviews conducted for this research – that ‘… it’s simple science. No fuel, no 
fire’ (Commins, cited in Adamson 2003, 11). Unfortunately, the science of prescribed burning is not 
simple and there is, in fact, considerable disagreement among scientists as to its effectiveness in 
reducing fire hazard in different fuel types and weather conditions. A useful review of the international 
scientific literature is provided by Fernandes and Botelho (2003). Having reviewed the evidence, they 
conclude that: 
 
… the fuel/age paradigm is a simplification… the hazard-reduction effectiveness of 
prescription burning will vary by ecosystem (or fuel type) and according to the relative 
impacts of fuels and weather on fire behaviour. Because fire behaviour increases in a non-
linear fashion with the decrease of fuel moisture and the increase of wind speed, which 
additionally vary in much wider range than fuel properties, the influence of these factors 
on fire behaviour will increasingly prevail over the effect of fuel characteristics in more 
severe weather scenarios. Prescribed burning will be less effective in regions that have a 
higher likelihood of experiencing strong winds during drought periods, because such 
combination is conducive to extreme fire events in intensity and extension (Fernandes 
and Botelho 2003, 122).  
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It is clear from the evidence presented in Chapter 5 that residents and landholders attributed their 
exposure to bushfire hazards on January 30, 2003, to the accumulation of fuels in the Alpine National 
Park to the north and west of the district. There was a strong and widely held belief that more regular 
and broad-scale fuel reduction would have prevented, or at least reduced, the damage caused by the 
fires. This view was consistent among many rural people who were affected by the 2003 Victorian 
bushfires. More than a quarter of submissions to the State government inquiry into the fires addressed 
the issue of prescribed burning, the majority of which called for greater fuel reduction on public land 
to protect private land and assets (Esplin et al. 2003). However, claims that greater fuel reduction 
would have prevented or significantly reduced the impacts of the fires were not supported by public 
land and fire managers. While they shared a commitment to burn as much public land as possible – to 
meet asset protection and ecological objectives – it was generally agreed that the extreme weather 
conditions experienced on January 30 would have negated any significant effects of previous 
prescribed burns. As noted in Chapter 5, fire behaviour specialists observed that very few previous 
prescribed burns were effective in slowing the spread of fires on January 18, 26 and 30, which were all 
days of extreme fire weather. 
 
Based on the evidence provided by land and fire managers and the wider scientific literature, it can be 
concluded that the accumulation of fuels on public land was not the dominant factor in people’s 
exposure to bushfire hazards, as is commonly claimed. Extreme fire weather conditions on January 30 
largely negated the influence of previous prescribed burns on fire behaviour. Furthermore, the 
extraordinary climatic conditions that preceded the fires – a culmination of rainfall deficiencies, low 
atmospheric humidity and cloudiness, and high daytime temperatures – meant that, in addition to fine 
fuels, heavy fuels were well cured (Taylor and Webb 2005). Consequently, it is unlikely that greater 
fuel reduction, which aims principally to reduce the availability of fine fuels, would have slowed the 
spread or significantly reduced the intensity of fires in the Wulgulmerang district. This is not to deny 
the importance of prescribed burning in mitigating bushfire hazards. If the January 30 bushfires had 
burned under milder weather conditions, it is likely that prior fuel reduction would have assisted 
firefighters to control and suppress fires and may have helped residents and landholders to defend their 
homes and livelihood assets. 
 
Household capacity to mitigate bushfire hazards 
The research identified a range of strategies that residents and landholders adopted to mitigate 
bushfires hazards prior to the bushfires. These included strategic measures, such as designing and 
situating homes to minimise exposure to flames and heat, seasonal preparations, like clearing 
flammable materials from around buildings, and actions that were taken once it was clear that 
bushfires were a direct threat to life and property, for example, filling gutters with water and covering 
the insides of windows with blankets. Most residents planned their responses to the fires, deciding 
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whether they would stay and defend or leave early and what the specific roles and responsibilities of 
each member of the household would be. However, the scale of damage and destruction in the district 
raises questions about how effectively households mitigated, and thus reduced their exposure to, 
bushfire hazards.  
 
Most importantly, no one was killed or seriously injured in the January 30 bushfires. This can be 
attributed partly to the fact that there were very few late evacuations, which are a well-known cause of 
bushfire fatalities (Handmer and Tibbits 2005; Tibbits et al. 2008). The research revealed that most 
people had made firm decisions to stay and defend or leave early. Overall, there was a high level of 
commitment to staying to defend property, particularly among agricultural landholders. Farmers were 
found to have particularly strong capacity to mitigate bushfire hazards. On the whole, they were found 
to be well-equipped to defend assets, with many having specialised firefighting equipment or being 
able to adapt basic farm equipment for firefighting purposes. Farmers typically have a broad base of 
technical knowledge and skills. For example, many were able to create mobile firefighting units by 
connecting water tanks and pumps on trailers behind 4WD vehicles. The critical role of improvisation 
in their preparedness cannot be understated. While some farmers were able to buy specialised 
firefighting equipment prior to the fires, financial pressures prevented many from doing so. Their 
technical knowledge and skills meant that they were able to improvise and adapt everyday equipment 
for use during the fires. Furthermore, farmers were advantaged by their capacity to repair equipment 
that failed or was damaged during the fires. In contrast, residential and holiday home owners were 
more likely to leave early or stay away from their properties. Considering that many of these 
properties were situated in highly hazardous locations – due to their isolation, inaccessibility and the 
abundance of unmanageable fuels – and that many of these residents did not have prior experience of 
bushfires, these were good decisions. 
 
While safety was the ultimate consideration, decisions to stay and defend or leave early had a clear 
economic dimension. A key finding of the research was that while most people had insurance for their 
homes and contents, many were underinsured for damage to livelihood assets. Some residential and 
holiday-home landholders took the view that, since they were fully insured, their best and safest option 
was to leave early or stay away from their property altogether. In contrast, agricultural landholders and 
others who had a direct commercial interest in their property were more committed to defending it. 
That many of these landholders were underinsured was an added incentive to stay and defend. 
However, there was an overwhelming sense that ‘leaving early’ is not an option for farmers, regardless 
of their insurance cover. Their commitment to staying to defend against bushfires also stems from 
their responsibility for livestock, their strong connections to the places they live and an acceptance that 
fire is a natural feature of their environment.  
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In terms of the physical preparedness of their private property, most residents and landholders fell in 
the middle-range between the few who were very well-prepared and the few who were almost totally 
unprepared. Volunteers with the local CFA suggested while people may have been adequately 
prepared for a ‘normal’ bushfire, most were unprepared for fires of the scale and intensity of those that 
razed the district on January 30, 2003. General property maintenance formed the basis of most 
people’s preparedness (e.g. mowing lawns, weeding etc.), which was followed by a period of intense 
preparatory activity once it was clear that the fires were threatening. These last minute preparations 
were typically actions that would have been impractical to implement for the duration of the bushfire 
season (i.e. summer), such as boarding up windows, or actions that would have imposed unacceptable 
social or economic costs had the fires not reached the district, such as ploughing paddocks, relocating 
livestock or mulching gardens. Clearly, people need to be reasonably sure that bushfires are directly 
threatening their property before they are willing to accept these social and economic costs. Bushfire 
education programs, such as those recommended by various government inquiries (e.g. Esplin et al. 
2003; McLeod 2004; Ellis et al. 2004), are unlikely to change this situation. In the event of fast-onset 
bushfires, then, it is likely that many people will be relatively unprepared. Residents and landholders 
of the Wulgulmerang district were fortunate that the fires had been burning for three weeks by the 
time they reached the district, which meant they had ample forewarning and time to prepare. 
 
Participation in non-local social networks was found to be an important determinant of bushfire 
preparedness. The broad distribution of assets across large farm properties and the small local 
population meant that most landholders sought help to prepare from beyond the district. The vast 
majority of people organised visits from friends and relatives to help prepare and defend against the 
fires. This help was particularly important for older residents who may have been incapable of 
undertaking physically demanding preparations.2 Social networks were also used to access refuge for 
children, many of whom were sent away for the duration of the fires. Again, the long-lead up time to 
the fires meant that there was sufficient time to make these arrangements and for help to arrive. In 
fast-onset bushfires, people may not receive this vital support. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to address the suggestion that the January 30 fires were a ‘firestorm’, rather 
than a ‘normal’ bushfires, and there was little people could have done to prepare for it. The fires were 
certainly characterised by extreme fire behaviour and intensity; however, local CFA volunteers, who 
observed a basic level of preparedness throughout the district, were adamant that most people could 
have done more to prepare themselves and their properties. This point is well demonstrated by the fact 
that those who were well-prepared were able to defend their homes. Of the six houses that were 
destroyed, three were unattended (and therefore not actively defended) and three were either 
                                                 
2
 Recall that 38% of research participants were aged over 65 years (see Chapter 4). 
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inadequately defended (suggesting poor preparation) or un-defendable due to their condition and poor 
level of preparedness. 
 
It can be concluded that most residents and landholders were not prepared for bushfires of the scale 
and severity of those that razed the district on January 30, 2003. Perceptions of adequate bushfire 
preparedness were formed on the basis of past experiences of smaller, more manageable fires. 
Critically, the long build-up to the fires meant that people had the time to prepare their properties and 
organise for relatives and friends to assist. Had the bushfires occurred with little or no warning, 
residents and landholders would have been far less prepared than they were. 
 
Physical characteristics of the January 30 bushfires 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that an emphasis on human vulnerability often leads to the neglect of 
environmental factors in social science analyses of hazards and disasters (Cardona 2004). Rightly, 
some hazards research has attracted criticism for overemphasising the role of environmental factors in 
shaping human responses to hazards (Hewitt 1983a). However, there is no doubt that hazard 
characteristics – such as magnitude, frequency, duration, areal extent, speed of onset, spatial 
dispersing and temporal spacing (Burton et al.1993) – in conjunction with human agency, influence 
human behaviours and the types of responses that are appropriate to protect human life and property. 
Furthermore, there are rare instances where the physical impact of an environmental process or event 
is so great that uneven human vulnerabilities are not the dominant factor in determining patterns of 
loss and harm (Brookfield 1999). 
 
According to the Bureau of Meteorology (2003c, 20), January 30 was the most significant ‘blow-up 
day’ of the 2003 Victorian bushfires. The day was characterised by large fire runs, long-distance 
spotting and extreme fire behaviour throughout north-east Victoria and East Gippsland. As noted in 
Chapter 5, a fire behaviour scientist interviewed for this research observed that some of the most 
extreme fire behaviour on this day occurred in the Wulgulmerang district. By 11am temperatures in 
Gelantipy had reached 30°C and, after a north-westerly wind change at 11.19am, soon rose to more 
than 33°C with winds gusting to 65km/h. Strong winds drove fires through the Alpine National Park 
toward the district until, shortly before 2pm, embers began to land in Wulgulmerang, igniting spot 
fires. Fires burned with extreme intensity in forested areas, with flames heights between 10 and 30 
metres and fires intensities greater than 40,000kW/m. In the grasslands of the Plateau, flame heights 
ranged between one and three metres, with fire intensities of approximately 7,000kW/m (CFA and 
DSE 2003). Fires burned throughout the district and at approximately 3.30pm a south-westerly wind 
change blew two runs of fire together, causing extreme fire behaviour. The junction zone for these two 
fires was Seldom Seen, where a home and service station were destroyed. The south-westerly wind 
change abated the spread of fires into Gelantipy; however, blazes continued further to the north. 
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Certain characteristics of the January 30 bushfires were particularly influential in shaping people’s 
exposure to hazards. First, as noted above, the long build-up to the fires meant that residents and 
landholders had ample forewarning and time to prepare. Nevertheless, extreme fire weather conditions 
caused the fires to spread rapidly and arrive in the district earlier than expected. A fire behaviour 
specialist noted that although the maximum rate of spread predicted by the McArthur Metre is 3km/h, 
the fire ran from Benambra to Wulgulmerang to January 30 averaged 4km/h and may have reached 
rates of 8km/h. Consequently, the fires arrived in the district three days earlier than authorities had 
expected. Strike teams arrived in the area in the night before the fires and thus had limited time to 
familiarise themselves with the area.  
 
Second, the extent of the fires meant that firefighting and other resources were committed throughout 
north-east Victoria and East Gippsland. The fires grew by more than 200,000ha in the week preceding 
January 30 and were estimated to have burned 465,000ha of forested land (CFA and DSE 2003; 
Wareing and Flinn 2003). This meant that hundreds of communities were under threat and firefighting 
resources were severely limited.  
 
Third, the fires affected large parts of the district simultaneously. In past fires, local people had been 
able to move around the district to defend assets. However, as one resident recalled: ‘I thought we’d 
have time to get from one place to another, but there was no time – it hit everybody all at once’ 
[Dennis, Gelantipy]. Consequently, residents and landholders were also limited in the support they 
could provide to friends and neighbours.  
 
Finally, the extreme fire behaviour and intensity of the January 30 fires undoubtedly contributed to the 
scale of damage and destruction. A number of studies have demonstrated that the probability of house 
destruction during bushfires increases dramatically at higher FFDIs. Jasper (1999) estimated that 95% 
of bushfires that destroyed property in the Sydney region occurred on days when fire danger was 
‘Very High’ or ‘Extreme’. Similarly, Bradstock and Gill’s (2001) study of 40 years of bushfire losses 
in the same region revealed a strong correlation between high FFDIs and the probability of house 
destruction. Specifically, it found that at least one home was destroyed in every bushfire that burned in 
FFDIs greater than 40. The FFDI reached 52 (‘Extreme’) at Gelantipy and may have been higher 
further to the north, where the majority of houses and farm buildings were destroyed. 
 
Household responses 
Household responses were largely consistent with the approach advocated by Australian fire 
authorities; that is, to stay and defend or leave early (see Chapter 2.5.2). As noted in Chapter 5, plans 
had been made for people to stay and defend in more than three-quarters of households, with the 
remainder opting to leave early or, in the case of seasonal or part-time residents, to stay away from 
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their properties altogether. Importantly, no one planned to evacuate late or, as is often the case, 
planned to evacuate if they felt threatened while staying to defend.3 Fortunately, the vast majority of 
households acted on these decisions.  
 
Overall, household responses were characterised by active defence. Three-quarters of households were 
attended during the fires and, where necessary, actively defended. Residents commonly sheltered 
inside their homes during the main fire front, but were able to defend their homes and other assets by 
suppressing small ignitions immediately before and after. Critically, three of the six houses that were 
destroyed were unattended during the fires; three were inadequately defended or un-defendable due to 
their condition and poor preparation. These findings support the assertion that ‘ordinary’ people can 
successfully defend their homes from bushfires, provided they are physically and mentally prepared to 
do so (Handmer and Tibbits 2005). This is important because it adds weight to an approach that 
encourages people, whether they choose to stay and defend or leave early, to accept responsibility for 
their own safety and not to be passive and overly reliant on fire and emergency services.  
 
The capacity of residents and landholders to defend their livelihood assets was limited. Most people 
concentrated their efforts on their home and assets in close proximity. The large size of farm 
properties and their broad distribution of assets meant that it was not possible for landholders to 
actively defend them all. Consequently, thousands of sheep and cattle, hundreds of kilometres of farm 
fences, sheds, and large quantities of pasture and hay were destroyed. Interviewees maintained that 
these losses would have been drastically reduced if they had received firefighting support. 
 
Household responses did not always go to plan. An elderly grazier, for example, undertook a late 
evacuation on the advice of a neighbour. He made it to the safety of a neighbouring property, but lost 
his home. In stark contrast, the early arrival of the fires prevented one couple from leaving early. 
Fortunately, their high level of preparedness – they had sent their children to stay with friends and had 
meticulously prepared their property – meant that they were able to safely and successfully defend 
their home. More common were deviations from the informal plans that specified rules, roles and 
responsibilities for each member of the household. It is significant that people broke rules designed to 
ensure their safety – for example, by leaving the safety of the home and driving vehicles through 
smoke and flames – to protect livelihood assets. These people were almost always men. These 
attempts to protect assets were usually futile and greatly increased their exposure to bushfire hazards. 
                                                 
3
 A study of household implementation of the ‘Stay and defend or leave early’ policy during the 2003 fires found 
that many people who plan to stay and defend retain late evacuation as a last option (Tibbits and Whittaker 
2007). Thus there is potential for these people to attempt late evacuation, which is the most dangerous strategy 
during bushfires (Tibbits et al. 2008; see Chapter 2.5.2). 
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Interviewees reported a small number of ‘near misses’ arising from these incidents and it is perhaps 
only through luck that no one was killed or seriously injured.  
 
These findings reinforce the need for households to carefully plan their responses to bushfires and 
commit to their implementation. They also point to the gendered nature of bushfire response and 
hazard exposure. During the fires, men were more often outside defending assets, while women tended 
to stay within the relatively safety of the home. An analysis of Australian bushfire fatalities between 
1901 and 2008 (Haynes et al. in prep.) found that men died in greater numbers than women, usually 
while outside defending assets. In contrast, the majority of women and children died while passively 
sheltering inside the home or attempting to flee. Despite an overall trend toward fewer bushfire 
fatalities each year, the rate of death for women has risen. 
 
Firefighting and emergency responses 
Firefighting is also part of the ‘societal protection’ referred to by Cannon (2000). The CFA is the lead 
authority when it comes to protecting people and property from bushfires. However, as noted in 
Chapter 5, the majority of residents and landholders did not receive firefighting support during the 
January 30 fires. Due to extreme fire danger, fire authorities decided that they could not send 
volunteers into situations where their lives could be threatened. Regardless of whether this was the 
correct decision – a matter that was debated intensely after the fires – it is clear that many local people 
experienced greater hazard exposure than would have been the case if they received firefighting 
support. Firefighters would not have been able to stop the spread of fires in the district; however, 
might have been able to help residents and landholders to safely stay and defend their homes and other 
assets. 
 
As has been noted, the CFA’s official message to residents is that they should not expect to receive 
firefighting support in the event of a bushfire. The logic behind this message is that fires may threaten 
property with little or no warning and there may be insufficient time for firefighters to arrive on the 
scene. Furthermore, during large bushfires, the number of people and assets under threat means that it 
will not be possible to have fire units at every property. Consequently, people are advised to prepare to 
stay and defend or leave early, without relying on the support of fire authorities. Despite this, many 
residents and landholders clearly expected to receive firefighting support. Some people assumed help 
would be forthcoming because they could see fire units in the area. Others received advice direct from 
authorities, including professional and volunteer firefighters, that this would be the case. Local people 
commonly argued that there were enough fire tankers in the area to have one protect each property. 
However, the fires were expected to spread into Gelantipy and the country further south where there 
were many more residents and landholders that could have laid claim to the same level of protection. 
Unmet expectations were a source of considerable anger and discontent after the fires. As a result, 
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relationships deteriorated between some local people and the CFA which, in some cases, led to the 
resignation of volunteers from the local brigade. Clearly, the CFA must be consistent in the 
communication of its message that people cannot depend upon firefighting support during a bushfire. 
From an organisational perspective, this may prove difficult. It is volunteer firefighters, themselves 
residents and landholders of bushfire prone areas, who have the greatest interaction with those who are 
threatened by bushfires. Volunteers are not always aware or supportive of CFA policies and 
procedures. Furthermore, they often do not appreciate fire authorities’ broader strategic objectives and 
the challenges they face when managing large and protracted bushfire events with limited resources. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Number of CFA volunteers, 1988 – 2004 
Source: McLennan and Birch (2005) 
 
Most significantly, the aged and diminished state of the Wulgulmerang district’s population meant that 
the local capacity for firefighting was severely limited. The ranks of the local fire brigade reflected the 
state of the local population, with too few volunteers, the majority of whom were aged in their 50s and 
60s. Consequently, local people were reliant on non-local firefighters who were unfamiliar with the 
district. This problem was compounded during the fires by the fact that the vast majority of local 
firefighters stayed with their own properties to defend their homes and assets. McLennan and Birch 
(2005) report a recent decline in volunteer numbers for all State and Territory volunteer fire services. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the number of volunteers with the CFA declined by 30% (Figure 7.2). The 
authors attribute this decline – particularly in brigades that service small, rural communities – to the 
economic restructuring that has profoundly transformed the social and economic landscape of many 
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rural communities (see Chapter 4). This is supported by the CFA’s (2001) own research, which 
identified a range of barriers to volunteering, including: 
 
• Increased working hours; 
• Increased stress at work; 
• Reduced job security; 
• Increased family demands, particularly where both partners are working; and 
• The need to leave the area (for lifestyle, work, family, or retirement) and the resulting 
disruption of their social networks and links to CFA. 
 
In the Wulgulmerang district, limited opportunities for employment and education and the 
inaccessibility of goods and services have encouraged a cycle of rural out-migration, particularly of 
younger people, which has depleted the population from which the local fire brigade draws its 
volunteers. 
 
7.3  Coping and adaptive strategies 
As shown in Chapter 6, the January 30 bushfires had a range of impacts on residents and landholders. 
They are summarised below in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Impacts of the January 30 bushfires 
Human health Finances and livelihoods Social and community life 
Post-traumatic stress Loss of homes Social cohesion (short-term) 
Depression Loss of farm buildings Social exclusion and division 
Anxiety Loss of farm fences Resignations of volunteers from 
local fire brigade 
Sleeplessness Loss of livestock  
Triggering of past trauma and 
underlying mental illness 
Loss of pasture and hay  
Neglected symptoms of physical 
health 
Costs of re-instating and 
maintaining livelihoods 
 
 Reduced productivity of farm 
businesses 
 
 
To avoid repetition, these impacts are discussed below alongside the specific strategies that people 
adopted to cope and adapt. 
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Household capacities to cope and adapt: health 
Fortunately, no one was killed or seriously injured in the bushfires. However, some people’s 
experiences of the fires had a lasting impact on their psychological health. Health service providers 
reported an increase in mental health issues after the fires, including incidences of post-traumatic 
stress, depression and anxiety. These issues were particularly prevalent among those who had lost their 
homes and/or large amounts of livelihoods, particularly livestock. It was also noted that symptoms of 
mental illness often took months to present. Similar findings emerged from a study of the health and 
social impacts of the Ash Wednesday bushfires in South Australia (Clayer et al. 1985). Researchers 
found that the majority of mental health problems were identified or acknowledged months after the 
bushfires took place. Post-traumatic stress disorders characterised by anxiety, depression, disturbed 
sleep and acute distress were found to present as many as 12 months after the disaster and were often 
triggered by reminders of the fires (e.g. hot and windy days, television and newspaper reporting, etc.). 
In the Wulgulmerang district, reminders of the January 30 bushfires included the ongoing debate about 
fire management and who was to blame for the disaster, as well as the severely burnt landscape.  
 
Previous life stress, trauma and family histories of mental illness have all been found to influence the 
incidence of post-traumatic stress from bushfires (Byrne et al. 2006). Studies have also revealed 
increased rates of stress, anxiety, depression, grief, anger and family breakdown resulting from 
drought in many parts of rural Australia (Alston 2007). The cumulative effects of drought, OJD and 
financial pressures on the health of local people, particularly graziers, cannot be underestimated. The 
connections between these earlier stresses and the bushfires were well-described by two local health 
service providers.  
 
I just think farmers have such a hard life. There’s one guy up there who’s been in years 
and years of drought, then he got Johne’s Disease and he had to get rid of all his 
breeding stock, and then the fire came through and burnt him out. But he just keeps going 
on. They’re incredibly tough. I’m still surprised that no one committed suicide. 
– Bush Nurse, Gelantipy 
 
They would normally be really resilient people – they’d bounce back and they’d bounce 
back. And they’re really good at doing that. But you can’t get knocked down consistently 
and keep bouncing back. 
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
While there is concern that suicide rates may be rising in many rural areas – particularly due to 
pressures associated with drought (Hussey 2007) – recent research challenges the popular perception 
that people in rural and remote Australia suffer higher rates of mental illness than those in 
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metropolitan areas (Morrissey and Reser 2007). Research by Judd et al. (2006) suggests that higher 
rates of suicide among farmers do not necessarily reflect higher rates of mental health issues. More 
important, they argue, are factors that limit a person’s ability to acknowledge and seek help for 
problems. In particular, it is noted that people in rural and remote areas tend to have much poorer 
access to healthcare services than those in metropolitan areas (Alston 2007), while masculine cultures 
of self-reliance mean that rural men are less likely to seek help (Alston and Kent 2008). Both are 
problems that affected residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district after the January 30 
fires.  
 
The accessibility of health services is a significant issue for residents of the Wulgulmerang district. As 
stated earlier, it is one of the few parts of Victoria that is classified as ‘remote’ under the Accessibility 
/ Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA), due to the very restricted accessibility of goods and services, 
including healthcare (GISCA 2004). The Bush Nursing Centres at Gelantipy and Buchan provide basic 
healthcare; however, residents must travel to Bairnsdale, approximately 130km from Wulgulmerang, 
to access more advanced health and medical services. In terms of emergency care, the area is serviced 
by a rural ambulance that operates out of Buchan, with more experienced paramedics responding to 
serious incidents from Bairnsdale. After the fires, the Gelantipy Bush Nurse was the main provider of 
basic healthcare, with counselling and other services provided through home-visits from Bairnsdale. 
The district’s inaccessibility meant that these services were provided on a relatively limited basis. 
 
In addition to geographical constraints on health service provision, post-fire access to healthcare was 
limited by a general reluctance, particularly among men, to seek help. Many people claimed not to 
access the counselling services provided immediately after the fires because they were too busy 
cleaning up their properties and re-establishing their livelihoods. However studies of rural men’s 
health consistently show that masculine cultures of stoicism and the stigma associated with mental 
illness are major barriers to men’s help seeking (e.g. Fuller et al. 2000; Judd et al. 2006b; Alston and 
Kent 2008).  
 
Household capacities to cope and adapt: finances and livelihoods 
The most immediate impacts of the January 30 bushfires were losses of homes and livelihood assets. 
The DPI’s initial assessment of agricultural losses in north-eastern Victoria and East Gippsland (Table 
6.3) illustrates the scale of damage and destruction in the Wulgulmerang district. It shows that, relative 
to the number of properties that were assessed, losses of homes, farm buildings, livestock, fences and 
fodder were greater than in any other Victorian locality affected by the 2003 fires. This is partly 
attributable to the fact that, unlike the increasingly diversified economies of north-eastern Victoria and 
the Omeo region, the economy of the Wulgulmerang district remains firmly rooted in traditional 
agriculture. This is evident in the fact that just 10% of the properties assessed by the DPI in the 
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Wulgulmerang district were classified as ‘hobby farms’, compared to 24% in the Omeo region, 42% in 
Stanley and 59% in Eldorado.4 As discussed in Chapter 4, economic deregulation and the pursuit of 
free trade have exposed Australian agricultural producers to volatile market fluctuations and 
unfavourable terms of trade. To remain economically viable, most farmers have had to restructure 
their businesses to achieve greater ‘efficiency’ and productivity. Most notably, this has seen a shift to 
larger, more productive farms with increased capital bases. Consequently, the high rates of loss in the 
Wulgulmerang district can be attributed partly to the relatively high proportion of large, asset-laden 
farms that were threatened by the January 30 fires. 
 
Residents and landholders employed a range of strategies to cope and adapt to these impacts. For most 
people, insurance was the primary strategy for recovering losses. Two broad types of insurance are 
available. Home insurance covers landholders against certain types of damage or loss of the home 
building and/or its contents. Business insurance covers businesses, including farms, for damage or loss 
of assets, as well as claims of liability or workers’ compensation. Many insurance companies offer 
policies that are tailored to the needs of rural landholders, such as the Wesfarmers Federation 
Insurance (2007) ‘Rural Plan’, which specifically covers day-to-day risks faced by farm businesses. 
Critically, the research revealed that although residents and landholders typically had insurance for 
their homes and contents, many were uninsured or significantly underinsured for damage to livelihood 
assets such as farm fences, livestock and sheds. In much of the hazards literature, non-insurance and 
underinsurance are attributed primarily to the faulty hazard perceptions and flawed decisions of those 
at risk (see Chapter 2). For example, Mileti’s (1999, 168-9) influential review of hazards and disaster 
research states that:  
 
[There are] several reasons why many people do not buy these optional coverages [sic]. 
In general, they are much the same as the influences on adoption and implementation of 
mitigation measures… In short, people think the premium is too great for an uncertain 
payoff possibly far in the future; they think that it can’t happen to them; they think that 
federal assistance will make them whole if a disaster does occur; they don’t know that 
appropriate coverage is available… or they do not know about the hazard and cannot 
accurately assess their exposure to it. 
 
To take a broader view, a vulnerability (or resilience) perspective on the problem of non-insurance and 
underinsurance would also consider the cultural, economic, political and social factors that may 
prevent people from attaining an adequate level of cover. Priest et al. (2005), for example, argue that 
the uninsured are often the most economically and socially vulnerable members of society. They note 
                                                 
4
 Stanley and Eldorado are exemplars of the new, ‘mixed’ economies of north-eastern Victoria. 
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that many people are excluded from insurance markets for financial reasons, including those on low 
incomes and those who reside in high-risk, high-premium areas (as noted in Chapter 2, these are often 
one in the same). This research revealed that, in addition to inaccurately valuing or forgetting to 
reinsure assets, many people were knowingly underinsured because they could not afford to pay 
comprehensive insurance. Some farmers explained that their underinsurance was a direct result of 
drought and other financial pressures on their businesses. Investments to maintain livelihoods, such as 
the purchase of hay to feed livestock through the lack of pasture, were seen as more pressing concerns 
than maintaining a high level of insurance cover. In hindsight, one might say that these people 
inaccurately assessed their exposure to bushfire hazards. However, at the time these decisions were 
taken, drought was a far more real and immediate threat to people’s livelihoods than bushfires (or 
other agents of property loss). Understandably, farmers channelled their limited resources toward the 
problem at hand – drought – in full knowledge of their potential exposure to bushfire hazards. Clearly, 
the drought and other livelihood pressures are pivotal to understanding people’s vulnerability to the 
bushfires of January 30, 2003. 
 
Changes to the nature of farming have also contributed to the underinsurance problem. It has been 
noted that many farmers have progressively restructured their businesses to achieve greater 
productivity and efficiency, which has involved a shift to larger landholdings with increased capital 
bases. However, farm incomes have not risen accordingly and many farmers now find themselves in 
positions where they have an increased asset base – including more kilometres of fences and 
additional livestock, farm buildings and pasture – but not the resources to insure them.  
 
The ultimate consequence of widespread underinsurance has been that many people have had to take 
out high-interest loans to repair and replace damaged livelihood assets, or have simply accepted losses 
and scaled down their businesses, thus placing even greater financial pressure on households. This is 
akin to the ‘ratchet effect’ of vulnerability, ‘… where each succeeding event reduces the resources a 
group or individual has to resist and recover from the next environmental shock or stress’ (Pelling 
2003, 16; c.f. Chambers 1989). The ‘ratchet effect’ of underinsurance means that, once impacted, 
people may have fewer resources to insure assets into the future and that a greater share of income 
may be diverted away from households, further adding to economic disadvantage in the district.  
 
Residents and landholders adopted a range of additional strategies to cope and adapt to their losses. 
Access to government assistance was particularly important given the context of widespread 
underinsurance. In particular, those who lost their homes were entitled to apply for a series of grants, 
up to a total of $22,800, to help cover the costs of initial expenses (e.g. food and clothing), temporary 
accommodation, and the repair and refurnishing of their homes. Other forms of financial assistance, 
such as low interest loans to replace damaged assets, were also made available. However, the formal 
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procedures for accessing this assistance discouraged some people, at least initially, from applying. It is 
significant that frustration at application procedures was most often expressed by older, farming men. 
Women often took responsibility for seeking and accessing assistance. Their greater capacities for 
performing these tasks can be attributed to the fact that many were or had previously been employed 
in professions that require these skills, such as nursing and teaching, and because women are often 
responsible for the day-to-day administration of farm businesses. As Alston (1995, 92) remarks:   
 
Bookkeeping on the farm remains a female-dominated task; far more women than men 
are in charge of the farm books… There is an obvious link here between the higher 
educational achievements of farm women… and women’s bookkeeping role. 
 
This is true of the Wulgulmerang district, where, in 2001, there were far more women than men who 
had completed Year 12 of their schooling (55% to 17%). Furthermore, more than two-thirds of women 
(69%) described themselves as professionals or clerical workers; there were no men in these categories 
(ABS 2001). The generally lower capacity of men to access resources through official channels 
suggests that male-only households may be more vulnerable to bushfires. This proposition is 
supported by the stories of two elderly men, both of whom lived alone, who lost their homes to the 
fires. Both were deterred by the formal procedures for accessing government assistance and only did 
so after friends stepped in to help them through the process. 
 
Insurers and economists argue that, by providing financial assistance to those in disaster, governments 
create ‘imperfections’ in insurance markets that actually promote non-insurance and underinsurance 
(Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007, 321). This is the problem of ‘moral hazard’, where individuals 
choose not to insure or take other mitigation measures because they expect to receive financial aid 
from government or other sources (Brown and Hoyt 2000). Moral hazard may be a legitimate concern 
for insurers and governments in some instances; however, evidence from the district suggests that 
expectations of disaster-aid did not contribute to the underinsurance problem. In particular, the 
research revealed that a number of people tried to increase their insurance cover once it was clear that 
the fires were threatening. This suggests that people had more confidence in insurance as a means for 
recovering losses than in government and other forms of aid. After the fires, those with insurance 
reported generally positive dealings with insurance companies, while those who were dependent on 
government support were dissatisfied with the amounts they received. 
 
Participation in social networks was another important means for households to access resources to 
cope and adapt. These resources included donations of domestic goods, such as food and clothing, as 
well as agricultural supplies and volunteer labour to help farmers re-establish their livelihoods. Given 
the diminished population, most of these resources came from outside the district, including from: 
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family and friends; farmers and their industry associations; churches; service clubs; rural fire brigades; 
and sport and recreation clubs. Entities such as churches, service clubs and sporting groups often 
became involved in volunteer works due to their associations with a particular person or group of 
people. However, the support they provided was typically made available to all those in need. Farmers 
were found to have extensive social networks, based on associations developed through trade and 
shared identity. They were able to mobilise resources through their associations with farmers and 
others in the agricultural sector, through direct trade-based relationships and their involvement in 
industry associations, such as the VFF, or farm-based politics. Importantly, popular support for 
farmers – a product of their place in Australian folklore and the well-publicised hardships they may 
endure – means that they are typically able to mobilise resources from much further afield than non-
farmers. For example, some farmers received goods and labour from individuals and families with 
which they had no prior association, purely because they were farmers. Other groups, such as the 
‘alternative life-stylers’ at W Tree, may participate in social networks that provide them with 
resources that are not accessible to farmers. 
 
Households also had to cope and adapt to numerous longer-term impacts of the fires. By destroying 
livelihood assets, the fires reduced the productivity of many farm businesses. Regardless of their level 
of insurance (discussed below), affected farmers commonly reported reduced incomes in the months, 
even years, after the fires. Most notably, the lack of pasture and farm fences forced many graziers to 
reduce livestock numbers until grasses re-grew and fences were repaired or replaced. Many also faced 
additional costs to re-instate and maintain their livelihoods. With much of Australia in drought, many 
graziers were forced to buy hay at high prices in order to feed their remaining livestock. While costly, 
this was seen as a better option than losing years of breeding and rebuilding herds from scratch. High 
cattle prices alleviated the impacts of some of these costs; however, other strategies were required to 
cope with the reduced productivity and income of farm businesses. Seeking off-farm income is a 
common strategy among Australian farmers for coping with drought and other financial pressures 
(Gray and Lawrence 2001; Black 2005). In 2000-01, the average Australian broadacre farm had a total 
family income of $60,022, of which a staggering $29,259 was earned off-farm (ABS 2003).5 Those 
that are dependent upon off-farm income to maintain their standard of living tend to be smaller, 
family-owned farms with lower incomes. In the Wulgulmerang district, two-thirds of households 
where agriculture was the primary livelihood strategy had at least one person engaged in off-farm 
employment on a casual or part-time basis. These included occasional jobs on neighbouring farms, 
particularly on absentee landholdings, as well as with other local businesses and community services. 
However, the severely limited opportunities for local employment meant that some people were 
working outside of the district. Off-farm employment was a fundamentally important coping strategy. 
                                                 
5
 Broadacre farms include sheep, beef, mixed livestock, wheat and other crop farms, and mixed livestock-crop 
farms (ABS 2003). 
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By compensating for lost income, it helped households to meet basic needs and cover some of the 
additional costs that were imposed by the fires, such as buying feed for stock. The fact that farmers 
had endured drought prior to the January 30 bushfires meant that many were already engaged in off-
farm employment. 
 
From a sustainable livelihoods perspective, Oughton and Wheelock (2003) have argued that the partial 
containment of micro-businesses within households means that it is impossible to understand the two 
separately. For example, Phillipson et al. (2004) demonstrated the role of households in providing 
resilience to micro-businesses during the Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic in the UK. They found 
that households absorbed the costs of the epidemic through adjustments in the wage taken from 
businesses, restrictions of household spending and the use of personal savings. Australian farm 
households adopt similar strategies to cope with drought and other financial pressures (Gray and 
Lawrence 2001). Responses to the January 30 bushfires highlight the inseparability of farm businesses 
and households. Households absorbed the costs to farm businesses by reducing their income, utilising 
personal savings and restricting expenditure on household goods and non-essentials, such as food and 
leisure activities. These were accepted as cost of re-establishing livelihoods, which would ultimately 
sustain households in the longer-term. 
 
Household capacities to cope and adapt: social and community life 
Immediately after the fires, a sense of shared experience and solidarity provided the foundation for a 
newfound social cohesion among residents and landholders. Longstanding social divisions (see 
Chapter 4) were broken down as people shared donated goods and volunteer labour and worked 
cooperatively to clean up the district. This is consistent with the findings of sociological disaster 
research, which demonstrates that individuals and groups tend to become more cohesive and exhibit 
pro-social behaviour in disaster situations (Drabek and McEntire 2003; Perry and Lindell 2003). 
Furthermore, Tierney (2006) notes that community conflicts are often suspended as people and 
organisations put aside their pre-disaster agendas in order to overcome disaster-induced challenges. 
This is evident in Fritz’s (1961, 689) early observation that:   
 
The widespread sharing of danger, loss and deprivation produces an intimate, primary 
group solidarity among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a 
channel for intimate communication and expression and a major source of physical and 
emotional support and reassurance. 
 
This was certainly the case in the Wulgulmerang district, where residents and landholders observed a 
sense of caring and goodwill in their relationships with one another, even among old foes. Increased 
social cohesion enabled a more cooperative, inclusive and efficient approach to the allocation and 
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distribution of resources. However, this cohesion was neither all-encompassing nor lasting. A small 
number of people felt that the communal response was socially exclusive and divisive, particularly 
with respect to the sharing of donated goods and other support. These included some non-farmers, 
absentee landholders and others who were considered, or considered themselves, ‘outsiders’ in the 
community. Moreover, after an initial period of increased cohesion, the social divisions that existed 
prior to the fires gradually became re-established. Given that these divisions were broken down by the 
need to work cooperatively to overcome common disaster-induced challenges, it appears that they 
gradually became re-established as people recovered from the fires. Furthermore, pre-existing social 
divisions had an added dimension after the fires. The fact that the northern end of the district had been 
burnt-out, but the southern end had not, exacerbated pre-existing divisions to the point where one 
resident questioned whether there were, in reality, two separate districts. Some of those who were 
severely affected believed that Gelantipy had received greater support during and after the fires, 
despite being only minimally affected. Unmet expectations of firefighting support, in particular, 
created tensions that prompted a small number of volunteers to resign from the Gelantipy fire brigade.  
 
It is important to emphasise that despite pre-existing social divisions and the fact that some people’s 
experiences of the disaster had strained their relationships with others in the district, people were, on 
the whole, able to work together and help each other to cope and adapt to the fires’ impacts when it 
mattered most. Furthermore, a number of residents later re-joined the local fire brigade and continued 
to participate in community life. 
 
I don’t think there’d be too many people from up here, even now, who’d be visiting down 
there [W Tree], or vice versa, as far as actual friends are concerned. But social functions 
and that – yeah – they sort of mix and there’s no animosity or anything like that. We had 
a reunion for the fires last year up at Wulgulmerang and we included W Tree. We try, if 
we have something on, to get them to come. 
– Fred, Gelantipy 
 
Interestingly, relations between residents and landholders of the Wulgulmerang district and those in W 
Tree were largely unchanged after the fires. It was noted in Chapter 5 that many W Tree residents 
oppose broadscale prescribed burning on ecological grounds. While the interviews revealed clear 
differences of opinion on this issue, W Tree residents were not blamed for the disaster. In fact, despite 
conflicting value systems and occasional disagreements on certain issues, there was a general 
recognition of the importance of the W Tree population to the district and the region as a whole. In 
particular, the relatively large number of children at W Tree helps to sustain the primary school at 
Buchan. This thesis has clearly demonstrated that schools are fundamental to the social and economic 
viability of isolated rural communities.  
 221 
 
7.4  Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has integrated the key research findings into the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter 2. This framework provides for the analysis of two core elements of vulnerability: (a) 
exposure to hazards; and (b) capacities for coping with and adapting to hazard impacts. Overall 
conclusions about the nature and causes of human vulnerability in the Wulgulmerang district are 
drawn in the concluding Chapter. Here, it is necessary to briefly recap the main points of this Chapter. 
 
Hazard exposure: 
• Residential and holiday-homes were often located in areas of high fire risk. While these 
landholders potentially faced greater risks to life, most were fully insured and decided to leave 
early or stay away from their properties during the fires. 
 
• Agricultural landholders typically have their homes and livelihood assets threatened by 
bushfires. These landholders faced far greater economic damages – a product of their larger 
asset bases and their underinsurance – and therefore accepted the increased risks to life and 
health of staying to defend their assets. 
 
• Prescribed burning is the state’s principal strategy for mitigating bushfire hazard on public 
land. Despite local people’s claims to the contrary, the accumulation of fuels on public land 
was not the dominant factor in their exposure to hazards during the fires. Evidence provided 
by land and fire managers, which is supported by the wider scientific literature, suggests that 
the extreme weather conditions experienced on January 30 would have negated the influence 
of previous prescribed burns.  
 
• Most residents and landholders were not prepared for bushfires of the scale and severity of 
those experienced on January 30. Perceptions of adequate bushfire preparedness were formed 
on the basis of past experiences of smaller, more manageable fires. Nevertheless, the long-
build up to the fires meant that people had time to implement basic preparedness measures. 
 
• The physical characteristics of the fires influenced household and firefighting responses. 
Firefighting resources were severely limited in the Wulgulmerang district because: (a) large 
parts of north-east Victoria and East Gippsland were affected by bushfires; (b) the fires arrived 
earlier than fire authorities had expected; (c) most properties were affected simultaneously; 
and (d) extreme fire behaviour prevented firefighters from assisting residents and landholders 
during the main passage of the fire front.  
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• The aged and diminished state of the district’s population meant that the local capacity for 
firefighting was severely limited. Almost all of the local fire brigade’s remaining volunteers 
were busy defending their own properties during the fires.  
 
• The physical characteristics of the fires also contributed to the scale of damage and 
destruction. Studies have shown that the probability of house destruction during bushfires 
increases dramatically at FFDIs greater than 40. The FFDI reached 52 (‘Extreme’) at 
Gelantipy and may have been higher further to the north, where the majority of houses and 
farm buildings were destroyed. 
 
Coping and adaptive strategies: 
• While there were no fatalities or serious injuries, the fires had a lasting impact on the 
psychological health of some local people. People’s capacities for coping with these impacts 
were undermined by the limited accessibility and provision of healthcare services – a product 
of geographical remoteness and deliberate policy choices – and by their own reluctance to 
seek help.  
 
• Women played a vital role in persuading their partners and other local men to access post-fire 
healthcare services. Service providers were aware that people might be deterred by an overly 
formal approach and thus were careful to deliver services in an informal, culturally sensitive 
way. 
 
• For most people, insurance was the primary strategy for recovering losses incurred in the fires. 
While most residential and holiday-home landholders were well-insured, many farmers and 
other agricultural landholders were significantly underinsured. Underinsurance was not simply 
a result of misperception or flawed decision-making; a range of financial and livelihood 
pressures associated with agricultural production prevented many from attaining an adequate 
level of cover.  
 
• Given the widespread underinsurance of agricultural landholders, government and other forms 
of assistance provided valuable resources for coping and adapting. Some men experienced 
difficulty applying for government financial assistance and were often helped through the 
process by women, who tended to have greater capacities for performing complex 
administrative tasks. Participation in social networks was another important means for 
accessing resources, such as farming materials and labour, to cope and adapt.  
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• Many farm businesses experienced reduced productivity as a result of the fires. Off-farm 
employment was an important strategy for compensating for lost income, allowing households 
to meet basic needs and cover some of the costs incurred as a result of the fires. Households 
also absorbed some of the costs to farm businesses by reducing income and expenditure on 
household goods and non-essentials.  
 
• Immediately after the fires, an enhanced sense of social cohesion among local people enabled 
donated goods and volunteer labour to be shared among those in need. While most people 
were satisfied with the communal response, a small number of those who considered 
themselves ‘outsiders’ in the community felt that it was socially exclusive and divisive.  
 
• As people began to cope and adapt, their need for external assistance diminished. 
Consequently, the enhanced sense of social cohesion also diminished and pre-existing social 
divisions were gradually re-established. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
They would normally be really resilient people – they’d bounce back and they’d bounce back.  
And they’re really good at doing that. But you can’t get knocked  
down consistently and keep bouncing back. 
– Counsellor, LECH 
 
This thesis began by introducing the Wulgulmerang district and the disaster that was triggered by the 
bushfires of January 30, 2003. This remote settlement, situated between the Alpine and Snowy River 
National Parks in East Gippsland, was home to fewer than 100 people, most of whom earned their 
living from cattle and sheep farming. The damage and destruction wrought by the fires was 
unprecedented in the district’s history and, given the small population, was proportionally greater than 
in any other part of Victoria that was affected by bushfires in 2003. When the research began, in 2004, 
it was clear that losses of homes, buildings, livestock, farm fences and other assets had severely 
affected people’s finances and livelihoods. However, the fires had also affected people in less tangible 
ways. Initial research revealed concern that some people were not coping emotionally with their 
experiences, while widespread discontent with official and unofficial responses had created and 
intensified rifts within the community. The fires had occurred in a context of depopulation and service 
withdrawal, which had undermined the social and economic viability of the district, and after 
prolonged drought, which had placed many farm households under considerable financial pressure. All 
of this suggested that the disaster was not simply a product of an exceptionally severe bushfire. 
Clearly, a deeper analysis of the nature and causes of people’s vulnerability to bushfires was required. 
 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, human vulnerability was defined as a spatially and 
temporally dynamic social space in which people differentially experience heightened exposure to 
hazards and a diminished capacity to cope and adapt to hazard impacts. This definition emphasises 
that vulnerability is a situation, rather than a status, that people may move in and out of over space and 
time. Consequently, the research aimed to develop an understanding of: (a) how and why people were 
exposed to hazards during the bushfires of January 30, 2003; and (b) how and why they were capable 
of coping and adapting to the fire’s impacts.  
 
The position taken in this thesis is that human vulnerability arises from the circumstances of people’s 
day to day lives, which are shaped by factors both within and beyond their control. Consequently, the 
analysis considered the conditions of life in the district prior to the disaster. A range of pressures and 
challenges that contributed to people’s vulnerability to bushfires were identified. Most significantly, it 
was shown that changes to the nature of local livelihoods had profoundly transformed the social and 
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economic foundations of the district. Declining terms of trade and increasing competition had forced 
widespread restructuring in the agricultural sector. To achieve greater productivity and efficiency, 
farmers increased the size of their properties and reduced their production costs. The economic 
dependence on agricultural income meant that the local community was severely affected by these 
changes. The social and economic viability of the district was further undermined by a process of out-
migration that resulted in reduced local economic activity and the withdrawal of public services. 
While residents of the district have always faced challenges associated with the limited accessibility of 
goods and services, the closure of the local primary school in 2001 was widely regarded as a ‘tipping 
point’ for the community. Residents were adamant that the area would be unable to attract young 
families without a school and were therefore pessimistic about the prospects for revitalising the local 
economy and community.   
 
The research has developed a multifaceted understanding of how and why people were vulnerable to 
the January 30 bushfires. In particular, important differences in the hazard exposure and adaptive 
capacities of agricultural and non-agricultural landholders were identified. Residential and holiday 
homes were often located in areas of high fire-risk, typically for their high amenity values. However, 
most of these residents decided to leave early or deliberately stayed away from their properties for the 
duration of the fires. The fact that their livelihoods were not at stake and that most had their homes and 
contents insured meant that their exposure to bushfire hazards was minimal. In contrast, agricultural 
landholders’ homes and farms tended to be located in lower fire-risk areas, as most were surrounded 
by open pastures, but contained a greater assortment of assets that could be threatened by fires. 
Consequently, farming families had a greater share of their total asset base at risk and faced the 
prospect of far greater economic damages from the fires. Thus they accepted the risks to life to stay 
and defend their assets and livelihoods. 
 
There were also important differences in agricultural and non-agricultural landholders’ capacities to 
cope and adapt. A major finding of the research was that while most residents had their homes and 
contents insured, many farmers were underinsured for damage to their livelihood assets. The cost of 
premiums was identified as the principal barrier to greater insurance of these assets, with longstanding 
drought and other financial pressures on farm households leading to reduced expenditure on business 
risk management. The shift to larger, asset-laden farms was also a driver of underinsurance, as farmers 
had greatly increased their asset bases but did not necessarily have the resources to insure them. 
Fortunately, most people were found to be well-integrated into social networks and were able to access 
government assistance, which provided them with the resources to begin to cope and adapt to the 
impacts of the fires. 
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Another stated aim of the research was to build on critical hazards theory by developing and applying 
the concept of vulnerability in a Western context. As noted above, the research developed a concept of 
vulnerability that enabled analysis of people’s hazard exposure and their capacities for coping and 
adapting to hazard impacts. Because many social scientists regard hazard exposure as a technical 
matter – involving assessments of frequencies, probabilities and other hazard characteristics – their 
analyses tend to focus on the capacities of people or organisations to cope and adapt to hazards. This 
thesis clearly demonstrates the role of social, political and economic factors in exposing people to 
hazards. Property prices, for example, may compel people with low incomes to occupy hazardous 
locations. Those who are politically marginal may receive minimal societal protection. For a social 
scientist, then, hazard exposure is properly regarded as a social process through which people are 
differentially exposed to hazards. Analyses of human vulnerability should explicitly and systematically 
consider differences the causes of, and differences in, people’s exposure to hazards and their 
capacities to cope and adapt.  
 
The thesis also illustrates the role of ‘root causes’ in the production of vulnerability. Most notably, the 
rise of neoliberal ideology in Australian public policy profoundly affected many rural communities. 
Deregulation and the abandonment of protectionist trade policies forced the restructuring of farm 
businesses, which, as discussed, triggered a process of out-migration, economic contraction and 
service withdrawal that undermined the social and economic viability of the district. Neoliberal 
ideology also underpinned governments’ reduced commitments to service provision and infrastructure 
in rural areas, with goals of economic efficiency and small government overriding concerns for socio-
spatial equity. Given the centrality of livelihoods and regional social and economic vitality to the 
explanation of vulnerability developed throughout, the thesis clearly demonstrates the role of macro-
political economic change in the production of vulnerability.  
 
The research also contributes to critical hazards theory by challenging approaches that reduce 
vulnerability to a matter of individual hazard perception and decision-making. In line with the critique 
of perception and adjustment studies developed in Chapter 2, the research clearly demonstrates that, 
while individual perceptions and decisions are important, human vulnerabilities are caused by a far 
broader and more complex range of factors. Consequently, the research also challenges the orthodox 
approach to reducing vulnerability, which is based on information provision and education to raise 
individuals’ awareness and knowledge of hazards. 
 
Importantly, the research raises the question of what can be done to reduce vulnerability to bushfires 
in the Wulgulmerang district. This thesis has focused explicitly on questions of how and why people 
were vulnerable to the bushfires of January 30, 2003. Future research will need to consider the 
avenues and opportunities for vulnerability reduction in the district. Nevertheless, the findings 
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presented in this thesis provide some useful starting points. It is clear that vulnerability reduction will 
not be achieved through bushfire awareness and education programs alone. Climate change 
projections suggest that East Gippsland will be hotter and drier in the future, with an increased risk of 
damaging bushfires and floods (DSE 2004; Hennessy et al. 2005; Lucas et al. 2007). An increase in 
the severity of droughts is likely to amplify the financial pressures on farm households and may 
increase the risks associated with underinsurance. In addition, residents and landholders are likely to 
be affected by successive droughts and bushfires in relatively short periods of time, which, together, 
may exceed their capacity to cope and adapt.  
 
The key research need emerging from the thesis is an in-depth examination of underinsurance in rural 
communities. Future research should examine the reasons why rural households and businesses may 
not attain an adequate level of insurance and, crucially, the options that are available to government 
and insurance companies to facilitate greater insurance. To build community resilience to bushfires, as 
well as drought and other shocks and stresses, a holistic development agenda must be pursued. 
Strategic planning and policy should aim to build the social and economic viability of the district by 
revitalising and diversifying the local economy, attracting new businesses and residents to the area and 
increasing access to basic services. Projections of a warmer climate and fewer frosts suggest 
opportunities for the development of new industries, including horticulture and viticulture (DSE 
2004). In the meantime, fire authorities should develop policies and programs that aim to provide 
remote, rural communities with greater protection and support before, during and after bushfires, 
recognising that these communities may have limited capacities to protect themselves. 
 228 
References 
 
Adams, J. D. 1981. The Tambo Shire centenary history. Bairnsdale: James Yeates & Sons. 
 
Adamson, K. 2003. Older, wiser head saw fire coming. The Weekly Times, 2 April: 11. 
 
Adger, W. N. 2000. Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Progress in Human Geography 
24: 347-64. 
 
———. 2003. Social capital, collective action, and adaptation to climate change. Economic 
Geography 79: 387-404. 
 
Adger, W. N., N. Brooks, G. Bentham, M. Agnew, and S. Eriksen. 2004. New indicators of 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Technical Report 7. Norwich, U.K.: Tyndall Centre for 
Climate Change Research. 
 
Adger, W. N., T. P. Hughes, C. Folke, S. R. Carpenter, and J. Rockström. 2005. Social-ecological 
resilience to coastal disasters. Science 309: 1036-39. 
 
Alexander, D. E. 1993. Natural disasters. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Alston, M. 1995. Women on the land: the hidden heart of rural Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Alston, M. 2007. Globalisation, rural restructuring and health service delivery in Australia: policy 
failure and the role of social work? Health and Social Care in the Community 15: 195-202. 
 
Alston, M., and J. Kent. 2008. The big dry: the link between rural masculinities and poor health 
outcomes for farming men. Journal of Sociology 44: 133-47. 
 
American Anthropological Association (AAA). 1998. Code of ethics of the American Anthropological 
Association. http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethicscode.pdf (last accessed 22 March 
2006). 
 
Appleby, L. ed. 2004. Flames across the mountains: personal accounts of the Bogong, Razorback and 
Pinnibar fires, East Gippsland 2003. Benambra: Leanne Appleby. 
 
Ashe, F., A. Finlayson, M. Lloyd, I. MacKenzie, J. Martin, and S. O'Neill. 1999. Contemporary social 
and political theory: an introduction. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Association of American Geographers (AAG). 2005. Statement on professional ethics. 
http://www.aag.org/Publications/Other%20Pubs/Statement%20on%20Professional%20Ethics.
pdf (last accessed 22 March 2006). 
 
Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC). 2005a. Guidance for people in vehicles during 
bushfires. East Melbourne: AFAC Limited. 
 
———. 2005b. Position paper on bushfires and community safety. East Melbourne: AFAC Limited. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2001a. Census of population and housing. Available from: 
http://www.abs.gov.au (last accessed 1 October 2007). 
 
———. 2001b. Census of population and housing: Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA), 
Australia – Data cube only, 2001. 
 229 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2033.0.55.001Main+Features12001?O
penDocument (last accessed 1 October 2007). 
 
———. 2003. Australian social trends, 2003: living arrangements – farming families. 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/ABS@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001cc588/cdcd7dca1
f3ddb21ca2570eb00835393!OpenDocument (last accessed 18 March 2006). 
 
———. 2005. Australia’s beef cattle industry. In 2005: Yearbook Australia. ABS catalogue no. 
1301.0, ed. D. Trewin, 471-78. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
 
———. 2006a. Census of population and housing. Available from: http://www.abs.gov.au (last 
accessed 1 October 2007). 
 
———. 2006b. Census Quickstats: 2040201(Census Collection District). 
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/ABSNavigation/prenav/LocationSearch?locationLastSearc
hTerm=2040201&locationSearchTerm=2040201&newarea=2040201&submitbutton=View+Q
uickStats+%3E&mapdisplay=on&collection=Census&period=2006&areacode=2040201&geo
graphy=&method=Place+of+Usual+Residence&productlabel=&producttype=QuickStats&top
ic=&navmapdisplayed=true&javascript=true&breadcrumb=PL&topholder=0&leftholder=0&c
urrentaction=104&action=401&textversion=false&subaction=1 (last accessed 1 October 
2007). 
 
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2007. Gippsland. 
http://www.aec.gov.au/profiles/g/gippsland.htm (last accessed 10 December 2007). 
 
Author unknown. 1949. Historical event at Gelantipy: first auction sale of livestock. Bairnsdale 
Advertiser, 10 May: 1. 
 
———. 1965a. Bruthen area on alert again. Bairnsdale Advertiser, 11 March: 1. 
 
———. 1965b. Gelantipy thanks fire fighters. Bairnsdale Advertiser, 25 March: 3. 
 
———. 1965c. New policy on burning-off wanted. Bairnsdale Advertiser, 18 March: 1. 
 
———. 1965d. Public probe into the fire. Bairnsdale Advertiser, 25 March: 1. 
 
———. 1965e. Strong attack on Forests Commission. Bairnsdale Advertiser, 22 March: 1 and 7. 
 
———. 1965f. 80 trapped as fire roars past town - Showers bring some hope. The Age, 9 March: 1. 
 
———. 2003. Hay & straw price guide (South-eastern Australia) $A per tonne shed price for week 
ended 12/2/2003. The Weekly Times, 19 February: 78. 
 
Ball, N. 1975. The myth of the natural disaster. The Ecologist 5: 368-69. 
 
Balmer, I. 1993. Selling the mountain calves: a personal history of the East Gippsland calf sales. 
Bairnsdale: Kapana Press. 
 
Barrow, G. J. 1945. A survey of houses affected in the Beaumaris fire, January 14, 1944. Journal of 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 18: 27-37. 
 
Barrows, H. H. 1923. Geography as human ecology. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 12: 1-14. 
 
 230 
Bebbington, A., and T. Perreault. 1999. Social capital, development, and access to resources in 
highland Ecuador. Economic Geography 75: 395-418. 
 
Beringer, J. 2000. Community fire safety at the urban/rural interface: the bushfire risk. Fire Safety 
Journal 35: 1-23. 
 
Berkes, F., J. Colding, and C. Folke eds. 2003. Navigating social-ecological systems: building 
resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Berkes, F., and C. Folke. 1998a. Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and 
sustainability. In Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social 
mechanisms for building resilience, eds. F. Berkes and C. Folke, 1-25. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
———. 1998b. Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms 
for building resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Berry, M. 2003. Why is it important to boost the supply of affordable housing in Australia – and how 
can we do it? Urban Policy and Research 21: 413-35. 
 
Bhaskar, R. 1975. A realist theory of science. Leeds: Leeds Books. 
 
———. 1979. The possibility of naturalism: a philosophical critique of the contemporary human 
sciences. Brighton: Harvester. 
 
Black, A. 2005. Rural communities and sustainability. In Sustainability and change in rural Australia, 
eds. C. Cocklin and J. Dibden, 20-37. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner. 1994. At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability 
and disasters. London: Routledge. 
 
Blanchi, R., and J. Leonard. 2008. Property safety: judging structural safety. In Community bushfire 
safety, eds. J. Handmer and K. Haynes, 77-85. Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
 
Blong, R. 1997. A geography of natural perils. Australian Geographer 28: 7-27. 
 
Bohle, H. G., T. E. Downing, and M. J. Watts. 1994. Climate change and social vulnerability: toward a 
sociology and geography of food insecurity. Global Environmental Change 4: 37-48. 
 
Bowman, D. M. J. S. 1998. The impact of Aboriginal landscape burning on the Australian biota. New 
Phytologist 140: 385-410. 
 
Bradbury, J. A. 1989. The policy implications of differing concepts of risk. Science, Technology & 
Human Values 14: 380-99. 
 
Bradstock, R.A. and A.M. Gill. 2001. Living with fire and biodiversity at the urban edge: in search of 
a sustainable solution to the human protection problem in southern Australia. Journal of 
Mediterranean Ecology 2: 179-95. 
 
Brannen, J. 1992a. Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview. In Mixing 
methods: qualitative and quantitative research, ed. J. Brannen, 3-37. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
——— ed. 1992b. Mixing methods: qualitative and quantitative research. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
 231 
Brewer, J., and A. Hunter. 2006. Foundations of multimethod research: synthesizing styles. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Brookfield, H. 1999. Environmental damage: distinguishing human from geophysical causes. 
Environmental Hazards 1: 3-11. 
 
Browne, M.J., and R.E. Hoyt. 2000. The demand for flood insurance: empirical evidence. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 20: 291-306. 
 
Bryman, A. 1988. Quantity and quality in social research. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 2004. Social research methods. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bryman, A., and R. Burgess. 1999. Qualitative research methodology: a review. In Qualitative 
research, volume 1: fundamental issues in qualitative research, eds. A. Bryman and R. 
Burgess, 160-79. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Buchan Sesquicentenary Committee. 1989. Bukan-Mungie: 150 years of settlement in the Buchan 
district, 1839-1989. Bairnsdale: E-Gee Printers. 
 
Buckle, P., G. Marsh, and S. Smale. 2000. New approaches to assessing vulnerability and resilience. 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 15: 8-14. 
 
Bunting, T. E., and L. Guelke. 1979. Behavioral and perception geography: a critical appraisal. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 69: 448-62. 
 
Burby, R.J. 1998. Natural hazards and land use: an introduction. In Cooperating with nature: 
confronting natural hazards with land-use planning for sustainable communities, ed. R.J. 
Burby, 1-26. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 
 
Bureau of Meteorology. 2003a. Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology submission to the Victorian 
Emergency Services Commissioner's inquiry into the 2002/03 bushfires. Melbourne: Bureau of 
Meteorology, Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
———. 2003b. Gelantipy weather profile for 30 January 2003.  Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
———. 2003c. Meteorological aspects of the eastern Victorian fires, January - March 2003. 
Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
———. 2007. El Niño - detailed Australian analysis. 
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/enso/australia_detail.shtml (last accessed 19 October 2007). 
 
———. 2008. Climate statistics for Australian locations: Gelantipy Automatic Weather Station (no. 
084142). http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/tables/cw_084142_All.shtml (last accessed 
19 February 2008). 
 
Burnley, I., and P. Murphy. 2004. Sea Change: movement from metropolitan to Arcadian Australia. 
Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Burton, I., and R. W. Kates. 1964. The perception of natural hazards in resource management. Natural 
Resources Journal 3: 412-41. 
 
Burton, I., R. W. Kates, and G. F. White. 1978. The environment as hazard. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 232 
 
———. 1993. The environment as hazard. Second edition. New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Byrne, M., D. Lerias, and N. Sullivan. 2006. Predicting vicarious traumatization in those indirectly 
exposed to bushfires. Stress and Health 22: 167-77. 
 
Caldwell, T. M., A. F. Jorm, and K. B. G. Dear. 2004. Suicide and mental health in rural, remote and 
metropolitan areas in Australia. Medical Journal of Australia 181: s10-14. 
 
Cannon, T. 2000. Vulnerability analysis and disasters. In Floods, ed. D. J. Parker, 45-55. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Cardona, O. D. 2004. The need for rethinking the concepts of vulnerability and risk from a holistic 
perspective: a necessary review and criticism for effective risk management. In Mapping 
vulnerability: disasters, development and people, eds. G. Bankoff, G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 
37-51. London: Earthscan. 
 
Chambers, R. 1989. Editorial introduction: vulnerability, coping and policy. IDS Bulletin 20: 1-7. 
 
———. 1995. Poverty and livelihoods: whose reality counts? Environment and Urbanization 7: 173-
204. 
 
Chambers, R., and G. Conway. 1992. Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st 
century. IDS Discussion Paper 296. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Cheney, N. P. 1976. Bushfire disasters in Australia, 1945-1975. Australian Forestry 39: 245-68. 
 
———. 1996. The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning for fire management. In Fire and 
biodiversity: the effects and effectiveness of fire management, ed. J. Barnett, 9-16. Canberra: 
Biodiversity Unit, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories, Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
 
Cheney, P., and A. Sullivan. 1997. Grassfires: fuel, weather and fire behaviour. Collingwood: CSIRO 
Publishing. 
 
Cheshire, L., and G. Lawrence. 2005. Neoliberalism, individualisation and community: regional 
restructuring in Australia. Social Identities 11: 435-45. 
 
Chouinard, V., R. Fincher, and M. Webber. 1984. Empirical research in scientific human geography. 
Progress in Human Geography 8: 347-80. 
 
Clayer, J. R., C. Bookless-Pratz, and A. McFarlane. 1985. The health and social impact of the Ash 
Wednesday bushfires: a survey of the twelve months following the bushfires of February, 
1983. Adelaide: South Australian Health Commission.  
 
Collier, A. 1994. Critical realism: an introduction to Roy Bhaskar's philosophy. London: Verso. 
 
Cortner, H. J., P. D. Gardner, and J. G. Taylor. 1990. Fire hazards at the urban-wildland interface: 
what the public expects Environmental Management 14: 57-62. 
 
Costar, B. 1999. Coalition government: an unequal partnership. In The Kennett revolution: Victorian 
politics in the 1990s, eds. B. Costar and N. Economou, 88-98. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Costar, B., and N. Economou eds. 1999. The Kennett revolution: Victorian politics in the 1990s. 
Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 233 
 
Costello, L. 2007. Going bush: the implications of urban-rural migration. Geographical Research 45: 
85-94. 
 
Costin, A. B. 1954. A study of the ecosystems of the Monaro region of New South Wales, with special 
reference to soil erosion. Sydney: Government Printer. 
 
Country Fire Authority (CFA). 2001. The impact of structural change on the Victorian economy: 
submission by the Country Fire Authority on the impact of structural change on volunteerism 
within CFA. Melbourne: Economic Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria. 
 
———. 2003. The campaign fires: North-East / East Gippsland fires 2003. Burwood East: Country 
Fire Authority. 
 
———. 2004. Living in the bush: bushfire survival plan workbook. Burwood East: Country Fire 
Authority.  
 
———. 2006. Can I or can't I? 
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/restrictions/documents/can_i_cant_i/can_i_english.pdf (last 
accessed 16 October 2007). 
 
———. 2007. On the land: agricultural fire management guidelines. Burwood East: Country Fire 
Authority.  
 
———. 2008. Funding. http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/about/funding.htm (last accessed 15 January 2008). 
 
Country Fire Authority and Department of Sustainability and Environment. 2003. Gelantipy / 
Wulgulmerang, 30 January 2003: summary of Near Miss Investigation for Chief Officers of 
CFA and DSE and their response. Melbourne: State Government of Victoria. 
 
Cox, H. 1998. Women in bushfire territory. In The gendered terrain of disaster, eds. E. Enarson and 
B. H. Morrow, 133-42. New York: Praeger. 
 
Creswell, J. 2003. Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Creswell, J. W., and V. L. Plano-Clark. 2007. Designing and conducting mixed methods research. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Crotty, M. 1998. The foundations of social research: meaning and perspective in the research process. 
Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Curr, E. 1965. Recollections of squatting in Victoria, then called the Port Phillip District. Second 
edition. Carlton: Melbourne University Press. 
 
Cutter, S. L. 1996. Vulnerability to environmental hazards. Progress in Human Geography 20: 529-
39. 
 
Cutter, S. L., J. T. Mitchell, and M. S. Scott. 2000. Revealing the vulnerability of people and places: a 
case study of Georgetown County, South Carolina. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 90: 713-37. 
 
Davison, G. 2005. Rural sustainability in historical perspective. In Sustainability and change in rural 
Australia, eds. C. Cocklin, and J. Dibden, 38-55. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
 234 
Delanty, G. 1997. Social science: beyond constructivism and realism. Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
 
Delica-Willison, Z., and R. Willison. 2004. Vulnerability reduction: a task for vulnerable people 
themselves. In Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development and people, eds. G. Bankoff, G. 
Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 145-58. London: Earthscan. 
 
Dempsey, K. 1990. Smalltown: a study of social inequality, cohesion and belonging. Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Denzin, N. K. 1989. The research act: a theoretical introduction to sociological methods. Third 
edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Denzin, N. K., and Y. S. Lincoln. 2005. Introduction: the discipline and practice of qualitative 
research. In The Sage handbook of qualitative research, eds. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 
1-32. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Department of Education. No date. State School No. 3153, Gelantipy. In Series VPRS 795, Building 
Files: Primary Schools. Collection of papers held at the Public Record Office of Victoria, 
North Melbourne. 
 
Department of Planning and Community Development. 2007. East Gippsland Planning Scheme – 
Local provision: Wildfire Management Overlay. 
http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/PlanningSchemes/eastgippsland/maps/eastgippsland10wmo.pdf 
(last accessed 4 May 2008). 
 
Department of Premier and Cabinet. 2003. Submissions to the Inquiry. 
http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/CA256D8000265E1A/page/Listing-Inquiry+into+the+2002-
2003+Victorian+Bushfires-Submissions+to+the+Inquiry!OpenDocument&1=10-
Government+Initiatives~&2=Listing+key-+Inquiry+into+the+2002-
2003+Victorian+Bushfires~&3=20-Submissions+to+the+Inquiry~ (last accessed 16 July 
2004). 
 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). 2004. Climate change in East Gippsland. 
http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/CF7EA29FFB2C9881CA25719
B000557CA/$File/East+Gippsland.pdf (last accessed 23 April 2008). 
 
———. 2006. Code of practice for fire management on public land. East Melbourne: Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, State Government of Victoria. 
 
———. 2007. Major bushfires in Victoria. 
http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/DSE/nrenfoe.nsf/LinkView/E20ACF3A4A127CB04A2567930015
5B04358FFCDA5CA1F43FCA256DA6000942C9 (last accessed 12 September 2007). 
 
Deputy State Coroner (South Australia). 2005. Preliminary findings of inquest 2005. 
http://www.courts.sa.gov.au/courts/coroner/findings/findings_2005/wangary_bushfires.htm 
(last accessed 23 December 2006). 
 
Dexter, L. 1971. Elite and specialized interviewing. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Doherty, M. 2005. Bushfire victims sue govts - more lawsuits expected to follow. The Canberra 
Times, July 1: 1. 
 
 235 
Dovers, S. 1994. Still discovering Monaro: perceptions of landscape. In Australian environmental 
history: essays and cases, ed. S. Dovers, 119-40. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 2004. Sustainability and disaster management. The Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management 19: 21-25. 
 
Dovers, S., and J. W. Handmer. 1992. Uncertainty, sustainability and change. Global Environmental 
Change 2: 262-76. 
 
Dow, K. 1992. Exploring differences in our common future(s): the meaning of vulnerability to global 
environmental change. Geoforum 23: 417-36. 
 
Drabek, T. E., and D. A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: lessons, 
trends and opportunities from the research literature. Disaster Prevention and Management 
12: 97-112. 
 
Dynes, R. R. 2006. Social capital: dealing with community emergencies. Homeland Security Affairs 2: 
1-26.  
 
East Gippsland Catchment Management Authority (EGCMA). 2005. East Gippsland Regional 
Catchment Strategy. Bairnsdale: East Gippsland Catchment Management Authority. 
 
East Gippsland Shire Council (EGSC). 2007. East Gippsland Planning Scheme. 
http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/planningschemes/aaCombinedPDFs/EastGippsland_PS_Ordinance.
pdf (last accessed 4 May 2008). 
 
Eckersley, R. 1992. Environmentalism and political theory: toward an ecocentric approach. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 1991. Manual for estimating 
the socio-economic effects of natural disasters. Santiago, Chile: United Nations. 
 
———. 2003. Handbook for estimating the socio-economic and environmental effects of disasters. 
Mexico City: United Nations. 
 
Edgell, M. C. R. 1973. Nature and the perception of the bushfire hazard in southeastern Australia. 
Department of Geography Monash University, Melbourne. 
 
Edgell, M. C. R., and E. H. Brown. 1975. The bushfire environment of southeastern Australia. Journal 
of Environmental Management 3:329-49. 
 
Elliott, J. R., and J. Pais. 2006. Race, class, and Hurricane Katrina: social differences in human 
responses to disaster Social Science Research 35: 295-321. 
 
Ellis, F. 2000. Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Ellis, S., P. Kanowski, and R. Whelan. 2004. National inquiry on bushfire mitigation and 
management. Canberra: Council of Australian Governments, Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
Emel, J., and R. Peet. 1989. Resource management and natural hazards. In New models in geography: 
the political economy perspective, Volume 1, eds. R. Peet and N. Thrift, 49-76. Boston: Unwin 
Hyman. 
 
 236 
Emergency Services Commissioner (ESC). 2005. Examination of prescribed burning practices. 
Melbourne: Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner, State Government of Victoria. 
 
Enarson, E., and L. Meyreles. 2004. International perspectives on gender and disaster: differences and 
possibilities. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 24: 49-93. 
 
Eriksen, C. 2007. Why do they burn the 'bush'? Fire, rural livelihoods, and conservation in Zambia. 
The Geographical Journal 173: 242-56. 
 
Esplin, B., M. Gill, and N. Enright. 2003. Report of the inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian 
bushfires. Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, State Government of Victoria. 
 
Ewald, F. 1991. Insurance and risks. In The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality, eds. G. 
Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller, 197-210. London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
 
Fernandes, P. M. and H. S. Botelho. A review of prescribed burning effectiveness in fire hazard 
reduction. International Journal of Wildland Fire 12: 117-28. 
 
Fischhoff, B. 1989. Risk: a guide to controversy. In Improving risk communication, ed. Committee on 
Risk Perception and Communication, 211-19. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 
Fleeton, M. W. 1980. Public and private adjustment to bush fire hazard in Australia: empirical 
evidence from New South Wales. Australian Geographer 14: 350-59. 
 
Flood, J. 1973. Pleistocene human occupation and extinct fauna in Cloggs Cave, Buchan, South-east 
Australia. Nature 246: 303. 
 
———. 1980. The moth hunters: Aboriginal prehistory of the Australian Alps. Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal Studies. 
 
———. 2006. The Original Australians: story of the Aboriginal people. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Folke, C. 2006. Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses. 
Global Environmental Change 16: 253-67. 
 
Fontana, A., and J. H. Frey. 2005. The interview: from neutral stance to political involvement. In The 
Sage handbook of qualitative research, eds. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 695-727. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Fordham, M. 2004. Gendering vulnerability analysis: towards a more nuanced approach. In Mapping 
vulnerability: disasters, development and people, eds. G. Bankoff, G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 
174-82. London: Earsthscan Publications. 
 
Fordham, M. H. 1999. The intersection of gender and social class in disaster: balancing resilience and 
vulnerability. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 17:15-36. 
 
Fothergill, A. 1996. Gender, risk, and disaster. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters 14: 33-56. 
 
Fothergill, A., and L. A. Peek. 2004. Poverty and disasters in the United States: a review of recent 
sociological findings. Natural Hazards 32: 89-110. 
 
Fritz, C. 1961. Disasters. In Contemporary social problems, eds. R. Merton and R. Nisbet, 651-94. 
New York: Harcourt. 
 
 237 
Fuller, J., J. Edwards, N. Procter, and J. Moss. 2000. How definitions of mental health problems can 
influence help seeking in rural and remote communities. Australian Journal of Rural Health 8 
(3): 148-53. 
 
Gardner, J. S. 2002. Natural hazards risk in the Kullu district, Himachal Pradesh, India. The 
Geographical Review 92: 282-306. 
 
Gardner, P. D. 1993. Gippsland massacres: the destruction of the Kurnai tribes, 1800-1860. Ensay: 
Ngarak Press. 
 
Gardner, P. D., H. Cortner, and K. Widaman. 1987. The risk perceptions and policy response toward 
wildland fire hazards by urban home-owners. Landscape and Urban Planning 14: 163-72. 
 
Geysen, S. 2002. The road to Suggan Buggan. Second edition. Melbourne: Alpha-Gen Computers. 
 
Gill, A. M. 1981. Post-settlement fire history in Victorian landscapes. In Fire and the Australian biota, 
eds. A. M. Gill, R. H. Groves and I. R. Noble, 77-98. Canberra: Australian Academy of 
Science. 
 
Gill, A. M., K. R. Christian, P. H. R. Moore, and R. I. Forrester. 1987. Bushfire incidence, fire hazard 
and fuel reduction burning. Australian journal of Ecology 12: 299-306. 
 
Gill, N. 1994. The cultural politics of resource management: the case of bushfires in a conservation 
reserve. Australian Geographical Studies 32: 224-40. 
 
GISCA. 2004. Accessibility / Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). 
http://www.gisca.adelaide.edu.au/web_aria/aria/aria.html (last accessed 16 April 2006). 
 
Glaser, B. G., and A. L. Strauss. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
research. New York: Aldine Publishing Company. 
 
Gleeson, T., D. McDonald, S. Hooper and P. Martin. 2003. Australian beef industry 2003: report on 
the Australian Agricultural and Grazing Industries Surveys of Beef Producers. ABARE 
research report 03.3. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
 
Goodman, H., and M. Proudley. 2008. Social contexts of responses to bushfire threat: a case study of 
the Wangary fire. In Community bushfire safety, eds. J. Handmer and K. Haynes, 47-58. 
Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
 
Gorman, D., E. Buikstra, D. Hegney, S. Pearce, C. Rogers-Clark, J. Weir, and B. McCullagh. 2007. 
Rural men and mental health: their experiences and how they are managed. International 
Journal of Mental Health Nursing 16: 298-306. 
 
Gould, J. 2006. Fuel management - an integral part of fire management: trans-Tasman perspective. In 
Fuels management - how to measure success: conference proceedings, 28-30 March 2006; 
Portland, OR, eds. P. L. Andrews and B. W. Butler, 17-28. Fort Collins, CO.: Forest Service, 
United States Department of Agriculture. 
 
Gray, I. 1991. Politics in place: social power relations in an Australian country town. Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gregory, D. 2000. Realism. In The dictionary of human geography, eds. R. J. Johnston, D. Gregory, 
G. Pratt and M. Watts, 673-76. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Groff, R. 2004. Critical realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge. London: Routledge. 
 238 
 
Guhar-Sapir, D., D. Hargitt, and P. Hoyois. 2004. Thirty years of natural disasters, 1974 - 2003: the 
numbers. Brussels: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université 
catholique de Louvain. 
 
Gunderson, L. H., and C. S. Holling eds. 2002. Panarchy: understanding transformations in human 
and natural systems. Washington: Island Press. 
 
Halpern, D. 2005. Social capital. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Hammersley, M. 1992. Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide. In Mixing methods: 
qualitative and quantitative research, ed. J. Brannen, 39-55. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
Hammersley, M., and P. Atkinson. 1983. Ethnography: principles in practice. Second edition. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Hancock, W. K. 1972. Discovering Monaro: a study of man's impact on his environment. London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Handmer, J. 1985. Floodplain maps: uses and limitations as public information. In Abstracts of the 
13th New Zealand Geographical Society Conference. Hamilton, New Zealand. 
 
———. 2003. We are all vulnerable. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 18:55-60. 
 
Handmer, J., and S. Dovers. 1996. A typology of resilience: rethinking institutions for sustainable 
development. Industrial & Environmental Crisis Quarterly 9:482-511. 
 
———. 2007. Handbook of disaster and emergency policies and institutions. London: Earthscan. 
 
Handmer, J., and A. Tibbits. 2005. Is staying at home the safest option during bushfires? Historical 
evidence for an Australian approach. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental 
Hazards 6: 81-91. 
 
Haynes, K., A. Tibbits, and L. Coates. Forthcoming. 100 years of Australian bushfire fatalities: 
exploring the trends. Risk Frontiers working paper. Sydney: Macquarie University.  
 
Henessy, K., C. Lucas, N. Nichols, J. Bathols, R. Suppiah, and J. Ricketts. 2005. Climate change 
impacts on fire-weather in south-east Australia. Aspendale: CSIRO. 
 
Hewitt, K. 1980. Review of 'The environment as hazard'. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 70: 306-11. 
 
———. 1983a. The idea of calamity in a technocratic age. In Interpretations of calamity from the 
viewpoint of human ecology, ed. K. Hewitt, 3-32. London: Allen & Unwin. 
 
——— ed. 1983b. Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
 
———. 1995. Sustainable disasters?  Perspectives and powers in the discourse of calamity. In Power 
of development, ed. J. Crush, 115-28. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 1997. Regions of risk: a geographical introduction to disasters. Harlow: Longman. 
 
———. 1998. Excluded perspectives in the social construction of disaster. In What is a disaster? 
Perspectives on the question, ed. E. L. Quarantelli, 75-91. London: Routledge. 
 239 
 
Hill, R., and D. Baker-Gabb. 1991. Flora & Fauna Guarantee Action Statement: Brush-tailed Rock-
wallaby, Petrogale penicillata. East Melbourne: Department of Conservation and 
Environment, State Government of Victoria. 
 
Hodgson, S., and M. Papadakis. 2003. Gippsland fire toll is 39 houses. Sunday Herald Sun, 2 
February: 8. 
 
Holling, C. S. 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 4: 1-23. 
 
Holling, C. S., and L. H. Gunderson. 2002. Resilience and adaptive cycles. In Panarchy: 
understanding transformations in human and natural systems, eds. L. H. Gunderson and C. S. 
Holling, 25-62. Washington: Island Press. 
 
Hood, B., and T. Seedsman. 2004. Psychosocial investigation of individual and community responses 
to the experience of Ovine Johne’s Disease in rural Victoria. Australian Journal of Rural 
Health 12: 54-60. 
 
Horton, D. R. 1982. The burning question: Aborigines, fire and Australian ecosystems. Mankind 13: 
237-51. 
 
Howitt, A. W. 1890. The Eucalypts of Gippsland. Transactions of the Royal Society of Victoria 83: 
81-120. 
 
Hughes, J. 1990. The philosophy of social research. Second edition. London: Longman. 
 
Hugo, G. 2005. The state of rural populations. In Sustainability and change in rural Australia, eds. C. 
Cocklin and J. Dibden, 56-79. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Hunt, P. 2003. Farmers seek fire damages. The Weekly Times, 3 December: 1-2. 
 
Hussey, G. 2007. Outback depression situation near crisis point, health conference told. 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1925070.htm (last accessed 28 January 2008). 
 
Hutton, D., and L. Connors. 1999. A history of the Australian environment movement. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Immurs, T. M. 1976. Bushfire hazard: the effects of experience on perception and adjustment. 
Unpublished BA (Hons) thesis. Adelaide: Department of Geography, University of Adelaide. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). 2004. Living with risk. A global review of 
disaster reduction initiatives. Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction. 
 
———. 2005. Hyogo framework for action: building the resilience of nations and communities to 
disasters. http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf (last 
accessed 18 February 2008). 
 
———. 2006. Disaster occurrence. http://www.unisdr.org/disaster-statistics/occurrence-trends-
century.htm (last accessed 14 February 2008). 
 240 
 
———. 2008. Mission and objectives. http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-mission-objectives-
eng.htm (last accessed 18 February 2008). 
 
Irwin, A., P. Simmons, and G. Walker. 1999. Faulty environments and risk reasoning: the local 
understanding of industrial hazards. Environment and Planning A 31: 1311-26. 
 
Ison, R. 2005. Traditions of understanding: language, dialogue and experience. In Social learning in 
environmental management: towards a sustainable future, eds. M. Keen, V.A. Brown, and R. 
Dyball, 22-40. London: Earthscan. 
 
Ison, R., N. Röling, and D. Watson. 2007. Challenges to science and society in the sustainable 
management and use of water: investigating the role of social learning. Environmental Science 
& Policy 10: 499-511. 
 
Jackson, E. L. 1981. Response to earthquake hazard: the west coast of North America. Environment 
and Behavior 13: 387-416. 
 
Jasper, R. G. 1999. The changing direction of land managers in reducing the threat from major 
bushfires on the urban interface of Sydney. In Proceedings of the Australian Bushfire 
Conference, eds. I. Lunt and D.G. Green, 175-84. Albury: School of Environmental and 
Information Sciences, Charles Sturt University. 
 
Jessup, S., and G. Johnson. 1997. Action Statement No. 82: Yellow Hyacinth Orchid, Dipodium 
hamiltonianum. East Melbourne: Department of Natural Resources and Environment, State 
Government of Victoria. 
 
Johnson, R. B., and A. J. Onwuegbuzie. 2004. Mixed methods research: a research paradigm whose 
time has come. Educational Researcher 33: 14-26. 
 
Johnstone, G. 2002. Report of the investigation and inquests into a wildfire and the deaths of five 
firefighters at Linton on 2 December 1998. Melbourne: State Coroner’s Office of Victoria. 
 
Jones, R. 1969. Fire-stick farming. Australian Natural History 16: 224-28. 
 
Judd, F., H. Jackson, C. Fraser, G. Murray, G. Robins, and A. Komiti. 2006a. Understanding suicide in 
Australian farmers. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 41: 1-10. 
 
Judd, F., H. Jackson, A. Komiti, G. Murray, C. Fraser, A. Grieve, and R. Gomez. 2006b. Help-seeking 
by rural residents for mental health problems: the importance of agrarian values. Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 40: 769-76. 
 
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky eds. 1982. Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and 
biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kasperson, R. E., and K. Dow. 1993. Hazard perception and geography. In Behavior and environment: 
psychological and geographical approaches, eds. T. Garling and R. G. Golledge, 193-221. 
New York: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 
 
Kates, R. W. 1971. Natural hazard in human ecological perspective: hypotheses and models. 
Economic Geography 47: 438-51. 
 
Keen, M., V.A. Brown, and R. Dyball eds. 2005. Social learning in environmental management: 
towards a sustainable future. London: Earthscan. 
 
 241 
Kelly, P. M., and W. N. Adger. 2000. Theory and practice in assessing vulnerability to climate change 
and facilitating adaptation. Climatic Change 47: 325-52. 
 
Kepe, T. 2005. Grasslands ablaze: vegetation burning by rural people in Pondoland, South Africa. 
South African Geographical Journal 87: 10-17. 
 
King, D. 2001. Uses and limitations of socio-economic indicators of community vulnerability to 
natural hazards: data and disasters in Northern Australia. Natural Hazards 24: 147-56. 
 
Kirschenbaum, A. 2005. Preparing for the inevitable: environmental risk perceptions and disaster 
preparedness. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 23: 97-127. 
 
Klinenberg, E. 2002. Heat wave: a social autopsy of disaster in Chicago. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Kiss, R. 1999. Local government to local administration: the new order. In The Kennett revolution: 
Victorian politics in the 1990s, eds. B. Costar and N. Economou, 110-21. Sydney: UNSW 
Press. 
 
Kohen, J. 1995. Aboriginal environmental impacts. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Kuhlken, R. 1999. Settin' the woods on fire: rural incendiarism as protest. The Geographical Review 
89: 343-63. 
 
Kull, C. A. 2002a. Empowering pyromaniacs in Madagascar: ideology and legitimacy in community-
based natural resource management. Development and Change 33: 57-78. 
 
———. 2002b. Madagascar aflame: landscape burning as peasant protest, resistance, or a resource 
management tool? Political Geography 21: 927-53. 
 
———. 2004. Isle of fire: the political ecology of landscape burning in Madagascar. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lakes Entrance Community Health. 2004. East Gippsland fire recovery report: December 2004. 
Lakes Entrance: Lakes Entrance Community Health. 
 
Land Conservation Council. 1977. Report on the Alpine study area. Melbourne: Land Conservation 
Council (Victoria). 
 
Laris, P. 2004. Grounding environmental narratives: the impact of a century of fighting against fire in 
Mali. In African environment and development: rhetoric, programs, realities, eds. W. Mosely 
and B. Logan, 63-85. London: Ashgate Publishing. 
 
Laris, P., and D. A. Wardell. 2006. Good, bad or 'necessary evil'? Reinterpreting the colonial burning 
experiments in the svanna landscapes of West Africa. The Geographical Journal 172: 271-90. 
 
Latour, B., and S. Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory life: the construction of scientific facts. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Lawrence, G. 1987. Capitalism and the countryside: the rural crisis in Australia. Leichhardt: Pluto 
Press. 
 
Learmont, J. 1971. The attitudes, perception and behavioral response of residents in the Dandenongs 
to the bushfire hazard. Unpublished BA (Hons) thesis. Melbourne: Department of Geography, 
Monash University. 
 242 
 
Leiblich, A. 1998. Narrative research: reading, analysis and interpretation. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Leichenko, R. M., and K. L. O'Brien. 2002. The dynamics of rural vulnerability to global change: the 
case of southern Africa. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 7: 1-18. 
 
Leonard, J. 2003. People and property: a researcher's perspective. In Australia burning: fire ecology, 
policy and management issues, eds. G. Cary, D. Lindenmayer and S. Dovers, 103-12. 
Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
 
Leonard, J., and N. A. McArthur. 1999. A history of research into building performance in Australian 
bushfires. In Proceedings of the Australian Bushfire Conference, eds. I. Lunt and D. G. Green, 
219-25. Albury: School of Environmental and Information Sciences, Charles Sturt University. 
 
Lindell, M. K., and R. W. Perry. 2004. Communicating environmental risk in multiethnic communities. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Lucas, C., K. Hennessy, G. Mills, and J. Bathols. 2007. Bushfire weather in southeast Australia: 
recent trends and projected climate change impacts. Consultancy report prepared for The 
Climate Institute of Australia, Bushfires CRC and CSIRO. Melbourne: CSIRO. 
 
Lugg, A., P. Marsh, A. Bartlett, and F. King. 1993. Statement of resources, uses and values for the 
East Gippsland Forest Management Area. East Melbourne: Department of Conservation and 
Natural Resources, State Government of Victoria. 
 
Luke, R. H., and A. G. McArthur. 1978. Bushfires in Australia. Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service. 
 
Lupton, D. ed. 1999. Risk and sociocultural theory: new directions and perspectives. Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lynn, K. 2003. Community capacity and wildfire protection: indicators of rural, low capacity 
communities. 
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/dspace/bitstream/1794/2320/1/PWCH_poverty_indicators_9
-23-03.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2008). 
 
Lynn, K., and W. Gerlitz. 2005. Mapping the relationship between wildfire and poverty. 
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/dspace/bitstream/1794/2417/1/firepovertydraft_11-21-05.pdf 
(last accessed 16 February 2008). 
  
Marshall, C., and G. B. Rossman. 2006. Designing qualitative research. Fourth edition. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Martin, I. M., H. Bender, and C. Raish. 2007. What motivates individuals to protect themselves from 
risks: the case of wildland fires. Risk Analysis 27: 887-900. 
 
Martin, W. E., C. Raish, and B. Kent eds. 2007. Wildfire risk: human perceptions and management 
implications. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
 
McArthur, A. G., and N. P. Cheney. 1967. Report on the southern Tasmanian bushfires of 7 February 
1967. Hobart: Forestry Commission of Tasmania. 
 
McArthur, N. A., and P. Lutton. 1991. Ignition of exterior building details in bushfires: an 
experimental study. Fire and Materials 15: 59-64. 
 243 
 
McCaffrey, S. 2004. Thinking of wildfire as a natural hazard. Society and Natural Resources 17: 509-
16. 
 
McCarthy, G. J., and K. G. Tolhurst. 2001. Fire management: effectiveness of broadscale fuel 
reduction burning in assisting with wildfire control in parks and forests in Victoria. 
Melbourne: Department of Natural Resources and Environment, State Government of 
Victoria. 
 
McDaniel, J., D. Kennard, and A. Fuentes. 2005. Smokey the Tapir: traditional fire knowledge and 
fire prevention campaigns in lowland Bolivia. Society and Natural Resources 18: 921-31. 
 
McLennan, J., and A. Birch. 2005. A potential crisis in wildfire emergency response capability? 
Australia’s volunteer firefighters. Environmental Hazards 6: 101-07. 
 
McLeod, R. 2003. Inquiry into the operational response to the January 2003 bushfires in the ACT. 
Canberra: Australian Capital Territory Government. 
 
Middleton, N., and P. O'Keefe. 1998. Disaster and development: the politics of humanitarian aid. 
London: Pluto Press. 
 
Mileti, D. 1999. Disasters by design: a reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. 
Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 
 
Miller, C. 2002. Logging cutbacks to save dwindling forests. The Age, 21 February: 3. 
 
———. 2003. After the inferno, hope, acts of kindness and red tape. The Age, 22 February: 4. 
 
———. 2005. Snowy River story: the grassroots campaign to save a national icon. Sydney: ABC 
Books. 
 
Miller, G., and K. J. Fox. 2004. Building bridges: the possibility of analytic dialogue between 
ethnography, conversation analysis and Foucault. In Qualitative research: theory, method and 
practice, ed. D. Silverman, 35-55. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Ministerial Taskforce on Bushfire Recovery. 2003. Final report from the Ministerial Taskforce on 
Bushfire Recovery, Melbourne: State Government of Victoria. 
 
Mirams, S. 2007. ‘Tired little Australian children are still plodding unnecessary miles in wet or shine’: 
school and scandal in Mallacoota. The Journal of Public Record Office Victoria. 
http://www.prov.vic.gov.au/provenance/no6/tiredlittlechildrenprint.pdf (last accessed 1 
October 2007). 
 
Mistry, J., A. Berardi, V. Andrade, T. Krahô, P. Krahô, and O. Leonardos. 2005. Indigenous fire 
management in the cerrado of Brazil: the case of the Krahô of Tocantíns. Human Ecology 33: 
365-86. 
 
Mitchell, G. 2003. Joy on fire sale. The Weekly Times, 19 February: 92. 
 
Mitchell, J. K. 1984. Hazard perception studies: convergent concerns and divergent approaches during 
the past decade. In Environmental perception and behaviour: an inventory and prospect, eds. 
T. F. Saarinen, D. R. Seamon and J. L. Sell, 33-59. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
 
Mitchell, J. K., N. Devine, and K. Jagger. 1989. A contextual model of natural hazard. The 
Geographical Review 79: 391-409. 
 244 
 
Morrissey, S.A., and J.P. Reser. 2007. Natural disasters, climate change and mental health 
considerations for rural Australia. Australian Journal of Rural Health 15: 120-25. 
 
Mountain Cattlemen’s Association of Victoria. 2003. Submission by the Mountain Cattlemen’s 
Association of Victoria on the 2003 Alpine Fires. 
http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/Bushfires/MountainCattlemen.pdf (last accessed 4 December 
2006).  
 
Moyser, G., and M. Wagstaffe eds. 1987. Research methods for elite studies. Boston: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Mugford, V. P. 1975. Bushfire hazard perception and adjustment: a case study of the Mitcham Hills, 
South Australia. Unpublished BA (Hons) thesis. Adelaide: Department of Geography, 
Flinders University. 
 
Muro, M., and P. Jeffrey. 2008. A critical review of the theory and application of social learning in 
participatory natural resource management. Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 51: 325-44. 
 
Murray, R., and K. White. 1995. State of fire: a history of volunteer firefighting and the Country Fire 
Authority in Victoria. North Melbourne: Hargreen Publishing Company. 
 
Mustafa, D. 1998. Structural causes of vulnerability to flood hazard in Pakistan. Economic Geography 
74: 289-305. 
 
Nelson, K. C., M. C. Monroe, J. Fingerman Johnson, and A. Bowers. 2004. Living with fire: 
homeowner assessment of landscape values and defensible space in Minnesota and Florida, 
USA. International Journal of Wildland Fire 13: 413-25. 
 
Nicholson, P. H. 1981. Fire and the Australian Aborigine - an enigma. In Fire and the Australian 
biota, eds. A. M. Gill, R. H. Groves and I. R. Noble, 55-76. Canberra: Australian Academy of 
Science. 
 
Niemi, E., and K. Lee. 2001. Wildfire and poverty: an overview of the interactions among wildfires, 
fire-related programs, and poverty in the western States. Portland: The Centre for Watershed 
and Community Health. 
 
O'Bryan, D. 1983. Pioneering East Gippsland. Collingwood: Renwick Pride. 
 
O'Keefe, P., K. Westgate, and B. Wisner. 1976. Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. Nature 
260: 566-67. 
 
O'Rourke, E. J. 1936. Black Mountain and Suggan Buggan. The Bairnsdale Advertiser, 28 April: 1. 
 
O'Rourke Family. no date. O'Rourke graves at Wulgulmerang and Black Mountain. In O’Rourke 
Family: miscellaneous papers and photographs. Collection of papers held in the State Library 
of Victoria’s Australian manuscripts collection (MS 12608, Box 3435/7), Melbourne. 
 
Oliver-Smith, A. 2004. Theorizing vulnerability in a globalised world: a political ecological 
perspective. In Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development and people, eds. G. Bankoff, G. 
Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 10-24. London: Earthscan. 
 
Oughton, E. and J. Wheelock. 2003. A capabilities approach to sustainable household livelihoods. 
Review of Social Economy 61: 1-22. 
 
 245 
Pagram, R. J. 1989. Fire in the hills: bushfire occurrence, fire management and perception of the fire 
risk in the Shire of Mundaring, Western Australia. Unpublished BA (Hons) thesis. Perth: 
School of Social Sciences, Curtin University of Technology. 
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. 2002. Towards sustainability in the water sector – the importance of human actors and 
processes of social learning. Aquatic Sciences 64: 394-411. 
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., D. Tàbara, R. Bouwen, M. Craps, A. Dewulf, E. Mostert, D. Ridder, and T. Taillieu. 
2008. The importance of social learning and culture for sustainable water management. 
Ecological Economics 64: 484-95. 
 
Parker, D. J., and J. W. Handmer. 1998. The role of unofficial flood warning systems. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 6: 45-60. 
 
Parliament of Australia. 2003. Inquiry into the recent Australian bushfires: submissions. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/bushfires/inquiry/subs.htm (last accessed 16 January 
2004). 
 
Parliament of Victoria. 1999. Parliamentary debates (Hansard), Legislative Assembly, Fifty-fourth 
Parliament, first session, 9 November 1999 (extract from Book 2). Melbourne: State 
Government of Victoria. 
 
Patton, M. Q. 2002. Qualitative research & evaluation methods. Third edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Pearson, A. M. 1969. Echoes from the mountains and history of the Omeo Shire Council. Bairnsdale: 
James Yeates & Sons. 
 
Peet, R., and N. Thrift. 1989. Political economy and human geography. In New models in geography: 
the political economy perspective, Volume 2, eds. R. Peet and N. Thrift, 3-29. London: Unwin 
Hyman. 
 
Pelling, M. 1998. Participation, social capital and vulnerability to urban flooding in Guyana. Journal 
of International Development 10: 469-86. 
 
———. 2003. The vulnerability of cities: natural disasters and social resilience. London: Earthscan. 
 
Pelling, M., and C. High. 2005. Understanding adaptation: what can social capital offer assessments of 
adaptive capacity? Global Environmental Change 15: 308-19. 
 
Pelling, M., C. High, J. Dearing, and D. Smith. 2008. Shadow spaces for social learning: a relational 
understanding of adaptive capacity to climate change within organisations. Environment and 
Planning A 40: 867-84. 
 
Pendergast, J. V. 1968. Pioneers of the Omeo District. Port Melbourne: Riall Bros. 
 
Pendlebury, P., W. D. Erskine, S. Lake, P. Brown, I. F. Pulsford, J. Banks, and J. Nixon. 1996. Expert 
panel environmental flow assessment of the Snowy River below Jindabyne Dam. Unpublished 
report. Cooma: Unpublished report for the Snowy Genoa Catchment Management Committee. 
 
Perry, R. W., and M. K., Lindell. 2003. Understanding citizen response to disasters with implications 
for terrorism. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 11: 49-60. 
 
Perry, R. W., and E. L. Quarantelli eds. 2005. What is a disaster? New answers to old questions. 
Philadelphia: Xlibris. 
 246 
 
Philip, L. J. 1998. Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to social research in human 
geography - an impossible mixture? Environment and Planning A 30: 261-76. 
 
Philip, P. 2004. Wulgulmerang's fighting back. Brigade. Autumn edition: 10-11. 
 
Phillips, L., and M. W. Jørgensen. 2002. Discourse analysis as theory and method. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Phillipson, J., K. Bennett, P. Lowe, and M. Raley. 2004. Adaptive responses and asset strategies: the 
experience of rural micro-firms and Foot and Mouth Disease. Journal of Rural Studies 20: 
227-43. 
 
Pidgeon, N., and K. Henwood. 2004. Grounded theory. In Handbook of data analysis, eds. M. A. 
Hardy and A. Bryman, 623-48. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Pidgeon, N., C. Hood, D. Jones, B. Turner, and R. Gibson. 1992. Risk perception. In Risk analysis, 
perception and management, ed. Royal Society Study Group, 89-134. London: The Royal 
Society. 
 
Pimm, S. L. 1984. The complexity and stability of ecosystems. Nature 307: 321-26. 
 
Platt, R. H., T. O'Riordan, and G. F. White. 1997. Classics in human geography revisited: 'Human 
adjustment to floods'. Progress in Human Geography 21: 243-50. 
 
Portes, A. 1998. Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of 
Sociology 24: 1-24. 
 
Priest, S. J., M. J. Clark, and E.J. Treby. 2005. Flood insurance: the challenge of the uninsured. Area 
37: 295-302. 
 
Productivity Commission. 2005. Trends in Australian agriculture. Melbourne: Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
 
Pulsford, I. F., J. C. G. Banks, and L. Hodges. 1993. Land use history of the white cypress pine forests 
in the Snowy Valley, Kosciusko National Park. In Australia's ever-changing forests II, eds. J. 
Dargavel and S. Feary, 85-104. Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Australian National University. 
 
Putnam, R. 1995. Turning, turning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America. 
Political Science and Politics 28: 667-83. 
 
Pyne, S. J. 1998. Burning bush: a fire history of Australia. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
 
———. 2006. The still-burning bush. Melbourne: Scribe Short Books. 
 
Quarantelli, E. L. ed. 1998. What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 2002. The Disaster Research Centre (DRC) field studies of organized behaviour in the crisis 
time period of disasters. In Methods of disaster research, ed. R. A. Stallings, 94-126. 
Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation.  
 
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 1930. Former numbers and distribution of the Australian Aborigines. In 
Official yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 23, ed. J. Stonham, 687-96. Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
 247 
 
Ramsay, G. C., N. A. McArthur, and V. P. Dowling. 1987. Preliminary results from an examination of 
house survival in the 16 February 1983 bushfires in Australia. Fire and Materials 11:49-51. 
 
Raschky, P. A., and H. Weck-Hannemann. 2007. Charity hazard – a real hazard to natural disaster 
insurance? Environmental Hazards 7: 321-9. 
 
Resilience Alliance. 2007a. Homepage. http://www.resalliance.org/1.php (last accessed 22 January 
2008). 
 
———. 2007b. Resilience. http://www.resalliance.org/576.php (last accessed 22 January 2008). 
 
Rhodes, A. 2005. Stay or go: what do people think of the choice? Paper read at The Australasian Fire 
Authorities Council and Bushfire CRC Conference. Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
Ritchie, L. A., and D. A. Gill. 2007. Social capital as an integrating theoretical framework in 
technological disaster research. Sociological Spectrum 27: 103-29. 
 
Robbins, J. R. 1990. A burning issue: the politicization of a bushfire. International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters 8: 325-40. 
 
Robson, C. 2002. Real world research. Second edition. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Rodríguez, I. 2007. Pemon perspectives of fire management in Canaima National Park, southeastern 
Venezuela. Human Ecology 35: 331-43. 
 
Rogers, K. C. 1972. Historical notes. In Notes on the history of settlement and farming at Black 
Mountain, Gippsland. Collection of papers held in the State Library of Victoria's Australian 
manuscripts collection (MS 12960, Box 3695/7), Melbourne.  
 
———. 1976. Notes on changes in mountain areas. The Clematis: a magazine produced by the 
Bairnsdale Field Naturalists' Club 15: 3-6. 
 
Rubin, H. J., and I. S. Rubin. 2005. Qualitative interviewing: the art of hearing data. Second edition. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Rural and Regional Services and Development Committee. 2006. Final report: Inquiry into retaining 
young people in rural towns and communities. Melbourne: Parliament of Victoria. 
 
Russell-Smith, J., S. Djoeroemana, J. Maan, and P. Pandanga. 2007. Rural livelihoods and burning 
practices in savanna landscapes of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Eastern Indonesia. Human Ecology 
35: 345-59. 
 
Saarinen, T. F. 1966. Perception of drought hazard on the Great Plains. Research report no. 106. 
Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Chicago. 
 
Sanderson, D. 2000. Cities, disasters and livelihoods. Environment and Urbanization 12: 93-102. 
 
Sayer, A. 1992. Method in social science: a realist approach. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 2000. Realism and social science. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Schindler, B. 2007. Public acceptance of wildland fire conditions and fuel reduction practices: 
challenges for federal forest managers. In People, fire, and forests: a synthesis of wildfire 
 248 
social science, eds. T. Daniel, M. S. Carroll, C. Mosely and C. Raish, 37-54. Corvallis, OR: 
Oregon State University Press. 
 
Schuller, T., S. Baron, and J. Field. 2000. Social capital: a review and critique. In Social capital: 
critical perspectives, eds. S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller, 1-38. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Scoones, I. 1998. Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis. IDS Working Paper 72. 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
 
Scott, D. 2007. Resolving the quantitative-qualitative dilemma: a critical realist approach. 
International Journal of Research and Method in Education 30: 3-17. 
 
Scott, J. C. 1985. Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
———. 1998. Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Seddon, G. 1994. Searching for the Snowy: an environmental history. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Siegrist, M., C. Keller, and H. A. L. Kiers. 2005. A new look at the psychometric paradigm of 
perception of hazards. Risk Analysis 25: 211-22. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1956. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review 63: 
129-38. 
 
———. 1959. Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral science. The American 
Economic Review 49: 253-83. 
 
Sims, J. H., and D. D. Baumann. 1983. Educational programs and human response to natural hazards. 
Environment and Behavior 15: 165-89. 
 
Sjöberg, L. 1998. Worry and risk perception. Risk Analysis 18: 85-93. 
 
Slovic, P. 2000a. Introduction and overview. In The perception of risk, ed. P. Slovic, xxi-xxxvii. 
London: Earthscan. 
 
——— ed. 2000b. The perception of risk. London: Earthscan. 
 
Slovic, P., B. Fischhoff, and S. Lichtenstein. 1982. Why study risk perception? Risk Analysis 2: 83-93. 
 
Smith, J. A., A. Braunack, and G. Wittert. 2006. What do we know about men's help-seeking and 
health service use? Medical Journal of Australia 184: 81-83. 
 
Smith, K. 1996. Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster. London: Routledge. 
 
———. 2001. Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster. Third edition. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Smith, S. J. 2000. Qualitative methods. In The dictionary of human geography, eds. R. J. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 660-62. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
 249 
Stake, R. E. 2005. Qualitative case studies. In The Sage handbook of qualitative research, eds. N. K. 
Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 443-66. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
State Government of Victoria. 2002. Our forests, our future: balancing communities, jobs and the 
environment. East Melbourne: Department of Natural Resources and Environment. 
 
———. 2005. Media release from the Premier and the Minister for Environment: High country 
grazing continues outside National Park. 
http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/89EDE5378F9AB0E7CA25700B001D84F
6/$File/Grazinglicenses.pdf (last accessed 8 May 2007). 
  
Stephenson, H. 1988. Cattlemen & huts of the High Plains. Second edition. Ringwood: Viking. 
 
Strauss, A. L., and J. Corbin. 1990. Basics of qualitative research: grounded theory procedures and 
techniques. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Stretton, L. E. B. 1939. Report of the Royal Commission into the causes of and measures taken to 
prevent the bush fires of January, 1939, and to protect life and property and the measures to 
be taken to prevent bushfires in Victoria and to protect life and property in the event of future 
bush fires. Melbourne: State Government of Victoria. 
 
Swanson, K. 2008. Witches, children and Kiva-the-research-dog: striking problems encountered in the 
field. Area 40: 55-64. 
 
Sykes, C. 1982. A man from Gelantipy. Bairnsdale: James Yeates & Sons. 
 
Tacconi, L., and Y. Ruchiat. 2006. Livelihoods, fire and policy in eastern Indonesia. Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 27: 67-81. 
 
Taylor, J., and T. Daniel. 1984. Prescribed fire: public education and perception. Journal of Forestry 
82: 361-65. 
 
Taylor, J., and R. Webb. 2005. Meteorological aspects of the January 2003 south-eastern Australia 
bushfire outbreak. Australian Forestry 68: 94-103. 
 
Thomas, D. R. 2006. A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative evaluation data. American 
Journal of Evaluation 27: 237-46. 
 
Thompson, K. 1985. A history of the aboriginal people of East Gippsland: a report prepared for the 
Land Conservation Council, Victoria. Melbourne: Land Conservation Council. 
 
Thurmond, V. A. 2001. The point of triangulation. Journal of Nursing Scholarship 33: 253-58. 
 
Tibbits, A., J. Handmer, K. Haynes, T. Lowe, and J. Whittaker. 2008. Prepare, stay and defend or 
leave early: evidence for the Australian approach. In Community bushfire safety, eds. J. 
Handmer and K. Haynes, 59-71. Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
 
Tibbits, A., and J. Whittaker. 2007. Stay and defend or leave early: policy problems and experiences 
during the 2003 Victorian bushfires. Environmental Hazards 7: 283-90. 
 
Tierney, K. 2006. Social inequality, hazards, and disasters. In On risk and disaster: lessons from 
Hurricane Katrina, eds. R.J. Daniels, D.F. Kettl, and H. Kunreuther, 109-28. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
 250 
Timmerman, P. 1981. Vulnerability, resilience and the collapse of society. Environmental Monograph 
1. Toronto: Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto. 
 
Tindale, N. B. 1974. Aboriginal tribes of Australia: their terrain, environmental controls, distribution, 
limits, and proper names. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Tolhurst, K. G., and N. P. Cheney. 1999. Synopsis of the Knowledge Used in Prescribed Burning in 
Victoria. East Melbourne: Fire Management, Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment. 
 
Tonts, M. 2000. The restructuring of Australia's rural communities. In Land of discontent: the 
dynamics of change in rural and regional Australia, eds. B. Pritchard and P. McManus, 52-72. 
Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Tonts, M., and F. Haslam-McKenzie. 2005. Neoliberalism and changing regional policy in Australia. 
International Planning Studies 10: 183-200. 
 
Torry, W. I. 1979. Hazards, hazes and holes: a critique of ‘The environment as hazard’ and general 
reflections on disaster research. Canadian Geographer 23: 368-83. 
 
Trewin, D. 2003. Socio-economic indexes for areas: Australia, 2001. Information paper 2039.0. 
Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Turner, B. A. 1981. Some practical aspects of qualitative data analysis: one way of organising the 
cognitive processes associated with the generation of grounded theory. Quality and Quantity 
15: 225-47. 
 
Turner, B. L., R. E. Kasperson, P.A. Matson, J. J. McCarthy, R. W. Corell, L. Christensen, N., Eckley, 
J. X. Kasperon, A. Luers, M. L. Martello, C. Polsky, A. Pulsipher and A. Schiller. 2003. A 
framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 100: 8074-79. 
 
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 
185: 1124-31. 
 
Twigg, J. 2001. Sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability to disasters. London: Benfield Greig Hazard 
Research Centre. 
 
———. 2007. Characteristics of a disaster-resilient community: a guidance note. 
http://www.benfieldhrc.org/disaster_studies/projects/communitydrrindicators/Characteristics_
disaster_high_res.pdf (last accessed 15 January 2008). 
 
United Nations. 1994. Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-yokohama-strat-eng.htm (last accessed 18 February 
2008). 
 
United Nations General Assembly. 1989. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r236.htm (last accessed 18 February 2008). 
 
Vanclay, F. 2003. The impacts of deregulation and agricultural restructuring for rural Australia. 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 38: 81-94. 
 
Victorian Electoral Commission. 2007. Electorate profile: Gippsland East District. 
http://www.vec.vic.gov.au/gippslandeastdistrictprofile.html (last accessed 10 December 
2007). 
 251 
 
van Hoven, B. 2003. Using CAQDAS in qualitative research. In Key methods in geography, eds. N. J. 
Clifford and G. Valentine, 461-76. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Vogt, C., G. Winter, and J. S. Fried. 2005. Predicting homeowners' approval of fuel management at 
the wildland-urban interface using the theory of reasoned action. Society and Natural 
Resources 18: 337-54. 
 
W Tree Progress Association (WTPA). 2005. Submission to the 2005 - 2008 Fire Operations Plan, 
Nowa Nowa Forest District. W Tree: W Tree Progress Association. 
 
Waddell, E. 1975. How the Enga cope with frost: responses to climatic perturbations in the Central 
Highlands of New Guinea. Human Ecology 3: 249-73. 
 
———. 1977. The hazards of scientism. Human Ecology 5: 69-76. 
 
———. 1983. Coping with frosts, governments and disaster experts: some reflections based on a New 
Guinea experience and a perusal of the relevant literature. In Interpretations of calamity from 
the viewpoint of human ecology, ed. K. Hewitt, 33-43. London: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Wade, D. D. and J. D. Lunsford. 1988. A guide for prescribed burning in southern forests. Technical 
publication R8-TP 11, Atlanta: Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture. 
 
Wakefield, N. A. 1967. Naturalist's diary. Croydon: Longmans. 
 
———. 1969. Aspects of exploration and settlement of East Gippsland. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of Victoria 82: 7-25. 
 
———. 1970. Bushfire frequency and vegetational change in south-eastern Australian forests. 
Victorian Naturalist 87: 152-58. 
 
Walker, J. 1981. Fuel dynamics in Australian vegetation. In Fire and the Australian Biota, eds. A. M. 
Gill, R. H. Groves and I. R. Noble, 101-27. Canberra: The Australian Academy of Science. 
 
Walker, R. A. 1979. Review of The environment as hazard. Geographical review 69: 113-14. 
 
Walmsley, D. J., and G. J. Lewis. 1984. Human geography: behavioural approaches. London: 
Longman. 
 
Walter, J. ed. 2004. World disasters report 2004: focus on community resilience. Geneva: 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 
 
Wareing, K., and D. Flinn. 2003. The Victorian Alpine Fires: January - March 2003. East Melbourne: 
Department of Sustainability and Environment, State Government of Victoria. 
 
Watts, M. J. 1983a. On the poverty of theory: natural hazards research in context. In Interpretations of 
calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology, ed. K. Hewitt, 231-62. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
 
———. 1983b. Silent violence: food, famine and peasantry in northern Nigeria. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
 
Watts, M. J., and H. G. Bohle. 1993. The space of vulnerability: the causal structure of hunger and 
famine. Progress in Human Geography 17: 43-67. 
 
 252 
Wesfarmers Federation Insurance. 2007. Rural plan: product disclosure statement. 
http://www.wfi.com.au/wps/wcm/connect/internet/wfi/resources/c875f700487953dcb999b96a
db95ec72/CompleteRuralplanpolicy.pdf (last accessed 16 December 2007). 
 
Wettenhall, R. L. 1975. Bushfire disaster: an Australian community in crisis. Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson. 
 
White, G. F. 1945. Human adjustment to floods. Chicago: University of Chicago Department of 
Geography. 
 
——— ed. 1974. Natural hazards: local, national, global. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
White, P. 2006. Control options for Ovine Johne’s Disease infected flocks. 
http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/dpi/nreninf.nsf/LinkView/73A2F8EBC39CDA32CA256CAE0001
D7495FA46B2D7E0F5E9E4A256DEA00274704 (last accessed 30 January 2008). 
 
Whittaker, J., and D. Mercer. 2004. The Victorian bushfires of 2002-2003 and the politics of blame: a 
discourse analysis. Australian Geographer 35: 259-87. 
 
Wiest, R., J. Mocellin, and T. Motsisi. 1994. The needs of women in disasters and emergencies. 
Report prepared for the Disaster Management Training Programme of the United Nations 
Development Programme and the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator. 
Winnipeg: Disaster Research Unit, University of Manitoba. 
 
Wildavsky, A. 1988. Searching for safety. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Wilkinson, I. 2001. Social theories of risk perception: at once indispensable and insufficient. Current 
Sociology 49: 1-22. 
 
Wilson, A. A. G., and I. S. Ferguson. 1984. Fight or flee?  A case study of the Mount Macedon 
bushfire. Australian Forestry 47: 230-36. 
 
———. 1986. Predicting the probability of house survival during bushfires. Journal of Environmental 
Management 23: 259-70. 
 
Winchester, P. 1992. Power, choice and vulnerability: a case study in disaster mismanagement in 
south India, 1977-1988. London: James & James Science Publishers. 
 
Winter, G., and J. S. Fried. 2000. Homeowner perspectives on fire hazard, responsibility, and 
management strategies at the wildland-urban interface. Society and Natural Resources 13: 33-
49. 
 
Wisner, B. 2004. Assessment of capability and vulnerability. In Mapping vulnerability: disasters, 
development and people, eds. G. Bankoff, G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 183-93. London: 
Earthscan. 
 
Wisner, B., P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and I. Davis. 2004. At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability 
and disasters. Second edition. London: Routledge. 
 
Woodgate, P. W., W. D. Peel, K. E. Ritman, J. E. Coram, A. Brady, A. J. Rule, and J. C. G. Banks. 
1994. A study of the old-growth forests of East Gippsland. Heidelberg, Victoria: Arthur Rylah 
Institute for Environmental Research, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. 
 
Woolcock, M. 2002. Social capital and development: concepts, evidence and applications. 
http://vle.worldbank.org/gdln/fsharing/uploads/file1896.ppt (last accessed 16 July 2007). 
 253 
 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our common future. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Yeung, H. W. 1997. Critical realism and realist research in human geography: a method or a 
philosophy in search of a method? Progress in Human Geography 21: 51-74. 
 
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Zimmerer, K. S., and T. J. Basset. 2003. Approaching political ecology: society, nature, and scale in 
human-environment studies. In Political ecology: an integrative approach to geography and 
environment-development studies, eds. K. S. Zimmerer and T. J. Basset, 1-25. New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
 
Zylstra, P. 2006. Fire history of the Australian Alps: prehistory to 2003. Canberra: Australian Alps 
Liaison Committee. 
 254 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
Appendix 1.1: The Wulgulmerang district 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 1: A view from Gelantipy 
 
 
 
Photograph 2: A view of Black Mountain 
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Photograph 3: Farmland at Gelantipy 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: Farmland at Wulgulmerang 
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Photograph 5: A residential property surrounded by dense bush 
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Appendix 2.1: A brief overview of disaster research 
 
This Appendix provides a brief overview of the sociological literature on disasters. While this 
literature is not central to the argument of this thesis, a discussion of disaster concepts and of 
collective behaviour and social organisation in disaster is broadly relevant and may be of interest to 
some readers.   
 
The nature of disasters 
Sociological research on emergencies and disasters originated with Samuel Prince’s (1920) doctoral 
dissertation on collective behaviour in response to the 1917 Halifax explosion in Nova Scotia, Canada. 
Other formative studies include Carr’s (1932) study of disaster and social change and Sorokin’s (1942) 
Man and society in calamity. Disaster sociology emerged as an organised field of study in the mid 
1950s, spurred largely by the US military’s interest in questions of maintaining social order in wartime 
situations (Quarantelli 1987). In an era of Cold War uncertainty, and with financial support from 
military organisations, research was geared towards practical concerns such as predicting whether 
citizens would panic when faced with potential or actual nuclear attacks. During this period, 
researchers also studied the phenomena of individual and group convergence on disaster sites; that is, 
situations in which ‘outsiders’ descend on the scene to provide assistance to those affected (Drabek 
and McEntire 2003). Sociological research focused primarily on disaster events and their immediate 
impacts and, consequently, engaged in little theorising about the social causes of disasters (Tierney et 
al. 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘disaster’ has been the subject of considerable debate (e.g. Quarantelli 
1998; Perry and Quarantelli 2005). Perspectives on disaster range from agent-specific 
conceptualisations, which focus on the properties and forces of physical events, to social 
constructionist approaches, which emphasise the role of discourse in the claims-making processes 
through which events or processes are classified as ‘disasters’. For example, Fritz (1961, 655) defined 
disaster as: 
 
… an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-
sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its 
members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the 
fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions of society is prevented.  
 
The functionalist character of disaster research is also reflected in Barton’s (1969) conceptualisation of 
disasters as a type of ‘collective stress situation’. Disasters are here defined as a situation (rather than 
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an event) arising from exogenous disturbance in which ‘… many members of a social system fail to 
receive expected conditions of life from the system’ (Barton 1969, 38).   
 
Gilbert (1998) identifies three main paradigms into which the numerous theoretical approaches to 
disasters can be classified. In the first paradigm disasters are analogous to war in that they are 
attributed to external agents (‘attacks’) to which human communities must react aggressively to 
minimise damage. Disasters are considered an expression of social vulnerabilities that exist within a 
social system in the second paradigm. In the third, disasters are understood in terms of uncertainty, 
which is held to be an inherent feature of increasingly complex, modern societies in which dangers are 
not easily defined in terms of cause and effect (see also, Beck 1992; Luhmann 1993). In practise, 
however, the most common approach to defining or, more accurately, declaring disasters is to use 
official statistics of the fatalities, casualties, physical damage and/or economic costs triggered by 
discrete, identifiable events. Such an approach may be useful in administrative settings where, for 
example, decisions must be made about when and how to access and allocate disaster relief; however 
it is inherently political. 
 
Kreps (1998) sees general agreement among social scientists about what disasters are and how they 
can be distinguished from other types of social phenomena. With Drabek, he fuses a functionalist with 
a social constructionist perspective to define disasters as ‘non-routine social problems’ (Kreps and 
Drabek). Accordingly, they frame disaster research in terms of the conditions arising from social 
systems and their transformation (functionalism) and the claims-making and response activities that 
determine how the problem is defined (social constructionism). For Kreps and Drabek (1996, 142), 
 
… the essence of disaster is the conjunction of historical conditions and social definitions 
of physical harm and social disruption at the community or higher levels of analysis. 
During and immediately following an event, claims-making and response activities 
translate as domains of collective action to meet demands that are socially defined as 
acute. A large-scale mobilization takes place to meet these needs, existing groups and 
organizations restructure existing activities, and new structural forms are socially created. 
 
For Kreps and Drabek, disasters constitute non-routine events because they are unusual and dramatic 
‘social happenings’ that are markedly different from those people encounter in their everyday lives 
(1996, 133). The ‘key defining properties’ of non-routine events include the length of forewarning and 
the magnitude, scope and duration of impacts. These properties are important in their formulation 
because they set important limits on the types of events that are included in the analytic category 
‘disaster’. For example, Ellemor and Barnett (2005) question why the annual death toll from handguns 
in the US – which reached 28 874 in 1999 – is not considered a disaster in the same way September 11 
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terrorist attacks – which killed nearly 3 000 people – are. Following Kreps and Drabek, the death toll 
from handguns, although serious, is a different type of problem than that of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. The latter would be considered a disaster primarily because of the magnitude and 
concentration of its physical, social and economic impacts on New York City and its people, but also 
because of the claims-making activities and responses through which it has been socially defined as a 
disaster (e.g., by politicians and the media).   
 
However a disaster is conceptualised or defined, sociological disaster research has developed by 
asking certain types of questions about certain types of phenomena. In particular, research has focused 
on collective behaviour in the time after disaster – ranging from minutes and hours (e.g. Quarantelli 
1993) to years (e.g. Erikson 1976) after ‘impact’ – and on social organisation during and after disaster 
(e.g. Kreps 1989; Kreps and Bosworth 1994). The empirical findings of disaster research have been 
catalogued in a number of volumes (e.g. Mileti et al. 1975; Drabek 1986; Mileti 1999; Tierney et al. 
2001) and are too numerous to mention here. Nevertheless, it will be useful to provide an overview of 
research on collective behaviour and social organisation during disaster.  
 
Collective behaviour and social organisation 
Disasters are widely believed to trigger panic, looting and other anti-social behaviours. Research, 
however, has repeatedly demonstrated that such behaviour is rare and that, more often than not, 
individuals and groups become more cohesive and exhibit pro-social behaviour in disaster situations 
(Drabek and McEntire 2003; Perry and Lindell 2003). Disaster myths are often perpetuated by the 
mass media (Fischer 1998), especially television broadcasters (Quarantelli 1990), as was the case 
during and after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, 2005, where reporters breathlessly retold stories of 
horrific crimes – including the sexual abuse and murder of infants and young children, and the 
predation of the helpless by roaming, armed gangs – which remain unsubstantiated (Rosenblatt and 
Rainey 2005). Tierney et al. (2001) claim that, in fact, US crime rates tend to decline following large-
scale disasters. For Perry and Lindell (2003, 50), the ‘… myths of irrational and antisocial behaviour 
in disaster are not just erroneous – they hamper the effectiveness of emergency planning by 
misdirecting the allocation of resources and the dissemination of information’. They suggest that 
expectations of mass panic often become a justification for providing limited information to the 
public, which research has found is less likely to act on vague or incomplete information (Perry and 
Lindell 2003). 
 
Of course, disasters typically present people – as individuals, families and communities – with 
unprecedented challenges and problems. Not surprisingly, research confirms that people and 
organisations commonly cease routine activities and take on new disaster responsibilities, which can 
add to the damage and destruction caused by the disaster-agent (Drabek and McEntire 2003). 
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Communities may be strained by the scarcity of information, an inability to communicate with each 
other or outsiders, the challenges of managing limited resources, excessive responses by ‘outsiders’ 
and the emergence of new norms. Similarly, organisations may be faced with unprecedented 
challenges for which they must share tasks and resources in situations where responsibilities are not 
well-defined. New behaviours and organisations will emerge when those existing organisations cannot 
meet the demands or challenges of the disaster, when traditional tasks and structures no longer suffice, 
or when people take it upon themselves to resolve their crisis situation (Drabek and McEntire 2003). 
For example, local people may share existing resources and coordinate the collection and distribution 
of donated goods and labour, as they did in Wulgulmerang (see Chapter 6), or form support groups to 
discuss and come to terms with their experiences.  
 
Fothergill (1996, 44) presents evidence of a ‘gendered division of labour’ in emergency response, with 
men being more likely to engage in labour intensive activities outside the home (such as firefighting or 
search and rescue) and women being more likely to engage in important, but less visible, work within 
the home. This, however, is not always the case and women may also play important roles in disaster 
response outside of the domestic sphere. It has been argued that women’s tendency for greater 
sympathy, sensitivity to victims and household management skills represent are valuable assets in 
disaster management, and that greater involvement of women in activities outside of the home can 
greatly improve a community’s recovery from disaster (Fothergill 1996). 
 
Drabek and McEntire (2003) note that disaster response is usually quicker and more effective when 
managers utilise emergent behaviours and organisations. However, emergent phenomena provide both 
opportunities and challenges when managing disasters. Convergence on a disaster site may create 
logistical problems due to the congestion of people, vehicles, equipment and supplies. Those who 
coordinate response activities may find themselves challenged by the overabundance of volunteers or 
distracted by the demands of managing the media. Managing information, communication and the 
division of tasks and jurisdictional boundaries may present disaster and emergency managers with 
further challenges. But while scholars often recognise the opportunities posed by emergent 
phenomena, most practitioners advocate command-and-control approaches to disaster management 
(Drabek and McEntire 2003). The prevalence of command-and-control approaches is a legacy of the 
military origins of modern disaster research and management, in which disaster is analogised to 
wartime attacks (Gilbert’s ‘war paradigm’) (Dynes 1994).     
 
For Dynes (1994, 144), command-and-control approaches to emergency planning are based on an 
assumption that there is a clear distinction between the emergency and the pre-emergency period; that 
‘While the pre-emergency period can be characterized by some notion of ‘normalcy’, the emergency 
period is marked of by manifestations of social chaos’. Here, the supposed social disorganisation that 
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follows disaster is attributed to ineffective pre-emergency social organisation. Consequently, it is 
assumed that ‘… emergency planning should be directed to establishing a ‘command’ over the chaos 
and to ‘regain control’ over the disorganization of individuals’ (Dynes 1994, 144-5). But, as has 
already been discussed, widespread social disorganisation and anti-social behaviour during 
emergencies and disasters is rare. Command-and-control approaches to managing these phenomena 
are based on flawed assumptions about how people actually behave in such situations (Dynes 1994). 
In contrast to the top-down, rigidly controlled and highly centralised patterns of social organisation 
that are engineered in command-and-control approaches, Dynes advocate a ‘problem solving’ 
approach to emergency planning. In this approach, ‘… emergencies are, in effect, sets of problems 
which have to be solved with some degree of speed and effectiveness by the existing resources within 
that social unit – the community’ (Dynes 1994, 156). The problem solving model rests on a set of 
‘more realistic’ assumptions that derive from the findings of sociological research on emergencies and 
disasters: 
 
• Emergencies do not reduce the coping capacities of individuals or social structures, but 
they may present new and unexpected challenges. 
• Existing social structure is the most effective way to solve those problems.  To create an 
artificial, emergency-specific authority structure is neither possible nor effective. 
• Social units must be seen as resources for problem solving, rather than as problems 
themselves.  Planning should be built around the capacity of social units to make rational 
and informed decisions.  
• Emergencies are characterised by decentralised and pluralistic decision-making.  
Autonomy of decision-making should be valued, rather than the centralisation of 
authority. 
• An open system is required in which a premium is placed on flexibility and initiative 
among the various social units and in which those efforts are coordinate.  Goals should be 
oriented toward problem solving, rather than avoiding chaos. 
 
Dynes’s insistence that the capacities of ordinary people be acknowledged and integrated into 
emergency planning is an important precursor to the discussion of vulnerability and resilience, which 
emphasises adaptive capacity.  As is discussed in Chapter 5, one of the major criticisms from locals 
after the Wulgulmerang bushfires concerned the failure to capitalise on local knowledge in emergency 
planning and response. 
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Critiques of disaster research 
The basic concepts, theories and methods of sociological disaster research are the subject of 
considerable debate (e.g. Quarantelli 1998; Perry and Quarantelli 2005). Two interrelated critiques of 
disaster research are especially relevant here. First, most disaster research employs an agent-specific 
approach in which the physical event or process that triggers the disaster assumes primary analytical 
importance (Hewitt 1998) and, second, disaster research has had relatively little to say about the social 
causes of disasters (Perry 1998; Tierney et al. 2001).  
 
Hewitt (1998) draws parallels between the prevailing, agent-specific approach in disaster sociology 
and the hazards paradigm in geography (c.f. Hewitt 1983). He argues that the agent-specific approach 
‘… undermines the prospect of social understanding’ because disasters are classified, explained and 
responded to as if they are primarily a function of the physical agent, which impinges upon a 
vulnerable society (Hewitt 1998, 78). The agent-specific approach therefore gives rise to a logic of 
‘mechanism and control’ (c.f. Watts 1983) whereby disasters are explained by way of causal chains 
that begin with the impact of a physical agent and move along a series of pathways or response 
elements to abstract real-life phenomena and processes from the contexts of people’s everyday lives 
(Hewitt 1998). Hewitt argues that the agent-specific approach to disasters entails a ‘… tacit 
assumption of an unexamined normality; supposedly predictable, managed, stable and the basis of 
productive society’ (1998, 80). Consequently, in hazards geography and disaster sociology, disasters 
are treated as ‘unmanaged’, ‘unexpected’ and ‘unprecedented’ phenomena that derive from highly 
‘uncertain’ environmental processes or events of which human victims are typically ‘unaware’ or 
‘unprepared’ (Hewitt 1983, 10).  In this view, disasters are defined as disruptions to, or breaks from, 
‘normal life’ and the responsibility of professional managers becomes the restoration of social order. 
Consequently, Hewitt sees disaster sociology as reinforcing the power of centralised organisations 
(e.g. governments and financial organisations such as the World Bank) and promoting technical 
responses that are frequently ineffective and often insensitive to local cultures and environments 
(Hewitt 1998).   
 
The primary focus on disaster impacts and their immediate impacts in disaster sociology has mean that 
most studies are largely descriptive and do not attempt to explain the social causes of disasters 
(Tierney et al. 2001). Indeed, Perry (1998, 215) notes that ‘… disaster research has many examples of 
description, but our excursions into explanation have been relatively few’. For Enarson and Meyreles 
(2004, 61), mainstream disaster research is characterised by ‘snap shot’ case studies of single events, 
usually ‘natural hazards’, that lack historical perspective and any investigation of the ‘root causes’ of 
disasters. It is the latter understanding, that of history and underlying causes, that is central to research 
on human vulnerability to environmental hazards and disasters. 
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Appendix 3.1: Extracts from initial fieldwork report 
 
 
First stop was Traralgon where we met with Murray Ravenhall, Manager of Community Safety with 
the CFA for Regions 9, 10 and 11 (including East Gippsland). He talked mostly about the fires at 
Wulgulmerang. It was predicted that the fires wouldn’t arrive for a few days, so when they arrived 
early the CFA ‘got caught’. Someone from CFA was in the valley to start the community information 
process when the fires arrived. The people in Wulgulmerang ‘… felt they were left, but the CFA got 
caught’. X said that had the fires arrived the next day, the CFA would have been able to get a strike 
team in there. There is also a lot of anger at government departments (CFA DSE, Parks Victoria) for 
perceived mismanagement of national parks and, more generally, fuel loads. X also pointed out that a 
higher proportion of land burnt in East Gippsland was private land, so there is a lot of anger that public 
attention has focused on the Alpine regions. The suffering of people in the area around Wulgulmerang 
is felt to have been ignored. Murray gave me contact details for X, CFA Captain at Gelantipy. 
 
On Wednesday afternoon we arrived in Gelantipy to meet with X, a local farmer and [identifier 
removed]. He lives with his wife and daughter and together they run a cattle and sheep farm of 
approximately 1000 acres. We had a bit of a chat about his experiences of the fires, which burnt most 
of the trees on his property. He felt he was lucky not to have been burnt-out, as there is a lot of (now 
burnt) native vegetation on the hills surrounding his farm. X talked about why the CFA is ‘a dirty 
word’ in the area, particularly in Wulgulmerang. He said that locals were told that the fire would come 
through the area three days earlier than it did. He claims that there were CFA tankers in the area but 
that they were ‘pulled out’. He said that calling people to tell them that the CFA wasn’t coming was 
the hardest thing he’s ever had to do. 
 
Brigades from Queensland helped fight the fires and did a good job, but they lacked essential local 
knowledge. There was also annoyance at the fact that CFA directives were coming from outside of the 
area and therefore didn’t capitalise on local knowledge. 
 
The community has been a bit divided since the fires – people in Wulgulmerang believe they were 
abandoned and have not received much support (or recognition). For example, I read somewhere (I’ll 
find the reference) that people from Wulgulmerang had to drive to Gelantipy for public meetings for 
the Esplin Inquiry. This angered them, as Gelantipy was not affected to the same degree as 
Wulgulmerang. 
 
It was interesting to get some insight into the context in which the bushfires occurred. The school at 
Gelantipy was closed down a few years ago and there are very few young people in the area.  
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Someone has also been buying up a lot of land around the area to farm cattle, but apart from a few 
casual employees, there’s nobody on the land.  It’s very remote country too. As the narrow roads rise 
into the mountains, they wind through kilometres upon kilometres of farmland and bush. Gelantipy is 
hardly noticeable as a town (there are no shops, pubs etc., just a few houses that are barely visible 
from the road) and we’re not even sure of whether we drove through Wulgulmerang (according to the 
map we did, but we’re not sure).   
 
We asked X about the Esplin inquiry.  He said that Esplin was a nice bloke and did a pretty good job – 
with the exception of his comments about grazing. He suggested we speak to X at Wulgulmerang who 
is an old grazier and is still livid about the fires.  Apparently cattlemen used to travel through the forest 
throwing matches in areas where fuel had built up. He pointed out that this ‘patchwork’ burning was 
like that done by Aboriginals.  
 
The drive from Gelantipy/Wulgulmerang across to Benambra was spectacular. It took us almost three 
hours to drive 70kms on the steep and winding roads through the national park. We saw a couple of 
wild dogs: a car had hit one, while the other was found hanging from a road sign. X had said that since 
the fires the bush is a lot more open, which means that wild dogs can travel more easily through it. He 
lost $4000 worth of sheep and has had no success in hunting the culprit. DSE used to employ three 
people to hunt wild dogs in the district – for a while there was only one but now it’s back up to two.   
 
X lost a lot of fencing. To access government support to replace them, which he did, new fences had to 
be dog-proof. Dog-proof fencing is expensive and time consuming to put up, so the government’s 
contribution of paying for half of the materials was inadequate. While the fencing support was 
marketed as being for ‘bushfire recovery’ it was simply repackaged from support for building of dog 
fences that was already available before the fires. 
 
X also told us a story about how, after the CFA tankers were pulled out, the voice of what sounded 
like a young boy came out over the radio, saying that sparks were coming in the windows. There was 
panic and the tankers headed out to find him. One tanker had its windshield blown in and another got 
caught. No one knows where the call came from – to this day it’s a mystery. 
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Appendix 3.2: Letter of invitation 
 
[insert date] 
 
 
Dear [insert name]: 
 
The purpose of this letter is to tell you about a research project that 
will be conducted in the Gelantipy and Wulgulmerang area, 
beginning next month. It is part of a larger research effort that aims 
to improve bushfire preparedness and response throughout 
Victoria. 
 
We are from the Centre for Risk & Community Safety, RMIT 
University, which is a participant in the Bushfire CRC. The 
Bushfire CRC is a federally funded research initiative launched in 
December 2003 and was established to provide advice for 
improved bushfire management and community safety. Although 
part of the Bushfire CRC, the Centre for Risk and Community 
Safety is an independent research body and has no obligations to 
any Government department or land, fire or emergency services agency.  
 
As part of this project we would like to interview people from the Gelantipy and 
Wulgulmerang areas that were affected by the 2003 bushfires. We are especially interested 
in talking to people from your area because of the extent of damage caused by the 2003 
fires, but also to redress the imbalance in post-2003 bushfire research, which has focused 
on more accessible locations in Victoria’s north-east. The interview will take 
approximately one hour. 
 
The information you provide will be invaluable, as the collected data will be used as 
evidence to influence the way land, fire and emergency management agencies prepare for 
and respond to future bushfires. 
 
Any information will be treated confidentially and measures have been taken to ensure 
participants remain anonymous and that their views are not misrepresented. You will also 
be provided with an opportunity to read our report. 
 
Josh Whittaker will be contacting you by telephone in the next couple of weeks to 
personally invite you to participate.   
 
If you have any queries about the research or the Centre for Risk & Community Safety, or 
would like to arrange an interview time, please don’t hesitate to call us on (03) 9925 9663. 
   
We look forward to speaking to you in the coming weeks. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Josh Whittaker   Professor John Handmer 
PhD Student   Director, Centre for Risk & Community Safety 
 
 
 
GEOSPATIAL SCIENCE 
 
 
School of 
Mathematical & Geospatial 
Sciences 
 
Excellence in: 
• GIS & Remote Sensing 
• Surveying & GPS 
• Multimedia & Visualisation 
• Risk & Community Safety 
• Sustainable Development 
 
GPO Box 2476V 
Melbourne Australia 3001 
 
Telephone + 61 3 9925 2213 
Facsimile + 61 3 9663 2517 
Email: geospatial@rmit.edu.au 
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Appendix 3.3: Interview guide 
 
 
1. Tell me what happened to you and your family immediately before (when you realised 
you would be directly affected) and during the bushfires. 
• Preparedness 
• Decision to ‘Stay-or-go’ 
• Losses 
• Assistance received – official and unofficial (i.e. friends and neighbours) 
 
2. Why do you think the Wulgulmerang district was so severely affected by the fires?  
 
3. How did the community respond to the fires, immediately before, during and after? 
• Did the community help each other (same as usual, or different?) 
• Did the fires create any tensions or divisions within the community? 
 
4. As an individual/household, how were you able to cope with the fires, immediately 
before, during and after? 
 
5. Have the fires affected your livelihood?   
 
6. What should be done – in terms of emergency management – to improve things for 
others, or if there is another major bushfire here in the future?  
 
7. Are there any issues not yet discussed that you think are important to the way 
bushfires are managed? 
 
The final question should only be asked if it has not already been covered in the discussion: 
8. Tell me a little about yourself and what it is like to live in the local community 
• How long have you lived in the area? 
• What do you do for a living? 
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 Appendix 4.1: The Suggan Buggan schoolhouse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 1: The Suggan Buggan schoolhouse, est. 1865  
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Appendix 4.2: Ovine Johne’s Disease 
 
The following passage is taken from the transcript of a public hearing into ‘the prevalence and 
incidence’ of OJD, conducted by the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 
(1998) of the Australian Senate.  
 
BOLITHO, Mr William, Acting Secretary, Buchan and Gelantipy Branch, Victorian Farmers 
Federation 
 
HODGE, Mr Nigel Dougglas, Member, Buchan and Gelantipy Branch, Victorian Farmers 
Federation 
 
LIVINGSTONE, Mrs Health, President, Buchan and Gelantipy Branch, Victorian Farmers 
Federation 
 
CHAIR – Welcome. 
 
Mr Bolitho – On behalf of the members, I thank the committee for this opportunity to appear before 
it. My colleagues Mrs Heather Livingstone and Mr Nigel Hodge both wish to give evidence to the 
committee this afternoon. Heather will speak on her own behalf as well as in her capacity as president 
of the branch. The branch has prepared a brief supplement to the submission it made to your inquiry 
on 20 January last, and copies have been made available to the secretariat this afternoon. With your 
concurrence, Chairman, I propose to speak first on that supplementary submission. 
 
In drawing up the supplementary submission, we have drawn largely upon the experiences of two 
branch members who have been found to have OJD infection in their flocks, and also upon the 
experiences of their neighbours: Mr and Mrs Ray Murphy have destocked their property, but Mr and 
Mrs Peter Bowman have not destocked theirs. Without repeating the supplementary submission 
verbatim, I put it that it reinforces the basic points of our 20 January submission. The amount of 
compensation agreed by the executive of the VFF with the state government is inadequate by a large 
order of magnitude. In the case of Murphy and Bowman, if they destock and then restock, 
compensation falls short of the cost by between $120,000 and $160,000. 
 
It is the view of the branch that the resources of the DNRE [Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment] are inadequate for the task imposed. Neighbours of the Murphys were not subject to 
trace forward testing until a year after the disease was first detected. None of the members of our 
branch have been offered counselling or support, and only one has been advised in person by an 
officer of the DNRE of the infection. None of our members with infected flocks have been informed in 
writing of the infection, and only one has received test results, after making a formal request. In view 
of the quite serious legal, financial and social consequences of being destocked or quarantined, this 
would appear to be quite inappropriate. 
 
We believe that eradication is, at best, a doubtful exercise and that its implementation appears to leave 
much to be desired. Rather than weary you with material you can read and reflect on at your leisure, I 
will conclude by recounting the situation of Mr and Mrs Bowman as at this moment. This morning an 
officer of DNRE rang Mr and Mrs Bowman to say he was coming up at 11 a.m. tomorrow. He 
required signed copies of the forms provided by Mr and Mrs Bowman in respect of Ovine Johne’s 
disease. If he did not receive those signed forms, he would immediately impose quarantine on the 
Bowmans. It is, however, instructive to learn that Mr and Mrs Bowman received those quite complex 
forms on 2 February – a week ago. These forms have serious and massive legal implications for the 
Bowmans, the ramifications of which were not explained to them. 
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On 5 February 1997, Mr and Mrs Bowman wrote by facsimile to DNRE, seeking clarification of a 
number of matters in relation to these forms and the destocking process. The only answer Mr and Mrs 
Bowman have received is the threat to impose quarantine if the forms are not signed. It is important 
for the committee to understand that the imposition of quarantine would financially destroy Mr and 
Mrs Bowman. When Mr and Mrs Bowman’s flock was tested, they were advised by an employee of 
DNRE – one Mr Leo Coffey – that test results would be available within two weeks. In fact they took 
11 weeks. As a result of this delay, destocking would now take three years and not two, as this 
summer will be over before destocking is completed. Mr and Mrs Bowman have never received 
written advice of their infection, nor have they received their test results. They have never been given 
counselling or support. 
 
The Murphy and Bowman cases are typical of the whole destocking policy. In our view, it is 
confusion thrice compounded and appears, at least in part, to arise from the DNRE not having the staff 
or procedures to handle this major animal health crisis arising from the destocking policy. It is the 
view of the branch that the Bowman and Murphy cases fairly clearly illustrate the problems which we 
have put to the committee in our submission of 20 January. Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
 
CHAIR – Thank you. 
 
Mrs Livingstone – We have made a submission supplementary to that submitted on 20 January and 
both the submissions are now before the panel, aren’t they? This branch had no written information of 
substance until 30 October 1997, when information of the status of OJD and VFF policy in respect of 
it was received after many requests. The status of OJD and the VFF policy came as a complete 
surprise to us. We probably have not read papers and things like that as we should have, but there has 
been no written information from these parties. 
 
We had been made aware that OJD had infected some flocks in the Ensay Valley and we were very 
concerned and sympathetic towards the people’s plight there. We believed that it was confined to a 
small number of flocks and that appropriate compensation would be available to them. We are now 
appalled at their unfair treatment. This is really serious stuff. 
 
We were really concerned, but it was only from the rural press that we became aware that OJD was 
not confined to Ensay. On our own initiative, we then sought scientific and practical information, 
because we have not really had anything except sort of placatory stuff – it is hard to put into words – 
nothing scientific and nothing you could get your teeth into. We had a paper from the local NRE 
office. There may be one about but it was not very informative if you were in a serious situation. We 
became aware that Ensay was not the only place and we found lots of information from vets and 
CSIRO and CSL. I cannot remember all the places I have rung for information. This had not 
previously been made available to the branch. We had to seek it out for ourselves. We then realised 
that we had been exposed to OJD since 1980. This came as quite a shock; it was on a piece of paper 
from the local NRE office. That was the only really informative thing. We have not been informed, 
whatsoever, from New South Wales or Victoria. We buy our sheep up there every year and bring them 
across the border; our rams we buy, but sometimes sheep in early days. We feel that somebody is 
responsible there. If the service was working, we would be getting some information. 
 
CHAIR – When you say ‘up there’, do you mean New South Wales? 
 
Mrs Livingstone – Yes, and Victoria, because I understand that Victoria was aware of the fact that it 
had been diagnosed in New South Wales in 1980. If that is the case, those two states have a 
responsibility, don’t they? 
 
CHAIR – Yes. 
 
Mrs Livingstone – I would think so. I am not asking you a question. 
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CHAIR – We hear you. 
 
Mrs Livingstone – We believe there has been a lack of consultation with us and that a policy with 
such serious ramifications should not have been implemented without more information and not 
without detailed consultation with all sheep breeders. We believe the grassroots they refer to in the 
consultation took place with the Ensay group of people. I may be wrong, but this is as I understand it. 
We did not know of the OJD legislation until we saw a copy of the Hansard of the second speech. 
That Hansard – it is here – was April or May and we found out about it in October 1997. We would 
have thought that our VFF branch would have given us this information. The branch passed a 
resolution on OJD in October 1997 which is still valid because everybody still agrees very much with 
it. We have had several meetings and it has been discussed pretty widely. I would like to table a copy 
of that resolution.  
 
I believe that NRE have insufficient resources to handle this emergency properly. There has been a 
lack of counselling, information and support for affected farmers. Rural Victoria, on top of drought, 
now has a major animal health problem to cope with, and we feel it is being neglected by Spring 
Street. The Bairnsdale veterinary laboratory facilities are in existence. In an emergency such as this, 
steps should be taken to staff and fund it appropriately. As it is taking such a long time for tests to 
come through, it would seem that staffing is inadequate. Current delays in testing and in the provision 
of results are insupportable when stock and livelihoods are at risk. The trauma of destocking is 
devastating, and a well considered national approach based on scientific research is required, as is 
adequate consultation with farmers. 
 
Mr Hodge – I live at Gelantipy, and my stud is a victim of the Johne’s disease, and all the animals on 
my stud have had their heads cut off. I am speaking from a stud person’s point of view, and I am also 
going to back these two up. 
 
CHAIR – Would you like to make a brief statement now? 
 
Mr Hodge – I will make a brief statement now. The compensation for these people is not enough and 
it is completely inadequate for stud people. Talking about the shortage of staff in the DNRE, I will 
give you a practical illustration of that. They had found Johne’s on my property and, with the last 200 
sheep that I sent to the abattoirs, they informed me at 9 o’clock the night before that they were so 
short-staffed that they could not send anyone to the abattoirs to take samples from those animals. 
Therefore, we do not know how many more of my sheep had Johne’s because the testing was not done 
on them at the abattoirs because of a shortage of staff. They did not have the numbers of people to 
send to the abattoir to do the testing. So, how on earth do you ever expect to carry out an eradication 
program if they are going to do things like that? They are so short-staffed they could not even see how 
many sheep in my flock actually had it. At this stage, they have only found one which is confirmed. 
That is all that I have to say. I think these other fellows have filled it in pretty well. Thank you very 
much. 
 
 
 
Reference: 
Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (1998). Uncorrected Proof 
Committee Hansard. Reference: Prevalence and incidence of Ovine Johne’s Disease, Public 
hearing, Wednesday, 11 February 1998, Bairnsdale. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Hansard/senate/commttee/s1607.pdf (last accessed 30 May 2007). 
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Appendix 5.1: Weather observations at the Gelantipy Automatic Weather 
Station, January 30, 2003 
 
Air 
Temperature 
 
Relative 
humidity 
Wind 
direction 
Wind speed Max wind 
gusts 
Precipitation 
since 0900 
Time 
ºC % Degrees km/h km/h mm 
0000 20.8 55 10 13 17 0.0 
0030 20.8 58 10 21 24 0.0 
0100 20.6 57 20 22 24 0.0 
0130 20.8 41 10 22 24 0.0 
0200 21.0 43 10 18 21 0.0 
0230 23.0 34 20 22 28 0.0 
0300 22.2 43 20 22 24 0.0 
0330 22.1 42 20 21 24 0.0 
0400 22.2 41 10 22 24 0.0 
0430 22.0 40 10 17 21 0.0 
0500 21.7 39 20 17 21 0.0 
0530 23.0 31 10 24 28 0.0 
0600 22.8 32 10 22 26 0.0 
0630 22.0 33 20 18 24 0.0 
0700 22.6 31 20 24 28 0.0 
0730 23.4 30 20 22 24 0.0 
0800 24.5 29 20 22 26 0.0 
0830 25.7 29 30 21 26 0.0 
0900 26.6 26 30 26 33 0.0 
0930 27.0 27 20 22 31 0.0 
1000 26.9 29 20 15 18 0.0 
1030 28.0 26 20 21 28 0.0 
1100 30.2 24 20 15 22 0.0 
1119* 32.6 18 330 28 54 0.0 
1130* 33.4 17 330 37 65 0.0 
1137* 33.4 18 320 28 46 0.0 
1200* 32.7 18 320 37 63 0.0 
1230 32.2 19 330 39 57 0.0 
1231* 32.2 18 330 39 59 0.0 
1252* 32.5 16 320 33 55 0.0 
1310* 32.5 16 320 39 57 0.0 
1330 31.8 16 310 26 50 0.0 
1400 30.7 19 290 13 21 0.0 
1422* 31.9 16 290 28 63 0.0 
1500 31.5 18 320 15 21 0.0 
1530 26.9 35 180 22 33 0.0 
1548* 26.5 36 180 28 55 0.0 
1600 26.2 37 190 26 41 0.0 
1601* 26.2 37 190 28 48 0.0 
1630 23.6 48 190 28 44 0.0 
1700 20.0 70 200 18 30 0.0 
1730 18.8 81 180 13 22 0.0 
1800 17.1 98 200 21 39 0.0 
1830 15.9 100 180 17 30 0.0 
1900 15.4 100 140 13 17 0.0 
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1930 15.2 100 160 13 21 0.0 
2000 13.7 100 210 15 24 0.0 
2030 13.0 100 200 13 24 0.2 
2100 11.8 100 190 17 31 0.2 
2130 11.6 100 190 13 24 0.2 
2200 11.6 100 190 11 17 0.6 
2230 11.2 100 180 13 21 0.8 
2300 11.1 100 190 13 21 1.0 
2330 11.1 100 190 9 17 1.2 
 
* special report   
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Appendix 5.2: Residents’ photographs of the January 30 fires 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 1: 2pm on ‘Australia Day’, January 26  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Photograph 2: The fire front approaches Wulgulmerang, January 30 
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Photograph 3: A home is destroyed at Wulgulmerang  
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: A hayshed burns at Black Mountain  
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Appendix 5.3: Cattle grazing on roadside 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 1: Cattle graze the roadside in Gelantipy  
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Appendix 6.1: Coping with injured and dead stock1 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 1: Dead sheep at Wulgulmerang 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 2: Dead cattle at Wulgulmerang 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Photos courtesy of the Gelantipy District Bush Nursing Centre. 
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Photograph 3: A boy shoots injured sheep at Wulgulmerang 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: Residents dispose of dead cattle at Seldom Seen 
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Appendix 6.2: Personal support services provided by Lakes Entrance 
Community Health Service 
 
 
• Reception and direction of disaster victims to welfare facilities for necessary care, 
with specific attention to special cases including trauma affected people, unattached 
children, the frail and elderly, people in transit or in billets (when requested by 
response agency. 
• Provide immediate personal needs such as crisis counselling, grief and loss 
counselling, child minding and care of people with special needs. 
• Attention to minor cases of illness or personal concerns, facilitating access to 
appropriate care. 
• Provide ongoing counselling and general information to the public. 
• Referral to services of a spiritual nature. 
• Provide support and operational debriefing /defusing to workers and volunteers. 
• Provide general information to the public and gather information from the public 
about personal and community needs. 
• Initiate coordinated needs assessment and identification of affected people, 
particularly to identify vulnerable/special needs groups. 
• Provide outreach visitation services as required, to offer support and information, and 
concurrently make an assessment of people’s current circumstances. 
(LECH 2004) 
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Appendix 7.1: Wildfire Management Overlay 
 
 
(Department of Planning and Community Development 2007)  
